An on-and-off quasi-love triangle in the Middle East has been emerging over the past nearly two decades. It can be best described as the US having an existing intimate relationship with Israel while simultaneously pursuing a relationship with Iran.
Obviously, this is making Israel go nuts as it tries to sabotage any romantic date between its nemesis Iran and the US; Iran is hesitant to warm up to the US because it perceives the latter as in bed with Israel; and the ambivalent US plays both sides with the secret wish of simultaneously having both the marriage and the affair.
Yes, it is no surprise, love triangle dynamics can be complicated and competitive.
The US interest in engaging Iran timidly began with former President George W. Bush in 2006 after the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, a process that was reinforced with former President Barack Obama and the US nuclear deal agreement.
President Donald Trump’s first term was a corrective measure to this process with maximum pressure policy on Tehran that was relatively put on hold during the Joe Biden presidency. Trump’s second term seems to be starting off with an Obama-like attempt to defuse nuclear tensions with Iran; however, this time, after the Iranian regime’s regional clout was primarily incapacitated.
US Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held on May 11 the fourth round of talks in Muscat as the Omani-led mediation continues.
Both Washington and Tehran have conveyed positive feedback on this fourth round, even though US officials seem more upbeat about the process.
These talks mark the two-month deadline Trump set to reach a deal in his initial letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which falls on May 12, when Trump embarked on his Gulf trip to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
Yet, US negotiators do not seem tight to this deadline if the talks are going in a positive direction. The status of these talks is not linear nor static, as there are many layers of complexity from policy divisions inside each government to the Israel factor. Araghchi noted that “contradictory positions taken by the US in the media is not acceptable to us as they do not help the negotiations”.
However, this contradictory rhetoric also applies to the Iranian regime, which is part of the negotiation tactics. Chief Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Major General Hossein Salami affirmed on May 8 that “Americans should know that if they threaten us, we are prepared for war at any scale”.
Ménage à Trump
The window of opportunity for the Iranian regime is the currently strained US-Israeli relationship. Trump blindsided Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his stop in the Oval Office on April 7 by announcing the nuclear talks with Iran. Trump took it personally when Netanyahu literally went behind his back to directly coordinate with White House National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, who was ousted on May 1 because of that.
Since then, Trump has bypassed Netanyahu in major US policy decisions: the ceasefire deal with the Houthis, the prisoner deal with Hamas, and the lifting of some US sanctions on the new Syrian regime.
Even though he just saw Netanyahu last month, it cannot go unnoticed that Trump excluded Israel from his presidential tour in the Middle East this week. Trump is doing what Biden should have done, which is having the US act on its own independently of Israeli interests.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu pursues his own regional agenda, and Israel continues to be on the offensive against the Iranian regime and its proxies in Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen while pushing against Turkish influence in Syria despite US objections. According to the Israeli daily Maariv, Netanyahu told the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee on May 11 that “I think we will need to wean ourselves off American military aid”, which is equal to $4 billion.
This is an unprecedented statement by an Israeli leader, even though it seems to be tactically leaked by Netanyahu’s office to put public pressure on Trump, who is fully ignoring him in this phase without any on-the-record public statement from the White House.
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The Iranian government, meanwhile, is luring Trump with promises of US investments in the country if the nuclear deal goes through. Hezbollah has remained quiet since the ceasefire with Israel last November and is gradually disarming even if far from fully disarming, the Houthis ceased the attacks in the Red Sea except on Israel ships and Trump said they showed “bravery”, and Hamas released an American prisoner irrespective of the ongoing stalled prisoner talks between Israel and Hamas. Iranian foreign minister Araghchi is just back from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, preempting Trump’s visit.
Against this background, American and Iranian negotiators are seeking a nuclear deal through indirect and direct talks, even though Tehran does not publicly acknowledge the direct talks for domestic reasons. Trump was accommodating Iranian demands, but after the third round on April 26, there was pressure in his inner circle to raise the negotiation bar.
Grandstanding is expectedly the name of the game, especially on the issue of enrichment. Witkoff initially said that Iran could enrich uranium at 3.67%, which is the level agreed on in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.
On May 9, however, Witkoff told Breitbart that “an enrichment program can never exist in the state of Iran ever again. That’s our red line. No enrichment. That means dismantlement, it means no weaponisation, and it means that Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan — those are their three enrichment facilities — have to be dismantled”.
This echoes Netanyahu’s demands of “zero enrichment” and a Libya-style deal that fully dismantles the Iranian nuclear program. The US aims to shrink its nuclear infrastructure to the point where developing a bomb is no longer possible.
An "honourable" deal
However, having at least 3.67% seems non-negotiable for Iranian officials, who seem flexible. Araghchi said: “Enrichment is an issue that Iran will not give up, and there is no room for compromise on it. However, its dimensions, levels, or amounts might change for a period to allow confidence-building”. Tehran has agreed in the current talks to limit stockpile size and centrifuge types, and seems open to granting the unprecedented International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expanded access to its nuclear sites in exchange for substantive sanctions relief.
The Iranian regime is insisting on the issue of “honour” in describing these talks by linking it to enrichment. Araghchi recently talked about the need for an “honorable agreement”, called the enrichment capability is one of the honors” of Iran, and that Iran’s program as springing from “the blood of our nuclear scientists” who were assassinated by Israel over the years. The “red line” of a superpower versus the “honor” of a revisionist power might define the perception of these talks.
While Trump is bypassing Netanyahu, he is also threatening Tehran that Israeli airstrikes could be unleashed against Iran’s nuclear program, hinting that the US will no longer restrain Israel if nuclear talks fail.
These talks are important for the Iranian regime more than it publicly admits. The Iranian rial strengthened from 1 million to $1 to around 830,000 to $1 after launching these talks hence, the stakes are high if it fails. Unlike his predecessor, Biden, Trump has a limited expiration date for these talks and the Iranian regime's options are limited.
Trump is trying to reach an agreement that is relatively a revision of the so-called Obama nuclear deal that he has long criticised, by extending the agreement to 25 years and tightening verification; the question is whether the US is willing to accept expanded sunset clauses that pause but stop short of fully dismantling Iran's nuclear program. This, and the Israeli factor, might be the make-or-break issues of the nuclear talks.
The dynamics of this love triangle could be at a tipping point.
Joe Macaron is a researcher and analyst in international relations and geopolitics with over two decades of experience with high-profile international organizations. He holds a Ph.D. in Politics and International Studies from the University of Bath in the United Kingdom.
Follow Joe on X: @macaronjoe
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