"Three Iranian pilots were captured alive by Qatari forces after their Su-24 fighter jets crashed during the war," said General Mohammad Bagherzadeh of the Iranian armed forces, Fars news agency reported.

"Javad Salehi, Abdolmajid Dashtian, and Omran Behraveshian have been held by Qatari forces for six months," he said in a letter addressed to the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In the letter, Bagherzadeh called for their release, saying the pilots had not been allowed to meet or contact their families.

Last month, Iran's army said it had retrieved the body of Iranian pilot Majid Kazemi, who was killed during an attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar in early March.

Iran had previously said the other pilots were missing but news of their alleged capture was not publicised at the time.

The Al Udeid base in Qatar includes forward components of US Central Command (CENTCOM), as well the command's air forces and special operations forces.

It is the largest US base in the region.

The Middle East war broke out on 28 February, when the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran, which retaliated with attacks across the region.

Diplomatic efforts led to an April ceasefire, ending nearly 40 days of fighting, before the signing of a framework for peace talks in June, which later collapsed.

Iran and the United States have since traded fire sporadically, with fighting mainly centred in southern Iran and around the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

A lull in fighting has been in place since late July.

A new UN report detailing the use of the ransom did not identify the hostage or say who had made the payment.

Three regional sources identified the country having made the payment as the United Arab Emirates. The sources said that an Emirati citizen, as well as two other foreigners who had been kidnapped but were not referenced in the UN report, were freed after money changed hands. They did not explain how it had been done.

In response to questions about the kidnapping and ransom payment, a UAE official did not address the specifics of the case but said the country was unwavering in condemning and countering extremism and terrorism.

"UAE continues to strengthen its counter-terrorism efforts through active engagement in relevant international and regional frameworks, and through sustained efforts to cut off sources of extremist financing and counter extremist ideology," the official said.

UN sanctions committee discussed report last week

Most of the money went to fighters operating in the Sahel region, but some also flowed to al Qaeda in Yemen and the organisation's core leadership, which is likely to be in Iran or Afghanistan, the UN report said.

It was not possible to reach the al Qaeda affiliates in Africa and Yemen for comment. Mali's government did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the incident.

The two other hostages freed were from Pakistan and Iran, two regional security sources said, without detailing any ransom payments. The Pakistani and Iranian governments did not respond to requests for comment.

The UN report, written by a team that monitors al Qaeda and Islamic State on behalf of the UN Security Council, was presented to the UN sanctions committee behind closed doors last week, a source with direct knowledge told Reuters.

It is dated 10 August but appeared on the UN website the following day. The findings underscore how a single ransom payment can reshape the finances and reach of a militant network. With al Qaeda's strongest affiliates now in Africa, the cash injection has bolstered fighters who have expanded across several West African countries and challenged governments backed by Russian forces, regional security officials and military experts said.

The UAE has become an increasingly important partner for Mali's military-led government, expanding trade and investment links, and is also a key destination for gold produced by Mali's informal miners.

Al Qaeda, once led by powerful figures in Afghanistan and Pakistan and supported by influential branches in the Middle East, has evolved into a decentralised network whose strongest members are now in Africa. The UN report said that most of the "approximately USD50 million ransom received in 2025 for the release of a hostage" was redistributed among katibas – a term used to describe groups operating across the Sahel region that are part of a coalition of militants known as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

"These funds played a key role in financing the group’s offensive across Mali," the report said, without specifying how the funds were transferred or what they were used for.

JNIM has 7,000 to 8,000 fighters in Africa's Sahel region, half of whom are in Mali, the report said. The al Qaeda-linked Sahel fighters operate across territory in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger as well as Benin and Togo to the south, while helping support al Qaeda more broadly. By enabling the militants to pay for the arms, logistics and fighters needed to extend their insurgency across the desert region, the ransom gives them significant influence there, as well as within the global al Qaeda network, experts on the conflict said.

Kidnappings provide cash, undermine confidence in the state

The UN reports do not say how the UN experts knew where the ransom money had gone - they are briefed by intelligence services around the world and also obtain information from their own sources. Advances by JNIM in Mali this year, as well as insurgencies raging in neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger, have underscored the threat and influence of al Qaeda and Islamic State-linked groups across West Africa. In April, JNIM fighters allied with separatist rebels attacked Mali’s capital and a string of towns across the country, killing the defence minister.

Kidnapping has long been a lucrative activity for militant groups, but last year's payment dwarfs previous ransoms, which are generally in the range of $4 million to $6 million for foreigners, security sources said.

JNIM sees kidnappings both as a funding source and as a way to undermine confidence in state security, the UN report said. In June, JNIM issued a statement offering millions of euros for information on the whereabouts of Mali's president and top military officials.

The UN report said a portion of the $50 million ransom was allocated to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, a member of JNIM that is the official al Qaeda affiliate in North Africa.

This entity then passed some cash on to al Qaeda core leadership, as well as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a faction in Yemen, the report said.

Reuters was unable to reach those al Qaeda groups to verify the information or establish how much money had been received.

Iraqi political sources told The New Arab that Zaidi had ordered a review of the security and logistical situation in the town, around 60 kilometres south of Baghdad in the country's Babil province, which has remained largely emptied of its residents and under the control of Iran-aligned armed factions since 2014.

The government is examining mechanisms for regular security forces to deploy around Jurf al-Sakhar and at its entrances before beginning a process to restore state control.

Zaidi has also ordered the area to be reopened, its residents allowed to return and state institutions restored.

"The government is not considering storming the area, but rather reclaiming it through understandings and by gradually applying pressure on the factions," sources told The New Arab.

The move could coincide with the expiry on 30 September of a deadline given to Iraqi factions to surrender their weapons.

Sources said the government's plan includes gradually evacuating some faction headquarters in Jurf al-Sakhar, including those belonging to groups formally affiliated with the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and others operating under its umbrella.

They would be replaced by forces from the Iraqi army, Counter Terrorism Service, National Security Service and intelligence agencies, alongside some PMF brigades regarded as disciplined. "Zaidi wants to use the deadline given to the factions to surrender their weapons to resolve outstanding issues, including displacement," the sources said.

Twelve years of displacement

Jurf al-Sakhar was a predominantly Sunni Arab town and a stronghold of the al-Janabi tribe before the Islamic State group seized the area in 2014.

Iraqi forces and Shia armed factions retook it in October that year, but its civilian population was not subsequently allowed to return.

The New Arab's sources put the town's displaced population at around 180,000 people, many of whom remain scattered across camps and other areas of Iraq despite repeated promises by successive governments to facilitate their return.

The town has since remained largely isolated from the rest of Iraq, with even government and military officials facing restrictions on entering because of the presence of Iran-backed armed groups.

The issue returned to the political agenda over the past two weeks after Adnan al-Janabi, sheikh of the Janabi tribe in Babil, described Jurf al-Sakhar as still "occupied".

"The people of Jurf al-Sakhar consider 25 October 2014 to be the day the area was occupied, not the day it was liberated," Janabi said at a press conference.

He accused militias of refusing to hand security responsibility back to state forces and demanded accountability for "forced displacement and the crimes of kidnapping, torture, enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings".

Janabi also said residents remained unable to access their land and alleged that property, including water wells, had been stolen or looted.

His comments prompted the Babil Provincial Council and provincial government to file a legal complaint against him, accusing him of presenting false information and making statements that could provoke sectarian tensions.

Babil governor Ali Turki, a senior figure in Asaib Ahl al-Haq, rejected the return of Jurf al-Sakhar's displaced residents in June, claiming their land consisted of agricultural leases whose legal status had expired.

Sunni Sovereignty Alliance leader Khamis al-Khanjar responded by describing Turki's position as "an explicit declaration of a sectarian demographic change project".

The dispute now risks becoming part of a wider confrontation over the power of Iraq's armed factions.

A member of the Sunni National Political Council told The New Arab that Zaidi faced the challenge of restoring state authority over areas not under its full control "after disarming or expelling the factions controlling depopulated areas, including Jurf al-Sakhar".

The official argued that Iran-aligned factions were significantly weaker than in previous years and said the local population would support moves to end militia control.

"Zaidi faces a major challenge and must restore the state's authority in the face of gangs and rogue groups," the official said.

The event, "Bearing Witness: Tribute Panel for Anas al-Sharif & Gaza’s Murdered Journalists," was held at Palestine House and organised by Youth Movement Palestine.

It brought together Ahmed Al-Naouq, a Palestinian journalist at Palestine Deep Dive; Mariam Al-Sayeh, a journalist and media researcher at Al Jazeera; and Malak Tantesh, a Guardian reporter formerly based in Gaza. Abubaker Abed, a Palestinian journalist who evacuated Gaza for Dublin, joined remotely.

The panel took place as Palestinian media workers continue to face a devastating toll. The Palestinian Journalists’ Syndicate says that 264 journalists have been killed, 572 injured and 38 detained since October 2023, while 150 media institutions and infrastructure sites have been destroyed.

Al-Sharif, 28, was a prominent Al Jazeera Arabic correspondent whose broadcasts from northern Gaza made him an essential source of information for Palestinians and audiences abroad during Israel’s genocidal war.

He was killed on 10 August 2025 when an Israeli strike hit a tent used by journalists near al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. Five other Palestinian journalists were also killed in the attack: Al Jazeera correspondent Mohammed Qreiqeh; camera operators Ibrahim Zaher, Mohammed Noufal and Moamen Aliwa; and freelance photojournalist Mohammed al-Khaldi.

At Friday’s event, the speakers unanimously agreed – the incident was not murder, but a mass assassination.

Israel acknowledged targeting al-Sharif and alleged he was linked to Hamas. Al Jazeera rejected the claim, while the Committee to Protect Journalists said the allegations against him were unsubstantiated and called for accountability. The killing followed months of threats and public accusations against the reporter, who had become known for reporting from areas subjected to intense bombardment, displacement and starvation.

For Tantesh, who began reporting from Gaza in 2024 at the age of 20 and was displaced 13 times during the genocide, al-Sharif’s standing was evident in the response he received from ordinary Palestinians.

"I met Anas just once, just a few days before he was killed," she told The New Arab. "I was reporting about the situation at Al-Shifa Hospital in northern Gaza. His smile was shining the place and everyone was happy to see him, especially the patients, who saw him as the messenger who would deliver their suffering to the outside world."

Abed called al-Sharif "a giant of a man", describing his work as "very extensive, very thorough, very professional, indispensable, and instrumental in shedding light on the genocide in Gaza, particularly on the vast destruction and catastrophic famine levels in the northern parts of the Strip."

"He is the best in our lifetime," Abed told The New Arab.

Reporting and surviving

Much of the discussion focused on the impossible conditions confronting Palestinian journalists, who have had to report on Israel’s assault while enduring the same hunger, displacement, loss and threat of death as the people they cover.

"Our work as journalists was extremely difficult and exhausting," Tantesh said. "We were experiencing fear, hunger and displacement, just like everyone else in Gaza. At the same time, we continued reporting and risking our lives to tell the truth and share our suffering and our voices with the outside world."

She described the fear of being killed while working, and of the consequences for her family. "I clearly remember how scared I was of being targeted while working," she said. "I was afraid that my family would not be able to recognise me, or that they would not even be able to find my body. I was also afraid that my family and the people around me would be killed, leaving me alone."

Abed, who said he felt compelled to leave Gaza after receiving repeated threats on social media, likened the labour expected of Palestinian reporters to “the work of a superhuman”.

Yet, he said, journalists continued because of their attachment to their homes and communities. "We did it because we loved our homeland," he said. "Because we love our homeland, we love our people, we love justice to be served, and we want our human rights and dignity and freedom, as any other human being around the world."

Speakers also emphasised the dignity with which journalists such as al-Sharif worked amid extreme deprivation. They recalled the difficulty of preparing to go live while facing queues for bathrooms, unstable communications and shortages of food.

Al-Sharif, they said, often refused food aid himself, accepting only food offered directly by others even as people phoned urging him to eat.

A struggle over the narrative

The panel framed the killing of journalists not as a series of isolated wartime deaths, but as part of a broader effort to restrict Palestinians’ ability to document their own reality.

"The killing of journalists has been systematic," Abed said. "I’m so lucky to have survived, and I also feel sorry and contrite that other people, other journalists, have been killed. I feel a lot of guilt."

"It’s a tactic," he added. "It’s not some sort of aberrational activity. It is a tactic, and it is something that Israel deliberately did because [journalists] expose the unbelievable magnitude of what they have perpetrated in Gaza."

The speakers argued that the pressure on Palestinian journalists has changed over the course of the war: from threats, online discrediting and attempts to constrain live reporting, to the killing of media workers.

They said the attacks have also stripped Gaza of established reporters whom Palestinians had long relied on, leaving younger and less experienced journalists to fill the gap.

Mariam Al-Sayeh argued that the media’s failure was not limited to under-reporting mass casualties. "Mainstream media still cannot accept what happened," she said, criticising coverage that focuses on spectacular moments of violence while neglecting the conditions that make daily life unliveable, including heatwaves, deprivation and the continued deaths of children after ceasefires.

"Every day, the media chooses to ignore what is happening in Palestine," she said, as the speakers expressed outrage at the censorship reserved for Palestinian journalists who would refer to Israel's deadly campaign as a "genocide".

Al-Naouq urged journalists and media institutions to resist an audience-driven approach that prizes novelty over necessity. "We should not actually care what the audience wants, but what the audience needs," he said. "And the people need to see what’s going on in Gaza."

Abed was equally critical of political and media institutions beyond Israel, telling The New Arab: "What we are seeing is something that has been enabled by Western media outlets, by Arab media outlets, and by Western and Arab regimes. They have enabled all this. They stayed silent. Not all they stayed silent, but they funded the genocide."

On accountability, Abed said he had little faith in the international community, noting that al-Sharif had appealed for protection after receiving threats. "If you want to achieve accountability, which I don’t see in a complicit, rude world who has been standing by for the past few years, you go to occupy Palestine," he said. "You take the soldiers responsible. You put the Israeli military under the pressure and under the accountability umbrella. Other than that, this won’t happen."

A serious response requires more than condemnation. UNESCO called for a "thorough and transparent investigation" after the killings, while press-freedom organisations have called for answers from Israel and accountability for attacks on media workers.

"Do not forget Gaza"

Towards the end of the evening, al-Sharif’s will was read aloud. Speakers noted that many journalists in Gaza had prepared similar messages because of the persistent danger they faced.

"If these words reach you, know that Israel has succeeded in killing me and silencing my voice," al-Sharif wrote.

"I have lived through pain in all its details. Tasted suffering and loss many times. Yet I never once hesitated to convey the truth as it is, without distortion or falsification."

He left behind his daughter Sham, his son Salah and his wife, Umm Salah, whom he described as remaining "steadfast as the trunk of an olive tree that does not bend" despite the separation imposed by Israel's war.

Al-Sharif’s final appeal was directed beyond the journalists’ tent where he was killed: "I urge you not to let the chains silence you, nor borders restrain you. Be bridges toward the liberation of the land and its people, until the sun of dignity and freedom rises over our stolen homeland."

"Do not forget Gaza," he wrote, "and do not forget me in your sincere prayers for forgiveness and acceptance."

Piker was due to speak in January next year as part of the 2026-27 Speaker Series, which features talks, panel discussions, and presentations across the University's campuses, at Seattle Town Hall, on the radio station KEXP, and online.

In a statement, the university said: "The University of Washington is dedicated to the free exchange of ideas, including on controversial topics and involving provocative speakers. After Hasan Piker was announced as a speaker for the 2026-27 Speaker Series, there was a review of the process by which the event was planned. It was determined that the process for organizing this event did not meet the necessary level of rigor for University-hosted events in the Speaker Series. As a result, this event will not be held."

Piker, who rose to fame on streaming platform Twitch and on YouTube under the moniker HasanAbi, emerged as one of the more outspoken public figures over Israel’s military onslaught in the Gaza Strip, ongoing for nearly three years, and the plight of the Palestinian people in the face of genocide and occupation.

Piker has used his platform to repeatedly criticise Israeli military actions in Gaza, calling them a form of collective punishment, labelling the campaign a genocide, and also condemning the United States’ political and financial support for the Israeli government.

He has also taken to criticise US foreign policy and imperialism, President Donald Trump and the Republican Party, as well as some moderate factions of the Democratic Party, and has advocated for universal healthcare and better LGBTQ rights.

In response to the cancellation of his appearance, Piker said on X earlier this week: "I wish the Dems were smarter and didn’t let the rw [right-wing] groups be the only people who speak out against this clear violation of 1A, but unfortunately my position as a prominent critic of Israel stops them from using this moment to show GOP as arch cancel culture warriors."

The left-wing commentator was stopped by US Customs and Border Protection agents in May last year and questioned about his opinions of Donald Trump and Israeli war policy at a time when his criticisms of Israel’s war on the Palestinian enclave became more mainstream.

In June, the streamer was denied entry to the United Kingdom where he was due to attend SXSW London after the Home Office revoked his visa, along with his uncle, Cenk Uygur, the co-founder and co-host of the "The Young Turks" political show on YouTube.

Both Piker and Uygur said they were barred from entering the UK over their criticism of Israel. On the incident, Piker said: "The UK has revoked my visa as well. All at the behest of Israel. The West is betraying 'liberal values' for a genocidal fascist foreign government. Soon we will all become Israel."

This comes as the University of Washington has been the subject of Trump administration investigations over the years following the pro-Palestine campus protests that swept the US in spring 2024, in protest against the war in Gaza, and universities’ complicity in the onslaught through partnerships and other collaborations.

The university was investigated by the Task Force to Combat Antisemitism, a multi-agency task force created by Trump in February 2025 in response to the protests, which he deemed "anti-semitic".

Spain's government did not heed their warnings and took little action, they told Reuters.

A Spanish court ruling, published on 29 June, stated migrants could only be immediately pushed back from entering Ceuta if they crossed a physical barrier, specifying that anyone swimming to the enclave did not.

News of this ruling and videos of migrants successfully entering Ceuta encouraged more and more to try their luck.

Spain and Morocco's governments blamed the deadly rush of 29-30 July on misinformation about the ruling spread by criminal networks.

However, public and private warnings issued by trade unions representing border workers, seen by Reuters, highlight that Spanish authorities were warned weeks earlier that arrivals to the enclave in North Africa could escalate and urged to act fast.

Spanish authorities say 80 people died in the rush and Moroccan authorities said 14 bodies were recovered in their territory, putting the number of confirmed deaths at 94. Human rights groups say more remain missing and the number could be higher.

'An explosive cocktail'

Rachid Sbihi, spokesperson for Spain's Civil Guard police trade union AUGC in Ceuta, said no one could have imagined the scale of what eventually took place on 30 July.

"We understood the ruling would trigger more arrivals. The ruling, the criminal gangs, and social media networks were an explosive cocktail," he told Reuters.

Asked about comments that Spain did not act in time, a Spanish Interior Ministry spokesperson said authorities had studied various options after the court ruling before installing a floating barrier on the ocean on 1 August.

"This prior assessment and analysis work allowed the floating barrier to be put in place just 48 hours after the decision to install it was made, following the massive arrival on 30 July," they said in a written statement to Reuters.

'A legal loophole'

Reuters reviewed six instances of written statements and letters to the national government representative in Ceuta and the enclave's police chief from Spanish border unions calling for guidance and action from government after the court ruling.

"[The ruling] has opened a legal loophole which only well-defined protocols can close," the AUGC Civil Guard union said in an online statement on 10 July. Until a physical barrier is installed at sea, "the ball is in the court of those who must provide clear instructions to agents at the border every night," it said.

"Criminal gangs analyse every normative and legal change and adapt their routes and methods when they notice return procedures have become slower or more complex," warned police union SUP three days later on X, calling for reinforcement of their numbers and a "coherent and effective" immigration policy to avoid the ruling being exploited. In a letter to Ceuta's police chief dated 23 July and seen by Reuters, the union flagged "constant arrivals by sea with direct repercussions on staff which conventional police infrastructure is not conceived to handle" and called for the establishment of a temporary reception centre.

Spain's Interior Ministry, responsible for police, did not respond while the government delegate offered an appointment weeks later, according to spokespeople from unions AUGC and SUP.

There is no link between the rising arrivals before 29-30 July and the mass crossing that followed, a spokesperson for the delegate to Ceuta said. The delegate was unable to attend meetings requested by the unions but was in constant communication with the police and Civil Guard, they added.

Spokespeople for the police and Civil Guard declined to confirm what discussions were held with the delegate. Police unions said if any meetings had taken place, no fresh instructions resulted from them.

The pull factor

Morocco is one of several North African countries the European Union pays to help police its borders. Rabat received €152 million ($176 million) in 2023.

Morocco says it spends around €500 million a year on border control in the north and it steps up frontier checks when calls for collective crossings are detected on social media, according to analysts.

Although Spanish and Moroccan border staff flagged more crossing attempts from mid-July, more stringent measures in Morocco - such as bus and train station checks - only began one to two days before the mass crossing. Only when the surge of arrivals spiralled into the tens of thousands on 29 July did Morocco send significant reinforcements, according to media reports, testimonies from NGOs and a Reuters witness.

"They didn't do anything proactive. That strikes me as a policy failure," said Riccardo Fabiani, North Africa project director at International Crisis Group.

In Morocco, a senior government official said they had asked Spanish counterparts after the ruling if it would generate problems. They did not disclose what Spain answered. Tackling the consequences was Spain's responsibility, added the official, who declined to be named.

Increasing the numbers of security forces would have achieved nothing, the senior Moroccan government official told journalists on 3 August, noting the pull factor was too strong.

EU urged to do more to deter migrants

The border rush, and Madrid and Rabat's stance in the weeks before, raise questions about Europe's reliance on other countries to police its borders. Nevertheless, Spain and Morocco have praised their cooperation, and the EU said it could provide more financial support. The European Commission said in a statement it would continue to work with both Spain and Morocco to strengthen the border, and the two countries were investigating last month's events at the frontier.

Moroccan officials however have also stressed Europe must do better at deterring migrants in the first place.

Spain's government has set itself apart on migration from many peers, urging a more humanitarian approach and registering undocumented migrants to allow them to work and support its fast-growing economy.

"If Spain announces that it is willing to receive all immigrants, why are we forcing people to jump the fences and throw themselves into the sea?" Moroccan Justice Minister Abdellatif Ouahbi said this week in an interview with Spain's EFE agency. "Let's open the borders... If you are going to receive them, why are we stopping them?" (

The vote will determine who succeeds Khalil al-Hayya as head of Hamas's political bureau in Gaza after Hayya was elected overall head of the movement's political bureau in July following a contest with former leader Khaled Meshaal.

Sources told The New Arab that Amoudi is currently considered the most likely candidate for the Gaza position.

Amoudi was regarded as one of the Hamas figures closest to former political bureau chief Yahya Sinwar, who was killed by Israeli forces in Rafah in October 2024.

However, Hamas sources said Amoudi has also emerged, since the start of Israel's war on Gaza, as an advocate of a more pragmatic political approach.

According to the sources, he was among the most influential Hamas leaders advocating internally for the movement to accept the Gaza roadmap proposed in late July by Nikolay Mladenov, US President Donald Trump’s so-called Peace Council envoy.

They said Amoudi also supports strengthening Hamas's political track, including participation in Palestinian legislative elections scheduled for November.

He also played a supporting role in efforts to secure the October 2025 ceasefire agreement, whose negotiations were held in the Egyptian resort city of Sharm el-Sheikh.

The sources said that if Amoudi's election is confirmed, it would be an important indication of the direction Hamas's leadership in Gaza intends to take in the coming period.

Under Hamas's organisational structure, the movement elects a head of its Gaza bureau every four years, alongside leadership structures representing the West Bank and members based abroad. Hamas divides its organisation into three principal regions: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the diaspora.

On 20 July, Hamas announced that Hayya had been elected head of its political bureau, succeeding Sinwar.

Two Hamas sources told The New Arab at the time that Hayya secured a large share of votes from Hamas members in West Bank and Israeli prisons.

Meshaal, his principal rival and a former head of the political bureau, received near-unanimous backing from Hamas voters abroad as well as a portion of the West Bank vote, according to the sources.

The prospective Gaza leadership election comes as Hamas signals that it intends to participate in the Palestinian political process.

Hamas political bureau member Husam Badran said on Wednesday that the movement would take part in upcoming Palestinian elections "within the broadest possible national coalition".

He also rejected what he described as the "imposition of conditions" on factions and other parties seeking to participate.

At least 45 Reapers have been lost since the conflict began, according to The Washington Post, out of a pre-war US fleet of around 185 aircraft.

But defence analyst Stacie Pettyjohn, director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, told The New Arab that the scale of the losses should not necessarily be seen as evidence that the Reapers had failed.

"It is a notable portion of the active MQ-9 fleet. But there was a decision that it was worth putting the Reapers at risk to assist with targeting of mobile Iranian drone and missile forces," she said.

"They can loiter overhead for more than 24 hours keeping watch over an area and if they are shot down, no one dies."

The MQ-9, which can conduct long-duration surveillance as well as strikes, costs tens of millions of dollars depending on its configuration. Its losses during the Iran war could therefore represent well over $1 billion worth of aircraft.

Pettyjohn said the US Air Force had already been seeking for years to reduce its reliance on the Reaper as it shifted away from counter-terrorism operations towards preparing for conflicts with major military powers.

"They still are expensive platforms, but given that they were able to help US forces execute important missions without the loss of life I would consider their losses, which were for a good reason, acceptable," she said.

Even if the losses were judged operationally acceptable, however, the destruction of around a quarter of the fleet in less than six months represents a major depletion of a costly US surveillance and strike capability, raising questions over how readily Washington could absorb or replace losses on that scale in a prolonged conflict.

The Reaper was developed and heavily used during US counter-terrorism campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, where Washington largely enjoyed air superiority and faced little threat to the aircraft themselves.

The war on Iran has instead pushed the platform into a far more contested environment, exposing vulnerabilities that have long been understood, which raises questions about the Trump administration's use of them.

Pettyjohn said the vulnerability of large unmanned aircraft such as the MQ-9 to modern air defences has long been recognised.

"I don't think anyone ever thought that the Reapers would be survivable against modern air defenses," she said, pointing to Ukraine's early success with Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones before Russian air defences began operating more effectively.

"The US found a valuable role for MQ-9s against Iran but it entailed considerable risk. But in high-intensity modern wars there are going to be losses. Better they be uncrewed platforms."

The scale of those losses nevertheless underlines the cost of using high-end reusable drones in an environment where even unmanned aircraft can be destroyed in significant numbers.

The attrition comes as the US simultaneously expands its use of much cheaper unmanned weapons.

US Central Command announced this week the creation of Task Force Falcon Strike, its first multinational, multi-domain attack-drone force, which will operate one-way attack systems in the air, on the surface of the sea and underwater alongside regional partners.

The move builds on a broader Pentagon effort to field large numbers of inexpensive drones, reflecting lessons drawn from Ukraine, Russia and Iran.

Both Russia and Ukraine have deployed cheap first-person-view and one-way attack drones in significant numbers, while Iran has spent years developing relatively inexpensive systems such as the Shahed family that can be launched in massed attacks.

Those conflicts have demonstrated how lower-cost systems can impose significant military and financial pressure on forces relying on more expensive aircraft, missiles and air-defence interceptors, while also making battlefield losses routine rather than exceptional.

The experience has helped push militaries towards what is often described as "affordable mass": accepting that individual systems may be lost while possessing enough of them to sustain operations.

Pettyjohn said the Iran conflict had reinforced lessons already emerging from Ukraine "about affordable mass and the grim realities of modern warfare where there are many losses".

But she cautioned against treating cheap one-way attack drones as straightforward replacements for aircraft such as the Reaper.

"I think that they are complements. Cheap one-way attack drones are more like munitions. MQ-9s are intended to be used many times and fly many different munitions. That makes them in a different class of drone," she said.

Cheaper attack drones can also provide militaries with greater "magazine depth", allowing more weapons to be launched without rapidly exhausting stocks of expensive long-range missiles.

Yet their lower individual price does not always mean an attack will ultimately be cheaper.

"Cheap one-way attack drones provide additional magazine depth at much lower cost, but they do not offer the same capability as sophisticated missiles," Pettyjohn said.

"And you need many more of them to achieve the same effect, which means that their per salvo cost may be more expensive than high-end weapons."

Outside the former US embassy in Kabul, armoured Taliban vehicles took part in a parade, displaying flags and banners, and celebrating what the government described as "victory day" from Western domination.

Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban's interior minister, said in a video address that their return to power was the result of "morale, courage" and "divine assistance".

But he also made a rare acknowledgement of "issues and problems that may still exist".

International organisations and the UN say the Taliban have struggled to address the natural and humanitarian crises Afghanistan has faced over the past five years, in part because Afghan women are under severe restrictions.

The Taliban have also faced a string of assassinations of key regional officials in the country's northeast in recent weeks.

In late July, the Taliban's information director in Badakhshan province was killed in an attack later claimed by Islamic State. The mayor of the province's capital also died in an attack on Thursday, local media reported.

Taliban officials did not immediately confirm the reports.

Diplomatic inroads

When the Taliban returned to power in 2021 amid the withdrawal of the US and its allies, they promised to govern more liberally than they had in the late 1990s and early 2000s — a period marked by public executions, the sheltering of Osama bin Laden and the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas.

But those assurances quickly faltered, human rights groups say. The Taliban have imposed sweeping restrictions on women and girls since 2021, barring 2.5 million of them from secondary schools and universities, according to UNESCO, and limiting their freedom of movement.

Half of Afghan women now ‌leave their homes only once or twice a month, according to data released by UN Women on Wednesday.

The Taliban say they respect women's rights in accordance with Islamic sharia law.

Five years on, their government remains internationally unrecognised, with Russia the only country to have formally recognised it.

Relations between the Taliban and Pakistan — initially their most important partner — are tense, as Islamabad accuses Kabul of supporting Pakistani insurgents.

Many former embassies in Kabul have remained empty since the Taliban's return to power, including the US embassy that was the backdrop of Taliban celebrations on Saturday.

But the Taliban have made quiet diplomatic inroads, analysts say, as some countries weigh the limits of their influence in Afghanistan and the need to engage with the government.

The Taliban are increasingly pushing for arrangements with European nations that have been seeking ways to deport more Afghans. The government in Kabul is also using its geographical location at the crossroads of South and Central Asia and the Middle East to strike economic deals.

Zia Ahmad Takal, a deputy spokesman for the Taliban's foreign ministry, told Reuters that ceremonies marking the government's fifth anniversary were expected to be held in the capitals of Pakistan, China, Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkey and Malaysia.

"My hope for the future of Afghanistan is that we will move toward development, God willing," Najibullah Ghorzang, a 28-year-old shop owner who attended Saturday's ceremonies in Kabul, said.

"We defeated a great empire, and we will defeat them again," he said of the US and its allies.

Existential worries

The International Rescue Committee warned on Friday that Afghanistan's humanitarian needs had reached a record level, driven by droughts, the fallout from deadly earthquakes and the deportation of Afghans from neighbouring Iran and Pakistan.

While foreign aid budgets have shrunk, the number of Afghans in need of humanitarian assistance has risen by 3.5 million people since 2021, it said.

"Sustainable peace and prosperity require more than just an absence of conflict," Georgette Gagnon, a senior UN representative on Afghanistan, said in a statement.

"Afghanistan's future depends on building a society in which the rights and potential of all Afghans are realised."

Fatima, 28, has struggled to survive with her child. After the Taliban's return to power, she fled to Iran, where she could continue working as a make-up artist even as the Taliban banned women from such work in Afghanistan.

