Morocco: Silencing the last dissenting voices

These crackdowns - and there's a long list of them - on young YouTubers living in Morocco who have openly criticised the King and his policies clearly constitute an effort to stifle freedom of speech and, in the words of someone close to the Palace, "to restore the hiba (a mixture of fear and charisma) attached to the monarchy and the State", as embodied by an increasingly unpopular monarch.

For years, Mohamed VI built his political outreach on his image and his actions: He was a popular young King who went out to meet his subjects: the media published pictures of him inaugurating local projects or handing out gifts in kind (sometimes schoolbags or baskets of oil and flour) to people chosen by agents of the Ministry of Interior Affairs in certain towns or villages, generally just before Ramadan.

Mohamed VI's growing unpopularity can be measured on social networks

He also appears on the official TV channels (Al-Oula, 2M, MedilTV… where the journalists look less like news anchors than like minor officials from the civil registry) where the monarchy is presented as the only institution "which functions, which is active," the only one which is worthwhile.

Compared with the King who is also described as "the only trustworthy player," the government, the parties or even Pparliament are seen as mediocrity, opportunism, and inefficiency personified - which is not completely untrue. In an old Orientalist cliché, he is often seen as the good caliph surrounded by evil viziers: "Lmalik zouine, lidayrine bih li khaybine" (the King is good, the baddies are those around him).

The King's speeches are no longer a hit

Today these strategies have run out of steam and the popularity of Mohamed VI is on the wane. After 20 years of absolute rule, the King's image has been spoiled by the extent of the social problems which many Moroccans must cope with every day.

The development 'projects' promised time and again in the monarch's speeches, those supposedly 'key' projects and promises of reform seem only to have benefited a few lucky ones, as the King himself has admitted. Not to mention the reform of the education system, the battle against corruption, the poverty and social injustices which have reached dangerous proportions for the stability of the regime itself.

The King's decisions are increasingly incoherent and unrigorous, which does nothing to improve his popularity

Besides his speeches which are "no longer a hit with the people", the King's decisions are increasingly incoherent and unrigorous, which does nothing to improve his popularity.

Omar Radi's arrest took place only a few days after the King had appointed a 'commission for development' chaired by the ambassador to Paris, Chakib Benmoussa. One of its members, Rachid Benzine, though an academic close to the Palace, posted an indignant tweet:

"The imprisonment of Omar Radi calls on us to reflect and reminds us that no model of development is defensible or viable unless freedom of expression and information are guaranteed. Without criticism and discussion of ideas, development is meaningless."

Whatever its actual extent (opinion polls concerning the monarchy are against the law in Morocco), Mohamed VI's growing unpopularity can be measured on social networks where thousands of Moroccans can express themselves with relative impunity. The fact, for example, that Aacha chaab has been heard by around 22 million Moroccans and received positive commentaries from millions of users speaks volumes about the ruined popularity of the 'poor people's king'.

Police force reminiscent of the Ben Ali era

In addition, young people's criticisms and mockeries no longer spare the King, whose speeches are targeted, and with good reason: He has absolute power, complete control. Moroccans know this. Which is why, at the outset of his reign, his words raised great expectations, and why they now cause such disappointment.

In order to stifle those voices that surface spontaneously, criticising the King outside of social networks, the monarchy relies on a police force which harks back to the Tunisian regime as it was under Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, with its judges who were anything but independent.

Read more: How humiliation is fuelling the Arab street

Since the shutdown, just 10 years ago, of Journal Hebdomadaire - a beacon of the Moroccan independent press from 1997 to 2010 - economic pressures and legal threats are continually brought to bear on what is left of the private media. On this plane as well, the role of the justice system, utterly in the grip of the Palace and the royal entourage, is absolutely crucial.

As the repression spreads, Moroccan justice has been blacklisted by the NGOs (both Moroccan and international) and described as the secular arm of the King and his milieu.

Not only does the monarch appoint the magistrates, but their verdicts are handed down in his name. He also chairs the Supreme Council of magistry.

In the political trials that are still being held in Meknes, Lâayoun or Casablanca, he is implicitly judge and jury as human rights defenders bitterly complain, tirelessly calling for a true separation of powers.