How Khamenei's succession dilemma looms over Iran's election

On 1 March, Iranians will vote in two parallel elections: for the country's parliament, or Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the 88-strong body of clerics in the Assembly of Experts.

The parliamentary polls will test the government’s handling of the Gaza war and are the first elections since nationwide protests followed the death of Mahsa Amini.

But in the Assembly of Experts, a more existential question looms: who will take over the position of Supreme Leader?

The Assembly of Experts is charged with selecting the country’s next Supreme Leader when 81-year-old Ayatollah Khamenei, who has held the position since 1989, dies.

“Elections to the Assembly of Experts this year are taking place under the shadow of the impending leadership succession after Ayatollah Khamenei,” Ali Alfoneh, Senior Fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, told The New Arab.

“This not only explains why the likes of former President Hassan Rouhani were particularly interested in a seat in the Assembly, but also why the Guardian Council, likely under Khamenei's guidance, disqualified candidates like Rouhani and other undesirable elements.”

Khamenei has not publicly announced his preferred successor, but, as Supreme Leader, he has a veto on all candidates for the Assembly of Experts and the parliament.

“The moment Khamenei appoints a successor designate, all the power centres in the regime will shift their allegiance to the future leader,” Alfoneh added.

“I am expecting Khamenei to advance the careers of his preferred leadership candidates short of appointing a successor designate. What happens when Khamenei is no longer alive is the regime's and in particular the Revolutionary Guards’ problem.”

"Elections to the Assembly of Experts this year are taking place under the shadow of the impending leadership succession after Ayatollah Khamenei"

Who could be Iran's next Supreme Leader?

The coming transition will only be the second change of Supreme Leader since the Islamic Republic’s foundation in 1979.

While the enigmatic Ruhollah Khomeini’s ascension to leadership was all but predetermined by his central role in overthrowing the regime of the Shah and catalysing the revolution, Khamenei’s ascent to the position of Supreme Leader was more complicated.

Sectors of the country’s clerical body initially opposed his leadership, based on his lack of adequate religious qualification. The Assembly of Experts modified the country’s constitution to accommodate Khamenei because it did not allow anybody who was not an Ayatollah or Marja, a top religious authority, to become Supreme Leader.

Even Khamenei himself, at the time, only viewed himself as a “caretaker” Supreme Leader until a better-qualified candidate came along. He would go on to become one of the region’s longest-serving rulers.

Today, the country’s Shia clerics hold less power than in the past. They are blamed for many of the country’s hardships. Instead, it is the IRGC that holds most of the cards.

“The Revolutionary Guard largely perceives the Assembly of Experts as a nursing home, whose members will be wise enough to elect the Revolutionary Guard's candidate for succession after Khamenei. After all, if the Revolutionary Guard withdraws its support from the Shia clergy, whom the population blames for all the ills in Iran, their heads will roll,” Alfoneh told TNA.

For Ali Vaez, Director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group (ICG), the IRGC’s work of ensuring its preferred candidates assume the position of Supreme Leader has likely already begun.

“The IRGC is likely to engineer the succession process through the office of the current leader, so that the deep state would be able to preserve its vested economic and political interests in the post-Khamenei era,” he told The New Arab.

"Today, the country's Shia clerics hold less power than in the past. They are blamed for many of the country's hardships. Instead, it is the IRGC that holds most of the cards"

“The next leader is unlikely to be ‘supreme’ because he is likely to be subservient to the IRGC. As such, Iran would look like Pakistan or Egypt, where the military is the real power behind the veil.”

He said they are likely to try to install a Supreme Leader incapable of accruing too much independent influence. “Ayatollah Khamenei's successor is likely to be too old or too young so that he would have to rely on the existing deep state to govern.”

And, while Vaez called the Assembly of Experts’ process for approval of candidates a “rubber stamp” to support decisions made elsewhere, he added that “the system seems reluctant to take any risks and thus it is keeping a tight grip on who can run for the Assembly of Experts”.

While inside Iran discussion of the succession of the Supreme Leader is taboo, speculation is mounting around two key candidates: current president Ibrahim Raisi, and Ayatollah Khamanei’s son Mojtaba Khamenei.

Analysts at the DC-based Middle East Institute (MEI) suggest Raisi may be the IRGC’s favourite, because of his lack of political savvy and low education level. He would be a “useful idiot” under the influence of the IRGC, argue the MEI’s scholars - echoing Vaez’s suggestion that the IRGC prefers a weak ruler.

Negar Mortazavi, Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy and host of the Iran Podcast, explained to The New Arab that Khamenei’s son is unlikely as a successor because Khamenei himself wants to avoid looking like a king instigating a hereditary line of succession.

She said the situation is fluid. “It will be an important transformation moment for the Islamic Republic. It will have important political and even social ramifications. It all depends also on when it is and which faction has power when the moment comes. Currently, it is the conservatives/hardliners that have a total grip on power,” Mortazavi told TNA.

“The moderates (like former president Hassan Rouhani) and the reformists have been sidelined” - but she explained that this status quo may not last forever, citing various political shifts between moderate and hardliner governments in the history of the Islamic Republic.

A previous potential moderate candidate for the position of Supreme Leader, before Iran’s swing to the right, was Hassan Rouhani, who was in charge when Iran brokered the landmark nuclear deal with the US - a major diplomatic shift undone by the Trump administration.

While the Guardian Council disqualified him from selection, the fluid nature of the Iranian political structure and the timing of Khamenei’s death mean that candidates like Rouhani could yet have a role to play.

Another potential outcome following Khamenei’s death, said Mortazavi, is that not one person, but a group of people could replace Khamenei.

"The next leader is unlikely to be 'supreme' because he is likely to be subservient to the IRGC. As such, Iran would look like Pakistan or Egypt, where the military is the real power behind the veil"

“Once he dies, a leadership council of a few members could replace him. If there are a few candidates and none of them come out on top, they could all form a council of leadership,” she said.

“The entire process is obscure, not very transparent, not public, not very democratic, and not accessible to the populace - so this Assembly of Experts election is the closest that the population can get as far as any form of access or direct oversight.”

Chris Hamill-Stewart is a freelance journalist and writer specialising in the business and politics of the Middle East and the Islamic world. He speaks regularly on current affairs in the UK.

Follow him on Twitter: @CHamillStewart