Last year, she was expelled from Iran and deported to Afghanistan.

"Every morning, I wake up wondering how I will cover my basic living expenses, and every night I close my eyes with worries about my child's future," she said. 

The report, published on 13 August and based on 19 interviews with survivors, relatives and witnesses and an examination of 14 cases between June 2025 and June 2026, documented severe beatings, electric shocks, mock executions, forced confessions, unofficial detention, denial of access to lawyers and deaths in custody.

STJ said the evidence does not point to a single, centrally directed torture apparatus comparable to Assad's vast detention system.

Instead, it warned that abusive practices are recurring across different security and armed bodies because the conditions that allowed torture to flourish have not been fully dismantled.

Bassam Alahmad, co-founder and executive director of STJ, told The New Arab that human rights groups had hoped some of the most notorious practices associated with the Assad era would disappear with the regime.

"We thought that some practices would at least stop after the fall of the Assad regime. One of them was torture, as well as forced disappearances and arbitrary detention," he said.

Alahmad, himself a former detainee, stressed that the scale remains very different from under Assad, when torture was systematic and widespread.

"I was myself detained. I knew how much - I would say more than 90 percent of people - were tortured. It was almost automatic," he said.

"Here, of course, it is not widespread like that, but the practice itself is ingrained."

STJ documented detainees being beaten with cables, sticks and rifle butts, subjected to electric shocks and threatened with execution. In some cases, detainees were held in unofficial locations, denied access to lawyers and moved between facilities without their families being informed.

From systematic torture to a recurring phenomenon

Alahmad described the pattern as a "phenomenon" - more than isolated incidents, but not a centrally organised policy comparable to Assad's torture system.

"The groups that were integrated into the government and the army brought this practice with them," he said. "It is not an order from the Ministry of Defence or Interior. It is not a practice coming from the top down."

He said the persistence of torture could not simply be explained by former Assad-era security personnel remaining in place, noting that Syria's new security bodies are largely staffed by members of armed groups that operated during the civil war.

Those practices were not confined to one faction, he added, pointing to previous allegations of torture involving Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Syrian National Army factions and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces.

For Alahmad, the central problem is impunity. "If you think that there is really accountability, you will not do this kind of work," he told The New Arab.

STJ also found indications that some detainees had been abused because of their communal or ethnic background.

Alahmad said the organisation had received reports involving Kurds, Alawites and Druze in which insults used during torture appeared to indicate a sectarian or ethnic motive.

"Some people were tortured and beaten because they are Druze or Alawite or Kurds," he said.

But he stressed that the abuses were not limited to minorities.

"There were also cases where Arab Sunni people were tortured, because there is a practice," he said.

Questions over accountability

The report comes amid scrutiny of detention practices after the case of Mohammad Ghamira, a former Syrian Civil Defence volunteer who was hospitalised in critical condition after being held at a police station in al-Haffa, rural Latakia.

Ghamira's family said he entered the station conscious and in stable health after being summoned over a financial complaint, but emerged several days later bleeding and seriously ill.

According to relatives, he was later found to have suffered a brain haemorrhage and remains unconscious in intensive care.

The Syrian Interior Ministry has announced an investigation into the incident, but Alahmad said such inquiries must be independent and transparent.

"I am afraid that this kind of announcement is more to calm down the people, because we didn't see a real investigation or attribution of the act to the people," he said.

"We are in the right direction that we do investigations, but we need these investigations to be transparent and independent."

He said accountability should extend beyond punishing individual officers and address how abuses can be prevented from recurring.

"Sometimes it's not about training," Alahmad said. "Sometimes it's just about a clear order that no one should be torturing like that."

For STJ, the danger is not that Syria has already recreated Assad's centralised machinery of torture, but that recurring abuses could become embedded in the new security order if they are tolerated or inadequately investigated.

The organisation called for all detention facilities to be officially registered, detainees to have access to lawyers and families, independent oversight of detention centres, transparent investigations into allegations of torture, and accountability for perpetrators regardless of affiliation.

One member of port security was killed, while two sailors were reported missing. Eight civilians, including two security personnel, were wounded, according to an initial toll issued by the government.

Colonel Majed al-Nuzaili, spokesman for the Yemeni armed forces, said six ballistic missiles struck Mokha port on Friday evening in what he called an attack on a civilian, economic and maritime facility.

"The armed forces will not allow civilian facilities to be turned into military targets," al-Nuzaili said, pledging a "deterrent and harsh" response to attacks on Yemeni infrastructure and interests.

The Houthi shelling also struck residential areas in Mokha, with Yemeni authorities reporting that four civilians were killed and several fishing boats set on fire. A military source told the state-run Saba News Agency that air defences shot down a Houthi drone during the attack.

Port officials said four ballistic missiles hit a quay where an excavator was deepening the navigation channel. Abdulmalik al-Sharabi, Mokha port’s director, said the strike appeared intended to disable the excavation work and damage its equipment, potentially disrupting shipping activity.

Mokha is a key government-held port on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, located close to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a maritime chokepoint linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and a major route for global commerce.

Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said the group had carried out a large-scale operation using ballistic missiles, claiming it targeted gunboats, weapons stores and military gatherings in Mokha.

Saree said the attack had caused destruction to military equipment and killed and injured "Saudi military mobilisations", without providing evidence, a casualty figure or precise locations. The Houthis have framed the operation as a response to what they describe as Saudi-backed military deployments along Yemen’s western coast.

The government-aligned forces and port authorities, however, said civilian neighbourhoods and critical commercial infrastructure had been struck.

Government and diplomatic warnings

A source in Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council said continued Houthi attacks on ports, civilian facilities, economic sites and international shipping lanes "will not go unpunished".

The council said Mokha was one of the supply arteries relied on by millions of Yemenis for food, medicine, fuel and other essentials, warning that continued attacks could deepen an already severe humanitarian crisis.

Foreign Minister Afrah al-Zouba also said the targeting of Mokha threatened a Yemeni "lifeline" and jeopardised efforts to safeguard shipping in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab. In a post on X, she accused the Houthis of seeking to undermine government forces’ efforts to curb arms-smuggling routes and secure maritime navigation.

"Bab al-Mandab will not become a tool for pressure in the hands of an armed terrorist group," she said, calling for greater support for government forces, navies and coast guards to protect commercial ports, cargo vessels and freedom of navigation.

Government artillery meanwhile targeted Houthi gatherings and movements west of Jabal Han, west of Taiz city, according to the Yemeni Armed Forces Media Centre, without providing information on casualties or damage.

The June trilateral framework, to which the United States is also a party, involves the disarmament of the Lebanese militant group and a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon's south, where it has occupied several areas.

It also includes the deployment of the Lebanese army to areas where Israel's military has pulled out, starting in test areas known as "pilot zones".

"How can you accept this ongoing humiliation of the Lebanese army, exposing it to bombardment and Israeli pressures, instead of acting as its protectors?" Qassem said in a speech.

In talks between Lebanon and Israel in Rome last week, both sides discussed which countries might participate in a committee tasked with verifying the Lebanese army's deployment in the pilot zones and clearance of Hezbollah weapons and infrastructure, a Lebanese presidency source told AFP.

"Israel is attempting to bind Lebanon to an inquiry committee that oversees the army's deployment, operations, and internal details. Where is the patriotism? Where is the dignity of the army that ought to be preserved?" said Qassem.

Hezbollah has repeatedly rejected the direct talks and refuses to surrender its weapons.

Washington on Tuesday announced it would sponsor a new round of negotiations between Israel and Lebanon in Rome in early September.

But Qassem reiterated the group's rejection of the framework deal and called on Lebanese officials to reverse it.

Lebanon's health ministry said seven people were killed "including three children and two women," in Ansar, where Aoun said "an entire family" had been killed.

The ministry said four other people were killed and 17 others wounded including a child and 11 women in Deir Zahrani, raising an earlier toll of two dead.

The National News Agency (NNA) said "Israeli warplanes carried out a series of airstrikes targeting the Ali al-Taher ridge", a strategic hill overlooking the Nabatieh area, also reporting Israeli shelling there.

An AFP correspondent in Ansar saw a destroyed building as rescuers working to remove human remains from the rubble, and a swimming pool clouded and grey from dust and debris.

Abbas Khalil, 60, said he was doing his early morning Islamic prayers when the strike hit.

"We were shocked... There's no justification for this," he told AFP.

An Israeli army statement claimed that it struck "Hezbollah terror infrastructure in the areas of Nabatieh and Ansar", adding that the move came "in response to an action by the Hezbollah terrorist organisation" against Israeli soldiers in the Ali al-Taher Ridge area.

Israel and Hezbollah agreed to a framework deal at talks in Washington in June, but Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said Saturday's "violations are a clear message on the negotiations process and American efforts aiming to implement this agreement".

Hezbollah said the Israeli attacks "will be met with an appropriate response", urging Lebanese authorities to abandon "the humiliating path of direct negotiations".

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said that those killed in Ansar "are not 'military infrastructure' and the women and children who were killed are not military targets", urging Israel to halt the "extremely dangerous" escalation.

Parliament speaker Nabih Berri, a Hezbollah ally, said the attacks were a call "to the sponsors of the negotiations and the ceasefire agreements to bear their responsibility... before it's too late".

Lebanon was drawn into the Middle East war in March after Hezbollah responded to the US-Israeli military assault on Iran in early March. 

Israel responded with heavy airstrikes and a ground invasion which have killed more than 4,300 people.

Violence has significantly decreased since the signing of a US-Iran memorandum of understanding in June on the broader Middle East war, followed by a US-sponsored framework deal between Lebanon and Israel later that month.

But Lebanon still reports intermittent Israeli strikes, which have caused casualties, and broad demolitions of civilian buildings in southern villages and towns.

'Humiliation'

The NNA also said Israeli forces detonated homes in the town of Bint Jbeil near the border early on Saturday.

The Israel-Lebanon framework deal includes the disarmament of Hezbollah, a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon and the deployment of the Lebanese army to the region, starting in "pilot zones".

Israel and Lebanon are to hold an eighth round of US-sponsored negotiations in Rome early next month.

On Friday, Hezbollah chief Naim Qassem accused Lebanese authorities of subjecting the country's armed forces to undue pressure by implementing the deal.

"How can you accept this ongoing humiliation of the Lebanese army, exposing it to bombardment and Israeli pressures, instead of acting as its protectors?" Qassem said.

Earlier this week, Israel's Defence Minister Israel Katz visited southern Lebanon, vowing to keep troops in a so-called "security zone" there and saying the Israeli military was "destroying the underground infrastructure" and "destroying all the houses" in the area.

When asked about Katz's remarks, a US State Department official told AFP that "a permanent military presence in south Lebanon is not consistent with the commitments made in the framework".

Also this week, Lebanon said President Joseph Aoun and army chief Rodolphe Haykal met visiting US General Joseph Clearfield, who heads a coordination group involved with the Israel-Lebanon agreement, to discuss arrangements regarding the deal.

Human Rights Watch meanwhile urged the United Nations to keep an international force in Lebanon after its peacekeepers' mandate ends this year, calling the troops "a crucial deterrent against attacks on civilians and human rights abuses".

• US President Donald Trump on Friday said he would "soon" declare the Strait of Hormuz part of US territory after Washington "finishes defeating" Iran. Trump made this statement during a political rally at a police academy in New York state. An unnamed White House official later clarified that Trump was joking, the Wall Street Journal reported.

• But Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi fired back on Saturday in a post on X, stressing that the "Strait of Hormuz has been Iranian, is Iranian, and will remain Iranian."  He added that the "strait will only be closed and opened under Iran's command."

• Trump has repeatedly said that the key energy waterway, which Tehran effectively closed at the start of the Middle East war, is under US control - an assertion the Islamic republic denies.

• Meanwhile, in Lebanon, an Israeli strike killed at least 11 people in the southern town of Ansar, ending a lull in hostilities that followed a US-brokered agreement signed in June. The deal calls for Israeli troops to withdraw from southern Lebanon and for Hezbollah to disarm.

The comments underscore the growing political risk for Trump as higher fuel prices collide with his campaign promise to lower energy costs, with Democrats already seeking to make the economic fallout from the Iran war an issue heading into the November midterm elections.

In a speech in Garden City, Trump said Americans who had to "pay a tiny little bit more for your gasoline" should remember that this was the cost of ensuring "a very evil country" could not have a nuclear weapon.

"What we're doing is a great service for the world, not only for ourselves ... and we're really doing a great job," said Trump, adding he would never apologise for attacking Iran.

Around roughly 20% of global oil and LNG shipments usually pass through the Strait of Hormuz and the potential for long-term disruption has pushed up oil prices.

"After we finish defeating Iran ... pretty soon I'll be declaring the Hormuz Strait a territory of the United States," said Trump, escalating his rhetoric over the vital waterway.

It was unclear how seriously Trump intended the remark or whether it represented a new policy position.

The remarks come as the Strait of Hormuz remains a critical pressure point for global energy markets.

Oil prices have risen this week, with Brent crude approaching $90 a barrel, while US gasoline prices have climbed to around $4 a gallon.

The hostage, a pilot working for a Christian missionary organisation in Niger, was handed over to eastern Libyan authorities late Thursday, one of the sources said. Libya's role in the deal has not previously been reported.

Haftar's involvement in the freeing of a US hostage reflects how he has carved out a position as a major security broker in the Sahel region, and has used it as leverage to curry favour with the Trump administration.

The missionary, Kevin Rideout, worked for the evangelical agency Serving in Mission and was kidnapped in Niger in October. It was not clear what, if anything, was traded in exchange for his release. One of the four sources said the Libyan side had paid a ransom, without providing further details.

The State Department declined to comment. The White House did not respond to a request for comment about Haftar's involvement. In a social media post, Trump said the US looks forward to welcoming Rideout home.

The authorities in eastern Libya were not immediately available for comment.

Reuters reported last year that Rideout was seized by three unidentified men on his way to the airport in Niamey and taken to the western Tillaberi region of Niger, where Islamist militants linked to Islamic State and al Qaeda operate.

The US has made recovering Rideout one of its top priorities in the Sahel.

The Trump administration lifted sanctions on top Malian government officials earlier this year in an effort to secure overflight access to the country's airspace to hunt for the pilot.

For months, officials believed Rideout may have been moved to Malian territory.

The details of Rideout's handover to Libyan authorities and his journey to Libya were not immediately clear.

Two sources said the recent effort to secure his release from the Islamic State affiliate was led by Cherif Ould Tahar, a Malian Arab businessman with connections to regional armed groups and smuggling networks. Tahar could not immediately be reached for comment.

Those who remained in Ceuta faced dire humanitarian conditions, lacking sufficient food, water, and medical care as civil society reported a failure to provide their bare minimum for survival. Yet political discussion of the human toll among those who made the journey has been overwhelmingly absent.

Instead, politicians praise lawless returns while headlines proclaim an “invasion” of Europe via Ceuta, ignoring that it was Spanish authorities who deployed military personnel and equipment against individuals in need of urgent reception.

In addition to obscuring what happened to those who entered or tried to enter Europe beginning from 29 July, the “migration crisis” discourse overlooks how the long history of European border fortification, externalization, and expulsions in Ceuta and beyond has given rise to such events. In fact, recent changes to the EU’s migration framework appear likely to entrench, rather than address, deadly conditions at Europe’s borders.

Deadly history at the Spanish-Moroccan border

Although situated on the north-western African coast, Ceuta (Sebta) together with Melilla (Mlilia) have mainly been under Spanish control since the 15th-century Portuguese and then Spanish colonial expansions. With disputed status, their current borders are the product of mid-19th-century colonial military victories by France and Spain, which simultaneously ruled Morocco until the mid-20th century.

Since then, the enclaves remain military outposts, where, until recently, tributes to Franquism still stood. After Spain’s inclusion in the EU’s Schengen space in 1991, it erected border fences around the enclaves, dubbed the EU’s “only land borders with Africa,” illustrating how free movement for EU citizens came at the price of others’ immobility.

Due to their history and geographical position, Ceuta and Melilla are integral parts of North Africa. Until recently, locals could enter without visas and goods circulated without customs duties, making the enclaves an economic hub reliant on movement between Spain and Morocco.

Although onward travel to “mainland Spain” has been subject to border controls and visa requirements for non-EU citizens, the enclaves have also remained a symbol of Fortress Europe. Because the formal Morocco-Spain border crossing is largely inaccessible for the vast majority of people on the move in Morocco, particularly given racial profiling of those with Black skin, mass crossing attempts into Ceuta and Melilla have long been one of the only means for individuals to enter the enclaves and apply for asylum and other protections in Spain.

Yet since 2005, Spain has implemented what it calls “hot returns”—immediate, collective expulsion of persons not even identified—at its Ceuta and Melilla borders. Despite their non-compliance with national, European, and international law, “hot returns” were codified in national law in 2015, though only for people arriving by land, as confirmed by several national judgments, including, most recently, the Spanish Supreme Tribunal.

To deter those seeking entry and to effect their expulsions, Spanish and Moroccan violence has become a decades-long reality at these borders, epitomised by violent repression in Ceuta in 1995, the 2014 Tarajal Massacre in Ceuta, and the 2022 24 June Massacre in Melilla. Despite tireless advocacy, families and civil society on both sides of the borders have not seen accountability or justice for the many disappeared and killed during these violent expulsion operations, entrenching impunity at the border.

Reflections of Ceuta across and beyond Europe

Developments at the Spanish border have reflected the progression of European migration practice and policy more broadly. After the increase of arrivals to Europe in 2015’s “summer of migration” sparked political panic leading to border closures, their enforcement across the continent has relied largely not on the dignified and individualized processing of those continuing to flee to the EU, as required by European and international law, but instead on their immediate and often violent expulsions—commonly called “pushbacks”—operating entirely outside any legal protections.

In effect, “hot returns” spread from Ceuta and Melilla to the rest of Europe.

The backlash to migration also triggered reforms of the EU’s common asylum policy, which have been in effect since June of this year. Although praised by EU leaders, the new legislation has been heavily criticised by civil society for reducing rights protections afforded to those arriving by attempting to relocate much of Europe's asylum processing to its external borders—if not to third countries—and accelerate returns from its territory. This includes via country-level evaluations of safety divorced from reality: Within these efforts, Morocco has been designated as a safe country of origin for nationals arriving in the EU—a move ignoring detentions and violent repression there.

Although political leaders discussed the Ceuta events within an “instrumentalisation” framing, neither the new and regressive Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation to which this refers, nor any of the EU’s migration reforms, appear to have been applied in Spain’s response—confirming the long-standing criticism about their unworkable nature.

Indeed, one key focus of the reforms is this crisis regulation, which enables member states to derogate from ordinarily applicable asylum procedures in situations of so-called “instrumentalisation of migrants by a third country or a hostile non-state actor with the aim of destabilising” the EU or its member states. An emphasis on “instrumentalisation” traces back to Turkey’s 2020 opening of its border with Greece; in 2021, Belarus’s encouragement of asylum-seekers to travel to its borders with Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania was familiarly dubbed a “hybrid attack” on the EU by European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen.

As in Ceuta this past week, both instances resulted in heavy militarisation, deaths, and mistreatment of those who arrived at Europe’s borders, with little evidence of how Europe had been harmed other than through collective hysteria.

The repeated, deadly spectacle of border violence framed and responded to as an attack on Europe conceals an unacknowledged tension in the EU’s migration management logic: While advancing claims that the EU can be threatened by neighbouring states “instrumentalising” migration, the EU has simultaneously deepened its migration cooperation with neighbouring countries. This is particularly the case with countries in Africa, where funding is provided for increased border controls and returns in line with its own deterrence and expulsion policies.

Morocco is no exception, as affirmed by von der Leyen’s 3 August description that it remains an “important strategic partner” after the Ceuta events. Through these externalisation efforts, it is the EU that has been instrumentalising migration control, disregarding human lives, in exchange for development aid or other assistance to third countries—setting the stage for its further politicisation and abuse.

Last week’s events in Ceuta lay bare the failure of EU policies to reckon both with the continued human necessity of movement for survival and the local realities of communities on and around its borders. The history of its external borders with Morocco already made this clear. Yet they have further highlighted how the EU’s newest migration reforms remain both irrational, providing no solutions while fuelling human-made crises, and unsustainable, lacking the most basic humanity.

Hanaa Hakiki directs the Border Justice team at the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR).

Delphine Rodrik is a senior legal advisor in ECCHR’s Border Justice team, where they support litigation challenging human rights violations at Europe’s borders.

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

Iraqi Oil Minister Bassem Mohammed Khudair told a press conference that "exports since the beginning of the month have reached a rate of two million barrels" per day, for a total of around 26 million barrels.

He said the daily rate had been achieved "for the first time since the crisis began" on 28 February after US-Israeli strikes on Iran, which retaliated by blocking the waterway crucial for global oil and gas trade.

Before the war, Iraq produced around four million barrels per day, and exported an average of 105 million barrels per month, mostly from its Basra oil terminal via Hormuz.

Ali Nizar, the head of Iraq's State Organisation for Marketing of Oil (SOMO), said in a TV interview last week that Iraq exported in July "35.5 to 37 million barrels" via Hormuz.

Another seven million barrels were exported through a pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan.

According to SOMO data, Iraq exported via several routes just over 32 million barrels of crude oil in May and June, including more than 20 million barrels from its southern port.

Iraq, an OPEC founding member, was forced to halt production in most of its oil fields during the war as reservoirs filled up.

Due to the waterway disruption, it began exporting crude using tanker trucks through Syria, as well as the pipeline to Turkey.

The National Observatory for Protection from Digital Violence, a non-governmental organisation, recently said it was deeply concerned about the increase in attacks in the digital space as the elections approach.

In a statement, it stressed that these practices violate women's rights and the principle of equal opportunities in electoral competition.

The observatory said monitoring and follow-up operations during July and the beginning of August had revealed multiple forms of targeted attacks against several female candidates.

These ranged from insults, defamation and slander and violations of privacy and dignity to the use of digital media in organised campaigns aimed at damaging their reputations and presence in the public sphere.

The observatory considered this escalation a matter of serious concern, as it is occurring during the candidate selection process and amid a context in which women's participation and access to decision-making positions remain below the expectations of parity and equality.

It highlighted that political and digital violence against women poses a direct threat that limits the exercise of their constitutional rights and spreads intimidation messages that deter women from engaging in political work and public life.

According to the observatory, the 2026 elections will be the first major test of tougher penalties introduced under Organic Law No. 53.25. Article 51 bis criminalises the misuse of social media, digital platforms and artificial intelligence to spread false information or fabricate content intended to defame candidates or undermine the integrity of elections.

Women’s political participation in Morocco is underpinned by an explicit constitutional commitment dating to 2011, when the constitution enshrined the principle of gender parity.

It stated that men and women enjoy equal civil, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental rights and freedoms.

Morocco's international commitments also require it to uphold the principle of equality, while the state has established an Authority for Parity and Combating All Forms of Discrimination to support that aim.

Despite efforts made in recent years to advance women's rights, Moroccan women's political and social participation faces real challenges.

Despite progress in recent years, women remain underrepresented in parliament, with Morocco ranking 102nd globally and falling below the international average of 27.5 percent.

As Morocco prepares for the election, the Ministry of Solidarity, Social Integration and Family launched a campaign on 18 May in partnership with UN Women and the United Nations Population Fund, with support from the Canadian Embassy in Rabat.

The campaign, which ran until 5 June, was held under the slogan "Yedek fi yedya ncharco f'tanmia", meaning "Your hand in mine; let's participate in development". It covered all regions of the country, aiming to promote values of equality and parity, raise social awareness and reinforcing the importance of the presence of women in managing public affairs.

It also aims to encourage young women to actively engage in political, party and institutional work.

Just weeks before the Sept. 23, 2026, election, National Observatory for Protection from Digital Violence President Bouchra Abdou expressed her regret over the escalation of political and digital violence currently being practised against female candidates in the upcoming legislative elections.

She explained that there are social perceptions that reject women becoming candidates and leaders and occupying the top positions on electoral lists.

Abdou told The New Arab that Moroccan political parties still do not trust women due to the absence of parity.

She said they also appear unable to stand up to the digital violence practised against female candidates in the upcoming elections.

She said women are often left to face online violence, insults, abuse, bullying and attacks on their reputation and that of their families, without political parties publicly condemning such behaviour.

"Today, female candidates in the upcoming legislative elections must be strong and have the courage to file complaints with the relevant authorities to stop the advance of the violence they are facing," she added.

"Digital violence pushes female candidates to withdraw and refuse to contest the electoral battle in its broad form due to attacks on their honour, reputation and families, and on their public and private lives, which leaves them despairing of political work."

She also stressed the need for political parties to adopt the cases of female candidates and stand firmly against all violence and bullying practised against them.

"It is time for women to receive the trust of their parties and for the principle of parity and equality to be enshrined during next year's local elections, as this remains important for women to reach political decision-making positions."

The women's rights activist said a campaign of political and digital violence in July and early August had targeted 10 candidates from different parties.

Political science researcher Sharifa Lmouir said in an interview with The New Arab that the problem extended beyond election periods. "The phenomenon of political violence against women is not only linked to electoral stages but is also the result of stereotypes and deeply rooted prejudices in our society."

 "This political violence is an extension of the social violence that women experience within society, given that it involves the same practices and the same image in which it manifests itself."

Lmouir said that political violence in the digital space against women primarily aims to restrict them within the political scene and attempt to force them to withdraw from exercising their constitutional rights.

She pointed out that all this violence directed against women, whether physical, psychological or sexual, is fundamentally aimed at discouraging them from political engagement and attempting to deter them from participating in political life within society.

"Although the Moroccan legislature is trying to limit this phenomenon through several mechanisms it has adopted, they remain, in my view, insufficient, particularly as the phenomenon is widespread in society.," she added.

"Therefore, an awareness-raising approach targeting Moroccan citizens of all age groups must be adopted to reduce stereotypes targeting women in general."

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. 
 

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Some soldiers took to social media to post themselves wearing military garb and carrying equipment in airplanes, boarding and landing in locations that weren’t disclosed, with the Ugandan flag visible on their uniform. The troops posted the videos with the caption "Gaza here we come," in reference to their deployment to the Strip.

The videos have sparked backlash online given the controversy surrounding the International Stabilisation Force, which is part of US President Donald Trump’s so-called peace plan for the Gaza Strip.

The ISF is a UN-mandated peacekeeping force outlined in the wider peace plan for Gaza, where Israel has waged a vicious military onslaught and genocide for almost three years.

Activists took to social media to express anger at the soldiers leaving for the war-battered territory, where over 73,300 Palestinians have been killed, with thousands more unaccounted for.

One user labelled them "the scum of the earth", while another said they were "colonial troops".

In a post on X, anthropologist and author Shabana Mir called them "Ugandan mercenaries for genocide". Fellow writer Carolyn Hinds compared this deployment with that of troops from African countries to Haiti under a UN-backed mission aimed at curbing gang violence, and said: "They sent Kenyans and Ghanaians to Haiti as proxies under American mercenaries, and now they are sending Ugandans to Gaza as proxies under the IOF and Israeli government. Black African nations and people doing the dirty work of white imperialists are forever shameful."

The ISF is reportedly expected to help with security, train a Palestinian police force, and oversee the demilitarisation and rebuilding of Gaza.

Several nations have agreed to send their troops to Gaza as part of the plan, including Kazakhstan, Morocco, Indonesia, and Kosovo.

Some 30 Moroccan troops have already reportedly entered Gaza, in what was the Moroccan army's first field tour of the areas where soldiers are expected to operate.

Jordan and Egypt, which have mediated throughout peace talks between Israel and Hamas, said they would train police forces in the Palestinian territory, but declined joining the ISF.

Uganda was specifically requested to participate in the force, with the country’s parliament authorising the deployment last month.

Opposition politicians in the East African country have raised concerns over how "neutral" Ugandan troops will be in Gaza, given the government's strong pro-Israeli statements amid its ongoing military operations in the Palestinian territory and Iran.

The cab becomes a route into the driver’s life, with stops chosen by them - whether a restaurant, neighbourhood, place of worship or somewhere tied to a personal memory.

Rahma, best known for New York-based web series including Subway Takes, follows along. Previous episodes have centred on yellow-cab drivers in New York; the new Damascus instalment is the first set outside the city.

In the latest episode, published this week, Rahma lands in Damascus and meets Bashar, a local driver who takes him through the Old City, the Umayyad Mosque, Hanania Church, food stops and eventually Jobar, an eastern district devastated during the Syrian civil war.

The episode is warm, funny and, at times, difficult to watch. It also features illustrations by Syrian-American artist Rama Duwaji, wife of New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani, whose drawings appear between scenes and bring another Syrian perspective to the story.

The film’s local producer, Eyad Nemer, said he wanted the episode to complicate the way Syria is usually presented to foreign audiences.

"I think one of the biggest assumptions is that Damascus is only a city defined by war," he told The New Arab. "Of course, the war is part of our story - and we can’t pretend it didn’t happen. But Damascus is also a living city: people fall in love, laugh, sing, eat together, live together, make plans, and worry about completely ordinary things."

"I wanted people to see that side of Damascus, not to ignore what happened, but to understand that there’s a whole life that exists beyond the headlines."

A city of jokes and history

Much of the episode works because it does not attempt to make Damascus look polished or uncomplicated.

Rahma and Bashar get lost in the Old City’s narrow lanes. At one point Bashar says, "The cat lost its son," a Syrian Arabic expression used to describe being thoroughly lost - appropriate in a place where even someone familiar with the streets can lose their way.

There are food debates, long breakfasts and constant joking between the pair. Bashar moves easily between historical commentary, personal stories and teasing Rahma. The details are often ordinary, but they do the work of making the city feel lived in rather than presented as a backdrop.

Bashar describes the Old City as a "romantic city". He also speaks of its durability.

"This city has magnetic," he says. "I have visited Dubai, Manama, Amman, Beirut - I did not find any city like Damascus. I don’t know the secret about this city, maybe because it’s the oldest city in the world. In spite of all wars, earthquakes, disaster, it’s still alive. Damascus doesn’t die."

The film also makes room for uncertainty and trauma.

At the underground Hanania church, Bashar speaks about religion and how the war affected his faith. Referring to what Syrians saw during the war, he recalls the image of a one-year-old child covered in blood on the streets of Damascus. It is one of the episode’s most serious moments, and it sits sharply alongside its more playful scenes.

Finding Bashar

Eyad said the production did not find Bashar by chance. He joined a Facebook group for drivers, contacted more than 200 people and conducted between 50 and 60 interviews before choosing him.

Bashar’s story, he said, "touched me deeply".

The decision helps explain why the episode has a different feel from a standard travel video. Bashar is not simply a guide pointing out landmarks. He is the person through whom the city is shown: its humour, its history, its hospitality and its unresolved pain.

That pain comes into focus in Jobar, which Bashar calls "a city of ghosts".

The district, on Damascus’s eastern edge, was held by opposition fighters for much of the war and was subjected to repeated government assaults before it was retaken in 2018. Large parts of it were destroyed, and residents remain unable to return or rebuild at scale.

"Every time I visit Jobar, I cry," Eyad said. "It’s super difficult to show the area there, because there’s nothing there, really nothing."

Syria’s war began in 2011 following the Assad government’s violent repression of protests. It killed hundreds of thousands of people, displaced millions and transformed entire parts of the capital. Bashar al-Assad was ousted in December 2024, after a rapid offensive by opposition forces entered Damascus and ended his family’s decades-long rule.

