The US & Israel misread Iran: Minorities won’t topple the regime

The US press revealed that the decision to go to war with Iran relied heavily on the assumption that a popular uprising could follow the elimination of the top leadership in Tehran.

It appears this assessment, reportedly provided by Israeli intelligence and used by Benjamin Netanyahu to convince US President Donald Trump, was treated as a certainty rather than a possible scenario. Based on this, war and military resources were prepared for the duration of a few days, rather than for an extended campaign. The possibility of the Strait of Hormuz being closed was also not a consideration.

Where did this assessment fail? The Israeli judgement assumed that the Iranian people, including influential sections of the middle-class, workers, women, and liberals who aspire to a standard of living matching Iran’s resources and wealth, would seize the opportunity presented by the regime’s weakness after the elimination of its core leadership.

This assumption held that, because only weeks had passed since large-scale crackdowns that left thousands of protesters dead, Iranians would take to the streets with greater confidence against the Basij and Revolutionary Guards.

The expectation was that the remaining regime, facing chaos from the loss of its leaders and a vacuum in decision-making, would have no option but to flee, like the Assad regime.

However, analysis of the plan, statements, and early US and Israeli preparations show that the primary reliance was on minorities, rather than on the Persian majority. While the Persian majority disagrees with the regime on many issues, it does not oppose the centralised, strict domestic governance out of fear of national fragmentation.

It also largely supports Iran’s regional policies, which provide it with influence, strengthen its international position, and enhance its negotiating leverage on nuclear, energy, and military matters. Persians also see themselves as the country’s true owners and are reluctant to share power or wealth with non-Persian groups in Iran.

Under this plan, the targeted Iranian population are minorities who make up roughly 50% of the country. This includes Kurds, Arabs, Baloch, Azeris, and Turkmen, all of whom feel marginalised. US and Israeli strategists assumed these groups would view the regime’s weakness as a chance to replace it with a more liberal and open system that would allow them to secure rights through a new social contract and constitutional framework ensuring equal participation in power and wealth.

However, the flaw in the US-Israeli plan is its failure to consider the historical experiences of minorities in revolutions. Minorities rarely seek to overthrow ruling systems. They view revolutions as the concern of the majority, that are not worth sacrificing their own members over.

Instead, their objectives focus on gaining autonomy or special status, advancing their rights, and preserving distinct ethnic or sectarian identity. This often occurs through political and security leadership or by exerting influence over state institutions, laws, the economy, culture, and foreign relations.

The US and Israel recognise that minorities in Iran, whether under the Shah, the clerics, or any other ruling faction, ultimately live under Persian-majority control. The fate of the regime is therefore mainly a Persian matter, as the system represents them. Even a minority leader would be subject to the majority’s laws, logic, and methods.

Minorities often pursue strategies distinct from conventional revolutions. They emphasise self-determination rather than democracy, highlight discrimination and marginalisation rather than oppression, and frequently rely on armed struggle. Their struggles often centre on existential survival, unlike those of the majority amid anti-regime uprisings.

Minorities also operate within networks of regional and international interests, becoming part of broader geopolitical conflicts rather than purely domestic movements. They often coordinate with actors seeking to change the state’s structure rather than its ruling system, aligning with strategic calculations that regard supporting minority mobilisation as advantageous. In such contexts, minorities become instruments of international and regional influence.

Thus, the hidden objective of the US and Israel, even if publicly framed as regime change, appears to be the dismantling of the Iranian state. This seems to reflect an application of the “Periphery Doctrine”, developed by former Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, which advocates dividing states and creating chaotic entities.

Iranian minorities live on the country’s peripheries, providing an environment conducive to uprisings following regime collapse and shifting power dynamics on the Iranian plateau. While the majority may revolt to improve conditions or alter the ruling system, minority revolts usually aim to dismantle centralised state control and establish independent entities for their communities.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.

Ghazi Dahman holds a bachelor of political science and has been published in Arab newspapers since 1995. He is also the author of two books, one on Jerusalem in international law and the other on African- Arab relations.

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.