Witkoff: A dishonest broker who could end Gaza war with one call

Steve Witkoff, who is, for all intents and purposes, the US Secretary of State, has developed a serious credibility problem. That’s not a good position for a government’s top diplomat and negotiator to be in.

In January Witkoff earned significant credit in the Middle East for compelling Israel to accept a three-stage agreement that, if implemented, would have seen Israel’s genocidal campaign in the Gaza Strip brought to a halt and its forces withdraw from the territory; a conclusion of the exchange of captives between Israel and the Palestinians; and the beginnings of recovery after more than a year of relentless, systematic killing and destruction by Israel’s US-armed military.

Since it took only the proverbial phone call from Washington to bring Israel to heel and accept an agreement that had already been crafted before Witkoff appeared on the scene, it was not much of an accomplishment. But measured against the Biden administration’s steadfast refusal to impose any restraints whatsoever on the Israeli government, it was a significant development, and the region breathed a collective sigh of relief.

The agreement’s first phase, which, among other issues, called for a suspension of hostilities, also included a clause that negotiations regarding the mechanisms governing implementation of its second phase, including a durable ceasefire, would begin on a set date. It further specified that neither Israel nor the Palestinians could resume hostilities while negotiations continued, even if they were not concluded by the end of the first phase.

In late February, several weeks after the January agreement had come into force, and with Israel consistently refusing to engage in serious negotiations, Witkoff presented new terms that fundamentally altered what had already been agreed to by the parties the previous month. He was essentially doing Israel’s bidding, endorsing its main priority of avoiding any formal conclusion of hostilities.

Hamas predictably rejected the proposed revisions and insisted that the parties continue with the text they had already signed off on. When the Palestinians maintained their position in the face of increasingly bellicose threats by Witkoff, Washington authorised Israel to re-impose its siege of the Gaza Strip on 2 March, which it did with unprecedented ferocity, and to resume its genocidal campaign on 18 March. Some 400 Palestinians were slaughtered on that first day of bombings.

Between these two dates, and clearly in coordination with Witkoff, US envoy Adam Boehler held unprecedented, direct talks with the Hamas leadership in Qatar. Although both parties described the encounter as positive, it failed to produce a meeting of the minds. But it did succeed in ameliorating somewhat the damage produced by Trump’s harebrained February Gaza Riviera proposal, which set alarm bells ringing throughout the region.

In contrast to the Biden administration, which was passionately devoted to Israel and shared its agenda from A to Z, Trump doesn’t particularly care for this issue one way or the other.

His focus is on securing investments from wealthy Gulf states and exploring the prospects for an agreement with Iran that would prevent a costly war. In neither case has he been prepared to subordinate his agenda to Israel’s agenda or priorities, or even coordinate with it.

In Palestine, by contrast, Trump’s lack of interest translated into a carte blanche for Israel to slaughter and starve Palestinians at will.

One issue that does directly concern both Trump and Witkoff is securing the release of captives still held in the Gaza Strip, particularly those with dual US citizenship.

Here, too, Washington was prepared to operate independently of Israel and secured the release of an Israeli soldier who also holds US citizenship, on the eve of Trump’s victory tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

Hamas described the release as a “goodwill gesture”, which confirms Witkoff’s assertion that it was not the result of any formal agreement with the Palestinian movement.

Nevertheless, Hamas later stated that it had received informal assurances from Witkoff that the US would, in exchange, ensure the delivery of urgently-needed humanitarian supplies into the Gaza Strip by aid organisations that are prohibited from doing so by Israeli force of arms.

When several days later the Palestinians were instead burying 400 dead, Hamas felt double-crossed once again. Some commentators have speculated that Witkoff knowingly made false promises, out of a desire to ensure the soldier was released before the massive bombings he knew were imminent. It’s also possible Witkoff was rebuffed by the Israelis, and threatened with public exposure that Washington was prepared to reciprocate the “good will gesture”. Be that as it may, he declined to once again make the proverbial phone call that he appears to have committed to.

Better call Witkoff

Where the Biden administration never lost an opportunity to offer full-throated support to Israel’s genocide, its successor has been more circumspect. It’s quite happy to let Israel have its way but leaves most of the cheerleading to others.

As the situation in Gaza became increasingly dire with each passing day, and generated increasingly negative headlines for a presidency that prides image above all else, negotiations between Witkoff and Hamas resumed.

It has been suggested that Trump was encouraged in this direction by his Arab investors, and while this is possible it is also the case that bilateral relations took up the vast majority of Arab bandwidth, Syria sanctions relief, and encouraging agreement on Iran.

Last month, after a protracted back and forth, Witkoff and the Palestinians once again reached agreement. The new text revised elements of the January agreement, but retained the same objectives, thus producing a proposal acceptable to both Washington and Hamas.

When presented to the Israelis, the latter demanded and received key changes. In a nutshell, these would allow Israel to resume and further intensify the genocide more or less at will at any point after the initial 60-day suspension of hostilities.

Presented with these revisions, Hamas and the other Palestinian organizations predictably balked. In their response, they neither categorically rejected Witkoff’s framework nor insisted on maintaining every letter of what they had previously agreed with him.

They did, however, insist on explicit guarantees that any agreement produce a definitive end to the genocide, a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and the resumption of aid to the territory by established organisations rather than remaining the sole preserve of the misbegotten Gaza Humanitarian Foundation operated by US mercenaries under Israeli supervision.

In their response the Palestinians had, despite their indignation at Witkoff’s double dealing, maintained a generally respectful tone, and refrained from accusing Washington from acting in bad faith, either in their written response or public comments.

For his part Witkoff gave a bellicose public assessment of the Palestinian counter-proposal. Shortly thereafter the latest Israeli massacre, this time of several dozen desperate Palestinians seeking aid parcels from a distribution center manned by the US mercenaries, deservedly earned the name “Witkoff Massacre”.

It's unclear what happens next. Although Gaza is Trump’s lowest-hanging fruit since it can be resolved with a single phone call, Washington may well have concluded that in view of Netanyahu’s intransigence, the effort is not worth the political capital required, and has decided to just let Israel continue to do as it pleases.

A further theory is that the explanation for Witkoff’s latest performance relates more to Iran than Israel. In a recent meeting in Washington, the visiting Israeli envoys are said to have been informed that Washington expects its negotiations with Tehran to result in an agreement sooner rather than later.

Israel of course opposes any such agreement on principle, and will accept only one between the US and Israel to launch a war against Iran. In this context, Witkoff accepted Israeli revisions that fundamentally altered the text agreed with Hamas in order to mollify Israel. In compensation for losing on Iran, it gets rewarded with open-ended genocide in Gaza.

It's also entirely possible that, for any variety of reasons, the US will seek to resume efforts to produce an agreement on Gaza. If and when it does so, Witkoff will have a serious handicap.

Having double-crossed the Palestinians once too often, he has a credibility deficit that will ensure their opposition to any “constructive ambiguity” they might otherwise have been willing to accept.

Witkoff’s predecessor, Antony Blinken, gleefully accepted the role of Israel’s international errand boy, and it did him in. In other words, if Witkoff hopes to avoid a similar fate, he won’t get anywhere unless and until he’s finally prepared to once again make that proverbial phone call.

Mouin Rabbani is Co-Editor of Jadaliyya and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies.

Follow Mouin on X: @MouinRabbani

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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.