Beyond war

The risk for any programme trying to show Syria beyond war is that it might appear to minimise the scale of what happened. The episode largely avoids this by allowing both realities to stand: Damascus as a place of jokes, meals, romance and religious history, and Damascus as a place marked by loss.

"I think the episode worked really well because it felt honest," Eyad said. "We weren’t trying to create a perfect picture of Damascus, and we weren’t trying to make it only the war either. We just wanted to show the city through the people who actually live there, you know, and I think that really connected with the people."

The response from Syrians has been especially important to him.

"The reaction we’ve had since the episode came out has been amazing – especially from Syrians," he said. "I’ve had people telling me that they recognise parts of their own lives and their own Damascus in the episode and, for me, that’s probably the biggest sign that we did something right."

"We managed to tell a story that could work for someone watching from the other side of the world."

Near the end, Bashar asks Rahma what he saw during his two days in Damascus.

"I saw nothing but beauty," Rahma replies.

"You saw the Syrian people," Bashar says.

A potential environmental disaster is already unfolding off Oman outside of the Strait of Hormuz, where a grounded tanker, the Caroline Bezengi, is leaking Russian crude oil in a protected marine area and has created a massive slick, some estimates put at 2,000 square km.

The Caroline Bezengi incident has not been linked to the Iran war.

The two latest slicks are inside the Gulf.

Near dolphoned-shaped island

One slick has appeared off the southern tip of Qeshm Island, the large dolphin-shaped island in the Strait of Hormuz close to Iran’s coast, pictures from Copernicus’s ​Sentinel-2 satellites showed.

Wim Zwijnenburg, an environmental open-source researcher at Dutch peace organisation PAX, said the dark colour in parts of the slick indicated it was heavy fuel oil, while a lighter diluted slick stretched around 160 km.

A dark, bubbling liquid was spotted washing ashore on the beaches of Suza on Qeshm Island, contrasting with the turquoise water surrounding it, in a video posted on August 11 and verified by Reuters.

"This is the biggest one that I've seen in recent months, really since the conflict between Iran and the U.S. began," said John Amos, CEO of SkyTruth, which uses satellite imagery to detect oil spills, calling it a "a major incident".

A second slick was spotted near the smaller Sirri Island in the centre of the Gulf about 100 km southwest of Qeshm and home to some Iranian offshore oil and gas production, satellite showed.

The satellite imagery of Qeshm Island was taken on 10 August and that of Sirri Island on 13 August.

Dry bulk carrier was attacked

The Qeshm Island slick likely stemmed from a leak from the Minoan Pioneer, a Liberia-flagged dry bulk ship, said Samir Madani, co-founder of monitoring service TankerTrackers.com.

The Minoan Pioneer was hit by an unknown projectile close to Oman’s coast in a suspected Iranian attack while sailing through the Strait of Hormuz on 3 August and one seafarer went missing, maritime security sources said.

The same leak likely also affected Qeshm Island, one maritime security source told Reuters.

A spokesperson for Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Esmaeil Baqaei, said in a post on X that oil pollution from the Gulf had reached Qeshm Island and that preliminary evidence "indicates a foreign bulk carrier as the source".

Reuters could not independently confirm the cause of either slick nor identify the substances involved.

A source involved in the salvage operation for the Minoan Pioneer, who declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of matter, told Reuters on Friday that a tugboat dispatched to secure the grounded vessel could not approach it due to issues related to obtaining permission from Iranian authorities.

The Iranian Mission in Geneva did not respond to a Reuters request ​for immediate comment.

The conflict in the region had complicated efforts to assess and clean up spills in the Gulf, said Brian Barnes, a satellite oceanographer and research assistant professor at the University of South Florida.

"The longer that the oil is leaking into an environment, the more it can spread out and cause damage to ecosystems, coastlines." 

In Qusra, south of Nablus, settlers remained near Palestinian homes for a sixth consecutive day, while Israeli forces prevented foreign and Israeli solidarity activists from reaching besieged families with water and other basic supplies.

The siege has drawn unusually sharp criticism from Washington, with White House officials pressing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to publicly condemn the settlers after learning that one of the affected homes belongs to a Palestinian American.

US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee -- a supporter of the settler movement -- described those responsible as "Israeli terrorists" and their actions as "criminal", while France condemned what it called the "occupation" of Palestinian homes and called on Israeli authorities to arrest and prosecute those responsible.

Amid the criticism, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz ordered the military to prepare a plan to transfer civilian law enforcement in the occupied West Bank to the police.

"The army's role is to combat Palestinian terrorism ... and not chase hilltop youth," Katz said, using a term commonly applied to hardline young settlers involved in establishing unauthorised outposts and attacks on Palestinians.

Under the proposal, Israel Police would establish a dedicated force to handle civilian matters in the occupied territory.

Settlers returned on Friday morning to an outpost near Palestinian homes in Qusra, erecting a canopy in the presence of soldiers. Border Police later dismantled it, but the settlers remained nearby.

The confrontation has centred on the Ras al-Ain area west of Qusra, where settlers established an outpost between three Palestinian homes belonging to the families of brothers Rizq and Youssef Hassan and Qusay Abu Rida.

Residents have been prevented from moving freely and accessing basic necessities, while settlers last month cut water and electricity supplies to three neighbouring homes, according to the UN Human Rights Office.

Mohammad Joudat, a media activist from Qusra, told The New Arab that foreign and Israeli solidarity activists attempted on Friday to bring water and other supplies to the besieged families.

"Israeli forces arrived at the scene, prevented them from reaching the homes and completely removed them from the area," Joudat said.

Israeli forces entered Qusra on Thursday and evacuated the three homes before gathering their residents in one of them.

Local reports said the army subsequently informed residents of 16 homes that they would have to evacuate so they could be used as military positions.

The UN Human Rights Office said settlers had consolidated control over the area west of Qusra since an outpost was established there in November 2025.

Residents have since faced home invasions, physical assaults, theft, vandalism and arson, including an attack on a mosque, it said.

The UN office said the latest actions, carried out with Israeli support or acquiescence, were making life "intolerable" for Palestinian families and were clearly aimed at forcing them from their homes and land.

Taybeh faces continued attacks

The events in Qusra come amid a wider escalation in settler attacks across the occupied West Bank, including in Taybeh, the territory's last entirely Christian Palestinian village.

Israel declared Taybeh a closed military zone earlier this month, saying the measure was intended to protect residents following repeated settler attacks.

But Ihab Hassan, a Palestinian Christian activist, told The New Arab that attacks had continued despite the closure, while journalists, foreign activists and other outside observers faced restrictions on entering the village.

"No, the Israeli army is not protecting the residents. I say this based on what is actually happening on the ground," Hassan said.

"Israeli settler attacks on the village have continued even after it was declared a closed military zone. The difference now is that journalists, foreign activists, and other outside observers face restrictions on entering."

Hassan said international and Israeli activists had previously provided a protective presence in Taybeh, sometimes placing themselves between settlers and Palestinian residents.

"Restricting their access while settlers continue to reach and attack the village has left the community even more isolated and vulnerable," he said.

Hassan said the situation reflected a broader pattern across the occupied territory.

"In some cases, the army says it will 'remove' the settlers, but the fact that an army claims it cannot remove settlers who are besieging Palestinian families speaks for itself," he said.

He argued that settlers were also seeking to exploit the current political environment to seize land and establish realities that would be difficult to reverse.

"Once families are driven from their homes, land and property are taken over, and new facts are established on the ground, reversing them becomes extraordinarily difficult, even under a future Israeli government that might take a different approach," Hassan said.

"For Taybeh, this is therefore not simply about individual attacks," he added.

"It is about whether the last entirely Christian Palestinian village in the West Bank can remain on its land."

Here were the key updates of the day:

• President Donald Trump on Friday said he would "soon" declare the Strait of Hormuz waterway part of US territory after defeating Iran.
• US and Iran are deadlocked over who ultimately controls Hormuz as mediators try to salvage a memorandum of understanding that is set to expire on Sunday
• On the offensive, United States Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent says that the US is going to apply measures of "economic isolation" on Iran that have "never been seen"
• US Vice President JD Vance has noted a new two-fold goal: stabilise US energy prices, and stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons
• Israeli stikes continue in southern Lebanon and Gaza, while its pogroms in the occupied West Bank persists 

And so we continue our live coverage of the day...

One of the drones fell near the Rotana Hotel in central Erbil after the interceptions, prompting panic among residents and scattering shrapnel across the populated area.

The Kurdistan Region’s Counter-Terrorism Service said there were no casualties in the attack.

The incident came a day after another drone struck a house in a residential neighbourhood of Erbil, underscoring mounting fears among civilians over the repeated attacks and the risks posed by falling debris after aerial interceptions.

Authorities have not publicly identified who launched Friday’s drones. However, a senior official in Erbil told The New Arab that the attacks appear to involve multiple actors operating from both inside Iraq and across the border in Iran.

The official said Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was targeting positions held by Iranian Kurdish opposition forces in the outskirts of Erbil, while Iraqi armed factions loyal to Tehran were launching attacks on sites in the region from the Nineveh Plain.

"The danger is not only related to the fall and explosion of the drones, but also to the fragments that are scattered with each attack over long distances, especially after the drones are intercepted by air defences," the official said.

"Residents live under constant security pressure. The sounds of planes and explosions, and their interceptions, have become part of the daily scene in the city."

Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region has experienced a growing number of drone, rocket and other attacks over recent weeks, affecting both Erbil and Sulaimaniyah provinces. The escalation has coincided with the US-Israel war with Iran and has continued despite no recent direct strikes between the three countries.

On 17 July, a deadly barrage of drones and rockets killed nine members of an Iranian Kurdish armed opposition group. The group blamed Tehran for the strikes, while Iran has long accused Iranian Kurdish opposition groups of acting in the interests of Western states and Israel.

The Kurdistan Region has repeatedly been exposed to attacks due to its sensitive geopolitical position. It hosts US troops, foreign oil companies and several Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, making it a focal point in the wider confrontation between Iran, its allied Iraqi factions, Washington and Israel.

Kurdish officials have previously said that some attacks were launched from Iranian territory, while others originated from within Iraqi soil.

Majid Balak, a member of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party, blamed the federal government in Baghdad for failing to halt the attacks.

"Protecting the airspace from internal and external attacks, and preventing the use of Iraqi territory to carry out attacks on security and facilities inside and outside the country, is the responsibility of the Iraqi government," Balak told The New Arab.

The continued strikes have raised concern that Erbil’s civilian areas could face greater danger even when air defences prevent drones from reaching their intended targets, as wreckage and explosive fragments fall into densely inhabited parts of the city.

Iran-backed militia warns Baghdad

Meanwhile, the head of the Iran-backed Badr group warned Baghdad against using force to disarm armed factions, arguing that a coercive campaign could "ignite civil war" as the government moves towards a looming 30 September deadline to bring all militias’ weapons under state control.

Mohammad Naji, head of the organisation’s political office, said in a statement posted on X that the use of force against armed groups in the country would deepen internal divisions and serve the interests of foreign powers, including the United States and Israel.

He conditioned a disarmament of weapons to three conditions: a complete withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, the removal of “strategic threats” and the full rebuilding of Iraq’s armed forces.

Naji also criticised Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, accusing him of succumbing to pressure from Washington. Al-Zaidi had ordered officials to prepare a draft mechanism for the disarmament of Iraqi armed factions, arguing it undermines the authority of security institutions.

The Families of Egyptian Detainees Association (FEDA) announced its formation on Thursday, saying it would seek practical solutions to what it described as a 13-year detention crisis and press for improved prison conditions and fair trials.

In its founding statement, FEDA said its main objective was to bring an end to "the tragedy that has continued for 13 years" by pursuing measures that could lead to the release of political detainees.

"Our hands are extended to everyone who can contribute to closing this painful chapter," the association said.

The group's launch coincides with the 13th anniversary of the Rabaa and Nahda massacres on 14 August 2013, when Egyptian security forces violently dispersed two sit-ins by supporters of ousted president Mohamed Morsi in Cairo.

Over 1000 were killed in the operations, a defining moment in the crackdown that followed Morsi's removal by the military the previous month.

FEDA said it intends to bring together families of Egyptian detainees inside the country and abroad, keep their cases on the domestic and international agenda and represent them before relevant bodies.

The association said it would use legal and political channels to seek prisoners' release and push for fair trials and detention conditions that comply with Egyptian law and international standards.

Its plans include approaching Egyptian and international institutions, political and religious leaders, and figures working in politics, media and human rights.

FEDA also intends to visit the United Nations and bodies dealing with detention and enforced disappearance, pursue legal cases over alleged abuses and organise solidarity events.

Egyptian authorities do not publish an official figure for the number of people currently detained on political grounds.

Previous estimates by rights organisations have put the number detained since 2013 in the tens of thousands.

Human Rights Watch estimated in 2017 that around 60,000 people had been imprisoned on political grounds since that year, although that cannot be treated as a current estimate of those presently held.

Rights organisations say political detention has affected journalists, activists, human rights defenders, protesters, academics and political opponents, as well as people detained over expression or political activity.

In its 2026 World Report, Human Rights Watch said thousands remained in prolonged pretrial detention or were serving sentences following trials it considered unfair, while arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture and other forms of ill-treatment continued to be reported.

FEDA said detainees face problems including inadequate medical treatment, poor food and ventilation, overcrowding and restrictions on family visits and access to books, newspapers and news.

Human Rights Watch said detainees continued to be held during 2025 in conditions it described as amounting to ill-treatment, including denial of healthcare and prolonged solitary confinement, while dozens of deaths in detention were documented.

Egypt's government launched its National Human Rights Strategy in September 2021, pledging improvements to detention conditions, protection against torture and greater oversight of detention facilities.

The strategy also referred to expanding conditional release, presidential pardons and other measures aimed at reducing the prison population.

International rights organisations, however, have repeatedly said there remains a substantial gap between those commitments and practices on the ground.

FEDA said its establishment was intended to move families from individual campaigning towards a more organised effort, arguing that prolonged detention has imposed lasting social, economic and psychological consequences on prisoners' relatives.

The association stressed that it was not aligned with any particular political movement, saying its purpose was to represent detainees' families and work with Egyptian and international institutions to bring the political detention crisis to an end.

Issam Chebbi, the General Secretary of the centrist-liberal Republican Party, reportedly has a broken leg whilst in prison, which his wife ​​Faiza Rahem stated on social media.

​​Rahem said she visited her husband along with other family members on Thursday, and found Chebbi with a broken leg and in a cast, as well as using a pair of crutches.

“Today, Thursday, August 13, 2026, during the weekly visit, we were startled to see him behind the glass partition with a pair of crutches; his leg was broken and in a cast—I cannot even begin to describe the feeling that overcame us," she posted on her Facebook account.

Rahem said she found Chebbi with his arm in a sling during a visit on 30 July, two weeks prior, alluding to the dire conditions opposition activists and politicians are exposed to, and the lack of medical care.

"As always, the moment he saw us, he sought to put us at ease, greeting us with his trademark smile and unwavering composure and high spirits: "I'm fine; it's nothing," Reham continued. 

She said that they "know that everything is God’s will and decree," but in moments like these, “one feels a profound sense of injustice, anguish, and helplessness in the face of the oppression inflicted upon Issam and other detainees”.

In her post, Raham noted that Chebbi sought to reassure his family, greeting them warmly and insisting that the injury was "minor".

"Under such circumstances, he ought to be surrounded by his family, receiving proper medical treatment and care," she added.

"Instead, a malicious conspiracy charge — based on anonymous sources — has led to nearly four years of imprisonment under an unjust, authoritarian, and one-man rule that spares neither women nor men," she continued.

In recent weeks, alarm has been raised over the conditions of imprisoned opposition members and activists in Tunisia, jailed amid President Kais Saied’s increasingly authoritarian rule and clamp down on critics and what he calls "traitors and terrorists". Among them is the opposition party Ennahda's president Rachid Ghannouchi, who had fainted in prison last month, according to reports.

Chebbi was arrested in February 2023 as part of what Tunisian authorities called a "conspiracy against state security" case.

Prosecutors accused him of "plotting to destabilise the country and overthrow or undermine President Saied's authority".

The charges brought against Chebbi include conspiracy against the internal and external security of the state.

In April last year, he was handed an 18-year-long sentence, along with politicians and activists Ghazi Chaouachi, Jawahar Ben Mbrak and Ridha Belhaj.

Chebbi was previously held at Mornaguia Prison near Tunis, where his brother, Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, and Ghannouchi are also imprisoned. However, he was reportedly transferred in May 2025 to Borj Erroumi without his family or lawyers being notified in advance.

In 2024, Chebbi was suggested as a potential presidential candidate to counter Saied in the presidential elections of that year. Saied won the election, beating out Ayachi Zammel with a reported 90% win.

Also in Tunisia, the prominent lawyer and activist Chawki Tabib has gone on a hunger strike in prison to protest his imprisonment, his wife said, according to Tunisian media reports.

Mariem Ben Azzouz said that the former head of the Tunisian bar association and ex-chief of Tunisia's National Anti-Corruption Authority was carrying out his hunger strike in protest against injustice he perceives in his case. Ben Azzouz also expressed concern about the impact of this latest protest action on his health, asking: "How much of one's health, dignity, and life must be sacrificed for one's voice to be heard?"

Tabib was jailed in March this year for 10 years on charges including "forging documents" and "possessing and using forged documents".

Tabib's anti-graft body was dissolved in 2021 after a sweeping power grab by Saied, described by rights groups as a trigger in a major rollback of press freedom and freedom of expression.

The event promoted the sale of properties in illegal Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territories, triggering protests at the time.

The Charity Commission said it exercised its statutory powers under section 15(2) of the Charities Act 2011 to issue regulatory advice and guidance concerning the charity's decision to host the event. 

It added that the trustees of the Edgware United Synagogue must now take account of and act upon the guidance moving forward.

The development comes after the Commission said its statutory regulatory powers reflect its assessment that the issues raised by the complaints, such as that from the International Centre of Justice of Palestinians (ICJP), warranted formal regulatory engagement.

The complaint from the ICJP argued that the synagogue had allowed its charitable resources and premises to host a commercial event, where attendees were persuaded to buy properties in illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank.

The group also said that the event had gone ahead despite the trustees receiving detailed legal warnings before it took place, raising concerns over trustee governance, the discharge of trustees' legal duties, due diligence, the use of charitable assets, and reputational risk.

Another key concern about the event was the obligation of trustees to act exclusively in the best interests of their charity, while maintaining public trust and confidence.

The ICJP argued that by allowing the event to proceed, the trustees failed to consider the legal warnings and obligations, despite being made aware of the issues.

A statement from the ICJP, however, said that the Commission’s response was not sufficient, noting the serious nature of the matter.

The group said that they had submitted thorough evidence which showed the event raised serious concerns under both international law and UK laws.

“Where a charity permits its premises and resources to be used in connection with conduct that raises such serious legal concerns, the Charity Commission should take robust regulatory action to uphold charity law and protect public trust and confidence in the charitable sector,” a statement from the ICJP said.

The organisation called for a more adequate response and called for the Charity Commission to show that it is ready to use all of its powers in cases where charities risk being connected to serious breaches of law.

“Failing to do so risks undermining public confidence in charity regulation and sending the wrong message to trustees about the standards expected of them under charity law,” the ICJP said.

Being trapped in a 150,000-strong throng of protestors as a first-generation migrant might sound like a nightmare you would want to forget, but for Omar, it became the jump-off point for his debut stand-up comedy show, Guided Detour.

"To be honest, I was much more scared than I probably came across in the show," Omar tells The New Arab about that unfortunate experience ahead of his show's Edinburgh Festival Fringe run of his debut show.

"There was one very specific thing that was keeping me strangely safe throughout the whole experience. I don't really want to give it away here because it's quite a prominent part of the show. Ultimately, the show isn't really about the march — it's a much more personal story that just happens to be wrapped up in that event," Omar continues.

"Hopefully, people will come away having laughed, but also feeling that the story, in some way, belonged to them too."

Born in Egypt but raised in Wales and Cambridge (the latter location being the source of the word 'posh' in his Instagram moniker), Omar began performing stand-up comedy in 2019, with his own and his family’s experiences of racism and Islamophobia after migrating to the UK often forming an integral part of his sets.

Accolades for the newcomer soon came in thick and fast.

A year after starting stand-up, Omar won the So You Think You’re Funny? award, one of the most prestigious of its kind for British comedy newcomers, at the Edinburgh Fringe.

 

 

 

 

View this post on Instagram

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A post shared by Omar Badawy | PoshArab (@_omarbadawy_)

Given that his country of origin is a powerhouse of comedy in the SWANA region, does Omar consider his Egyptian heritage a head start in his career as a purveyor of humour?

"The average Egyptian is incredibly funny," Omar concurs. "Whenever I watch street interviews from Egypt, I'm always struck by people's comedic timing. There's also a real willingness to laugh at themselves."

He continues, "I don't think self-deprecation is always as prevalent elsewhere in the Middle East, where there's often a stronger sense of pride — and pride and humour can sometimes clash. If you're willing to let go of your pride a little, I think there's a lot more comedy to be found."

However, Omar believes humour is generally much more universal than people realise. "Every country seems to believe it has a unique sense of humour, but whenever I ask someone to show me something they find funny from their own country — especially if it's in Arabic, a language I understand — I can usually translate the joke into English, and it still works," he says. 

"Stand-up, in its essence, is a very universal art form. Most stand-up is about family, relationships, children, embarrassing moments and everyday situations. Those experiences are pretty universal, wherever you're from."

From Instagram sketches to Saturday Night Live UK

Omar gained wide recognition online when he began making videos mocking headlines in the establishment British press that have fanned the flames of Islamophobia, racism and other forms of prejudice that have made the UK increasingly fertile ground for far-right marches, just like the one Omar was caught up in last year.

Those videos have gone viral repeatedly, racking up millions of likes on Instagram and TikTok.

"The videos are essentially about media literacy, showing how the exact same story can be framed in completely different ways depending on the headline," Omar says.

"I've had university lecturers tell me they have shown the videos in seminars, and teachers say they've used them in schools. That's always really nice to hear, although that was never really the intention. I don't start with the goal of teaching people something. I start with an observation and ask, 'What's the funniest/silliest way to show this?' If it also gets people thinking or resonates beyond the joke, then that's a lovely bonus."

This year, Omar's incisive humour made British television screens after he joined the writing team for the first series of Saturday Night Live UK, the British spin-off of the landmark American television sketch comedy and variety show.

"Honestly, it was a dream come true," Omar says of the experience. "Saturday Night Live is such an iconic show, and getting the opportunity to be part of launching the UK version was incredibly exciting. The writing room was fantastic. The writers were brilliant, the cast was brilliant — you inevitably inspire each other because of the sheer volume of comedy you're producing," Omar shares.

"Being surrounded by people operating at that level really pushes you to raise your own game. The hosts were all fantastic to work with as well. One highlight was writing Riz Ahmed's opening monologue. He's naturally very funny, so it was great."

Why no story is too niche for the stage

Though British comedy still has a long way to go in terms of representation — particularly behind the scenes — Omar is one of several comics with origins in the SWANA region at this year's Fringe.

In a word of advice to aspiring SWANA-origin comics, he says mainstream British audiences are often much more receptive to unfamiliar stories than one might think.

"My biggest piece of advice would be to give mainstream audiences more credit… I think stand-up audiences are generally much more generous and empathetic than people sometimes give them credit for," Omar says.

"If there's a story you're worried is too niche or too culturally specific, I'd encourage you not to abandon it. Trust that if you tell it well and it’s funny, audiences will meet you halfway," he adds. 

"That's one of the things I love most about stand-up: it gives people the chance to experience someone else's perspective for a few minutes, and realise they have more in common than they thought."

[Cover photo credit: Matt Stronge]

Shahla Omar is a freelance journalist based in London

Follow her on Instagram: @shahlatan

Abdelatty made the remarks after talks with his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan, in the northern coastal city of El Alamein.

Asked at a joint press conference whether Cairo would enter the agreement, Abdelatty said the pact was being examined by the relevant Egyptian authorities in accordance with the constitution and any legal obligations that membership could entail.

The agreement, known as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, was signed last Friday by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

It includes a collective defence provision modelled on NATO’s Article 5, under which an attack on one member would be treated as an attack on all three.

The pact was signed against the backdrop of a regional war sparked by US-Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February. The conflict drew in regional states and disrupted shipping through both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.

Abdelatty said Egypt was also considering other regional security initiatives, including a Saudi proposal focused on Red Sea security, as the region faces what he described as "unprecedented challenges".

"We face many challenges in the region, and given this, we must remain in constant consultation," he said. "Today we held constructive talks with Mr Fidan, and senior officials also took part in these meetings. There is political will to advance our relations."

Turkish officials have signalled that Cairo may have been weighing participation since the agreement was announced.

On Saturday, one day after the pact was signed, Fidan said he expected Egypt to join the alliance, describing Cairo as a "natural partner on all issues".

"I believe that at the next stage Egypt will also be among us in the alliance," Fidan told Turkey’s state-run Anadolu Agency. "We already act toward one another as if we were alliance members. There are a few technical issues. Once these are implemented, there is no reason for Egypt not to be part of it."

The two officials said on Thursday they discussed a number of topics around the economy and trade relations, setting a bilateral trade target of $15 billion between the two sides.

On Thursday, Israeli strikes killed two Palestinians, including Gaza's police chief, Jamal Abu Kmeil, and a man identified by Palestinian sources as a Hamas member.

Israel claimed the men were Hamas operatives involved in planning attacks and maintained that its forces were operating within the terms of the ceasefire.

Hamas, however, described the strikes as violations of the agreement and accused Israel of seeking to destabilise Gaza.

For Palestinians, the distinction offers little reassurance.

"The word ceasefire means very little when we still hear strikes and people are being killed," Mohammed Ayoub, a Gaza resident, told The New Arab. "We thought the quiet meant that perhaps the war was finally ending. Now we are afraid that the strikes will start increasing again."

The attacks come as negotiations over the next stage of the ceasefire remain centred on Hamas's disarmament, an Israeli withdrawal and future security arrangements in Gaza.

Israel continues killing Hamas officials

Abu Kmeil, 43, was travelling in his vehicle in the Sheikh Ajleen area of southwestern Gaza City when an Israeli aircraft struck it, according to Gaza's Interior Ministry and the Palestinian Red Crescent.

Several people were wounded and taken to Al-Shifa Hospital.

Abu Kmeil had remained at his post throughout the war, according to Gaza's Interior Ministry, and had spoken publicly about efforts by police and local community leaders to maintain order.

The Israeli army claimed the strike was carried out under Shin Bet direction and described Abu Kmeil as a "Hamas operative who infiltrated Israeli territory during the 7 October 2023 massacre."

It accused him of advancing plans for attacks against Israeli troops and civilians during the war and in recent months, saying it acted "to eliminate the threat."

The army provided no further details about the alleged plans or Abu Kmeil's role in the 7 October attack.

Hamas called the killing a "treacherous and brutal crime", saying Israel was seeking to create "chaos and lawlessness" in Gaza.

It identified Abu Kmeil as the director of the civil police in Gaza Governorate and called on mediators to intervene over what it described as Israel's "daily violations".

The killing has also raised concerns among Palestinians about the future of basic security in the Strip, where much of the civilian infrastructure has been devastated.

"Even if Abu Kmeil worked for the Hamas-run government, that does not mean he was a Hamas member," Jalal Abu Hasira, a Gaza resident, told TNA. "And if Israel kills all the policemen in Gaza, what do you think the situation will be like?"

"People need someone to keep the streets safe. We are already living without functioning hospitals, schools and many basic services. When those responsible for security are also targeted, it makes everyone feel more vulnerable," he said.

Fears of wider war

Hours earlier, another Israeli strike hit an electric motorcycle near a Palestinian Red Crescent building in the Al-Amal neighbourhood west of Khan Younis, killing Huzaifa Kawareh and critically wounding another person.

Israel confirmed the attack and claimed, with no evidence, Kawareh as a "company commander in Hamas' military wing in the Khan Younis area", accusing him of planning attacks against Israeli troops.

It said the strike was intended "to eliminate the threat to the troops" and that forces under the Southern Command were operating "in accordance with the agreement".

The army did not provide details about the alleged attacks or explain why it considered the threat immediate.

Palestinian security sources said the strike was the third Israeli attack since Wednesday to hit an area beyond the Israeli-proclaimed "Yellow Line", the demarcation separating areas where Israeli forces remain deployed from other parts of Gaza.

On Wednesday evening, an Israeli strike targeting a motorcycle in Beit Lahia in northern Gaza also killed a Palestinian and wounded others.

Palestinian sources have accused Israeli forces of pushing the "Yellow Line" westwards, bringing more territory under de facto Israeli control, while demolition operations have continued in several areas.

"We do not know where the 'Yellow Line' is anymore or whether it will move again tomorrow," Saied Hamada, a Gaza resident, told TNA. "Every time people begin returning to an area or trying to rebuild their lives, something happens, and they are reminded that the war is still around them."

"People are exhausted. They do not want to hear about another war. Whatever Israel and Hamas disagree about, they need to find a way to stop the killing," he said.

The latest attacks have sharpened fears that the ceasefire could gradually erode without formally collapsing.

Truce terms

Israel maintains that the agreement does not prevent it from striking Hamas members it considers to be posing a security threat. Hamas says such attacks violate the ceasefire.

Yedioth Ahronoth, citing an Israeli security source, reported that Israel had told the US it would continue targeting Hamas operatives involved in the 7 October attack as well as "any emerging threats, whether immediate or subsequent".

The source claimed Washington accepts the Israeli position and that coordination with the American headquarters in Kiryat Gat had been strengthened.

Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem rejected Israeli accusations that the movement had resumed military operations or violated the ceasefire, describing them as "propaganda" intended to justify what he called Israel's continuing violations.

Qassem reiterated Hamas's "full commitment" to the ceasefire agreement and its roadmap, and called on mediators to compel Israel to respect the terms already agreed.

The dispute comes as negotiations over the second phase focus on Hamas's weapons and the future of Israeli forces in Gaza.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's 3 August meeting in Tel Aviv with Nickolay Mladenov, a representative of the so-called "Board of Peace," focused on implementing the second phase, including Hamas's disarmament and an Israeli withdrawal.

Gaza-based political analyst Akram Attallah told TNA  that Israel's continued targeting of Hamas members reflected its desire to maintain military pressure on the movement while negotiations continue.

"Israel views the targeting of Hamas figures as a way to prevent the group from rebuilding its military capabilities and to reinforce its demand for the movement's disarmament," Attallah said.

He said the strikes also showed that Israel does not view the ceasefire as preventing military action against people it considers security threats.

But Attallah warned that continued attacks could undermine the truce and make the transition to the next phase more difficult.

The unresolved questions of Hamas's disarmament, an Israeli withdrawal and future security arrangements leave the ceasefire vulnerable to further escalation, he noted.

Gaza's Health Ministry says 1,260 Palestinians have been killed and 4,154 wounded since the ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025.

The ministry puts the overall death toll since October 2023 at more than 73,389, with 174,266 wounded.

From a young age, Zahra would leaf through her mother’s Arabic magazines, studying the clothes, beauty looks and photography across the pages. They offered glimpses of a side of the MENA region, particularly Iraq, that felt familiar through her family but distant from her own life.

Now 27, she collects vintage magazines from across the region, particularly from Egypt and Lebanon, sourcing old issues on eBay, some dating back to the 1950s.

For her, they are more than fashion references; they are records of how people dressed, lived and saw themselves.

