In the months that followed a drone strike on a Syrian military academy in Homs province in October, killing 100 people, villages close to the opposition frontlines in Idlib province have been subject to almost daily bombardment by regime artillery.
The attacks usually come at night, sowing fear and confusion among the villagers, and causing another exodus from southern Idlib province to the north.
Haid Haid, a Senior Consulting Research Fellow at the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Programme, said the military campaign is likely in response to the academy attack, which the regime immediately blamed on Syrian rebels despite no opposition group claiming responsibility for it.
"Even if it is indirect retaliation for the attack on the military academy in Homs, this does not justify why they are attacking residential areas and why they have been ongoing for months now," Haid told The New Arab.
"There doesn’t appear to be a clear military aim to regain control over territory; they are not targeting the frontlines or military factions, the attacks seem to be at random and targeting civilian areas, aimed at terrorising people and making their lives worse."
On Monday, a regime 'suicide drone' hit an agricultural area in opposition West Aleppo killing a farmer, highlighting the continued havoc these attacks are wreaking on ordinary life in northwest Syria.
The bombardments are just one of the many hardships faced by the people of Idlib and West Aleppo, as Syria enters 13 years of war amid World Food Programme (WFP) aid cuts and serious challenges in humanitarian aid reaching the provinces.
The collapse of the Turkish lira, the de facto currency in Idlib province, has also created innumerable economic challenges for Syrian families who are still recovering from the 6 February 2023 earthquake.
"The economic situation continues to get worse, the free fall of the lira and lack of job opportunities, low salaries, and high prices have combined to increase suffering for the people living there," said Haid.
"The economic situation is similar on both sides of the frontline, but since many of those groups are involved in illicit activities it has not impacted [the fighters'] incomes, or their ability to fight, as they do not need to leave the frontlines to make ends meet."
Many regime and rebel fighters are now heavily engaged in smuggling drugs, goods, and people, which might not provide a significant cashflow for opposition militias but do make the frontlines an attractive secondment, including those from the dominant force in northwest Syria, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS).
Fadel Abdul Ghany, chairman and founder of the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), said the punitive bombing campaign is designed to inflict as much harm and economic disruption to opposition Idlib, amid growing anger about Bashar al-Assad's rule in regime areas.
"Assad does not want anyone to build a sustainable or ordinary life in areas outside regime control. If this life exists in SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) or opposition areas, that will give an example for Syrians to move to these territories and also give the international community a reason to support these areas," he told The New Arab.
"Without this (international) support, opposition areas will not be allowed to thrive and the people will not feel stable. This is the aim of Assad and he wants to seize the opportunity when any major international crisis emerges to launch full-scale attacks on Idlib."
Despite 13 years of hardship, the spirit of resistance remains strong in Idlib province - a bastion of anti-regime activism - with anger growing against HTS due to the dire economic conditions and the local security force's heavy-handed rule.
Protests broke out across Idlib in recent weeks against the detention and torture of pro-democracy activists, Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters, and rival jihadists, along with general dissatisfaction with the HTS-aligned Salvation Government's management of the local economy.
While HTS allegedly pledged to release political prisoners, freeze tax collections, and shake up governance structures, similar promises have been made in the past, said Suhail al-Ghazi, a Syrian researcher.
"The release of all commanders and fighters of HTS may restore some strength to the jihadist wing within the group, but it does not mean that the organisation will restore its connection with Al-Qaeda. Likewise, other jihadist factions that entered a conflict with the HTS may catch their breath if their fighters are released," he told The New Arab.
The Idlib unrest follows attempts last year by HTS to seize Turkish and Syrian National Army (SNA)-controlled Afrin, northern Aleppo province.
While Turkey managed to prevent the HTS from taking this agriculturally-rich land, the SNA are too weak to tap into the growing discontent in Idlib in a bid to regain its influence in the province after FSA elements lost a brief battle with the group in 2019 and saw the Salvation Government rule rolled out across the province.
"Turkey is unlikely to intervene now unless HTS tries to transfer its internal problems into the Afrin region by sending fighters again but it will not interfere with or against any party in Idlib to maintain the safety of its soldiers and military bases," al-Ghazi said.
"The opposition factions and Syrian National Army\Free Syrian Army do not seem to have a real plan to pull the rug from under HTS's feet because the opposition is still divided and lacks a popular incubator inside Idlib.
"The regime and Russia will work to exploit any HTS attack... to pressure Turkey, especially after [Russian Foreign Minister Sergey] Lavrov talked recently about halting the normalisation process between the Syrian regime and Turkey."
One possible challenge to HTS via the protest campaign is the possibility that Islamist adversaries, both internal and external, are being strengthened, amid concerted efforts by its leader, Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani, to present a more 'moderate' face to the group.
"The release of all commanders and fighters by HTS may restore some strength to the jihadist wing within the group, but it does not mean that the organisation will restore its connection with Al-Qaeda," said al-Ghazi.
"Likewise, other jihadist factions that entered a conflict with the HTS may catch their breath if their fighters are released... but security-wise, the area under their control can be considered relatively better than the areas controlled by the SNA and even the Syrian Democratic Forces.
"Economically it is not better due to the huge humanitarian need and the number of IDPs is higher than other areas."
Reports emerged last week that Abu Maria Al-Qahtani, a leading figure in HTS and long-time rival to al-Jolani, had been released after six months in detention on charges of "treason" and association with the US-led coalition.
A photo shared on social media also hinted that al-Qahtani, dressed in fatigues, could be back to playing a role in the HTS security apparatus, adding further intrigue to the affair.
Azzam Al-Kassir, an academic researcher specialist in radical Islamist movements, said that allegations of security breaches by key HTS figures, including al-Qahtani, pose a threat to stability and governance in northwest Syria, as does deep-rooted factionalisation within the movement.
"These security challenges hinder the establishment of a conducive environment in Idlib for investors and businesses, imposing yet another constraint on the economic situation and development of the northwest," he said, before al-Qahtani's release.
"The security situation in Idlib remains highly unstable, largely driven by internal contradictions within HTS and ongoing security breaches. Significantly, tensions are arising among distinct HTS factions, primarily formed along regional lines where members share geographical origins."
This has seen the HTS factions display loyalty to specific commanders or figures within the movement adding to a potentially explosive mix for Idlib province for months to come.
"Each faction pursues distinct strategic and ideological preferences, seeking to expand its influence within HTS-controlled areas," he added.
"This internal competition poses a significant challenge to Al-Jolani's authority."
Paul McLoughlin is a senior news editor at The New Arab.
Follow him on Twitter: @PaullMcLoughlin