Algeria at 68: A transformed country, an unchanged regime

On 1 November, Algeria celebrated the 68th anniversary of the outbreak of its war of Independence which started in 1954 and ended 132 years of French colonial rule. The war was led by the National Liberation Front (FLN) and its military wing, the National Liberation Army (ALN), which became the People's National Army (ANP) after 1962. Since then, Algeria has evolved socially, economically, and culturally and with it, Algerian society. However, one thing that has remained unchanged is the very nature of the regime.

While it is true that the country embarked on a course of political liberalisation, ending the one-party system in 1989, it is beyond argument that this did not lead to democracy. Algeria is more a continuation of its pre-1989 iteration than any precursor to democracy. The country moved from outright authoritarianism to semi-authoritarianism and today, there is no trend toward democratisation.

To understand the persistence of semi-authoritarianism in Algeria, one has to identify the five pillars sustaining the Algerian regime, without which it would have crumbled long ago. The first is the military; the second is the co-optation of the opposition; the third is the fragmentation of civil society; the fourth is rent distribution; and the fifth is repression.

''Despite periodic changes and cosmetic reforms, Algeria, for all intents and purposes, has been run by a military-backed regime since its independence. This has been demonstrated time and again, including during the crises of the summer of 1962, the Berber Spring in 1980, Black October in 1988, the interruption of the electoral process in 1992, the Black Decade (1991-2001), the riots in Kabylia in 2001, the Arab Spring in 2011, and again more recently during the 2019 political crisis.''

The army remains the real locus of power. Indeed, the ANP is the most powerful political institution in the country and wields extensive influence beyond the confines of the military. It perceives itself as the essence of the nation and cannot conceive of being restricted to the security sector. The army takes major decisions and the government, its civilian façade, implements them. It rules without governing.

Despite periodic changes and cosmetic reforms, Algeria, for all intents and purposes, has been run by a military-backed regime since its independence. This has been demonstrated time and again, including during the crises of the summer of 1962, the Berber Spring in 1980, Black October in 1988, the interruption of the electoral process in 1992, the Black Decade (1991-2001), the riots in Kabylia in 2001, the Arab Spring in 2011, and again more recently during the 2019 political crisis.

Despite the army's enormous power, the regime had to allow the opposition to exist and develop to avoid having the army govern the country outright. Among the large number of authorised parties, several of the narrowly focused issue-based ones have, on occasion, caused the party system to fragment.

Multiple parties created confusion in defining the cleavages that shape the political spectrum. This hyperpluralism, accompanied by co-optation, led to the inability of political parties to form strong bonds with social groupings and the demobilisation of an increasingly apathetic or cynical general public.

This "particification of politics", and co-optation allows the regime to maintain itself and gives it a democratic façade.

In addition, the fragmentation of Algerian civil society has meant that the state controls its activities and the curtails any activism. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are characterised by a lack of financial and material resources, reliance on government funding, restricted access to international financing and a lack of national and regional networking. As a result, they are vulnerable to the government's strategies such as co-optation, litigation, marginalisation, scapegoating, and coercion.

Many CSOs that had the potential to act as watchdogs for the state's authoritarianism and corruption, eventually became unwilling or unable to criticise its policies and conduct.

In a country where hydrocarbons account for 97% of exports, rent was and continues to be the mechanism by which the regime satisfies its appetite, the wants of its ayant droits and loyal clients, and the needs of the populace. Resources are concentrated in the hands of the state, and the politico-military elite has had significant discretionary power in allocating those resources since 1962.

Algeria's rulers have regularly exploited the tax system, credit, licensing concessions, government contracts, and other economic policy levers to reward allies, punish opponents, buy social peace, and keep the system in place.

When the economic resources are lacking due to fiscal and economic challenges, the regime uses its fifth pillar: coercion. Its coercive capabilities are such that it does not need to resort to massive violence to suppress opposition protests like it used to do in the 1990s. The authorities demonstrated this during the Arab Spring in 2011 and the Hirak movement in 2019.

During the Hirak's mass weekly demonstrations, the state used low-intensity coercion, including arresting youth activists, opposition figures, students, lawyers, and journalists, closure of media outlets, and the wholesale sealing off the capital to prevent it from swelling with demonstrators from elsewhere. These tactics succeeded in stifling the last voices of dissent, impeding the Hirak, and consolidating the regime's rule at a critical historical juncture. But how long will this last?

Despite its limited successes, the Hirak raised awareness and motivated people to push for change. Furthermore, president Tebboune's and his government's lack of legitimacy will likely exacerbate an already fragile social contract. Purchasing social peace is no longer a viable option as today's youth, who have high expectations for democracy, openness, and respect for human rights. They are adamant about rewriting the rules, drafting a new social contract, and getting rid of a system that has kept Algeria in a state of permanent transition.

Dr. Dalia Ghanem is a senior analyst in charge of the Middle East and North Africa portfolio at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris. She was previously a senior resident scholar at Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. Her research focuses on Algeria’s political, economic, social, and security developments. Her research also examines political violence, radicalization, civil-military relationships, transborder dynamics, and gender. She recently published Understanding the Persistence of Competitive Authoritarianism in Algeria.

Follow her on Twitter: @DaliaZinaGhanem

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