"I've always gravitated towards magazines," Zahra tells The New Arab. "They were how I discovered visual references, both from the Arab world and from fashion, through my mum's Arabic magazines."

Her interest in these publications eventually led her to the Iraqi Print Archive, which holds Iraqi magazines, books and other printed material documenting the country’s cultural life, particularly before 2003.

Much of the archive is available online, with publications also translated into English.

She turned to the archive while developing her Central Saint Martins graduate collection, asking to see publications from the 1960s through to the 1990s and early 2000s, with a particular focus on Iraqi women and their contribution to society.

The archive sent her a wide selection, which she narrowed down to stories about Iraqi women working in factories, contributing to the workforce and the arts, as well as other glimpses of Iraqi life before the 2003 US-led invasion.

One publication focused on vinyl and the music industry, with some of its images later appearing as prints across her collection.

For Zahra, the focus on women was personal.

Born in Montreal and raised in Milton Keynes, she has only visited Iraq once and grew up hearing about the country from her parents and grandparents. She also grew up around women who were engineers and doctors, while her grandmother raised seven children in Iraq and ran a large factory.

"Everything I know about Iraq comes from my parents and grandparents, and the stories they have told me about growing up there. They're also very proud of it and have always spoken about it with so much love," she says.

This was part of what drew Zahra towards stories that showed Iraq before 2003, rather than the country as it is often represented through the 2003 invasion and the wars that followed.

“We're often known for the invasion, but a lot of people don't know about the heritage and everything we achieved as a society before then," she adds.

She saw how much these images could mean when she showed her mother the publications she had selected. Her mother had not seen them in more than 30 years.

"She actually started crying," Zahra recalls. "She said she had reached a point where she almost believed it had never happened because it had been so long ago."

Zahra says her mother's reaction captures what sits at the heart of the collection: these are not simply old magazine pages being repurposed as fashion prints, but fragments of a visual history that her generation can look back on and her parents' generation can recognise, giving the images another life while bringing a part of Iraq that once felt distant much closer to home.

A collection rooted in memory

Reflecting on her participation in the Central Saint Martins graduate runway, Zahra says it was a really special experience.

Of the around 140 final-year students who presented their work, only 40 were selected for the press show, making her inclusion an important opportunity to represent an identity she says is still underrepresented at Central Saint Martins and in the wider fashion industry.

“There aren't many Arab students at Central Saint Martins either," she says. "There might be one or two in each year, and we all kind of know each other. So it was really meaningful to have that platform and bring this part of my identity into the space."

That sense of identity also influenced the collection, which brought together prints from the Iraqi Print Archive with references to her family and the clothes she grew up around.

Two of the six looks feature archival imagery, printed using sublimation so that the small text and photographs from the original magazines remained clear. She also worked with wool, cotton, silk chiffon and vintage fabrics, using layering throughout the collection.

The idea of layering came directly from photographs of Zahra’s family after they moved to Canada in the early 1990s.

Used to a much warmer climate, they would wear draped dresses underneath large coats, mixing lighter fabrics with heavier ones. Zahra brought that same combination into the collection, pairing chiffon and silk with wool.

That contrast between lighter and heavier fabrics can be seen in one of her three favourite looks, a pair of black-and-white trench coats. One is layered over the other, with both featuring text, imagery and faces from the Iraqi Print Archive, including an iconic photograph of a former Miss Iraq.

"I wanted it to feel like physical media right in front of you, where you can see the identities and the faces, and feel like you've been transported into that world," she explains.

Another favourite is the calligraphy dress, created with London-based artist Nayab Ahmed. Nayab travelled to Egypt during the collaboration to train with traditional calligraphy artists, before returning with the materials they used.

The pair then created a print that looks like Arabic calligraphy but says nothing.

For Zahra, the decision to create calligraphy without a specific meaning reflects her own relationship with Arabic. She speaks the language but is less confident reading and writing it, so she wanted to explore calligraphy through its appearance rather than its meaning.

"I wanted to stay true to myself, and I wanted it to reflect what Arabic calligraphy is to me," she says. "It's beautiful, but maybe because of my reading and writing, I'm not able to appreciate it as much. Just appreciate it visually."

The calligraphy print was then transferred onto silk chiffon, which was crystal-pleated and paired with two jackets finished with a fraying technique Zahra developed during her final year.

Her third favourite look takes a different approach, featuring a leather jacket covered in small vintage frames.

Each frame features an Arab female singer, including Fairuz and Umm Kulthum, alongside other singers who influenced Zahra as she grew up.

These references extend beyond the clothes and into the collection’s accessories. Zahra sourced vintage headpieces from sellers in Europe and the US, some of which were decorated with feathers that looked like hair from a distance.

She also built small mobile phones into headbands underneath the headwear, inspired by her mother and aunties putting their phones into their hijabs in the early 2000s.

"I thought that was quite a funny pop culture reference," she says.

The early 2000s references also carried through into the beauty looks.

Zahra looked to the vintage magazines she collected, particularly Egyptian publications, for the models’ thin eyebrows, dark lips and heavy eye makeup.

While the look may recall the late 1990s and early 2000s, Zahra found the same beauty style much further back in Egyptian magazines from the 1950s, particularly Al-Kawākib Magazine, where she found narrow eyebrows, dark red and almost-black lips and heavily lined eyes.

To complete the look, Zahra gave the models a serious expression that reflected the same early-2000s references, asking them not to look angry but "as if they're on the phone, focused and on their way somewhere."

What comes next

Upon reflection, Zahra says the references in her collection reflect a wider interest in archival fashion among young diaspora designers today, as a generation looks back at the places their parents came from and finds its own ways of engaging with that history.

"I think that it's growing because we are growing," she says. "We're kind of expressing our childhood, and we're expressing what we've been through here in the West."

For Zahra, that connection to heritage also gives her work a political edge, even when she does not set out to make political fashion.

“I wouldn’t necessarily say my work is political, but because of my background, it becomes political,” she says.

That is also where the archive plays a larger role in her work. The images allow Zahra to present a side of Iraq that she feels is often missing from the way the country is represented.

"We're trying to change the narrative and communicate a different perspective that isn’t often seen," she says. "That's why it's so important."

With her graduate collection now complete, Zahra is turning her attention to what comes next.

She has been accepted into a master's programme at Central Saint Martins and is awaiting news on her scholarship applications, while also considering returning to the fashion industry for a few years.

She has already gained experience at Viktor & Rolf in Amsterdam, working in the couture department, and at Louis Vuitton as an assistant designer for women's leather goods.

The two placements exposed her to very different sides of the industry.

At Viktor & Rolf, she learnt couture techniques and worked on showpieces, while Louis Vuitton gave her insight into the commercial side of design, from researching trends to developing products for a wider market.

Both experiences, she says, helped build her confidence when she returned to Central Saint Martins for her final year.

Ultimately, Zahra hopes to build a fashion house of her own, with "my own atelier and my own team."

For now, her work is already attracting attention, with a museum expressing interest in acquiring several looks from her graduate collection. Zahra cannot reveal more yet, but says she will share the details when she can.

Zainab Mehdi is a British Iraqi journalist and the Associate Features Editor at The New Arab. She holds a BSc in Modern History and International Relations from the University of Essex and an MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies from SOAS

Follow her on Instagram: @zaiamehdi_/@zainabmehdiwrites_

There have been more than 900 attacks between January and August this year, resulting in at least 900 deaths and more than 1,400 injuries, according to WHO data presented in Geneva by Altaf Musani, the agency's director of humanitarian and disaster management.

Ukraine, Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territory account for the largest share of reported incidents, although attacks have also been recorded in countries including Iran, Sudan, Myanmar, Syria, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Musani said.

"What we are witnessing are multiple forms of violence," Musani said, citing the use of heavy weapons, destruction of health facilities and the detention or abduction of healthcare workers and patients. During this period 94 healthcare workers have been detained.

In Gaza, all 36 hospitals have been damaged and only about half remain partially functional, while in Sudan 37% of health facilities are reported non-functional this year, he said. In Ukraine, the WHO has verified more than 3,100 attacks since Russia's full-scale invasion, including a recent strike affecting a WHO warehouse.

"An attack on healthcare does not end when an attack gets verified," Musani said. "It is the patient who cannot receive healthcare tomorrow. It is the ambulance that cannot make the next referral."

A WHO study of 69 attacks in northwest Syria found outpatient consultations fell by 51% immediately after an attack and remained depressed for more than a month.

Attacks can also undermine responses to disease outbreaks, Musani said. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, 12 verified attacks on healthcare since an Ebola outbreak was declared in May have disrupted surveillance, contact tracing, treatment and community outreach efforts. Such incidents make it harder to detect and contain outbreaks, he said. The 156 verified attacks in Ukraine so far this year, out of a total of 3,100 since Russia's full-scale invasion began, have affected hospitals, ambulances, warehouses and medical supply chains, Musani stated.

Since the WHO's surveillance system began tracking such incidents in 2018, more than 10,400 attacks have been verified across 29 countries and territories, resulting in about 5,700 deaths and over 8,500 injuries, Musani said.

Musani said not a single one of the more than 10,000 verified attacks had yet entered an accountability process.

Health facilities are protected under international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions, he noted.

To mark the 25th anniversary of the Justice and Development Party, The New Arab interviewed the second-in-command of Turkey's ruling party, discussing the party's trajectory, the challenges it has faced, its future and its position on the most important events that have taken place and are taking place.

Efkan Ala stressed that the Justice and Development Party had worked to resolve the country's problems through democracy, including electing the president by the people, for which constitutional amendments were introduced and the issue was resolved.

In the next phase, the party has set the goal of making Turkey one of the world's 10 most developed and advanced countries.

He revealed that preparations are still underway to amend the constitution, while explaining that Turkey's "terrorism-free" process is continuing and that the issue of non-Turkish elements will be resolved through diplomacy with neighbouring countries, particularly Syria and Iraq.

He explained that Turkey supports the two-state solution in Palestine, warning that the policies of Benjamin Netanyahu's government leave it without a future.

The following is an edited version of that interview:

The Justice and Development Party marks 25 years since its founding. What challenges did it face, and how did it overcome them?

The Justice and Development Party was founded 25 years ago, when the atmosphere in Turkey at the time was affected by the events of 28 February 1997. The Turkish National Security Council held a meeting that led to decisions resulting in the removal of former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Welfare Party, and the end of his coalition government.

The economy was facing major difficulties, a severe economic crisis and political instability, and the party was founded amid all these challenges.

There is no doubt that the events of 28 February 1997, dealt a severe blow to freedom of belief. The atmosphere was suffocating, and freedoms were restricted, particularly freedom of belief.

Amid these circumstances, the Justice and Development Party was founded. The party founder, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said on 14 August, 2001: "From now on, everything will not be as it was in Turkey."

Since then, as a party in power for 24 years, we have achieved a great deal across various fields and brought about real revolutions. We did all this for our people.

The Justice and Development Party put every problem it faced on the political arena before the people and resolved it through the ballot box.

We are a movement that has held 19 elections and referendums during our 24 years in power.

For example, presidential elections had always been a problem in Turkey before the Justice and Development Party. There were always difficulties that led to political crises.

We also witnessed the 360 crisis during our period in power, referring to the 2007 presidential election in Parliament, when problems emerged, but we resolved them.

We did not stop there. We amended the constitution and put the change before our people and said: Since presidential elections have always been a problem, let us give them to their rightful owner.

Who is their rightful owner? The people.

We said: Let the people elect the president directly.

Have the goals for the second quarter-century of the party's life or its vision been determined?

In the second century of the Turkish Republic, we set our main goal as becoming one of the 10 most developed and advanced countries in the world.

To achieve this, we shared the vision of the Turkish Century with our people, and from now on we will begin the second wave of reforms that are necessary.

With the first wave of reforms that we implemented over 25 years, we in fact demonstrated achievements and hard work spanning an entire century in Turkey.

With the reforms we will undertake in the future, we are laying the foundations and core principles for Turkey in the coming century.

Therefore, as our president said, a more just world is possible, and we believe that the world is bigger than five because the world needs these policies.

During our 25 years in power, while confronting many problems, we also succeeded in unifying Turkey and giving it all the opportunities available.

We implemented highly important infrastructure projects.

In foreign policy, Turkey previously adopted a more passive approach, but during our period in power and under the effective leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey became a regional power and a global actor.

Nevertheless, without ever overlooking the principles I mentioned at the beginning, we opposed all forms of injustice and declared this to the world through our foreign policy.

We have always been a country that denounces the genocide in Gaza and crimes against humanity elsewhere in the world, even from the platform of the United Nations.

If there is anything positive that needs to be built, we have worked hard to take the initiative in doing so.

That is why we pursue an active foreign policy that is just, fair and virtuous.

We continue our path by supporting this foreign policy through developing our defence industry, as well as other economic, social and political fields, and providing the necessary opportunities and means.

When talking about the future, there are upcoming presidential and general elections. In this context, what preparations is the Justice and Development Party making?

We have a distinctive approach, and this is a political method that our president taught us.

Elections are held, and the people choose us to come to power, but the very next day we begin working as if no election had taken place, as if there were another election the following day.

We begin preparing for the next election from the day after the election, which concerns the entire people.

We turn to them, go into the field, meet our people, and have representatives in every neighbourhood, village, city and province.

We hold monthly programmes to meet our people, explain our vision and listen to their demands.

We discuss their demands in our relevant institutions.

In our party and government committees, we conduct research and public opinion polls, and we do this every month.

We assess matters. The people's priority is our priority, the people's wishes are our wishes, and the will of our people is our will.

Everything our people oppose, we oppose, and everything our people support, we support.

What are the current public opinion trends regarding the party? What do the polls show?

Public opinion is very positive.

In the public opinion polls we are currently conducting, our president is clearly in the lead.

This is because our people are closely following what is happening in the world and our region.

Here, our president's initiatives, which are just, humanitarian and accepted by people's consciences, have broad public support, and our people continue to maintain their strong support for our president.

When problems emerge elsewhere, such as the Russian-Ukrainian war, our president demonstrates a high level of leadership experience and is able to take the most effective initiatives to save the world from problems arising from the grain crisis.

Within the party itself, there is cohesion, and the country is witnessing cohesion and progress.

Of course, there are problems, but there is a government that resolves problems through democracy.

There is a president who does not surrender his will or the will of the nation in the face of any threat.

Therefore, the situation of the opposition in Turkey is also difficult, as it suffers from serious internal problems.

Accordingly, what will lead the Justice and Development Party to achieve its goals is its ability to renew itself internally and maintain its unity, a leader who has demonstrated his position and will, and a people who trust him.

We are continuing on our path and hope that the research will show this clearly.

Do you have any statistics? Can you give some figures?

Well, first and foremost, we are 10 points ahead even of our closest competitors, so I can say that today, of course, we will continue with the People's Alliance.

Looking at it this way, our president can easily exceed 50% in the presidential elections.

Likewise, when looking at the Justice and Development Party within the alliance, the percentage is much higher, because our people see that the other parties are incapable of solving their internal problems.

A party that cannot solve its internal problems cannot in any way solve Turkey's problems.

It cannot connect Turkey's opportunities with the people.

Therefore, the Justice and Development Party and our president enjoy very strong popular support.

Justice and Development Party spokesman Omer Celik previously announced that the party's presidential candidate in the next elections is Erdogan. But how will the constitutional obstacles be overcome?

When our parliament decides to hold elections, this is clear and explicit in the constitution.

There are no obstacles.

The matter depends on a decision by parliament, and when parliament decides, Erdogan is the candidate of the alliance and the Justice and Development Party, and, God willing, the people will support him.

No one can oppose what the people want.

Therefore, through a decision by our parliament and the nomination of our president, he will have the opportunity to serve Turkey in the best possible way during the next term.

After the 2023 elections, there was a focus on a new constitution, but this issue is no longer on the agenda as it was previously. Is a new constitution or constitutional amendments on the agenda?

Turkey has witnessed constitutional debates since the constitution was adopted in 1982.

Because it is a constitution dating back to the coup era, many amendments have been introduced since then.

However, every amendment requires further amendments.

We have therefore also made many changes.

But the constitution should be viewed as a whole, in terms of its spirit, its drafting methodology and its understanding of the principle of consensus.

We have a committee formed by our president dealing with the constitution, and I am a member of it.

We have completed our work and are currently conducting several assessments.

We will then conduct studies to assess them with the relevant parties.

We will meet civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations to assess them.

Our desire to unite Turkey through a new constitution has remained alive from the beginning, and we still believe in it.

We believe that the time has come for Turkey to adopt a civilian constitution.

For this reason, we have completed our work from our perspective.

We have concluded, but discussions and assessments with other parties and non-governmental organisations will certainly reveal the issues on which we agree and those on which we disagree.

The aim is to draft a constitution through consensus and with the participation of all segments of society, and, if possible, with the participation of all political parties, which would ensure political consensus.

If this is achieved, the constitution will have a longer lifespan.

Then, with the support of the people, Turkey will have achieved the constitutional amendments it aspires to.

Therefore, we want a more robust constitution that guarantees rights and freedoms, including freedom of work, thought and belief; a constitution that builds an effective state, strengthens predictability, prioritises transparency and enables the participation of all segments of society.

Most importantly, the constitution must be drafted through civilian consensus, and the importance of following the same civilian procedures in this process is clear.

Therefore, our programme for drafting a new constitution is continuing.

Will the constitution be amended before the elections, or will it remain unchanged until after them?

Of course, we will continue this process, but because it concerns many parties, parliamentarians and civil society organisations, we want to complete it as soon as possible.

Nevertheless, the timing, timeframe and duration will be determined based on consensus and negotiations.

What is the timetable for the next stage of Turkey's terrorism-free process, and what mechanism will you follow?

Turkey has been fighting terrorism since the 1980s.

Terrorism is a major problem for all humanity. We want to completely eliminate terrorism in our region.

We say a terrorism-free Turkey and a terrorism-free region.

In other words, there should be no terrorism in the Middle East or anywhere else, because its costs are enormous, it has a huge capacity to cause harm, and there is no hope of victory.

Therefore, Turkey has brought the situation to this stage.

With broad participation and support from all sides, we submitted the bill to parliament and established specific mechanisms in it to eliminate the terrorist organisation and hand over weapons.

We are assigning tasks to state institutions under the law, and we will work with society to manage the dialogue transparently.

We have established these mechanisms, selected them and defined them in the law, and we will complete them soon, freeing Turkey from these constraints and implementing policies that will enable Turkey to move forward confidently towards its long-term goals.

We are working hard to do everything we can through an active foreign policy to end the suffering in our region, in Syria, Iraq and the Middle East, and to establish terrorism-free areas in those regions.

Are you concerned about external interference or the possibility of international actors intervening and sabotaging this process?

The possibility of provocation always exists, and this is what happens in the Middle East.

Even coincidences are orchestrated.

Therefore, we have to act with great caution while being aware of this.

That is why we pursue a firm foreign policy to resolve these issues peacefully and decisively and implement these policies by taking measures to thwart the plans and schemes of these powers.

Within the legal framework, details have been set out regarding the fate of Turkish citizens belonging to banned organisations. Is any work underway regarding non-Turkish nationals?

Some of our foreign policy issues can be resolved within the Turkish legal system, while others are resolved through international negotiations.

Turkey has sufficient experience in these matters, has an active foreign policy, maintains good relations with its neighbours, and pursues a high-quality and effective foreign policy.

I believe these issues will be resolved through cooperation with the Syrian and Iraqi governments, as well as regional and central governments, in a way that benefits the countries and peoples of the region.

I am certain of this as long as we maintain our active position.

The Israeli government recently issued statements against Turkey, and Erdogan was also targeted. What is Israel's aim with these provocations?

Israel issues these statements, but it receives a strong response from Turkey.

Since its establishment, it has pursued a policy based first on destabilising areas outside its borders, then occupying those areas and then attempting to annex them.

This is happening before the eyes and ears of the entire world.

It has committed a crime against humanity in Gaza, a horrific genocide.

Once again, our president was the one who strongly protested against this, and we have always stood on the side of justice and stood with Gaza.

Our policy is completely clear regarding the two-state solution.

We know that without recognising a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, it is impossible to build lasting peace in the region with Israel.

We have always supported this solution and will continue to support it.

The policy pursued by Netanyahu's government today has no future and benefits no one.

While they bury the people of Gaza, they are also burying their own future.

It has never been known for a state to prosper through an unjust foreign policy, an unjust system or repression.

Therefore, we believe that the two-state solution is the only solution, the just solution in the region and the region, and we are working hard to achieve it.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.

Kuwait's once prosperous oil sector has stood largely paralysed for months, with petroleum exports plummeting as fighting raged across the Gulf—triggering the country's largest crisis in decades.

Half a year into the war, Kuwait remains a hostage to its uncompromising need to access the Strait of Hormuz—where the war between the US and Iran has choked off the once plentiful energy exports that moved across its waters.

Oil has long been the bedrock for the tiny Gulf state's economy—where more than 90 percent of government revenue and nearly all export earnings rely on reliable crude sales. The country is also home to roughly six percent of total oil reserves globally.

Unlike Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait has no pipelines bypassing the strait—forcing its crude exports to sail through the contested waterway to the international market.

"Without a doubt, this is the toughest and biggest crisis that we have faced in the oil sector in Kuwait since the 1990 invasion by Iraq," said Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) chief executive Shaikh Nawaf Saud Al-Sabah.

Then, as Saddam Hussein's forces retreated from a US-led onslaught to liberate Kuwait, the Iraqi army torched hundreds of wells, destroyed massive storage tanks and targeted refineries—causing catastrophic damage to much of the country's oil sector.

'Crisis'

Kuwait has been spared the same levels of destruction during this war but has not emerged unscathed.

Just days into the war, the state-owned KPC declared force majeure—a legal maneuver that protects an enterprise when they cannot meet their contractual obligations due to unforeseeable events, like wars and natural disasters.

The notice was lifted in June.

The country has also weathered repeated waves of Iranian strikes targeting water desalination plants and energy installations, including petroleum infrastructure along with salvos aimed at US military bases.

"This crisis has presented us with a new challenge," Al-Sabah told AFP during an exclusive interview from a temporary office space he relocated to after KPC's headquarters was hit by a drone strike in April.

Before the US-Israeli war on Iran, Kuwait was producing slightly more than 2.6 million barrels of oil per day, with an ambitious plan to reach 4 million barrels daily by 2040.

"Once the strait is open, it reverts to free movement, then we can easily go back to our pre-war production levels and even higher," said Al-Sabah.

But when asked how much Kuwait was now able to deliver on a given day, the executive refused to provide a figure.

"It's something that—during this crisis—we prefer to keep to ourselves," he told AFP.

According to preliminary official data, Kuwait's economy contracted 4.6 percent year-on-year during the first quarter of 2026, with its oil-sector GDP collapsing by 12.5 percent.

The true toll is likely more damning, with available economic data only accounting for the first month of the conflict.

'In our blood'

Kuwaitis have largely remained resilient in the face of the war, despite Iranian attacks and talk of a Tehran-backed military buildup at the nearby Iraq-Iran border.

At night, lights at most of the country's major energy installations, including power stations and water plants, have been switched off.

Scaffolding has also been constructed around many of Kuwait's storage tanks -- where vast quantities of crude are held—hoping to protect the structures from any future strikes.

"We have recovered from worse. We are Kuwait. Resistance is in our blood," Noura, 45, told AFP at the historic Al-Mubarakiya market.

But in private conversations, Kuwaitis are much more frank, with some criticising American forces or lambasting US President Donald Trump's willingness to continue the war.

Al-Sabah insists the company is working tirelessly to execute contingency plans and said storage tanks outside of the region have helped buffer the strait crisis.

But even with such plans, experts said the strait's fate remains crucial to Kuwait's future.

"Kuwait's dependence on Hormuz has become a strategic vulnerability," said Amena Bakr, head of Middle East insights at Kpler.

According to Bakr, estimates predict that Kuwait's oil production could likely be restored to pre-war levels in two to three months.

"The country does have financial resources to withstand a serious temporary shock," said Bakr.

"But the longer the war drags on, the more the economy is exposed to the risks of not having a safe export route for this oil."

But Al-Sabah warned there was "no substitute" for unfettered access to the strait.

"If you do not have free flow of hydrocarbons through the Strait of Hormuz and free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, you will end up with another energy crisis very quickly," he said.

"It will be a combination of economic isolation, like the world has never seen before," Bessent told conservative television network Newsmax, adding that "the continued blockade in the Strait of Hormuz... will keep anything from going in or out of the Iranian ports."

"Watch this space for more announcements coming next week," he said.

Bessent described a two-pronged approach featuring financial pressure and a physical blockade of the ports.

The tougher stance contrasts with remarks by Bessent on 4 August, when he told CNBC that an agreement with Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz could be reached within days.

Those comments sent Wall Street higher and oil prices lower.

Meanwhile, Vice President JD Vance said earlier that the top US priority in the US-Israeli war on Iran presently was bringing oil and gasoline prices down for Americans, with preventing Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon ranking second.

Vance's comments underscored the stark reality that the war now centers on control of the Strait of Hormuz, the critical fuel supply conduit that was open before US President Donald Trump started the war along with Israel in late February.

Iran has all but shut it down in retaliation and thus found a crucial bargaining chip against Trump as he struggles to find a way out of the war and shies away from resuming large-scale attacks.

The 80-year-old president's approval rating is plummeting, the war is unpopular among Americans and midterm elections are approaching in November.

Republicans fear Trump and the war, which has caused gasoline prices to soar, will cost them their control of Congress.

"I know that oil is down today and it's way down from the highs in the early days of the conflict," Vance said on Fox News. "That's goal number one -- keep oil and gas cheap for Americans all over our country."

"And then obviously goal number two is ensure that Iran never gets a nuclear weapon," he added.

'Low-keying it'

The vice president has been among the members of the administration most skeptical of the offensive launched against Iran in late February.

These remarks, however, appear to confirm the more cautious approach now favored by the US president, which involves maintaining strong economic pressure on Iran by blockading its ports and preventing it from selling oil.

Heralding more economic punishment, Bessent threatened to subject Iran to economic isolation "like the world has never seen before." He said new measures are expected next week.

Only days ago Trump had said an agreement to reopen the strait was imminent. Now his administration seems to be digging in, with diplomacy on hold as he hopes economic suffering will cause Iran to yield.

"We are low-keying it," Trump said Sunday. "We are only semi-negotiating with them. We are just watching Iran with its huge inflation and the fact they have no money," Trump told the news outlet Axios.

The US military reportedly burned through stockpiles of costly high-tech missiles and other weapons in the months since the war started at a cost of billions and is now reportedly running low, limiting Trump's options for resuming attacks on Iran.

"Sometimes we're focused on the energy piece of it because we want Americans to be able to afford the price of oil and gas. Sometimes we're obviously focused on the military... on the nuclear program," Vance also said.

Trump had said recently he would hold off on attacking Iran again only if an agreement were reached quickly to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

Now Iran has set a list of conditions for reopening the passageway that the Trump administration is unlikely to accept: an end to the war on all fronts, the lifting of the US blockade of Iranian ports, the end of sanctions, the release of frozen assets and compensation for wartime damage.

Those conditions echo the terms of a so-called memorandum of understanding which was reached in June and collapsed as fighting resumed. It included a provision to create a $300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran.

Yahya Saree, a military spokesperson for the Houthis, said they targeted an Aramco refinery in the city of Jazan with a drone.

The attack was in response to Saudi drones’ breaching Yemen’s airspace over the provinces of Hajjah and Saada, he said.

There was no comment or confirmation regarding the report from Saudi Arabia. 

Before joining the European Parliament, she was a member of the Spanish parliament, where she was re-elected twice. 

Serra also served as spokesperson for Spain's left-wing Podemos party and worked as an adviser to Spanish Equality Minister Irene Montero between 2021 and 2023.

Serra belongs to the left-wing movement and is considered by some to be part of the most radical wing of the Spanish political scene. 

She has made human rights, migration, Palestine, anti-racism and anti-colonialism central to her political work in the European Parliament. In an interview with The New Arab, Serra strongly criticises the European project, which is undergoing major transformations, most notably, she says, its transformation "into a war project".

She places Palestine at the heart of these transformations, arguing that Brussels' position on the genocidal war in Gaza reveals its deep complicity with Israel and the European Union's subordination to US President Donald Trump and the United States.
 

The Ceuta incident has brought migration to the forefront of European debate. As a member of the European Parliament, how do you explain what happened, and what responsibilities does the European Union bear?

The crisis has so far left 141 people dead, while dozens remain missing. At this moment, thousands of people are sleeping in the streets in inhumane conditions, without adequate care, and many of them are minors. This is the most important issue, and all institutions must address it.

Nevertheless, we see how the far right in general, as well as institutions such as European institutions, which are directly or indirectly run by the far right, have not issued any message to the victims' families. If they had been white, European people from Ukraine, for example, we would have had months of condolences and mourning. But because they are dark-skinned and come from the Global South, this situation suits the far right and the European Commission perfectly, allowing them to justify greater Frontex involvement and more anti-migrant rhetoric.

Of course, 70,000 people cannot cross the border without incitement or even facilitation by the Moroccan regime, a regime that has condemned its people to poverty and unemployment, illegally occupies Western Sahara and systematically uses violence against the Sahrawi people.

This is the same regime that has important agreements with the United States and Israel, which will become stronger over time. But at the same time, there is something I think it is important to point out in light of the public debate over the past few days: I do not favour this pro-Spanish government discourse, framed in nationalist terms, which portrays an operation by Trump, Morocco and Israel to destabilise Sanchez and Spain, targeting our sovereignty and territorial integrity, ultimately adopting the terms "invasion" and "hybrid war", and claiming that the most important thing is to defend our sovereignty.

According to this discourse, Spain is a victim of Morocco. Migrants are merely tools, and the most important thing is protecting the border and sovereignty.

These narratives ignore the fact that Spain, whether the right-wing People's Party or the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, has always maintained the best possible relationship with Morocco and its regime, which has committed injustices against the Moroccan people.

These narratives ignore the fact that people from the Global South have died. They also ignore that Morocco influences because it is a stronghold for the United States and Israel but, at the same time, is simply another country in the Global South.

The problem is that the politicisation of borders not only empowers countries such as Morocco but also constitutes violence against peoples so that Europe can continue claiming to protect human rights while pushing others to violate them.

In short, I do not support this nationalist narrative that equates the Moroccan regime with those suffering under its rule. These people are the working class with whom we should stand in solidarity, build alliances and confront this colonial, imperialist, capitalist world that is becoming increasingly inhumane.

Has the European model of border control failed?

The model of politicising borders generates systematic violence and death. It is a model in which countries in the Global South are blackmailed into militarising their borders and building detention centres for people fleeing terrible circumstances in exchange for aid and development funding.

It is a catastrophic and failed model, not because it threatens our territorial integrity, but because it involves the use of violence against people. The European Union is increasingly promoting this model.

The current project of this European government, in which social democracies and the far right share power, is a war project. War with Russia is one side of it, while the other is war against migrants.

It is a project based on the idea that Europe – this Western civilisation – is threatened by Russia and by those who want to come here, to the countries of the continent, to live and work.

In the face of this situation, everything must be militarised. For this purpose, companies are making enormous fortunes manufacturing weapons for Ukraine, in addition to drones to monitor people and security systems as well. They are useful for everything.

So, this is the current project: more border surveillance. But there is pressure on other countries to do this work, to the point that countries aspiring to join the European Union must first pass a review of agreements with Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, and, in general, migration monitoring.

If they behave properly–that is, if they do not violate human rights on a large scale–they can join.

But there is something very important: Why does the far right adopt this agenda, this project, which is being implemented by both Trump and Ursula von der Leyen?

Well, first of all, I do not want them to prevent people from coming, but they want them to arrive in the most submissive, disciplined and dehumanising ways possible.

If you have to endure everything to get here, and you are among the few who were lucky enough to make it, you will accept anything here. Notice, I am not saying migrants will accept anything, but the entire institutional system is designed to achieve that.

Then the migrant will work from sunrise to sunset for low wages, while Spanish employers will exploit them to exhaustion to take all the profits, the surplus value.

It is a mechanism of class oppression through racism. Migration laws, such as Spain's shameful law, which deprives people of their rights and condemns them to precarious and unpaid work for years until they obtain residency, serve this purpose.

This is why I am deeply angered by the pro-Spanish government discourse that ignores Spain's colonial position towards the Global South and its racist position towards those who want to cross and those who arrive there.

So, this is the main function: exploitation and overexploitation.

It is globalised capitalism that exports companies to poor countries in the global South to extract greater profits by stealing natural resources and exploiting workers, and also by importing undocumented workers, thereby producing more undocumented workers.

Moreover, if these narratives generate intense hatred towards a scapegoat, you make people stop looking upwards and recognise that the person exploiting them is their boss and that the one plundering them is the greedy investment fund.

This is how they come to hate those at the bottom of the social ladder, and society becomes more authoritarian in the absence of a working class driven by the shared interests that unite us all, whether we are white or Black, men or women

How do you assess the Spanish government's reaction to Ceuta crisis and the reactions of some EU countries, such as Italy and Finland, which proposed excluding Spain from the Schengen area?

I never imagined that I would one day agree with Margarita Robles, the Spanish defence minister, more than anyone else in the Spanish government.

It seems to me that if we want to confront Trump, we must take a firm position: support the right to self-determination for Western Sahara; defend the need for legal and safe corridors; question Europe's role in the Global South throughout history; and clearly affirm that the migration of people to the Global North is the result of the North plundering the resources of the South and that it continues to do so.

We must also defend freedom of movement and the right to migrate as a universal right. We must cut ties with Israel, which supports Morocco, and stop selling weapons to and buying weapons from a state committing genocide.

We cannot afford to be afraid in ideological debates. The far right is attacking with all its might, and the world is changing. We have reached a point of no return. Nothing will return to how it was. Therefore, it is absurd to defend what prevailed in past decades.

That world and the international order that prevailed after the Second World War, a world shaped by fascism and the Holocaust, no longer exists. It was built on those events, while naturally ignoring other events, such as the genocides and Holocausts suffered by other peoples.

From this construction and from those narratives, such as the claim that the Jewish people were the only people to suffer, or the people who suffered the most, we live as we do today.

But in conclusion, I believe there is no room for half-measures. I believe we must be consistent.

I also believe that what Spain and its government urgently need is to guarantee the rights of people living in appalling conditions in Ceuta and, of course, not deport anyone against their right to seek asylum and not return any unaccompanied child.

They have the right to be treated and cared for by Spanish institutions exactly like any child born in Spain. Clearly, human rights violations are being committed, as many non-governmental organisations have reported

As vice-chair of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, do you believe that the European Union adheres to the values it claims to defend?

It is becoming more difficult day by day. Even European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen no longer hesitates to express this. 

For example, after Trump's and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's illegal attack on Iran, von der Leyen said that "the old order is no longer valid" and asked, "Why defend international law?"

There is no doubt that von der Leyen stands alongside a system whose perpetrators are committing genocide. Naturally, she does not defend international law, because in the case of Iran, for example, this essentially means defending Iran's right to defend itself against an illegal attack by another state. 

By the way, this is a right Israel does not have because it is a state occupying the territory of another state.

The same applies to the European Union's cooperation and development policy. Commissioners are no longer ashamed to acknowledge that development aid, or official development assistance, is not intended to lift any country out of poverty but rather to provide an institutional bridge for European private companies to plunder the resources of the Global South, in Africa, for example.

And now they say it openly: we want to compete with China, and we will do everything we can to achieve that. We will demand that African countries militarise their borders if they want funding (part of the budget will be allocated for this purpose), and in return, our companies will plunder their resources. This is exactly what they are doing.

They have always done this, but at least they used to hide their actions. Now they are doing it openly and in broad daylight, without shame and with growing enthusiasm.

As for migration policies, note that they have recently succeeded in passing the return law. It is not fundamentally different from what Trump is doing in the United States through mass deportations. We are facing a policy of mass deportation.

Just as Trump puts migrants in Guantanamo, in Europe they will soon put them in other countries known for human rights violations. This means torture, human trafficking and forced labour.

These are not the actions of the mafias or networks they refer to in their rhetoric. They are the actions of the states they pay to do this: Egypt, Libya, Turkey and Mauritania, for example.

With the new laws, it will become easier: families, children, people imprisoned for more than two years, and people fleeing wars started by the West and its allies, such as Israel, will be imprisoned for years.

Nothing remains of what Europe once claimed to be. Nevertheless, if you look a little deeper, you will see that even that was a great lie. The Western civilisation they fiercely defend was built on the extermination of indigenous peoples, on the colonisation of other peoples, and on describing these peoples as "barbarians".

The far right did not have to invent much. It only had to read the history books on European colonialism: the few books that tell the truth about how things happened.

Palestine occupies a central place in your political work. In your view, why does the European Union always fail to take effective action against Israel?

It fails because it does not want to get it right on this particular issue. The European Union wants to be a partner of Israel because it is an extension of the West, or rather its outpost in what they incorrectly call the "Middle East".

Palestine does not matter to them, and they do not care about it. It matters to them only insofar as it serves their interests in waging wars. 

For example, in the US-Israeli war against Iran, in strengthening American imperialism, to which Europe is subordinate, and in suppressing the rights of European peoples and restricting their freedom.

Look at what Germany, France and Britain have done against protesters supporting the Palestinian people. They have implemented policies criminalising them. It is as though civil and fundamental rights no longer exist.

And now what? Will they imprison us simply for saying: long live a free Palestine?

We cannot allow them to move towards this form of authoritarianism, mass surveillance and control over people through social media networks and artificial intelligence.

At the heart of all this, there is also the sanctions policy imposed by the European Union, which does not receive enough public discussion. The EU imposes these sanctions on organisations it describes as terrorist because of their positions in defence of Palestine.

We must talk about all of this. There is a mistaken belief that the European Union is a neutral democratic entity and a standard-bearer for human rights.

The European Union is run almost entirely by technocrats. They are ultimately politicians, and many of them are from the right and far right, and they are embracing the extremist ideological project day by day.

Their only project is war, colonialism and imperialism. They are obsessed with competing with China. They are not very different from Trump, at least Ursula von der Leyen and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas.

Their war project needs Israel, its war machine, its weapons and security systems, and its position in West Asia.

What steps have you and the Left blocs in the European Parliament taken for Palestine, and what obstacles have you faced in imposing sanctions on Israel?

Waging the political battle. This is the most important thing. And contributing to raising public awareness of what is happening and of what its "democratic institutions" are doing.

We have strengthened and expanded the solidarity movement with Palestine and launched a campaign for the European Union to cancel its association agreement with Israel.

We cannot stop talking about Palestine. Nor can we settle for a social democracy that says one thing and does the opposite: not only continuing trade with Israel but also expanding contracts under the pretext of rearmament and provoking wars.

Palestine is a cause of humanity. It is the centre of the struggle and resistance for broader struggles against racism, colonialism and imperialism.

These struggles will become more violent in the next phase because we are living in a time when elites and capital owners have decided to reorganise themselves and reshape the world into a more unequal form.

Therefore, the struggle for Palestine is a space and an arena for raising awareness among new generations and politicising them. The young generations fighting for Palestine today are likely to be decisive in determining the next phase and the shape of the world to come.

Do you believe that the European Union can formulate an independent policy towards the Middle East from US influence?

No. The European Union has made its decision. It has decided to be obedient and subordinate to Trump and the United States and to its imperialist project.

Now, could there be another Europe? With a different European Commission and different governments? Perhaps. But unfortunately, at present, the project of the far right and European capitalist elites dominates the European project.

The real problem is that the European Union is not what we want it to be. Since its establishment under the Maastricht Treaty, the Dutch treaty, in 1992, it has remained a structure designed to serve certain elites and specific countries.

For example, Germany, thanks to the European Union, has greater influence than the rest of the EU countries, as the EU mechanism has contributed to pushing some countries towards deindustrialisation and the loss of a more advanced productive model.

Other countries were assigned an economic model based on construction and tourism: speculation in the housing market, the consequences of which we are experiencing today with the housing crisis and the sun-and-beach economy.

Here I am specifically talking about Spain. I could give other examples.

The European Union is not a union serving its European peoples. It is quite the opposite. Today, this European project is becoming a war project.

And we are now in urgent need of a peace project. An anti-imperialist project that builds alliances with other forces and peoples, such as Palestine, and pushes Europe in the opposite direction to the path it is taking today.

Hundreds of thousands of citizens across Europe have mobilised for Palestine, while EU institutions have maintained a more cautious position. Is there a gap today between European states and their peoples?

Absolutely. We have witnessed enormous crowds. Yes, a majority of Europeans are with Palestine, regardless of what their governments do, whether they oppose them or not.

I think the Vuelta a España cycling race was a powerful moment (in 2025, against the backdrop of the participation of an Israeli team). We stopped it; we boycotted it. We, the people, did that while our government continues to trade with Israel.

People are facing legal action for mobilising for Palestine. But we must continue. In fact, I think it is impossible to understand Trump's colonial peace plan without recognising the Zionist goal of dismantling the international solidarity movement.

Huge crowds have mobilised for Palestine in many countries. 

I think we must understand that through mobilisation and participation in politics in their true sense and in an organised way like this, we can change everything and that we have no other option.

I also think the issue of Iran showed that the United States is not an absolute power but is weak and vulnerable to defeat and does not have everything in its favour, even if it resorts to undemocratic methods to remove elected governments and install its proxies, whether in the Middle East or Latin America.

We are witnessing the rise of the far right in many European countries, which has clearly affected European policies, whether on security or migration. Do you believe the identity of the European Union is changing?

There is no doubt that the European project is now under threat, and this is not solely because of the far right. It is enough to look at Germany, which is adopting a clear strategy based on militarism, to see this.

It is enough to read its recently published national strategy (rearmament and building the strongest army in Europe). Germany is not only now forcing its citizens to return to military service but is also implementing austerity policies because rearmament will inevitably lead to cuts in spending.

In addition, they are talking about a major war against Russia in 2029. Russia and its invasion of Ukraine have strengthened the EU's war system as a pretext, particularly for Germany, which is seeking economic and political gains.

The problem is that this path will lead to greater divisions between EU countries, and we will reach a point where the project becomes unable to protect the interests of those who wanted to establish it.

We must add to this the contradictions of the far right itself: it says it defends the nations of Europe, their interests and sovereignty, but in reality it defends the interests of the United States and Israel.

Therefore, I believe the European project will face major tensions in the coming years.

As for the philosophical foundations on which the Union was built, they are also collapsing. And this goes beyond human rights and this hypocritical narrative. I am referring to the idea of progress itself, which was central to modernity and the European Enlightenment.

This idea is based on the notion that what we are and what we can become are not the same thing and that there is a gap between them based on aspirations. This gap has widened, partly because of technological progress, but also because of political and cultural changes.

For example, comprehensive education, which could have made us better at managing our relations with others through diplomacy and democracy, is now threatened by the narrative that war is inevitable.

Climate change has also led many people today to feel that they may die before reaching old age. This is a major transformation in European societies.

There are also many, many other changes. This change may not be as pronounced in countries that have experienced wars for which the West was responsible. Perhaps other countries, such as China and others, do not experience the same degree of a sense of decline, collapse and fear.

But this feeling is growing in our European societies at a time when the elites are not offering a better alternative. Therefore, we, the peoples of Europe, must work with the peoples of the Global South to build a better alternative.


What is the biggest threat to democracy in Europe today?

Ursula von der Leyen and the tendency towards racial and ethnic supremacy, whether it is Israel's racial and ethnic supremacist tendency or that of the racist far right as a whole, which portrays black people and migrants as enemies, a source of problems and the cause of every disturbance.

Likewise, the social democracies, which, in the face of the seriousness of the situation the world is experiencing today, have decided to remain silent, turn a blind eye to what is happening, or follow those who are leading us towards the abyss.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here. 

Palestinians are grappling with the devastation caused by the Israeli genocidal war on Gaza, the longstanding split between Palestinian factions, and growing international pressure for political reform.

During an interview with Hamas-affiliated Al-Aqsa channel, Husam Badran, a senior Hamas official, announced that the movement "will participate in the elections within the broadest possible national coalition."

Badran said Hamas had begun contacting Palestinian factions about a month ago to form an electoral bloc representing the widest possible political spectrum.

He described the elections as an opportunity to "bring about change in the Palestinian situation and end the monopoly on Palestinian national decision-making," arguing that Hamas, which he described as deeply rooted in Palestinian society, should have a role in the political process.

Among the Palestinian public, the announcement has been met with sharply different views.

Some see Hamas's participation as a political right that should not be denied, while others fear its return to political institutions could bring renewed confrontation with Israel, international isolation and further suffering for Palestinians.

Between blame and fear

In Gaza, where nearly three years of the Israeli genocidal war have caused widespread destruction, displacement and death, attitudes towards Hamas's participation are closely tied to personal experiences and fears over what comes next.

"I am categorically opposed to Hamas taking part in the elections or returning to a position of political power," Ibrahim Jalal from al-Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza told The New Arab.

Ibrahim, who lost over 15 family members, his home, and his grocery store—his main income source—during the war, said Gaza's destruction is linked to Hamas's political and military choices, while also blaming Israel for what he called "great crimes" against Palestinians.

"Israel bears responsibility for its crimes and its war against us, but Hamas gave it the pretext it wanted without considering the fate of the people," Jalal said.

He argued that Hamas should not return to a position from which it could make major decisions affecting Palestinians, warning that continued political dominance by the movement could recreate conditions that contributed to the war.

Jalal argues that Gaza's priorities are now to end wars, rebuild homes and infrastructure, lift restrictions, and restore a normal life.

"People today do not need a struggle over political positions. They need security, reconstruction and a chance to live," he said.

Ahed Hamada, from Gaza City's al-Daraj neighbourhood, supports Hamas's right to participate in political life but does not want the movement to control the next government.

"A Hamas victory under current conditions could mean more wars, destruction, death and siege," he remarked to TNA, arguing that the international community still does not appear ready to accept Hamas as a governing party.

"I believe Hamas should reconsider this step, not because its popularity has declined, but because it needs to reassess its priorities and allow the people to rest after years of war," he said.

He suggested Hamas could remain a major political force without taking sole responsibility for government, allowing it to participate in political institutions while reducing the risks of another confrontation with Israel and the international community.

The next phase, he said, requires a "new Palestinian formula" that includes all factions while avoiding a repetition of the political isolation, blockade and wars of previous years.

West Bank fears and political calculations

In the occupied West Bank, opinions over Hamas's participation are also shaped by the potential response from Israel and the international community.

Sari Nubani, a resident of Nablus, opposed Hamas's participation, saying its entry into Palestinian political institutions could give Israel and other international actors further justification to increase pressure on Palestinians.

Nubani told TNA that Israel would not necessarily view a Hamas electoral victory as simply the outcome of a democratic process, but could instead treat it as a security threat, potentially leading to more raids, arrests and economic and political pressure.

"We are going through one of the most difficult political phases under growing Israeli power. It would be better if neither Hamas nor Fatah participated, because neither has provided a solution," he said.

"The Palestinians need new leaders capable of dealing with the challenges imposed by Israel," he added.

However, Samir al-Natsha, from Hebron, adopts a completely different view, arguing that excluding Hamas would not resolve the Palestinian political crisis but would only deepen the existing divide.

He criticised the Palestinian Authority for decades of political failure. "It failed to protect Palestinians or make progress on their national goals," he told TNA.

"What has the Authority done for us over the past decades? Nothing. It has continued security coordination with Israel, contributed to economic deterioration and failed to protect residents of the West Bank from Israeli violations," al-Natsha said.

He argued that elections without Hamas would not represent genuine political change, saying the ballot box should be the ultimate test of each faction's popular support rather than political or international pressure determining who is allowed to participate.

Governing

Gaza-based analyst Iyad Abdel Jawad said the main question is whether Palestinians, Israel and the international community would accept the results if Hamas makes significant gains.

"Hamas wants to remain part of the political system and avoid losing its influence, but participation is different from governing," he told TNA.

He said the outcome would depend on the electoral system, factional alliances and international positions, with the key challenge being to ensure all sides accept the results and prevent a return to division.

Excluding Hamas, meanwhile, could undermine the elections by leaving out one of the Palestinian political system's major forces.

The broader question, Abdel Jawad said, is whether Palestinian factions can accommodate their differences without allowing political competition to lead again to division and war.

This page is now closed.

Here are the key updates of the day:

• US and Iran are deadlocked over who ultimately controls Hormuz as mediators try to salvage a memorandum of understanding that is set to expire on Sunday
   
• On the offensive, United States Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent says that the US is going to apply measures of "economic isolation" on Iran that have "never been seen"
   
• US Vice President JD Vance has noted a new two-fold goal: stabilise US energy prices, and stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons
   
• Israeli stikes continue in southern Lebanon and Gaza, while its pogroms in the occupied West Bank persists 

The peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL, has roughly 7,500 personnel from nearly 50 countries, and has been in place since 1978.

Its presence has not prevented repeated outbreaks of conflict. Southern Lebanon has seen successive wars between Israel and Hezbollah.

In August last year, however, the UN Security Council, under US pressure, decided to end UNIFIL's mandate on December 31, 2026.

"Pulling the plug on UNIFIL without a robust international force in place would effectively abandon millions of Lebanese civilians to an uncertain and potentially disastrous fate," said Louis Charbonneau, HRW's UN director.

"The peacekeepers are a crucial deterrent against attacks on civilians and human rights abuses," he added.

HRW urged the UN to extend the peacekeeping force's mandate "until the security situation has improved sufficiently to consider further reducing the force".

UN chief Antonio Guterres has said that peacekeepers will be needed in Lebanon after the current mandate expires, a suggestion likely to face opposition from the United States and Israel.

In June, he proposed three options ranging from nearly 2,000 to more than 5,500 UN personnel to monitor the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, and support Lebanon's armed forces.

That same month, France and Italy said they wanted to launch a coalition for after UNIFIL to strengthen Lebanon's sovereignty and prevent its territory from being "a foothold for regional escalation".

The country became embroiled in the Middle East war after Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel on 2 March in response to joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran, prompting a widespread Israeli bombing campaign and ground invasion.

More than 4,300 people have been killed in Lebanon, though violence has decreased since a US-Iran deal and a Washington-sponsored framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel went into force.

In July, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun called for UNIFIL to stay. And Lebanon's UN mission sent a letter, signed by 86 member states, to the UN Security Council calling for UNIFIL troops to remain with an expanded mandate.

Aoun said that if UNIFIL could not stay there should be "an alternative force" to "assist the Lebanese army in clearing the southern regions, removing unexploded ordnance, and keeping pace with the implementation" of the framework agreement.

HRW's Charbonneau said that "the Security Council should not leave Lebanese civilians unprotected".

"The council will share much of the blame if UNIFIL's departure creates a security vacuum that opens the door to further abuses".

The U.S. military is on track to pull all of its forces out of Iraq by the end of September, officials said Wednesday, marking the end of a presence that started with the 2003 invasion against Saddam Hussein.

Washington and Baghdad agreed in 2024 to wind down the much smaller U.S.-led operations against the Islamic State group.

U.S. troops pulled out of bases in most areas of Iraq last year but maintained a presence in the semi-autonomous northern Kurdish region. Bases there have regularly come under attack since the U.S. and Israel launched the war on Iran on 28 February.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi met with Adm. Brad Cooper, who leads the U.S. Central Command, on Wednesday. Al-Zaidi said in a statement afterward that he had affirmed 30 September as the “fixed and final date for ending the military mission of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Iraq and completing the departure of its forces.”

A U.S. official confirmed that the U.S. expects to complete its pullout by 30 September, but declined to say how many troops remain in Iraq or where they would be redeployed.

“The United States, Iraq and coalition partners have achieved tremendous success in defeating ISIS and now the Iraqi security forces, including the Peshmerga and other Iraqi Kurdistan Region security forces, will lead the fight against terrorists in Iraq,” the official said.

Two Iraqi Kurdish officials said a drawdown of U.S. troops and military equipment from Erbil began about three weeks ago.

The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to comment publicly.

The U.S. presence in Iraq grew to more than 170,000 troops at the peak of counterinsurgency operations in 2007. In December 2011, the final combat troops departed. But in 2014, the rise of the Islamic State group and its capture of a wide swath across Iraq and Syria brought U.S. forces back at the Iraqi government's invitation.

After IS lost its hold on territory it once claimed, coalition military operations ended in 2021. The U.S. maintained about 2,500 troops in Iraq for training and to conduct counter-IS operations with Iraq’s military.

Iraq also wants to disarm non-state groups

Iraq's prime minister has also set a  30 September deadline for non-state armed groups in Iraq to give up their weapons, saying they will have no justification to carry arms once the foreign troops withdraw.

Some Iraqi militias have justified their existence by pointing to the U.S. military presence, which they describe as an occupation, although the current U.S. mission came at the invitation of the Iraqi government after IS militants rampaged across the country in 2014, seizing large swaths of territory.

It seems unlikely that the Iraqi government will meet its deadline for disarming non-state groups. Some of the country’s most powerful Iran-backed militias and have said they have no intention of giving up their weapons.

The Riyadh visit was the first announced by an Iraqi security official to Saudi Arabia since Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's trip to the Kingdom was cancelled after the strikes on 29 July.

Officials from the Hashed al-Shaabi, an armed Iraqi alliance also known as the Popular Mobilisation Forces and that includes pro-Iran groups, said the US-Saudi strikes killed 20 militants, including five Iranians.

Riyadh said its forces had intercepted drones targeting oil facilities, blaming Iran-backed groups in Iraq for the attacks.

"Iraq will remain a cherished neighbour; we share bonds of brotherhood, solidarity, and mutual support with its government and its brotherly people. The Kingdom will always stand by Iraq to support its security, stability, development, and prosperity, for the benefit of Iraq and its brotherly people," Khalid bin Salman wrote, in a post on X.

He added that he had met with the director of Iraq's Office of the Commander in Chief Abdul Amir Al-Shammari, saying the pair "reviewed Saudi-Iraqi relations in the military and defence sectors" and discussed developments in the Middle East.

"We also emphasised the importance of continued coordination and cooperation between our two countries to serve our mutual interests and ensure the region's security and stability," he wrote.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an alliance of Tehran-backed groups, had vowed to retaliate to the strikes, but last week announced they would postpone their response.

The first high-level meeting between Saudi Arabia and Iraq since the strikes took place last week was between their foreign ministers on the sidelines of a meeting in the Jordanian capital Amman.

The strikes came as Baghdad faces growing pressure from Washington to disarm pro-Iran armed groups, which have targeted US facilities hundreds of times during the Middle East war.

Zaidi, who came to power this year with Washington's blessing, vowed to ensure those groups would hand over their weapons, but has faced pushback from some powerful factions.

Washington and Tehran are Iraq's main allies, but their enmity has long turned the country into a proxy battleground and left successive governments struggling to maintain a delicate balance between the foes.

Support for dispossession depends on the ruling class's cultivation of segregation between in-and-out groups, fearmongering and propaganda, alongside rewards for aggression, including material gains such as land and other resources, elevated social status and impunity for aggression against the constructed out-group. This manipulation of fear and reward conditions societies to accept genocide as normal, even righteous, because they have been neurologically wired to steal.

The latest example of this dynamic came when Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir proposed surrounding Ketziot prison with a moat of Nile crocodiles (Crocodylus niloticus) to guard Palestinian prisoners.

Who knows, maybe the crocs will be enticed by a benefits package similar to that of newly arrived settlers. After all, both are being recruited to help secure the Zionist frontier.

An appeal to the reptilian brain

Nile crocodiles possess extremely powerful jaws, are opportunistic carnivores, can grow up to 6.1 meters (20 feet) in length, and weigh over 450 kilograms (1,000 pounds). They typically ambush prey near waterholes before executing a "death roll" to subdue large animals (including people). Due to the crocodiles’ inability to chew their food, the roll serves as the primary mechanical tool to break bones, tear flesh and rip the hapless victim into manageable, bite-sized pieces for swallowing.

Ben Gvir’s proposal, which mimics Donald Trump’s failed Alligator Alcatraz, is tragically far from satire. In fact, the National Security Ministry has budgeted around $7 million for the construction of the moats, which are underway. This includes long-term plans for the reptiles’ maintenance and care.

For now, however, the plan has been placed on hold; not out of concern for Palestinians who may be subjected to these barbarically punitive measures, including a death roll, but because of concerns for the animals’ welfare.

The crocodile proposal offers a revealing window into how systems of domination and dehumanisation condition societies, particularly those lower on the in-group hierarchy, to derive rewards from cruelty in service of ruling-class theft.

Similar to many Israeli policies since 7 October, it functions as political theatre designed to reward the most primitive impulses associated with the brain’s emotional/ limbic system and related pathways (what is colloquially called "the reptilian brain") of domination, fear, humiliation, revenge and schadenfreude (pleasure derived from another’s misery).

While Zionist ruling classes indulge in land and resource theft in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, Ben Gvir appeals to those for whom humiliating and abusing people perceived as inferior provides a psychological boost, reinforcing a sense of superiority.

Conscription of crocodiles also provides a political spectacle aimed at harvesting votes, a dopamine delivery system for an Israeli public conditioned to celebrate cruelty as virtue. Within this genocidal milieu, Ben Gvir reigns supreme, ascending the Israeli political hierarchy with the prime minister's office firmly in his sights.

As Richard H. Smith details in The Joy of Pain: Schadenfreude and the Dark Side of Human Nature, a recurring theme among perpetrators is that many were themselves mistreated in the past and sought opportunities for payback. In Israeli society, however, this extends across society, with people encouraged to embody a victim mentality reinforced by the conflation of Zionism and Judaism, drawing on the historical experiences of world Jewry, from the Holocaust to the decontextualisation of Palestinian resistance to Zionist oppression and colonisation.

Indeed, schadenfreude serves as a cheap reward for aggression in service of ruling-class theft of land and other resources, as reflected by the shameless and gleeful sadism demonstrated by Israeli soldiers, particularly since 7 October, for which imperial and domestic impunity promise a lack of accountability and therefore permission and even encouragement to engage in it.

Photos of bound and blinded Palestinian civilians alongside grinning Israeli soldiers have even been used as social currency, including on dating apps.

Dehumanisation and recovery

Frantz Fanon, the Martinican psychiatrist, author and revolutionary thinker, analysed how colonialism dehumanises both the oppressed and the oppressor, with the dehumanisation of the latter expressed through the humiliation and abuse inflicted upon the former.

Engagement in the destruction of Indigenous society epitomises the dehumanisation of the oppressor, which destroys the physical humanity of the oppressed while eroding its own humanity through the forsaking of what makes it human: the capacity for empathy across racial, gender and other constructed divides.

The crocodile episode reflects the extent to which Israeli Zionist society has forsaken its humanity in service of theft, and how its ruling class suppresses empathy while appealing to primitive “reptilian” neural processes of fear and reward to service its greed.

For nearly three years, the Zionist rampage has relentlessly destroyed any semblance of empathy toward the Palestinian people, replacing it with escalated dehumanisation, disgust at their culture, history and existence, and glee at their suffering. What remains is an endless descent into moral depravity and cruelty, where racism, colonial theft and capitalist individualism are celebrated as the very foundation of an identity, and escape from this construct is actively discouraged through threats of severe social and physical punishment.

This is precisely what systems of domination depend upon: convincing people that what has been conditioned is “natural” and therefore cannot be undone, or else. Yet what has been conditioned can be unlearned, and what has been wired for domination can be rewired toward empathy, solidarity and co-resistance by restructuring the social hierarchies that sustain domination.

This is the central argument of my forthcoming book with historian Ilan Pappé, Wired to Steal: Zionism and the Shaping of the Western Mind: an examination of the behavioural and neurological mechanisms through which systems of domination, including Zionism, condition people to participate in, and even derive reward from, the dispossession of others, while showing how that conditioning can be undone.

Yoav Litvin is a writer, photographer and doctor of psychology/neuroscience. Litvin’s new book - Wired to Steal: Zionism and the Shaping of the Western Mind (Interlink Books)- co-authored with renowned historian Ilan Pappé, will be released in November 2026.

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

Mohammed Bakir Torki, also known as Soufiane, was remanded in custody after the Sidi M'hamed Court in the capital, Algiers, brought several criminal charges against him.

The accusations brought against the activist, which also include disseminating false information via social media, are related to his participation in a TikTok live broadcast in June this year. Authorities accused Bakir Torki of glorifying and praising terrorism, and undermining public security and public order.

Bakir Torki was arrested on Sunday at his workplace at the Directorate of State Property in Algiers, where he works as a security officer. He was then placed in police custody until Wednesday, before being brought before the Public Prosecutor in Sidi M’Hammed.

The judge thus ordered his placement in pretrial detention and the opening of a judicial investigation.

Bakir Torki is known for coming up with the phrase "Ytenehaw ga3," which translates to "May they all leave" in Algerian Arabic. It quickly became the slogan of the Algerian Hirak protest movement between 2019 and 2021.

The sentence was first heard after he interrupted a local correspondent of the television channel Sky News Arabia on 11 March 2019, after ex-president Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced he was giving up a fifth term. The clip went viral and marked a significant moment for the Algerian Hirak protest movement.

The slogan was used to call for the departure of Algeria's ruling political elite who benefited from Bouteflika’s rule from their posts, and to make way for change.

Bouteflika had been president for 20 years, and announced a fifth term in 2019, triggering mass protests and anger across the North African nation.

Following this, the military insisted on Bouteflika's immediate resignation, which took place on 2 April 2019. Bouteflika passed away from illness in September 2021 at the age of 84.

The protests became the most significant political movement in the country since the 1962 fight for independence, and saw the arrest of several political leaders closely associated with Bouteflika, and the ushering in of elections, which current President Abdelmadjid Tebboune won by 58%, following a 40% turnout.

The Hirak movement saw over 1,200 people arrested, including activists, journalists, and other prominent members of civil society.

Among them are Karim Tabbou, an opposition politician who was arrested in September 2019 and later sentenced to a year in prison on charges including "incitement to violence" and "harming national security".

Others include journalists Fodil Boumala, Khaled Drareni, and Ihsane El Kadi.

The latest activist to be punished for taking part in the Hirak protest is Mohamed Saïd Riahi, who was arrested in June, and was sentenced to 18 months in prison and a 200,000-dinar fine for a post on Facebook.

The Iraqi delegation is headed by Lt Gen Abdul Amir al-Shammari and includes Lt Gen Falah Shaghati, assistant director of the Intelligence Agency; Hamid al-Shatri, head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service; Lt Gen Muhannad al-Asadi, commander of Air Defence; and Lt Gen Zaid Houshi, head of the Counter-Terrorism Service.

It is the first publicly announced visit by senior Iraqi security officials to Saudi Arabia since Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi received a renewed invitation to visit Riyadh.

An earlier visit was cancelled after US-Saudi strikes on Iraq on 29 July killed 20 people at facilities belonging to the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), an umbrella organisation that includes Iran-aligned armed factions.

An Iraqi security official told The New Arab that the delegation was holding talks with Saudi officials over the drone attacks that Riyadh says originated from Iraqi territory and targeted sites and facilities inside the kingdom, as well as the fallout from the subsequent airstrikes inside Iraq, which killed and wounded PMF members.

The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Saudi officials had presented information and evidence they say showed that the attacks originated from Iraqi territory.

The evidence, the official added, appeared to indicate that the incidents "were not the first of their kind".

The Iraqi delegation, meanwhile, briefed Saudi officials on security and military measures taken by Baghdad to prevent further attacks from Iraqi territory and to pursue groups that might use Iraqi territory or airspace to launch attacks against neighbouring countries.

The talks will also address closer security and intelligence coordination between Baghdad and Riyadh, border controls and airspace monitoring, as well as the exchange of information on groups that possess or operate drones, the official said.

The two sides are also expected to discuss rapidly evolving regional security developments and their implications for Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the wider region.

Tensions after drone attacks and airstrikes

The delegation's visit follows an unprecedented security escalation between Baghdad and Riyadh.

The crisis began on 27 July, when the Saudi defence ministry announced that it had intercepted and destroyed several drones that it said had been launched from Iraqi territory and targeted oil facilities in the kingdom's Eastern Province and Riyadh region.

Tensions escalated further on 29 July when airstrikes targeted PMF positions inside Iraq, according to statements from Saudi and Iraqi authorities.

The Iraqi security official said the visit carried additional political significance because it could pave the way for a recalibration of security relations between Baghdad and Riyadh.

The talks will also cover preparations for Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's expected visit to Saudi Arabia, including its security and military agenda, after an earlier trip was postponed following the latest escalation.

According to the official, the Iraqi delegation will seek to establish two parallel principles during the Riyadh talks.

The first is Baghdad's commitment to preventing Iraqi territory from being used to launch attacks against Saudi Arabia or other countries in the region. The second is Iraq's rejection of military strikes on its territory.

The meetings therefore represent "a test of the two countries' ability to contain the repercussions of the escalation and move from an exchange of accusations and strikes towards a higher level of direct security and intelligence coordination", the official said.

'Iraq does not want to be an arena for conflict'

Yasser Watout, a member of the Iraqi parliament's Security and Defence Committee, told The New Arab that the delegation's visit had come at an important and sensitive moment.

"We view it positively, as it opens the door to direct security dialogue to address the repercussions of the attacks that were said to have originated from Iraqi territory, as well as the strikes that targeted sites inside Iraq," Watout said.

He stressed that Iraq was committed to maintaining balanced relations with all neighbouring countries and would not allow its territory or airspace to be used as a launching point for attacks against another state.

"At the same time, protecting Iraqi sovereignty and preventing any recurrence of attacks on Iraqi territory are fundamental responsibilities of the state," he added.

Watout said the presence of senior officials from Iraq's intelligence services, air defence and counter-terrorism forces reflected the significance of the issues being discussed in Riyadh.

Those include intelligence sharing, airspace surveillance, border security, tracing the origins of drones and preventing armed groups from exploiting Iraqi territory to conduct cross-border attacks.

"The current phase requires moving beyond exchanging messages and accusations towards practical security coordination," Watout said.

Clear mechanisms should be established to deal with intelligence concerning potential threats or launches from Iraqi territory, he added, in a way that both protects Saudi security and preserves Iraqi sovereignty.

"Iraq does not want to become an arena for conflict or a platform for attacks against countries in the region, nor does it accept its territory becoming an arena for military retaliation by any party," Watout said.

"Direct security dialogue and coordination between the relevant institutions is therefore the best way to prevent these developments from recurring."

A date for Prime Minister Zaidi's visit to Riyadh has yet to be set, Iraqi government spokesman Haider al-Aboudi said on Monday.

Zaidi had been scheduled to travel to the Saudi capital on 30 July, but the visit was postponed amid the security developments and the latest regional escalation.

In a new statement issued on Wednesday, Artists4Ceasefire said there was "no ceasefire in Gaza", arguing that the announcement of a truce had not ended the devastating conditions faced by Palestinians in the enclave.

"Every day, Palestinians are continuing to experience horrific suffering," the group wrote. It said that more than 1,200 Palestinians in Gaza had been killed since the so-called ceasefire was announced in October last year, including 300 children in 300 days, while more than 4,000 people had been wounded.

 

 

 

 

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A post shared by @artists4ceasefire

The post also highlighted the fact that nearly 70% of Gaza’s territory remains under Israeli military control, despite the so-called peace plan put forward by US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace, envisioning a full withdrawal of the Israeli army.

Artists4Ceasefire, which has repeatedly called for an end to Israel’s war on Gaza, linked the situation in the besieged Palestinian territory to intensifying violence in the occupied West Bank. It said Palestinians there were being "terrorised and murdered by settlers and Israeli soldiers every day", while being forcibly displaced from their homes and land.

The statement was signed by actors and musicians including Javier Bardem, Melissa Barrera, Hannah Einbinder, Ilana Glazer, Annie Lennox, Poppy Liu, Cynthia Nixon, Mark Ruffalo, Susan Sarandon and Morgan Spector.

"As artists, we have the privilege of reaching people through our work and our platforms," the signatories said. "With that privilege comes a responsibility to keep demanding an end to this horrific suffering."

They called for a permanent ceasefire, unrestricted delivery of critical humanitarian aid and an end to what they described as the decades-long denial of Palestinian human rights.

"The only path to a lasting peace is when both Palestinians and Israelis live in freedom, justice, and equity," the statement said.

The group also urged followers to share the message, donate, contact elected representatives and continue speaking out over Israel’s conduct in Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

"We need everyone working together to assert our shared humanity towards an end to this decades-long oppression, and to demand our collective liberation,” it added. “None of us are free until all of us are free."

Several of the statement’s signatories have previously used public platforms to call for a ceasefire and highlight Palestinian suffering.

Mark Ruffalo, Ilana Glazer and Susan Sarandon were among hundreds of artists who signed a letter as early as October 2023 urging then-US President Joe Biden to press for an immediate de-escalation and ceasefire, the release of captives and the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza.

Ruffalo later wore an Artists4Ceasefire pin at the 2024 Oscars, alongside other prominent attendees, and shared the group’s call for an immediate and permanent ceasefire.

More recently, he used the Oscars stage to say "No to war, and free Palestine", while other awards-season interventions have seen him call for sanctions and a boycott of Israeli film institutions he said were implicated in abuses against Palestinians.

District Judge Richard Stearns in Boston ruled that the government had not sufficiently proven that Harvard breached a Civil Rights Act provision that bars discrimination along race, nationality and other lines.

President Donald Trump has launched a campaign against major American universities, accusing them of giving free rein on their campuses to pro-Palestinian movements in the face of the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip.

In its complaint filed in March, the Department of Justice said Harvard "faculty and leadership turned a blind eye to antisemitism and discrimination against Jews and Israelis."

"Harvard let anti-Israeli demonstrators occupy its libraries. Harvard allowed an anti-Israeli encampment to persist for twenty days in violation of university policy," it said.

But Judge Stearns, who granted a Harvard request to dismiss the lawsuit, said the incidents raised by the Trump administration were "too isolated and episodic" to prove noncompliance with the Civil Rights Act.

The decision marks a blow to Trump's attacks against the oldest university in the United States.

His administration has separately moved to freeze billions of dollars of funding for Harvard for allegedly tolerating antisemitism and harboring liberal bias.

Last September, a federal judge ruled that move largely unlawful and ordered the funds be restored.

Hamad Mohammad Hamad Khalifa announced his resignation from the RSF in a statement televised by Saudi-owned Al Arabiya on Wednesday, citing "ongoing suffering" in areas controlled by the group.

"I, Hamad Mohammad Hamed Khalifa, announce my resignation as governor of the Kordofan region within the structures of the so-called Tasis government, which, regrettably, has become merely a political façade for the practices of the Rapid Support Forces," he said.

"Sudanese people today have no choice but to unite against all attempts to legitimise parallel forces or rogue militias that have squandered an entire generation's lifetime in the service of individual interests," he added.

Alongside being the governor of RSF-held Kordofan, which is split into North, South and West Kordofan, Khalifa was also a member of the presidential council for the RSF's rival government.

The RSF formed a rival government in April 2025, two years after fighting broke out in the capital, Khartoum, launching the country into a vicious civil war that is now in its fourth year.

Khalifa also called for the return of the Sudanese government to the remainder of RSF-held Kordofan and Darfur, which mostly came under the control of the RSF following the capture of El-Fasher.

The capture saw large-scale atrocities and human rights violations perpetrated by the RSF.

On the humanitarian conditions in RSF-held territory, Khalifa stated that there was a "complete inability to provide even the most basic humanitarian needs for the people of Kordofan and Darfur", by the rival government.

He added that the RSF was continuing "a policy of destroying cities and killing civilians without conscience or moral restraint".

Defections come amid continued military pressure on RSF

Khalifa's defection comes as the army says it is pressing ahead with offensives on all fronts.

Other RSF defectors include Al-Nour Ahmed Adam, also known as al-Gubba, an RSF commander who led five units in north Darfur that defected to the army in April.

In late July, the army took control of a major highway linking El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, which had been under a partial siege, with Omdurman, opposite the capital Khartoum.

The army has continued pressing gains, in what conflict monitor ACLED has said marks the start of the war's third phase.

ACLED's Sudan researcher Ali Mahmoud Ali, and risk methodology lead Nohad Eltayeb said the army is  "seeking to build on its gains in Kordofan, and advance in the RSF strongholds, while the RSF attempts to relieve pressure on its western fronts through offensives in Blue Nile and drone strikes on Khartoum, and River Nile".

On Wednesday, the RSF launched drones targeting the capital Khartoum, as well as Omdurman, Atbara, and El Obeid, attacks which continued into Thursday.

Major RSF attacks were also reported in North Kordofan and the town of Kurmuk bordering Ethiopia, which had been recaptured by the army in July.

The army accused Ethiopia of aiding the RSF in the attack on Kurmuk. It denied the claims.

Ali and Eltayeb said that with the escalating fighting, both sides were likely to continue air and drone strikes, particularly in north Kordofan.

"Coupled with a steady trend of RSF fighters defecting to the SAF [Sudanese army], these trends point to a significant disruption of the RSF's supply lines and strike capacity," they said.

"It is therefore unlikely that the RSF can withstand offensives on three parallel fronts. The SAF advances, fragmentation of the RSF, and the shift to aerial warfare by both sides will continue to impact civilians nationwide," the two added.

The Shehab Centre for Human Rights said in a statement that despite the passage of over a decade, the massacre remains one of the bloodiest events in modern Egyptian history.

The organisation noted that the massacre has “opened a long chapter of pain, violations and impunity”, with victims’ families still waiting for the truth and for justice, adding that many families are still facing the consequences of what happened.

The Rabaa massacre took place in Cairo on the morning of 14 August 2014, when security forces violently dispersed a peaceful sit-in at the Rab’a al’Adawiya square, where many had gathered to demand Egypt’s first democratically elected President, Mohammed Morsi, be reinstated.

The large-scale protest had taken place after then-defence minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi led a military coup weeks earlier to remove Morsi from power.

The military operation saw security forces use firearms and tear gas while mounted on horses, and deploy military equipment and bulldozers to get rid of tents that protesters had brought to camp out in.

Hundreds of people were imprisoned and convicted in mass trials; others have fled into exile, while hundreds were killed after being shot at by snipers, trampled on, and beaten.

Rights groups say that protesters were not given enough time and effective warning to leave before the violence, adding that the operation lasted around 12 hours.

No proper investigation

Egyptian authorities have failed to properly probe the events surrounding the protests and the killings, with findings yet to be published.

A decade after the massacre, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights published a report titled ‘Obscuring the Truth’, with one a document from the fact-finding committee stating it “does not doubt that it was possible to end the Rabaa sit-in without all this bloodshed".

The full report from the fact-finding committee has still not been fully published, while the head of the group, Fouad Riad, died in 2020.

The Shehab Centre for Human Rights said on Thursday that it demands a serious and independent investigation into the killing of the protesters, with those responsible for the ordering the crackdown to be held responsible. It also demanded that those who were involved in covering up the violations be held accountable in accordance with international law.

In recent years, several rights groups have attempted to shed light on the repercussions and events of the Rabaa massacre, and are working to gather testimonies from survivors.

The claims prompted Trump to evacuate Ankara, Turkey, last month in an extraordinary escape operation that involved him hiding inside a catering truck before boarding a military plane, according to The Washington Post.

A new report from the same outlet on Thursday said CIA officials did not find the Israeli intelligence "compelling", a view that was conveyed to Trump's team when the information was relayed.

Despite US intelligence officials' scepticism, the president was evacuated first to the United Kingdom, where he later boarded an Air Force C-32A plane back to the US.

"The Secret Service has had three near misses with this president, so they’re not taking any chances. They did what they had to do," an unnamed intelligence official cited by The Post said, explaining the decision to act on the Israeli intelligence.

Another source, a former official, said the Israeli warning matched "a broader pattern of Israeli intelligence reporting that some officials see as designed as much to shape presidential decision-making as to inform it".

Israel's attempts to influence US decision-making have come under increased scrutiny after Trump joined Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in attacking Iran in late February.

The joint attacks, which came in the middle of negotiations over a new nuclear deal with Tehran, were launched in part on the basis of Israeli claims that Iran's government was close to collapse.

The attacks followed decades of lobbying by Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders for tougher US action against Iran.

A New York Times report earlier this year said senior figures in the Trump administration, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, CIA Director John Ratcliffe and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine, had warned the president that Netanyahu had "oversold" the threat posed by Iran.

Democratic lawmakers on Wednesday called for greater transparency over the intelligence and the evacuation operation.

"I am very curious about the extent to which the Israeli-provided intelligence was not only credible but independently verifiable," Senator Chris Van Hollen told The Post. "I have no doubt that Iran would like to see the president gone, but this all seems a little fantastical."

Gaza's civil defence agency said an airstrike west of Khan Yunis killed one person, with the city's Nasser Hospital confirming the arrival of a body following the attack.

In a separate incident in Gaza City, the civil defence said one person was killed and several others injured in an Israeli strike on a vehicle in the Sheikh Ajlin neighbourhood.

Al-Shifa Hospital said it had received the body of Gaza City's police governor Jamal Abu Kamil.

Gaza's interior ministry confirmed Abu Kamil "was assassinated in an Israeli airstrike targeting his vehicle on Al-Rashid Street, southwest of Gaza City".

When contacted by AFP, the Israeli military said it was checking the reports.

Israel on Wednesday carried out its first major airstrike in Gaza since 3 August.

The hiatus in airstrikes came after US President Donald Trump's claim of a "major milestone" in his plan to end the war on Gaza.

Hamas had announced that it would disarm by giving its weapons to a nascent Palestinian governing committee.

Trump's "Board of Peace", in charge of implementing the ceasefire deal, had initially announced that Israel in turn would start a phased withdrawal from much of the Gaza Strip.

But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday publicly rejected the deal and vowed no Israeli pullout, even after the Board of Peace reassured him that Israel would not have to withdraw until complete Hamas disarmament.

Israeli operations in Gaza have killed 1,260 Palestinians since the ceasefire, according to the territory's health ministry.

The Israeli army has reported five deaths in its ranks during the same period.

Andrey X, an activist and journalist who was detained on Monday while attempting to bring food to one of the besieged Palestinian families, told The New Arab that the military entered Qusra in force on Wednesday night, taking over Palestinian homes even as it prepared to remove settlers.

“Over the course of the night, the army invaded the village of Qusra itself with many armoured cars and a bulldozer,” he said. “They took over a Palestinian house, and then they ordered one of the families to vacate one of the houses at the top of the hill.

“The excuse for that is that they are going to use that house as a staging ground to expel the settlers.”

A Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) spokesperson told The New Arab that the UK "strongly condemns the escalating violence and the establishment of illegal settlements across the West Bank".

The spokesperson added that UK ministers have raised concerns at the highest levels with their Israeli counterparts.

"“The recent attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinian villages and communities are appalling, as are violent incidents in response. Civilians should always be protected, international law upheld, and the perpetrators held to account, the spokesperson said. 

"“Settlements are illegal under international law, undermine the viability of a two-state solution, and fuel insecurity for both Palestinians and Israelis," they continued.

Around 15 Palestinian families have now been forced from their homes as part of the Israeli military operation, residents and activists said, with the army declaring parts of Qusra, Jalud and Talfit a closed military zone while it dismantles an illegal settler outpost.

The operation followed days of mounting international pressure over the siege of Palestinian homes by settlers, whose actions US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee described on Thursday as a “horrific act of terror”.

But for Palestinians in Qusra, the army’s belated move against the settlers has done little to erase what came before it, including soldiers blocking access to families under siege, activists being detained as they attempted to bring in food, and Israeli troops seen praying alongside settler terrorists at the illegal outpost earlier in the week.

“If international pressure dies down, it’s likely that the army will take over the houses and then kick out the Palestinians and pass these houses over to the settlers,” Andrey X told The New Arab.

“If there is enough pressure, then they will dismantle the outpost, and we may be able to save these houses.”

His warning reflects a deep fear among residents that a military operation presented as an effort to remove settlers could itself become another instrument of Palestinian displacement.

Qusra Mayor Abdul Azim Wadi said seven Palestinian homes had been seized by the Israeli military and incorporated into the military zone, while settlers remained close to the houses they had spent days surrounding.

“The Israeli forces have now also taken over seven houses located in the centre of the village and designated them as a military zone,” Wadi told Medical Aid for Palestinians.

“The army did not enter only to remove the settlers; instead, it also entered seven homes in the middle of the village.”

The families have been moved elsewhere in Qusra after being told the operation could last three days.

One of the affected homes belongs to Yousef Hassan, whose family of four had been besieged by settlers since Sunday amid a wave of attacks that residents say has intensified since the beginning of the year.

Hassan said Israeli forces forced him from his home on Thursday morning and turned the property into part of the military zone. He and his family are now staying with his brother.

“We were not given any official or legal written order,” he told MAP. “Instead, we were verbally informed that we had to evacuate the house and were forced to do so.”

His wife and daughter had already left on Tuesday after one of the daughters developed a fever and began vomiting, symptoms a doctor said were linked to the stress of the siege.

The Israeli military said on Thursday that it had dismantled two illegal outposts in Qusra and nearby Jalud, confiscated equipment and detained an Israeli.

It later said Palestinian families would not need to leave their homes during the operation, despite residents and activists reporting that around 15 families had already been forced out.

According to Haaretz, reinforcements from the Israeli military’s 51st Battalion were expected to arrive to assist with the operation.

The military action also came a day after Israeli forces attempted to remove a settler tent erected between three Palestinian homes in the same area but failed to complete the operation after settlers gathered and obstructed the soldiers.

By Thursday, hundreds of Israeli soldiers had been deployed around Qusra, Jalud and Talfit as the military began dismantling structures at the settler outpost in the Ras al-Ain, or Ein Aina, area.

Fuad Hassan, an activist from Qusra, told The New Arab that settlers had established the outpost around six months earlier after taking over five unfinished Palestinian homes, bringing tents, water tanks and livestock onto the land.

He said the settlers withdrew into the surrounding hills with their sheep as the Israeli army entered on Thursday, while soldiers imposed sweeping restrictions on Palestinian movement and effectively confined residents to their homes.

The confrontation has exposed what Palestinians say is a familiar pattern in the occupied West Bank: settlers seize or attack Palestinian land and homes while Israeli forces either stand by, protect them or restrict Palestinians, with action against the settlers coming only after sustained outside pressure.

Ameer Dawood, director of publishing and documentation at the Colonisation & Wall Resistance Commission, told The New Arab that the Israeli response came four days into the siege.

“The victims are being made to bear the consequences of the perpetrators’ actions,” he said.

“Any temporary evacuation of Palestinian families must not become a pathway to permanent displacement or settler takeover.”

“All settlers must be removed from the land surrounding the homes; access roads, water and electricity must be restored; the families must be guaranteed a safe and unconditional return.”

From settler siege to international uproar

The attacks in Qusra have drawn unusual international attention after footage and testimony from the village circulated widely.

On Thursday, Huckabee issued one of his strongest condemnations yet of Israeli settler violence.

“The actions of those doing this to this family’s home is criminal,” he wrote on X, describing the violence as a “horrific act of terror” intended to “intimidate and harass this family”.

Huckabee also said the US embassy in Jerusalem had been “VERY involved” and that the Israeli army and police had gone to Qusra at Washington’s request “to remove the Israeli terrorists doing this”.

His remarks were striking given the long-standing reluctance of US officials to use the language of terrorism to describe settler attacks against Palestinians.

They also appeared to underline the role international pressure played in prompting an Israeli response after days in which Palestinians said the army had failed to protect them.

The European Union also addressed the situation on Thursday, with a spokesperson reiterating that settler violence, intimidation and the destruction of Palestinian homes and property “must come to an end”.

But Palestinians in Qusra say statements have repeatedly come only after attacks have already escalated.

MAP’s West Bank director, Aisha Mansour, said the events in Qusra showed “what happens when state-backed violence becomes part of everyday life”.

Rights groups have increasingly warned that settler violence, land seizures and forced displacement in the occupied West Bank cannot be separated from Israeli state policy, amounting to state-sanctioned ethnic cleansin.

Since the beginning of August, Qusra has faced repeated organised terror attacks by settlers, according to residents and Palestinian officials.

What began as incursions and assaults on the outskirts of the village developed into a siege around Palestinian homes in Ras al-Ain, with settlers blocking roads, water and electricity and erecting tents between houses.

Elsewhere in the occupied West Bank on Thursday, Israeli forces tightened military restrictions east of Jenin ahead of the inauguration of the Ganim settlement, while settlers attacked Palestinians near Qalqilya and Bethlehem and Israeli forces detained around 35 Palestinians in overnight raids.

Settlers also entered the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound under Israeli police protection, where groups performed Jewish religious rituals in several areas of the site, according to the Jerusalem governorate.

The widening settler violence comes as the West Bank faces what UN Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Ramiz Alakbarov described to the Security Council on Wednesday as a “breaking point”.

For Dawood, the concern in Qusra is that the sudden Israeli intervention will be treated internationally as the end of the crisis rather than another stage of it.

“International engagement must therefore focus on protecting the residents’ continued presence on their land, rather than merely welcoming announcements of military intervention,” he told The New Arab.

Wadi, Qusra’s mayor, said the village had lived with settler violence for more than a decade, with more than 11 residents killed since 2011.

“My message to the UK government is that I hope they will work to strengthen and support people’s resilience and their right to live their lives,” he said.

“We should not always have to pay the price because of our identity. There must be freedom for the Palestinian people.”

Foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei said the slick had "degraded the waters" of the Gulf and Sea of Oman, claiming "preliminary evidence indicates a foreign bulk carrier as the source".

TankerTrackers, a US-hosted website that monitors shipping movements worldwide, said however that the spill seemed to derive from an Iranian attack on bulk carrier Minoan Pioneer in Omani waters on 3 August.

"The spillage then drifted across the strait over to Iran," it said.

Baqaei wrote on X that such spills have in "recent decades imposed trillions of dollars in damage on Iran's coastal areas", calling for compensation.

"Every party that benefits from commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz carries both a legal and a moral obligation to remediate the environmental harm inflicted," he added.

The spill had reached Qeshm island but had been "almost completely cleaned up by Wednesday evening", said Habib Masihi, head of the environmental protection department in Iran's southern province of Hormozgan.

He said about 32,000 square metres of coastal area had been affected along with waters covering 90,000 square metres.

"The oil pollution on the southern coast of Qeshm is just one example of the widespread pollution that has destroyed the region's marine ecosystem over the past few decades," added Sheena Ansari, the head of Iran's Environmental Protection Organisation.

"Who is responsible for compensating for the damage? The countries consuming energy exports from our region or the aggressors who have made this region a staging ground for military operations?" Ansari posted to X on Thursday.

Iran has maintained control over the Strait of Hormuz since the outbreak of the Middle East war on 28 February, blocking the passage of ships carrying energy exports from US-allied countries in the Gulf.

It has said it plans to charge navigational fees from passing vessels to fund services including environmental protection.

The United States and some regional countries have expressed opposition to any fees.

The spill comes after another slick in recent days near neighbouring Oman from a tanker that ran aground.

An AFP investigation previously found the ship had been stranded for weeks near Oman's Al-Qibliyyah island after it was damaged by explosions.

The 7.4-magnitude earthquake that struck western Colombia on Monday has killed at least 265 people, injured 3,494 and left 496 missing, President Abelardo de la Espriella said on Wednesday. Authorities say 25,872 families – more than 53,800 people – have been affected as emergency crews search damaged cities and towns, with thousands of homes destroyed.

The disaster, described as the strongest earthquake to strike Colombia this century, has reduced buildings to rubble across western parts of the country, including in and around Cali and Pereira. Search teams have been using sniffer dogs and acoustic sensors to locate people believed to be trapped, as the chances of finding survivors diminish with each passing day.

Colombia’s disaster management agency initially said it would accept urban search-and-rescue teams from Israel, the United States, Ecuador and El Salvador, while appeals for specialist help from elsewhere were either declined or delayed. The government insisted this was a technical, rather than political, decision, saying that only teams able to meet international protocols and operate self-sufficiently would be admitted, it said.

But the explanation has been challenged after Mexico’s Topos Tlatelolco, a civilian rescue organisation internationally known for deploying after earthquakes and other disasters, said it could not enter Colombia to assist the response. The group had formally offered technical and humanitarian help, but said it was awaiting authorisation from Colombian authorities.

The government later softened its approach, saying it would accept further foreign teams that complied with its stated certification requirements. Colombian media reported that Topos personnel subsequently arrived in Cali, meaning the question is not whether the Mexican rescuers were permanently excluded, but why assistance was restricted during the most critical early stage of the rescue operation.

For critics, Israel’s inclusion in the small initial group of approved countries cannot be separated from De la Espriella’s rapid reorientation of Colombian foreign policy.

The right-wing president took office only days before the quake and has moved with striking speed to repair and deepen relations with Israel, rupturing policies made under the openly pro-Palestine government of his predecessor, Gustavo Petro. Petro severed diplomatic ties with Israel in 2024 over its genocidal war on Gaza, backed South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice and stopped Colombian coal exports to Israel.

De la Espriella, who has portrayed Israel as a model for his domestic security agenda, has instead promised renewed diplomatic, security and economic cooperation with Tel Aviv. Before taking office, he proposed a closer alliance with the US and Israel to fight organised crime, emphasising Israeli expertise in military training, drone surveillance, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity.

"Israel will find in Colombia a friend and a determined ally in the fight against terrorism and organised crime," De la Espriella said shortly after entering office.

The political shift was underscored this week when Colombia recognised Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Syrian Golan Heights – becoming only the second UN member state after the US to do so. Israel seized the territory from Syria in 1967 and unilaterally annexed it in 1981, a move declared "null and void" by UN Security Council Resolution 497.

Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt condemned Bogotá’s move, arguing that individual recognition cannot alter the Golan’s status as occupied Syrian territory under international law.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar met De la Espriella shortly before the president’s inauguration, hailing what he called the beginning of a "golden age" in bilateral relations. Israel subsequently announced that it would send an aid delegation at Colombia’s request.

Marked annually on 13 August and now celebrating 70 years since the code's introduction, National Women’s Day in Tunisia is one of the most significant women’s awareness days in the region.

Across the country, women’s rights groups marked the occasion by celebrating Tunisian women’s achievements, but also highlighted the struggles and challenges they still face.

What is the 1956 Code of Personal Status, and what does it entail?

Introduced by then-Prime Minister and later president, Habib Bourguiba, in the same year Tunisia gained its independence from France, the Code of Personal Status sets out several laws aimed at creating equality between men and women in Tunisian society. It was formally adopted on 1 January, 1957.

Drafted by a group of about fifteen legal experts — the majority of whom were Arabic speakers — it was adopted in the immediate wake of independence, even before the constitution was written.

The code introduced the banning of polygamy, set out laws which require the consent of both spouses for marriage, and established a minimum age of marriage.

It also introduced judicial divorce rather than allowing a husband to unilaterally end the marriage, the women’s right to compensation following divorce, as well as the principle of equality between men and women regarding citizenship, and the abolishment of the wife's obligation of obedience to her husband.

The Personal Status Code has undergone significant amendments, notably the amendment of 12 July 1993, which repealed and replaced certain provisions regarding the dowry, divorce, alimony, child custody, the wife's contribution to family expenses, and the granting of guardianship rights over minor children to the mother in the event of the father's death.

The amendment also gave the right for wives the right to transfer their nationality to their children to the same extent as husbands, even if they were married to a foreigner.

At the time, the Code of Personal Status was considered more progressive for women’s rights compared to its coloniser, France.

Today, Tunisian women make up 70% of all university graduates in the country, and 62% of those are awarded doctoral degrees.

In the workplace, Tunisian women account for between 26 and 30%, while around 16% of women occupy seats in the legislature. This number has been in decline in recent years, but Tunisia has boasted several high-profile female politicians in the region, notably Najla Bouden, who became the first female Prime Minister in the Arab world during her 2021-2023 tenure.

Used for political agendas

​Despite such progress, several rights groups have over the decades accused the country's governments of using women's rights as a means for political gain, or for pushing certain agendas.

Under Bourguiba's rule, the first-ever Tunisian president imposed restrictions on 'Islamic' clothing, as part of a push to modernise the country. The hijab was outlawed in 1981 in official state spaces, public administration and educational institutions. The sefsari, a traditional white veil worn by some Tunisian women, was also discouraged.

He even went on to ridicule the hijab and niqab, calling them "miserable rags" that Tunisian women shouldn't wear.

Former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who was deposed in 2011,  had pushed for the furthering of women's rights in the country but violently repressed critics and cracked down on human rights at the same time.

Challenges persist

Despite progress, Tunisian women today are faced with numerous challenges in the ever-changing landscape of the country, currently under Kais Saied’s increasingly authoritarian leadership, as well as economic hardship exacerbated by inflation, debt, and climate change.

These issued have been highlighted by civil society group Mousawat, which pointed to the continued deterioration in women's living conditions, driven by high rates of unemployment and poverty, the rising cost of living, and the decline of public services, including power and water outages, medicine shortages and price hikes, and environmental issues.

It also pointed to the escalation of violence against women, evidenced by rising homicide rates and the increasing number of female agricultural workers falling victim to transport-related accidents.

The NGO stressed that women in Tunisia are increasingly being used as scapegoats under Saied, which they said "attempts to offload the responsibility for its own incompetence and failure".

Representation for women in politics has declined since Saied assumed the presidency. Mousawat said since coming to power, Saied "has made no secret of his hostility toward the principle of equality".

As they marked National Women's Day, other Tunisian rights groups have issued statements rejecting attempts by politicians to amend the Code of Personal Status, which they say seek to "undermine the gains achieved by women" in Tunisian society.

Roger Lu Phillips, legal director at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, told The New Arab that the formation of the committee was a "meaningful first step in seeking to obtain custody of perpetrators of atrocities in Syria."

Deputy Justice Minister Mustafa al-Qassem announced the committee on Wednesday, telling Al-Ikhbariyah TV that it would coordinate international efforts to extradite suspects, pursue crimes linked to transitional justice and recover Syrian funds allegedly taken abroad.

He said greater cooperation with foreign governments could help Syria bring back suspects who fled the country and face prosecution at home.

The announcement came a day after a Damascus criminal court sentenced several former officials to death in absentia, including Assad and his brother Maher. The former president fled to Russia after his government was overthrown in December 2024.

But Damascus’s ability to bring former officials back to Syria will depend far less on Interpol itself than on the governments now hosting them.

Phillips said that Syrian authorities will need to compile thorough documentation on the accused, and that there will likely be follow-up questions from states responding to such requests, noting that responses to such requests will be essential.

Syrian human rights lawyer Anwar al-Bunni told The New Arab that extradition could not take place simply because Damascus requested it.

“Extradition does not simply happen because a country asks for a suspect to be handed over. There must be a proper legal process, and in some cases agreements between the countries concerned,” al-Bunni said.

“You need a complete case file containing the charges, evidence and other relevant material so that the authorities can establish that this is a genuine criminal case and not a politically motivated prosecution or a case related to someone’s opinions.”

"From a legal perspective, extradition is only available for cases of sufficient gravity and not for political or military crimes," Phillips explained. 

"The request must also establish “dual criminality” i.e. that the alleged acts of the accused were a crime both in Syria and the state from which extradition is sought. There must be some evidence to show that the alleged crimes were committed by the accused, but the court examining the request will not assess the guilt or innocence of the accused which would require a higher evidentiary threshold," he continued.

He also said that some states may refuse extradition based on a number of reasons, including if they believe the accused could face torture or will not receive a fair trial. 

What Interpol can do

Interpol can help locate suspects and circulate requests for their detention, but it cannot order an arrest or force a country to extradite someone.

As an Interpol member, Syria can seek a Red Notice, an international request asking police forces to locate and provisionally arrest a wanted person while extradition proceedings are considered.

Such requests generally require a domestic arrest warrant or judicial decision, along with information identifying the suspect and detailing the alleged crimes.

But a Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant. Governments remain free to decide whether to act on one according to their own laws and international obligations.

Al-Bunni said Syrian authorities would first have to assemble the relevant case material before seeking international action.

“The file has to go through the relevant authorities and then to Interpol,” he told The New Arab. “Interpol will examine the case and, if it meets its requirements, it can issue a Red Notice requesting that the person be located and provisionally arrested.”

“It is not a case of saying, ‘I want this person returned because he is a criminal,’ and Interpol simply acting on that request,” he added. “It is a much more complicated process, with a number of conditions that have to be met.”

Even an arrest would be only the beginning.

Extradition proceedings can involve courts, government ministries and lengthy appeals. Authorities in the country receiving Syria’s request could scrutinise the evidence against the suspect, the fairness of the Syrian proceedings and whether extradition would expose the person to treatment prohibited under domestic or international law.

That could make the pursuit of some of the most prominent former officials particularly difficult.

Assad, for example, has been granted asylum in Russia, which is unlikely to surrender him to Damascus regardless of whether Syria seeks Interpol assistance.

In practice, the committee may initially prove more useful in assembling case files, locating suspects and testing the willingness of individual governments to cooperate than in securing the immediate extradition of senior figures from the former regime.

Death sentences complicate extradition efforts

Syria’s pursuit also faces another obstacle of its own making: the death sentences handed down against Assad and other former officials.

Many countries will refuse extradition when a suspect could face execution, torture or other ill-treatment, or when there are concerns that a trial would not meet international standards. Governments that permit extradition in death-penalty cases can demand binding assurances that the punishment will not be imposed or carried out.

Al-Bunni said both the prospect of capital punishment and questions over due process could prove decisive when foreign governments consider Syrian extradition requests.

“The country where the suspect is located will also need to be satisfied that the person will receive a fair trial,” he told The New Arab. “The death penalty is another major issue, particularly for countries that do not recognise or apply capital punishment.”

“A complete file, evidence, witnesses and guarantees of a fair trial will all be important,” he added. “The possibility of a death sentence could also create serious difficulties for an Interpol request and for any eventual extradition.”

According to Phillips, any extradition request from a state party to the European Convention cannot agree to extradite for capital crimes, but in such cases Syria could make assurances that it would not apply the death penalty in order to facilitate extradition requests. 

The fact that the latest sentences were issued in absentia could bring additional scrutiny from foreign courts.

Damascus may have to demonstrate that suspects extradited to Syria would receive a full opportunity for a new trial, with access to lawyers, sufficient time to prepare a defence and proceedings before an independent court.

Al-Qassem said the ministry was seeking the “highest degree of compatibility” between Syria’s judiciary and international standards while maintaining Syrian sovereignty over the transitional-justice process.

That balance is likely to become increasingly important as Damascus seeks cooperation abroad.

Human-rights organisations and legal experts have already raised concerns over the use of the death penalty and the safeguards surrounding trials of former regime figures. Foreign governments asked to extradite suspects will have to make their own assessment of those proceedings before agreeing to send anyone back.

The provision is among the most politically sensitive elements of Lebanon’s first general amnesty since 1991, a law passed by parliament on Wednesday after years of negotiations over which prisoners, fugitives and former combatants should benefit.

It revives a long-stalled effort to reopen the contentious status of thousands of Lebanese who feld to Israel as Israeli forces withdrew from the south in May 2000, ending a 22-year occupation.

Among those who left were members of the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army, as well as their families and other civilians who feared reprisals after the collapse of Israel's occupation.

Under the new law, Lebanese who went to Israel but were not involved militarily or in security work with the South Lebanon Army may return, according to Lebanese media reports and lawmakers involved in the legislation.

MP Ziad Hawat told Al Jadeed TV  that any Lebanese citizen living in Israel who had not served in the South Lebanon Army and was not the subject of a judicial ruling could return once the amnesty law was published in the official gazette, provided they relinquished Israeli citizenship.

The legislation builds on a 2011 law that sought to regulate the return of Lebanese citizens who had fled to Israel but whose implementation remained stalled for years because it required further government measures.

The new amnesty removes a longstanding legal obstacle to their return covered by the earlier law, while maintaining exclusions for offences including treason, espionage and unlawful dealings with Israel.

The law stops short of granting a blanket pardon for former South Lebanon Army members or others accused of collaborating militarily or in intelligence work with Israel.

No amnesty for collaborators 

Nizar Saghieh, executive director of the Legal Agenda, told The New Arab that the law “did not grant an amnesty to collaborators for the violations they committed”, but rather benefited their families.

“What they did in this law was remove the need for the decree issued under the 2011 law,” Saghieh said. “But the problem is that these families have grown since they fled in 2000. Some have acquired Israeli citizenship, and perhaps some have entered the Israeli army. This will create a problem.”

The provision raises further questions over a generation born and raised in Israel over the past 26 years, some of whom have never lived in Lebanon and may hold Israeli citizenship from birth.

Even those who acquired Israeli citizenship could be eligible to return, provided they relinquish it, raising practical questions over how that process would be verified and how authorities would handle cases involving people born in Israel, those married to Israelis or children whose legal status differs from that of their Lebanese parents.

There are no official figures for how many people could ultimately qualify. Lebanese media have cited estimates of around 4,000 people still living in Israel, though the figure has not been formally confirmed and not all would automatically be eligible to return.

The Israel provision is only one part of a much broader amnesty package that could affect thousands of prisoners and wanted people across Lebanon.

The law covers offences committed before 1 March 2026, while excluding a series of crimes including intentional killing, terrorism offences against civilians and security forces, military crimes, treason and espionage.

It also provides sentence reductions for some prisoners whose offences are not covered by the full amnesty.

The legislation emerged from years of sectarian and political bargaining. Christian parties, including the Lebanese Forces, had long pushed for a resolution to the case of Lebanese families who fled to Israel, while Sunni politicians championed the cause of Islamist detainees and Shia parties, namely the Amal Movement, had pressed for relief in cases involving drug offences.

Saghieh criticised that approach, telling TNA that the law had turned accountability from “the principle” into “the exception”.

“The major observation we have about the law is the breadth of the amnesty,” he said. “Accountability should remain the principle and amnesty the exception, but what happened was the opposite.”

He described the negotiations as a form of political and sectarian bargaining in which each faction sought concessions for its own constituency.

The law was nevertheless welcomed by some in Lebanon as a long-delayed attempt to address prison overcrowding and unresolved cases dating back decades.

The national army, known as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), captured the road to secure a vital supply line to its fighters in El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan.

The city sits at a crossroads between SAF-controlled northern and eastern Sudan and RSF-held territory to the south and west, making it a logistics hub for military operations.

For weeks, the RSF targeted El-Obeid with drones, striking vital provisions such as generators, fuel, and water tankers. Despite the attacks, the RSF has struggled to hold ground in the sprawling region.

Shortly after losing control over the 350km highway, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo vowed to fight on until his forces reached Khartoum, which is currently under SAF control.

Analysts say that Hemedti’s statement reflects his desperation to halt the SAF's advances.

“Since losing control of villages around the highway, the RSF has called on all tribes in Darfur to mobilise and enlist,” Mohamed al-Fatih Yousif, a journalist from Darfur who recently visited the region, told The New Arab.

“Many of the new recruits are being trained in South Darfur and in Libya,” he added.

Since the SAF and the RSF plunged Sudan into a civil war in April 2023, they have fought each other to a near stalemate.

In recent weeks, SAF-aligned forces have attacked the RSF on three fronts - in southeastern, central, and western Sudan.

The attacks have inflicted a series of strategic blows against the RSF, pushing the group to launch a major recruitment drive and reactivate vital supply lines, say analysts.

On Wednesday, the RSF reportedly targeted El-Obeid and other Sudanese cities with drone attacks in response to the losses.

“The local tribal authorities have answered the RSF’s call. They are sending many young men to fight, including children,” Yousif told The New Arab.

Tribal allies

Most RSF fighters come from nomadic or pastoralist Arab tribes in the sprawling regions of Darfur and Kordofan.

Like tribes across Sudan, they are governed by native administrations – a hierarchical, British-imposed system from the 1920s. The British created these to bestow individual chiefs with significant power, making them easier to co-opt.

More than a century later, many tribal chiefs are backing the RSF in exchange for money and power. Others fear that their communities could be ethnically targeted if SAF recaptures the region.

Throughout the war, the SAF has labelled young men and women originally from Darfur as RSF “cooperators” or “spies” to justify detaining, torturing, and sometimes executing them.

“Many tribes believe that they don’t have a choice. They believe that they have to enlist their young men into the RSF in exchange for security,” Yousif explained to The New Arab.

At the same time, the RSF poses an existential threat to Arab and sedentary farming “non-Arab” communities that oppose them, say analysts. Back in February, the RSF raided the town of Misterai, the primary base of the Mahamid clan of the Rizeigat Arab tribe - the same ethnic group that the RSF’s own leaders hail from.

The RSF was trying to assassinate Musa Hilal, a rival tribal sheikh who eventually escaped to SAF-controlled areas. Weeks later, the intra-tribal rivalry prompted several RSF commanders from the Mahamid tribe to switch sides. They were lured with promises of amnesty, money, and power.

The UN and human rights groups also accuse the RSF of committing genocidal violence against non-Arab communities in West Darfur and in North Darfur’s capital of El-Fasher.

During the offensive to capture both areas, the RSF gunned down young men in their homes and as they were fleeing into Chad and through RSF checkpoints. The RSF also systematically abducted women and girls and subjected them to sexual violence.

Still, some non-Arab tribes such as the Fur have agreed to back the RSF out of fear that they could suffer a similar fate, according to Noon al-Baramaki, a journalist who survived the atrocities in el-Fasher.

The Fur have reportedly mobilised four battalions of young fighters to enlist with the RSF.

“It’s practically a forced recruitment campaign,” Al-Baramki, a journalist who survived the atrocities in North Darfur, told The New Arab. “[Non-Arab] tribes know that the communities who resisted joining the RSF were subjected to genocide and ethnic cleansing.”

UAE support

The RSF relies entirely on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to fuel its war against SAF, according to numerous reports published by the UN, human rights groups, and media outlets.

Some of the support includes shipments of Chinese-made drones and artillery.

The UAE has also used shell companies to hire former Colombian mercenaries to train RSF fighters in Sudan.

“There is a sort of stubbornness on the side of the UAE that is very, very clear. They are not going to stop [backing the RSF],” Jalel Harchaoui, a political scientist closely observing the UAE’s role in Libya and across North and East Africa, told The New Arab.

Weapons, fuel, and mercenaries often cross into RSF-held territory from neighbouring Chad, South Sudan, and Libya. In exchange, the UAE receives billions of dollars’ worth of illicit gold and preserves its massive strategic influence across the Sahel.

Over the last several weeks, Harchaoui said that the UAE has gradually reactivated a direct supply line from the Libyan town of Kufra into North Darfur.

Libya’s eastern authorities closed that route when Egypt and Turkey began bombing convoys heading directly into Sudan from Kufra in November 2025. The bombing started shortly after the RSF committed mass atrocities during its capture of El-Fasher.

Harchaoui now says that there has been a noticeable increase in the number of cargo planes and hangars stationed in the town since July. He also suspects that the UAE is planning to build air defences to protect convoys traversing this critical route.

“Turkey and Egypt conduct airstrikes very easily, which means that route is really dangerous,” Harchaoui told The New Arab.

“But the UAE is preparing to absorb a percentage of loss - in terms of fighters and munitions - to keep the route open. For the UAE, this is just the cost of doing business.”

Mat Nashed is an award-nominated journalist who has covered the MENA region since the Arab Spring

Follow him on X: @matnashed

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

Economic pressures and changing social norms are driving couples in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria to have fewer babies, with a recent study saying Maghreb fertility was at a historic low.

Experts and couples interviewed by AFP spoke of a combination of factors, including longer educations and growing professional ambitions among women, along with rising divorce rates and financial strain on young professionals.

The trend mirrors changes seen in many parts of the world. But in the Maghreb, it challenges stereotypes of families tending to be large.

A recent study by France's Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) said the decline has been exceptionally rapid and appeared to be "lasting", while Tunisian demographer Mohamed Ali Ben Zina described it as "profound".

In Tunis, Nadia Jaouadi, 42, said she does not regret the decision she and her husband made a decade ago not to have children.

"Nothing encourages having even a single child," said Jaouadi, a civil servant, blaming Tunisia's current economic woes and social climate.

Across all three Maghreb countries, fertility rates fell by more than half since the 1970s, according to official figures.

Social changes

Tunisia now has the lowest fertility rate in the Maghreb, with 1.58 children per woman in 2023 and an estimated 1.53 in 2024, compared with 1.97 in Morocco and 2.61 in Algeria.

Tunisian demographer Hassen Kassar said Tunisia's fertility drop was primarily the result of deep social changes, including the "modernisation of families" and urbanisation, which have reduced family size.

In Algiers, Said, a 66-year-old retired former finance executive who did not provide his full name, said he came from a family of 10 children.

"My father struggled to provide for the whole family," he recalled. "So I decided not to have more than two children. What's important is that they eat their fill, dress properly and live in good conditions."

Chaimae Drioui, a researcher and professor at Morocco's National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics (INSEA), said the decline in fertility was "a rational decision by families in response to a new economic and social context".

Having children was at times seen in popular culture as an investment in the future, particularly among poorer families who relied on their children for prospective support.

But that view "has now been reversed," Drioui said. "The child today costs more than he brings in immediate economic terms."

Economic hardship, however, is not the only factor as the mental and physical demands of parenthood also weigh on many.

"After giving birth, I realised how much motherhood was a challenge for my mental and physical health," said Zina, a 42-year-old Algerian who gave birth to a daughter at 38 and no longer plans to have another child.

In Rabat, Kaouthar, a 38-year-old public-sector manager who did not provide her full name said she will remain child-free: "I chose to live a peaceful life away from the worry and stress inherent in raising a child."

Drioui said women's education and empowerment were key to changing traditional family patterns.

Foreign workers 

Yet a decline in birth rates also translates to an ageing population across the Maghreb.

In Tunisia, people aged 60 and over now account for 17 percent of the population, or nearly 2 million people.

The trend is less advanced in Algeria, where people aged 60 and over represented a 10th of the population in 2023 -- and in Morocco, where the same category accounted for 13.8 percent of the population in 2024.

The demographic shift could put pressure on pension systems and weaken the balance between working-age people and retirees.

INED said that if deaths eventually outnumbered births, only immigration could sustain population growth.

And foreign workers could help fill labour shortages as the working-age population shrinks.

But that prospect could prove difficult in the countries where migration is already a highly sensitive topic.

For Kassar, one possibility is already emerging: "We will need sub-Saharan migrants."

The party's founder and leader, Paul Hopkinson, told The New Arab on Thursday, 13 August, "The party secretary sent me a message informing me that we had been officially registered after receiving an email from the Electoral Commission."

"I knew that there was enormous external pressure being exerted on them not to register the party. The commission received 207 objections from Zionists and Zionist organisations against recognising us as an official party," he added.

The New Zealand Electoral Commission announced its approval of the registration of the "Free Palestine" party as a political party after examining its registration application in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Act 1993.

The decision followed a public consultation during which the commission received 207 submissions opposing the application.

The commission concluded that the party had met the legal requirements, including providing evidence that it had at least 500 current financial members who were eligible to enroll as voters.

It also found no legal grounds requiring it to reject the registration.

The commission said it had carefully considered objections concerning the name "Free Palestine" party and whether it was offensive or likely to cause anger or disgust in a reasonable person.

"The phrase, while highly sensitive and the subject of widespread political disagreement", it noted, was not in itself "offensive" under the legal standard set out in the legislation.

It said supporters viewed it as a call for human rights, freedom and an end to occupation, while opponents considered it offensive or antisemitic or an implicit call for hostility towards Israel and Jewish communities.

The commission stressed that it was required to assess the party's name itself, rather than its positions, slogans or campaign material.

The commission, however, rejected registration of the party's logo, which includes the Palestinian flag and the words "Free Palestine" party, because it could confuse or mislead voters.

This was particularly because they might believe the party officially represented a Palestinian political entity or international movement, or that it had the support or control of Palestinian institutions.

It said the decision was also based on similar electoral precedents.

As a result, the "Free Palestine" party will be able to contest the upcoming general election, compete for party-list votes and nominate candidates in electoral districts.

However, its logo will not appear beside the name of the party or its candidates on the ballot paper, as the legal deadline for submitting an alternative logo has expired.

The party leader said to TNA that the party's official registration had multiple benefits for the Palestine solidarity movement in New Zealand.

"It gives us government funding of $82,000 to help raise awareness of the Palestinian cause, allowing us to increase pressure on any incoming government to listen to more than 60% of the New Zealand public who, according to opinion polls, are calling for action to impose sanctions on Israel," he added. "Most importantly, this registration makes it extremely difficult for any New Zealand government to restrict freedom of expression or the activities of Palestine supporters."

In the first official reaction opposing the party's registration, the Coalition of Ministers Supporting Israel (COMS), which comprises 136 Protestant Christian clergy in New Zealand from Pentecostal, Baptist, Brethren, Presbyterian, Anglican and Methodist churches and others, who support the right of the State of Israel to protect itself, issued a statement.

"The Coalition of Ministers Supporting Israel is concerned about the Electoral Commission's decision to register the "Free Palestine" party as a political party in the general election scheduled for November," it said.

"New Zealand's electoral system has been hijacked by foreign interests and influence seeking to use the electoral process in our country to promote the twisted ideology of those who call for the elimination of Israel," the statement continued.

Next steps for "Free Palestine"

Commenting on this, Hopkinson described the statement, in remarks to TNA, as "shameful" for its support of an apartheid state and the ongoing genocide of the Palestinian people.

He stressed that "calling for the downfall of the Israeli apartheid state is something we are proud to stand in solidarity with, just as many veteran Palestine supporters and activists in New Zealand were proud to support the struggle that ended the apartheid state in South Africa".

Asked about the next steps the party intends to take after its official registration, he said the party "will hold a launch event in the city of Christchurch, and we hope it will be before mid-September, followed by the launch of the campaign at a national level".

"Planning to contest this election is still under way; however, we are of course considering putting forward candidates on the party list, as well as candidates in electoral districts for key single-member seats," he added.

"We hope to be able to bring this issue to the heart of New Zealand politics, where it should be. It is time for New Zealand and its people to be leaders in the struggle against Zionism and Israel, just as we were leaders in the anti-nuclear weapons and anti-apartheid movements," he continued.

For his part, Maher Nazzal, head of the Palestine Forum in New Zealand, told The New Arab that "registering a party to participate in the upcoming general election is a very important step, not only for Palestinians in New Zealand but also for everyone who believes in justice, human rights and accountability".

He stressed that "this registration means that the voice calling for justice for Palestine now has a clear democratic political framework capable of addressing voters directly and raising issues that traditional parties have ignored".

He added that "this step represents the beginning of the road, not its end; the challenge now is to build a strong and organised campaign, reach as many voters as possible, explain the party's programme to people, and not only talk about Palestine but also about issues that matter to all New Zealanders".

Regarding the forum's mechanisms for helping the newly formed party, Nazzal said that "there are several ways, including joining, volunteering and donating within electoral laws, helping the campaign communicate with different communities, spreading the party's messages, and organising meetings and events across the country".

"The most important thing is to show that supporting Palestine does not conflict with being New Zealanders; rather, defending human rights, justice and equality is a fundamental part of the democratic society in which we live," he added.

The New Zealand-Palestinian activist considered that "we are facing a historic opportunity. It will not be easy, but if we work together in an organised and professional manner, we will succeed in turning this registration from a mere announcement into an influential political voice inside the New Zealand Parliament".

He noted that "small parties, under New Zealand's mixed-member proportional representation system, have a real opportunity to exert influence if they manage to reach the required electoral threshold or win an electorate seat".

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.

But who is Count Binface, Leader of the Recyclons, and where does he stand on Palestine and other issues in the Middle East?

Binface's foreign policy

Binface, the alter ego of comedian and comedy writer Jon Harvey, has set out a raft of policies, including a cap on croissant prices, improved Wi-Fi on trains and conscripting people who use speakerphones on public transport.

He has also occasionally ventured into foreign policy, including by calling for an end to British arms sales to Saudi Arabia

"The UK must immediately follow the example of President Biden and stop selling arms to Saudi Arabia. (They should also start buying space lasers from Count Binface, but that bit can wait.)," Binface wrote on Twitter in January 2021, responding to a Sky News post about the killing of nine civilians in Yemen by Saudi airstrikes.

The comedy candidate has otherwise said little about the Middle East, with some of his strongest political jabs instead directed at Britain's departure from the European Union.

"First I analysed the cons of Brexit. That took me quite a long time. I'm still doing that," Binface said in an interview with British journalist Mehdi Hasan earlier this week.

"Then I decided to look at the pros," he continued, before adding: "None that I can see."

Despite sitting down with Hasan, who is known for his coverage of the Middle East, the interview steered clear of the region.

'Where's Sangita?'

While Binface has not directly spoken about Palestine, the run-up to the by-election has seen videos resurface of the comedian repeatedly asking journalists from LBC Radio why one of the station's former presenters, Sangita Myska, was suddenly dropped without explanation.

Myska's last appearance on LBC was on 14 April 2024, when she grilled Israeli spokesman Avi Hyman over Israel's attack on the Iranian consulate building in Damascus. She did not return to her regular show, with LBC announcing weeks later that she was leaving the station.

Her departure prompted widespread speculation that it was connected to the interview with Hyman, although LBC has not publicly said this was the reason. Critics have cited the episode in wider concerns about the treatment of voices critical of Israel in Britain's mainstream media.

In one video circulated on social media, an LBC journalist introduces himself to Binface at an election count.

"LBC, lovely!" Binface responds. "What happened to Sangita Myska? What happened to Sangita Myska, everyone?"

The exchange is one of many quips delivered by Count Binface, whose unlikely presence in the political spotlight has also provided an avenue for more serious criticism of British politics and the media.

In the race for Clacton-on-Sea, Binface has taken indirect jabs at scandal-hit Farage by pledging not to accept £5 million gifts from crypto billionaires and to spend more time in Clacton than Washington, references to controversy surrounding the Reform leader and his frequent trips to the United States.

A 26 June deal brokered by the US supposedly linked the progressive withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon to the "verified disarmament" of all non-state armed groups by the Lebanese government. Hezbollah, which is not a party to the agreement, has rejected disarming.

Reuters reported last week that Lebanon and Israel had agreed to a shortlist and reported on Wednesday, citing three sources, that the list included Britain, Italy, Switzerland and Indonesia as potential contributors to the verification mechanism.

A Lebanese official on Thursday said there was no such agreement and that Beirut was still in discussions with the United States on the matter.

A State Department official said on Tuesday that a round of US-brokered meetings between Lebanon and Israel in Rome last week discussed the "third-party verification" of the Lebanese army's "clearance operations" but did not mention the shortlist or the countries involved.

Israel and Lebanon are to hold an eighth round of US-sponsored negotiations next month, in Rome.

Israel has killed more than 4,300 people in Lebanon since March.

These changes come amid ongoing attempts to revive the Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and bring both sides back to the negotiating table.

Against this backdrop, the appointments offer an early indication of how Iran’s factional politics are evolving under its new leader - and how those shifts could shape the country’s approach to the war and beyond.

Shifting balance of power

Iranian officials have announced several new political appointments in recent days, seemingly formalising shifts in Iran’s factional politics. On 9 August, Mohsen Rezaei - who previously served as commander in chief of the IRGC for 16 years - was appointed secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).

A decree from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on the same day appointed Rezaei as one of his official representatives on the SNSC.

These appointments mark Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s first major intervention in Iran’s political landscape since the outbreak of the war and appear designed in part to balance power between competing factions.

Such balancing acts - aimed at preventing any single faction from dominating Iran’s political and security institutions - have long been a feature of elite management in the Islamic Republic.

In this instance, Mohsen Rezaei’s appointment as head of the SNSC ends a just four-month tenure of Mohammed Bagher-Zolghadr, who is reportedly close to Mohammed Bagher Qalibaf, Iran’s parliament speaker and a key figure in the Iran-US negotiations.

Zolghadr was nevertheless retained as a political adviser to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, suggesting his removal from the SNSC represents a redistribution of influence, not his wholesale marginalisation.

Renewed US-Iran confrontation

Beyond balancing power, Mohsen Rezaei’s appointment suggests Iran’s new Supreme Leader may favour giving more weight to figures advocating a confrontational stance towards the US.

The former IRGC Commander in Chief has expressed opposition to the Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), and last week stated that Iran “will never permit the opening of a second corridor in the Strait of Hormuz”.

Such a stance, if adhered to in Tehran, would likely further complicate ongoing Omani, Qatari, and Pakistani attempts to bring Iran and the US back to the negotiating table.

Rezaei’s stance appears to mirror that of Saeed Jalili, the other representative of the Supreme Leader on the SNSC. Jalili, a prominent figure in the hardline Paydari Front, has historically opposed any negotiation with the US, and appears to see any sort of concession to the West as a red line.

Of note, Iranian state media has reported that Jalili was the only member of the 13-person SNSC to vote against the signing of the MoU in June.

Following Rezaei’s appointment, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei also appointed six senior commanders across Iran’s security forces.

This included the confirmation of Ahmad Vahidi as commander in chief of the IRGC, officially succeeding Mohammad Pakpour, who was killed in February at the outset of the Iran-Israel-US war.

In a further sign that Tehran views the war as ongoing, Khamenei in his appointment decree also called on Vahidi to prepare to carry out “powerful offensive operations against the enemy”.

Still, a renewed full-scale war with the US is not a foregone conclusion. Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Mohammed Bagher Qalibaf, have called for de-escalation and the resumption of negotiations with the US.

Both individuals seem to view this as necessary to resolve Iran’s dire economic situation and maintain domestic stability.

Additionally, the continued US blockade of Iranian ports and declining oil revenues could have an economic impact significant enough to bring even more hardline figures to the negotiating table.

The impact of the blockade so far has already been so severe that Majidreza Hariri, head of the Iran-China Joint Chamber of Commerce, has said that the effect of a continued blockade could surpass that of the multi-year sanctions regime imposed on the country.

In the short term, this may push Tehran to seek an understanding with Washington that would secure an end to the naval blockade and ease some economic pressures on Iran, without resolving the wider points of contention between the two sides.

Tactical survival or a new regime?

It remains to be seen whether the appointment of these figures is in preparation for a short-term conflict with the US or represents Mojtaba Khamenei’s long-term vision for the Islamic Republic.

However, the distinction may become increasingly difficult to make. Even if these appointments are primarily a response to the prospect of renewed full-scale confrontation, the strengthening of hardline voices within Iran’s political and security apparatus could have consequences that outlast the immediate conflict.

The consequences could be particularly significant for Iran’s foreign relations. A scenario including renewed, sustained attacks on Gulf states, and the further mobilisation of Iran-linked groups in Yemen, Lebanon and even Iraq, for example, would make a diplomatic and economic rapprochement with Gulf states after the war all the more difficult.

Similarly, further rounds of sustained confrontation with the US, particularly if key issues remain unresolved, would likely undermine Iran’s ability to obtain US sanctions relief in the medium term.

Continued international isolation will only exacerbate Iran’s economic crisis, potentially fuelling further public discontent.

Zahra Ladha is a geopolitical analyst focused on Iran, Iraq, and transnational Shiaism. She holds an MSc in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Oxford 

Follow her on X: @zahrariy_

Javad Heiran-Nia is an Iranian analyst based in Iran. He is the director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran

Follow him on X: @J_Heirannia

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

The unusually direct rebuke from Washington came after Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz declared that Israeli forces would not withdraw from Lebanese territory and had been ordered to prepare for a long-term presence in areas Israel has designated a "security zone".

A senior US State Department official said in a statement sent to Israel's Channel 12 seeking a response to Katz's remarks that Washington expected Israel to abide by the commitments it made under the US-brokered framework signed in late June.

"A permanent military presence in southern Lebanon is inconsistent with the commitments set forth in the framework, or with the long-term peace and security of both countries," the official said.

The official also reaffirmed Washington's "full support for Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty", drawing a clear line between the agreement negotiated by the United States and Katz's declaration that Israeli troops intend to remain on Lebanese soil.

The State Department official stressed that the framework provides a conditions-based pathway towards a gradual Israeli withdrawal, tied to the verified disarmament of Hezbollah and dismantling of its military infrastructure.

"The Lebanese Armed Forces are currently implementing the first pilot areas, and the United States will continue to support the full implementation of this process," the official said.

Israel has publicly framed its occupation of Lebanon as necessary to secure its northern border, but senior Israeli officials have repeatedly advocated the seizure and colonisation of Lebanese territory and the expansion of Israel's northern borders.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has called for Israel's northern frontier to be moved to the Litani River, while Katz has threatened Lebanon with the "loss of territory". His latest declaration that Israeli forces will remain indefinitely has further fuelled Lebanese fears that the occupation is intended to become permanent.

During a tour of occupied Lebanese territory on Wednesday, Katz said Israeli troops would remain in the so-called "security zones" in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza.

"We will not move from here and we will not withdraw," Katz said.

He said he had instructed the Israeli military to make the administrative and operational preparations required for a prolonged deployment.

The language echoed Israel's earlier occupation of southern Lebanon, when it maintained a self-declared "security zone" for nearly two decades before withdrawing in May 2000.

Katz also spoke openly about the destruction being carried out in the occupied area, saying Israeli forces were demolishing homes and alleged "Hezbollah infrastructure".

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on Wednesday condemned Israel's "systematic destruction" of homes and infrastructure in the south, saying it violated international law and was intended to prevent displaced Lebanese residents from returning to their land.

The Israeli statements come as negotiations over implementing the June framework remain deadlocked, particularly over the sequence of Israeli withdrawals and the Lebanese army's deployment in the south.

Lebanon has sought further Israeli withdrawals to allow its army to move into additional "pilot zones", while Israel has made further redeployments conditional on the verified disarmament of Hezbollah and dismantling of its infrastructure, while introducing a widening list of unrealistic and unserious demands.

These include the transfer to Israel of remains from Jewish cemeteries in Beirut and Sidon, information on 11 Jews who disappeared or were killed during Lebanon's civil war, and answers over the fate of Israeli airman Ron Arad, who disappeared in Lebanon in 1986.

The impasse has persisted despite the Lebanese army beginning implementation of the framework in the first pilot area. Lebanon has pushed for the same model to be expanded, with Israeli forces withdrawing and the Lebanese army moving in, but Israel has resisted opening additional zones.

Lebanese army commander General Rudolph Haykal raised the obstacles facing the military during meetings this week with US Major General Joseph Clearfield, who heads the military coordination group involved in implementing the agreement.

According to Lebanese accounts of the meetings, Haykal pointed to continuing Israeli attacks, bulldozing and destruction as among the principal difficulties facing the army as it attempts to deploy and carry out its responsibilities in the south.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has sought greater American pressure on Israel to withdraw, raising the issue during his July visit to Washington and talks with US President Donald Trump.

The latest comes ahead of another expected round of US-mediated negotiations in Rome in early September.

The confrontation unfolded on Wednesday morning in Qusra, south of Nablus, where settlers had erected a tent just metres from the home of the Abu Rida family. The family says settlers have besieged the property for four days in an attempt to seize it.

The scene was unusual in a territory where the Israeli military has for years been accused of protecting settlers during attacks on Palestinians, including assaults in which homes and property have been torched and Palestinians have been killed.

But shortly after 7am on Wednesday, Israeli soldiers arrived and attempted to dismantle the settlers' tent.

"The occupation army arrived at around 7am today, attempting to dismantle the tent that several settlers had set up in front of our home to seize it," Qusay Abdulmunim Abu Rida told The New Arab. "But what happened was strange, as the settlers attacked the soldiers, who responded by firing tear gas and stun grenades."

Soldiers dismantled the tent and confiscated a car and an off-road vehicle belonging to the settlers, Abu Rida said. The settlers then confronted the soldiers, recovered the car and fled along bypass roads used by settlers.

The confrontation lasted about an hour and a half. But any reprieve for the Abu Rida family proved short-lived.

"It is true that the army left after an hour and a half of clashes, but the number of settlers continued to increase until it reached more than 100 settlers at the site of the same tent that the soldiers had confiscated," Abu Rida said.

A family under siege

For four days, settlers have maintained a tent about four metres from the Abu Rida home, according to the family, as part of what they describe as an escalating effort to force them from the property.

The settlers began digging around water networks before removing electricity poles and destroying cables supplying the house. They also smashed surveillance cameras and blocked the road leading to the property, preventing residents of Qusra from bringing the family food, water and medicine.

For Abu Rida, the tactics bear an unsettling resemblance to what happened about two weeks earlier to the Tubasi family in nearby Jaloud, where settlers seized a Palestinian home after Israeli soldiers intervened and helped remove the family.

"They want to repeat what they did to the Tubasi family's homes in Jaloud," Abu Rida said.

He said the pressure began months earlier, after settlers erected additional tents at an outpost established at the beginning of the year.

Abu Rida, his brothers, their wives and children subsequently moved into the threatened house, which belongs to his brother Murad, who lives and works in the United States and returns to the village for annual visits.

The Israeli army's sudden confrontation with the settlers therefore left the family puzzled.

Just two days earlier, Abu Rida said, soldiers had prevented foreign activists from reaching the family with food and water, telling them that the surrounding area had been declared a closed military zone for six months.

The family says the designation is particularly difficult to understand because the house is in Area B, which under the Oslo Accords is under Palestinian civil administration and joint Palestinian-Israeli security control.

"We do not understand how Mount (Ain Ainya), where our home is located, can be turned into a completely closed military zone," Abu Rida said. "The settlers want to seize the entire mountain, so they have made our lives unbearable through their attacks and siege on us day and night."

The group immediately surrounding the house was initially small, he said, numbering no more than 10 settlers, most of them between 17 and 18 years old.

But larger groups have repeatedly joined them.

"Two days ago, they held a fire party at night, attended by dozens of settlers wearing white and black clothes, and they were armed," Abu Rida said.

Pressure on Israel

The confrontation came as Israel faces growing international scrutiny over escalating settler attacks against Palestinians across the occupied West Bank.

A day earlier, the UN Security Council had discussed the violence at a meeting requested by France, Britain, Greece, Denmark and Latvia, which cited a "significant escalation" in settler attacks in recent months.

Muawiya Musa, a researcher specialising in Israeli affairs, said the timing was significant.

Israel's government and state institutions have openly overseen and supported the expansion of settlements, he said, while the military has provided settlers with security cover during attacks on Palestinians.

The growing international criticism, he argued, had created pressure for Israel to demonstrate that it was capable of restraining the settlers.

"These international protests have finally begun to bother the Israeli government and army, requiring them to take a step that appears more serious, especially after the latter was accused of colluding in these attacks," Musa told The New Arab. "Therefore, today's campaign in Qusra was aimed at giving the impression that the army is enforcing order and the law."

The soldiers' relatively forceful response, including the use of tear gas and stun grenades against settlers, could reflect the need for a more visible display of enforcement, Musa said.

"Its use of a relatively higher degree of violence this morning may indicate an urgent need for a demonstrative display by the army in which it presents itself as more serious than at previous times," he said.

But Musa cautioned against interpreting the confrontation as evidence of a fundamental rupture between the Israeli state and the settlement movement.

Settlers and the religious Zionist movement have become deeply embedded in Israeli political and military institutions, he said, while support for settlement expansion has spread more broadly through Israeli society.

How powerful are the settlers?

Asked whether settlers had grown beyond the Israeli military's control, Musa said it was still "too early" to reach such a conclusion.

What was clearer, he said, was the extent of their influence.

Settlers, particularly members of the religious nationalist movement driving the current expansion campaign, wield considerable power across Israeli state institutions, including the military and security services, Musa said.

That influence makes any sustained confrontation between the state and the settlement movement difficult, he argued, because attempts to restrain settlers could produce far-reaching political consequences inside Israel.

There are nevertheless divisions within the Israeli military and political establishment over how far settlement expansion should go.

According to Musa, some of that concern centres on the expansion of settlements and outposts into Areas A and B of the occupied West Bank, which under the Oslo framework were intended to remain distinct from the territory under full Israeli control.

Expanding deeper into those areas would dramatically increase contact and friction between settlers and Palestinians, Musa said, further eroding any remaining physical separation between the two populations.

That trajectory, he argued, could ultimately force Israel towards either a binational political reality or an increasingly explicit system of apartheid.

Israel's right wing, however, has shown little concern about that prospect, Musa said, seeing the current moment instead as an opportunity to accelerate demographic changes across the occupied West Bank through sustained pressure on Palestinians.

For the Abu Rida family, those larger political questions are playing out immediately outside their home.

The soldiers who dismantled the settlers' tent on Wednesday eventually left. The settlers did not.

Within hours, their numbers had swelled to more than 100.

For Musa, the episode therefore offered little evidence that Israel's broader approach to the settlement movement had changed.

Instead, he said, the struggle over the West Bank was increasingly becoming "a race against time" before the United States determines what final political reality it wants to see there.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.

The biggest election night news by far was the defeat of progressive candidate for Wisconsin governor Francesca Hong, who had been ahead in the polls days before the election. She was beat by a razor-thin margin by moderate David Crowley, after her opponents focused on a past comment she made suggesting canceling Thanksgiving.

As with many primaries, the result appeared to come down to electability in a swing state where Democrats will have to appeal to moderates and independents in November. Like the tight Senate race in Michigan the previous week, Hong was quick to endorse Crowley, and the Wisconsin Democrats immediately started a statewide unity tour.

“I think winning became the most important criteria,” David Frank, professor of rhetoric and political communication at the University of Oregon, told The New Arab. “They’ll embrace a significant number of the DSA [Democratic Socialists of America] policies. The key is for the two wings of the Democratic Party to find common ground.”

In Minnesota, the epicentre of months-long anti-ICE demonstrations, progressive Peggy Flanagan beat establishment-backed Angie Craig by nearly 20 percentage points in the Democratic Senate primary. In her victory speech, she vowed to “rip ICE apart.” If elected in November, she would be the first Native American US senator.

On the Republican side, Trump-endorsed pillow executive Mike Lindell lost his bid for nomination for governor by more than 10 percentage points. He has yet to concede the race, and has suggested that errors took place in the vote counting.

Also in Minnesota, notable for its lack of fanfare, was the primary win of Ilhan Omar, who advanced in her Democratic House primary with 80 percent of the vote without a serious challenge from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) or other big donors.

In Connecticut, John Larson, an AIPAC-backed House candidate, who has been in office since 1999, was defeated by Hartford Mayor Luke Bronin, who has been campaigned on affordability and has said he is against sending US tax dollars for offensive weapons to Israel.

AIPAC, which has long been a staple in US elections and policymaking, has become increasingly toxic in Democratic elections, and a growing number of politicians are rejecting the Israel lobbyist’s support, seeing it as a liability.

Some progressives have successfully campaigned on their opposition to AIPAC.

"Every day I lived with the pain, knowing the foetus was dead," she says. "I had two choices. Wait for the pills, or wait to start bleeding."

The 31-year-old mother of four from the Sabra district of Gaza City has been displaced six times since the war began. She discovered she was pregnant in March, between one displacement and the next. 

Nuhail went to the hospital, had the tests, had an ultrasound, and was told the pregnancy was progressing normally.

She went back a fortnight later and was reassured again.

"When the doctor examined me the next time, he said the foetus was dead and incomplete, and that I needed an abortion," she says. "I was shocked, especially because I had been going back to him regularly, and every time he told me things were fine."

She had felt nothing. "I never expected it. I had no sense that the foetus had died, and the shock was enormous."

The doctor told her that the conditions the war had created were likely among the causes: cooking over firewood, physical exhaustion, walking long distances without transport, hunger, and poor nutrition.

The six weeks that followed were the hardest of it. "Every day that passed hurt, in my body and in my mind."

Her health has not returned. "My body became frail. I tire quickly, and my joints hurt. I reached a point where all I wanted was for someone to look after me."

'I had no feeling that this could happen'

Yusra (prefers to use her first name for privacy) is 29, has two children, has been displaced more than five times, and now lives in a tent west of Gaza City.

She learned she was pregnant in April 2026 and followed the pregnancy carefully from the first weeks, visiting a doctor three times and completing every test. Each time, she was told the foetus was developing normally.

"Every time I went, she reassured me the pregnancy was normal. I had no feeling that this could happen to me."

At twelve weeks, sitting inside her tent, she began to bleed heavily.

"I was very frightened. They took me to the hospital quickly, straight into the operating theatre, under full anaesthesia."

She woke to the news that the pregnancy was gone. Her haemoglobin had fallen to seven.

"Since then, I have had dizziness, exhaustion, and pain throughout my whole body. My health has not gone back to what it was."

No specific medical cause was given, only that the conditions of the war, the displacement, the strain and the unrelenting pressure may have been behind it.

Zaher al-Wahaidi, who directs the health information unit at Gaza's Ministry of Health, says the first half of 2026 shows an unprecedented rise in recorded miscarriages: 3,958 cases between January and June.

June recorded the highest number, at 790. April recorded the highest rate, 377.25 miscarriages per thousand live births.

Over the six months, the rate was 208.5 per thousand live births, compared with 64 per thousand in the second half of 2025. It has risen roughly 3.3 times in under a year.

Zaher says 73.6 percent of cases occurred in the first trimester, before thirteen weeks, and 26.4 percent in the second, between 13 and 24 weeks. Among pregnant women on the ministry's register, 57.1 percent were anaemic.

The curve rose from 93.28 per thousand in January to its April peak, fell back in May and June, and remains far above anything recorded before.

What the delivery room sees

Maysoun Suleiman Abu Braik heads the delivery room department at Al-Awda Hospital in Nuseirat. Her staff has recorded more women arriving with pregnancy loss, with early bleeding, and with pregnancies at risk of miscarriage.

Many arrive after their condition has already deteriorated, she says, because repeated displacement, the difficulty of moving around and the interruption of routine antenatal care delayed them getting there at all. She is careful to note that establishing the precise scale of the increase requires official statistics.

What she describes is an accumulation. Severe psychological pressure from bombardment, bereavement and displacement, alongside malnutrition, anaemia, dehydration and a shortage of drinking water.

Limited availability of basic medicines and supplements, iron and folic acid among them, and of the drugs needed for chronic conditions, including hypertension, diabetes and thyroid disease.

Conditions inside shelters and tents compound it: overcrowding, poor sanitation, and a higher risk of infectious disease. So does the physical labour of displacement itself, carrying belongings, walking long distances for water or food, and rarely sleeping properly.

With infrastructure destroyed by Israel and fuel and gas scarce, many women cook over firewood and inhale smoke for hours, alongside the dust and pollutants of the ruins.

Malnutrition, she says, is among the most dangerous factors of all. A woman who cannot get enough protein, energy, iron, folic acid and calcium risks anaemia, restricted foetal growth, low birth weight and premature delivery, and the risk of losing the pregnancy rises when that combines with infection, exhaustion and absent medical care.

Al-Awda's own records show the pattern:

'Permanently alert'

What pregnant women in Gaza face is not one threat but a set of interlocking ones: continuous fear, bombardment, displacement, malnutrition, dehydration, physical exhaustion and the difficulty of reaching healthcare at all, explains Said al-Kahlout, a mental health specialist. 

A pregnant woman in war lives in a state of permanent alert. Her body stays braced because the danger keeps recurring, and stress hormones including cortisol and adrenaline stay elevated.

That response is normal in the face of threat.

Sustained for months, it affects sleep, appetite, blood pressure, immunity and mental health, particularly when there are no intervals of safety in which the body can recover.

He describes insomnia and nightmares, palpitations, muscular tension, loss of appetite, persistent exhaustion, difficulty concentrating, panic attacks, depression and symptoms of post-traumatic stress.

War imposes what he calls continuous trauma, in which the painful experience never ends but renews itself with each bombardment, each displacement, each fear for a family member.

Studies link exposure to armed conflict with higher risks of certain pregnancy complications, including premature birth and low birth weight, though never to a single factor.

Losing a pregnancy in these conditions is harder and more complicated, he says, because a woman does not lose only the pregnancy.

She may have lost her home, or a member of her family, or her sense of safety, while the danger continues around her and there is no safe space in which to grieve or recover.

The response, he argues, cannot be medical alone. It has to include psychological support, social protection, and recognition that losing a pregnancy is a real loss deserving care rather than blame.

"In war, a woman may not only lose her pregnancy," he says. "She may lose her sense of safety with it, and her trust in her own body, and her picture of the future."

A legal question

Abdullah Sharshara, a lawyer and chairman of the Ajyal Association for Creativity and Development, argues that international humanitarian law and international human rights law impose clear obligations toward pregnant women in armed conflict, as among those most exposed to health and humanitarian risk.

Those obligations include guaranteeing access to antenatal, delivery and postnatal care, protecting medical facilities and personnel, securing medicines and medical supplies, and not exposing pregnant women to risks arising from siege, starvation or attacks on health infrastructure.

A rise in miscarriages during war, he says, should not be treated only as a set of individual medical events.

It can constitute a legal and human rights indicator of a possible violation of the right to health, if the cases are shown to be connected to factors produced by the conflict: the targeting or disabling of health facilities, absent medical care, malnutrition, severe psychological pressure, or restrictions on reaching services.

"The right to health, under international instruments, is not limited to providing treatment," he says.

"It also includes guaranteeing the conditions that allow pregnant women to receive safe and continuous care, protecting their lives and the lives of the foetuses they carry."

Where medical and statistical evidence supports it, he argues, such cases can be relied on as evidence of the conflict's direct effect on reproductive health, and of the scale of civilian harm.

But for Nuhail Muharram, she is not thinking about evidence.

She is thinking about the six weeks she spent carrying a pregnancy she already knew was over, waiting for medication that a hospital in Gaza could not give her.

Ansam Al-Kitaa is a freelance journalist based in Gaza. For years, she has covered the successive wars in Gaza and their humanitarian and social impacts for international and local outlets

This piece is published in collaboration with Egab

Infantino, who is seeking reelection next year, has faced open revolt after three confederations—UEFA, AFC and CONCACAF—called for him to quit over his aborted bid to bring private investment into FIFA competitions, including the World Cup.

The Swiss administrator had proposed carving off the commercial rights to the World Cup and selling 20% to private investors to raise about $4.2 billion.

"Recognising the important role of Arab football in bringing people together and strengthening cooperation among football associations across the Arab world, we ... express our full support for Mr Gianni Infantino, president of FIFA, and reaffirm our confidence in his leadership and continued commitment to the development of football worldwide," the heads of the six federations said in a joint statement.

The statement was signed by the heads of the national federations of Qatar, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt and Mauritania. Four of the six signatories are also FIFA Council members.

"We deeply appreciate Mr Infantino’s sustained efforts to advance football globally, expand opportunities across all regions and strengthen the game’s role in bringing people and communities together," they said.

"We look forward to continuing our close cooperation with him towards a stronger and more prosperous future for world football, expanding opportunities and further enhancing Arab football’s contribution to the global game."

Infantino’s withdrawn proposal came with a $20 million grant for member associations for the next funding cycle, an amount that could have been doubled if they signed the deal.

Despite the opposition of the three confederations, which represent 136 of the 211 member associations who will vote in the FIFA presidential election in March, Infantino still has plenty of allies in the game.

Eurovision Song Contest organisers announced Wednesday that they were excluding any country in an armed conflict from hosting the competition and increased the mininum age of competitors.

While they did not mention any country by name, Israel, which has been at war in Gaza since 2023, came close to winning the competition in both 2025 and 2026, ultimately finishing second on each occasion.

Under the old rules, the winning country normally hosts the following year's competition.

Under the new rules, "the winning broadcaster will automatically be ineligible to host the contest if an armed conflict, a sensitive geopolitical situation, or any other situation materially affects the security, safety or stability of their state or immediate region", they said in a statement.

In a first, five countries—Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Iceland—boycotted the 2026 competition in Vienna over Israel's participation.

They said they could not take part alongside Israel because of its genocidal war on Gaza, ongoing since October 2023.

Martin Green, director of the Eurovision Song Contest, said in a statement that the changes had been guided by feedback from member countries.

"These changes are about giving everyone involved greater clarity, protecting artists and ensuring the contest continues to provide a safe and welcoming environment, while preserving the spirit and integrity that make the Eurovision Song Contest so special," he added.

Minimum age requirement

The organisers also announced that competitors must be at at least 18, up from 16, on the day of their first rehearsal.

"This change continues the work already undertaken by the contest to strengthen safeguarding and protect younger artists from the pressures associated with competing at the Eurovision Song Contest," they added in the statement.

The youngest person to win the contest was 13-year-old Sandra Kim from Belgium in 1986, according to Eurovision records.

Eurovision is a co-production of public broadcasters belonging to the European Broadcasting Union. Since the EBU includes members from outside Europe, the contest is not limited to European countries.

The EBU said it could commission an independent security assessment before deciding whether a winning country is capable of hosting the event safely.

If a winning country is found unable to host the contest, the EBU will appoint another host nation.

Under the new rules, that country will organise the concert "in its own right" and "will not be required to stage the event on behalf of another member".

Ukraine hosted Eurovision in 2017 despite the conflict in the country's east between Ukrainian forces and Moscow-backed separatists.

But after Ukraine won the contest in 2022, it was unable to host the following year's edition because of Russia's full-scale invasion.

Eurovision 2023 was instead held in Liverpool in Britain on Ukraine's behalf.

After nearly three years of the Israeli genocidal war, Hamas and Fatah remain divided and face political and organisational limits. Smaller factions like Islamic Jihad have even less capacity to influence Gaza's future.

The issue isn't just how Palestinians should respond to Israel, but also each faction's role post-war. Can Hamas hold a political role if its weapons dominate negotiations? Can Fatah return to Gaza without Hamas's consent? And can factions unify before outside powers decide Gaza's future?

Akram Attallah, a Gaza-based political analyst, believes that the Palestinian factions are entering a phase in which none can impose its vision alone, making unity essential to shaping Gaza's future.

"The Palestinian factions face a new reality after the war. Hamas cannot return to governing Gaza as it did before, while Fatah cannot return without Palestinian agreement," Attallah told The New Arab. "Their weakness could either deepen the division or push them toward a new political understanding."

He said Netanyahu was seeking to alter the second phase by making Hamas' disarmament and the dismantling of its military infrastructure a condition for Israeli withdrawal.

"Israel does not reject the second phase, but wants a second phase that is radically different from the one that was negotiated," he added.

Attallah warned that continued division could leave outside powers determining Gaza's political future.

The weapons question

Hamas is at the centre of the next phase because its weapons is a very contentious issue in negotiations.

Accepting disarmament under Israeli terms risks stripping Hamas of its main military capabilities and protections without Israeli withdrawal guarantees. Rejecting disarmament might enable Israel to retain forces in Gaza or renew hostilities.

According to Palestinian analysts, a middle ground could involve gradual disarmament, phased Israeli withdrawal, international guarantees, reconstruction, and Hamas' inclusion in the Palestinian political system.

Ramallah-based analyst Tamara Haddad believes that the debate isn't just about disarmament but also about "who implements it, how, when, and what defines weapons as disarmed."

"Making disarmament a condition for Israeli withdrawal could reintroduce deadlock, with Israel demanding disarmament before pulling out and Hamas insisting it won't surrender weapons until Israel fulfils commitments," she told TNA.

"Any new deal needs clear timelines and verification to prevent indefinite Israeli presence in Gaza. Beyond weapons, Gaza's governance faces challenges after war damage and regional pressure, making a return to previous rule difficult," she said.

Haddad suggests Hamas could shift from sole governance to participation in broader Palestinian politics, ensuring its presence and avoiding disarmament exclusion.

Fatah faces a different challenge. Officially, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority might be ready to handle Gaza's administration, but its return needs Palestinian consensus. A return based on Israeli or U.S. plans excluding Hamas could just recreate division.

"Neither Hamas nor Fatah had the ability to impose its vision unilaterally," Esmat Mansour, a Ramallah-based analyst, told TNA.

Hamas, he said, was under pressure over its weapons and its future rule in Gaza, while Fatah could not govern the Strip without Palestinian consensus and political and regional support.

Mansour described the weakness of both sides as a possible opening for a new understanding.

The continued division, he said, "is no longer just an internal Palestinian problem, but has become a strategic weakness," allowing external actors to deal separately with Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

Palestinian or outside control?

The inability of the factions to impose their positions could either deepen their rivalry or encourage them to develop a common political framework.

So, Mansour called for a "comprehensive Palestinian formula" to unify factions, addressing Gaza's administration, weapons, and representation.

He proposed a transitional government of independent figures linked to unified institutions, involving political forces within a broader national framework.

Reconstruction and security efforts could support this, offering Hamas an exit from the control versus disarmament dilemma and Fatah a route back to Gaza based on Palestinian consensus, avoiding external deals.

Islamic Jihad and other factions may need to redefine their roles, shifting from mainly military actions to political participation within a broader Palestinian framework.

Mansour emphasised the immediate need to consolidate the ceasefire and prevent the second phase dispute from collapsing the agreement.

He also highlighted the importance of maintaining simultaneous disarmament and withdrawal.

He argued that this setup would need real US pressure on Israel, as Netanyahu probably wouldn't change just due to mediators.

"Time could be working against the Palestinian factions as Israeli elections approach," Taysir Abdullah, a Gaza-based analyst, told TNA.

He said US pressure on Netanyahu had declined as the Trump administration focused on other issues, while Netanyahu had effectively entered an "election campaign" and could use the rejection of the 15-point proposal to regain room for military operations and targeted killings.

Abdullah warned that continued Palestinian division could allow outside actors to shape Gaza's future. "If Hamas negotiates alone over weapons and Fatah over Gaza's administration, the Palestinians could find themselves implementing arrangements rather than shaping them," he said.

He stressed that consolidating the ceasefire and reaching a Palestinian understanding was essential to preventing US, Israeli and regional actors from determining Gaza's political and security future.

Paradoxically, the factions' shared weakness may offer their best chance for agreement. Hamas cannot restore its previous rule alone, Fatah cannot return without Palestinian consensus, and smaller factions lack a viable alternative.

Attallah, Mansour, al-Hadad and Abullah believe that the most realistic path is to consolidate the ceasefire, establish phased disarmament alongside Israeli withdrawal, form a transitional Gaza administration and rebuild unified Palestinian institutions.

Otherwise, continued division could leave Israel, the United States and regional actors shaping Gaza's future, rather than the Palestinians themselves.

Paramilitary drones on Thursday attacked the Sudanese capital Khartoum for the second day in a row.

Since April 2023, Sudan has been ravaged by war between the Sudanese military, led by its chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Burhan's former deputy Mohamed Hamdan Daglo.

The latest attack comes a day after the RSF launched far-reaching coordinated drone strikes targeting five army-controlled cities hundreds of kilometres apart.

On Thursday, an AFP correspondent in the capital reported the firing of anti-aircraft missiles from Omdurman, Khartoum's twin city, followed by the sound of an explosion.

"Military air defences engaged with the militia's drones and downed them," an army source told AFP.

Witnesses in central Khartoum and Khartoum North across the Nile river also reported seeing drones in the sky and hearing explosions.

Across the country, aid workers estimate more than 200,000 people have been killed in what the UN calls a "war of atrocities". The conflict has also caused the world's largest hunger and displacement crises.

Burhan and Daglo, allies until they fell out in a bitter power struggle, have spent most of the war in a relative stalemate, unwilling to hold negotiations while vying for a decisive battlefield advantage.

The RSF last year consolidated its hold on the vast western region of Darfur, and has since pushed to seize territory in the southern Kordofan region and along the southeastern Ethiopian border.

The army holds Sudan's centre, north and east, and last month clinched a victory in Kordofan by pushing the RSF off a key highway leading to the capital.

Daglo in the aftermath said he would "unleash" his fighters—already accused of war crimes including genocide—and his forces have since repeatedly threatened a large-scale retaliatory attack.

An Israeli military base in this part of Gaza and that close to the Palestinian territory's border with Sinai, the north-eastern Egyptian territory that shares borders with both Gaza and Israel, is a clear violation of political and security understandings between Cairo and Tel Aviv, Egyptian observers argue.

"This is particularly a violation of the Philadelphi Accord of 2005," Egyptian political researcher Islam Mansi said.

Speaking to The New Arab, he hoped that Egypt would submit an official complaint at the Multinational Force and Observers, which was established via a 1981 protocol to oversee the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, to prove the Israeli violation and end it.

Southern Gaza has been home to wide ranging activities by the Israeli military, including earthworks, berms, trenches, roads, and outpost fortifications, according to multiple media reports.

Some of these reports refer to Israeli engineering work continuing even as civilian rubble clearance and reconstruction in parts of the southern Gaza city of Rafah have stalled.

These activities are most probably related to the expansion of Israeli military outposts in the area, not to the construction of new bases, some observers note.

They add, however, that the same expansion works attest to the presence of a plan in Tel Aviv for permanent military presence in Gaza on the Egyptian border.

Constraints

Egypt has yet to officially comment on reports about the construction of new Israeli military bases or the expansion of outposts already present in Rafah.

Concern among observers in the populous Arab country is mainly focused on agreements and political and security understandings regulating military activity and deployments in areas along the Egyptian-Gaza border.

Signed on 1 September 2005 upon Israel's self-proclaimed "unilateral disengagement" from Gaza, the Philadelphi Accord delegated policing Gaza's border with Sinai as a mission to the Palestinian Authority.

It stipulated the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Philadelphi Corridor, a narrow strip of roughly 100 metres wide and about 14 kilometres long along the entire Gaza-Egypt border.

The accord came to add to constraints to military activity and presence along the Egypt-Israel border, ones enshrined in the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, the first between an Arab country and the self-proclaimed Jewish state.

Signed almost six years after Egypt's war for the liberation of Sinai from Israeli occupation, the treaty established demilitarized zones along the Egyptian-Israeli border and set force limits on both sides of the border.

Some Egyptian analysts argue that Israeli military presence in the Philadelphi Corridor also violates the spirit or the terms of those security arrangements and the peace treaty's emphasis on inviolable borders.

Mutual accusations

Israel took control of the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah crossing on Gaza's border with Egypt in May 2024, almost eight months after it unleashed its brutal genocidal war on Gaza.

At the time, the Israeli government claimed that the move aimed to block Hamas rearmament through tunnels along the Gaza-Sinai border.

Egypt condemned, however, the same move as a "dangerous escalation" and warned through diplomatic channels that the operation put its peace treaty with Israel at risk.

Such an exchange came as some Israeli officials and experts criticised what they described as Egypt's military build-up in Sinai, especially in the demilitarized border area, accusing Egypt of violating the peace treaty.

The most notable such criticism reportedly came during a meeting in Jerusalem between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in September 2025.

During the meeting, the Israeli premier called on the US secretary of state to put pressure on Egypt to remove military infrastructure and installations implemented in Sinai in recent years.

Israel's Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter also raised the same issue last year, by warning that Egyptian military bases in Sinai could be used for offensive operations.

Egyptian security analysts say, however, that their country has to beef up security in Sinai to prevent fallout from the chaos in Gaza and protect a territory that straddles one of the world's most crucial maritime chokepoints, namely the Suez Canal.

"Such measures are vital for Sinai's security which is inseparable from Egypt's national security," retired Egyptian army general Mohamed al-Ghabari told TNA.

Egypt, he added, acts under fears from the infiltration of terrorists from Gaza and also Israel's plan to displace Gaza's population into Sinai.

Ceasefire strains

Egyptian anger at the construction or the expansion of Israeli military sites in Gaza near the Sinai border comes at a time of major tension between Cairo and Tel Aviv, observers said.

Together with the other mediators, the US, Qatar and Turkey, Egypt helped broker the current Gaza ceasefire deal in October last year.

The deal, which ended major Israeli military operations in Gaza, stipulates a phased Israeli withdrawal from the war-ravaged territory to pave the way for its reconstruction and recovery.

Nevertheless, throughout all the past months, Israel refused to downsize its military deployments in the Palestinian territory, having already occupied over 70% of its pace, before Hamas decommissions its weapons.

Last month, truce mediators and the Board of Peace, the body formed by US President Donald Trump to oversee the implementation of the Gaza ceasefire plan, convinced Hamas and other factions to disarm.

This did not, however, reason the Israeli government out of its plan to maintain presence in Gaza, which further strains relations with Cairo, analysts said.

Mansi said Israel wants Hamas to be fully disarmed before it makes any troop withdrawal.

Israel, he added, uses its tightening military grip on Gaza as a political pressure card to ensure that its own conditions are met.

"This is why it keeps widening the scope of its military presence in the strip, including through the construction of new bases and the expansion of ones already present," he added.

Here are the updates of the day:

• President Donald Trump claims US has "total control" over the Strait of Hormuz, while Iranian officials claim it remains closed until Washington meets Tehran’s conditions
   
• Pakistan says it is trying to bring Washington and Tehran "to the negotiating table", as Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi visited Iran
   
• Oil prices reached $87.69 a barrel, once again 
   
• Israeli attacks on Gaza, West Bank, and south Lebanon despite any agreement. Meanwhile, Israel's defence minister Israel Katz says Israel will not withdraw from territory it occupies in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza

And so we continue our live coverage...