President Trump’s ’20 Point Peace Plan’ presents Hamas with a stark dilemma: disband, disarm, and accept governance of the Gaza Strip by a ‘Board of Peace’, or face unlimited US support for Israel to ‘finish the job’. With 72 hours to respond, this ultimatum represents a gamble: can deadline diplomacy break a two-year deadlock, or will fundamental flaws doom it to join the graveyard of failed initiatives?
The Trump plan demands the release of all Israeli hostages, alive or deceased, in exchange for the release of 1,700 Palestinians—a fraction of those abducted from Gaza since October 7, 2023. It also stipulates that Hamas disband and disarm, upon which the Rafah crossing will be reopened and full humanitarian aid sent into the Gaza Strip.
What is Trump proposing?
Under its terms, Gaza’s governance would be placed in the hands of Trump’s newly formed ‘Board of Peace’, which he will lead with the support of Tony Blair. The board is tasked with setting the framework for Gaza’s reconstruction, and will oversee a temporary transitional government of Palestinians and international experts who will deliver ‘the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities’.
The IDF would gradually hand over all occupied territory to a so-called ‘International Stabilization Force’, which will train and support ‘vetted Palestinian police forces’ to maintain internal security.
Critics within Hamas have pointed out that this force would not serve as peacekeepers but would pursue resistance elements and carry out military and security operations in coordination with the Israeli military—effectively continuing the occupation under international cover.
Another provision is that Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza, now or in the future. At the same time, the plan does not assert Palestinian statehood as an eventual certainty, only making references to it as an ‘aspiration’ for the Palestinian people. Instead, the plan refers several times to ‘peaceful co-existence’ between Gaza and its surroundings, with the very first clause of the proposal calling for the Strip to be a ‘deradicalized terror-free zone’—a criterion that will undoubtedly be measured by Israel and Israel alone.
Global response
The latest peace proposal comes at a crucial moment in which governments and international organisations around the world have intensified calls for an agreement that would end the genocide in the Strip. In recent weeks, the death toll in Gaza has surpassed 66,000, the UN has recognised the situation as genocide, and many states have recognised the existence of a Palestinian state.
The plan has received widespread backing from states in the region. The Palestinian Authority voiced its support for Trump’s effort towards peace, and the foreign ministers of eight countries: Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE, released a joint statement welcoming Trump’s efforts ‘to end the war in Gaza’.
Trump has given Hamas three to four days to make a decision, saying that there would be ‘a very sad end’ if the group rejected the proposal. Qatar and Egypt, the two countries largely responsible for mediation efforts in the past two years, have urged Hamas officials to accept the proposal. Turkey has joined mediation efforts alongside Qatari and Egyptian officials, meeting with Hamas leaders in Doha as Erdogan congratulated Trump for his efforts to broker a peace agreement.
However, Palestinian responses to the proposal have been far from receptive. Abbas Zaki, a senior Fatah official, described the proposal as ‘a document of surrender’. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) group said the proposal was a ‘recipe to blow up the region’. Members of Hamas on social media have lambasted the terms of the deal as a continuation of the occupying force that remains the main obstacle to lasting peace in Gaza and the rest of Palestine.
Other critics have pointed out that there are effectively two responses to the plan: acceptance or continued annihilation. The Trump administration has even dismissed any chance of negotiating the clauses of the proposal.
Critical problems
Yet beneath this apparent consensus lie three critical fault lines that will determine whether Trump's plan achieves a durable peace or simply reshuffles the deadlock. Three fundamental problems will need to be addressed for this plan to succeed where others have failed.
Firstly, the latest push for a peace deal for Gaza is notable in its deadline diplomacy and the force with which the Trump administration has presented Hamas with a stark choice. An ultimatum was issued with 72 hours for the movement to agree to the deal.
Whilst it is an open question whether an embattled and increasingly divided Israel is indeed able to ever fulfil its stated objectives in Gaza, this pathway at a minimum involves more destruction and a continuation of the genocide.
Hamas leaders must now weigh their political survival against immediate relief for Gaza’s besieged population without any ironclad guarantees that neither they, nor the leaders of Hamas, will not be targeted again in the future—specifically should the latter take the offer of safe passage to a third country.
Secondly, for any long-term ceasefire and eventual peace deal to be durable, it is vital to repair the breakdown in trust between all parties over the past month. The Israeli attack on the Hamas negotiating team in Doha on 9 September fractured trust not just between Israel and Hamas, but among the mediators themselves.
It also led to a much more cohesive and unified Arab and Gulf response, with GCC leaders discussing joint defence mechanisms and Saudi Arabia signing a security agreement with Pakistan, in part in response to the unprecedented attack.
Netanyahu’s apology to Qatar and President Trump’s security assurances in recent days are important steps taken to rebuild trust. This is vital as any deal for Gaza will not be a one-off negotiation; it will require dedicated follow-up, monitoring, and most likely renewed mediation efforts to overcome hurdles on the pathway to ending the genocide and lifting the blockade.
Thirdly, it is vital that any deal involves firm and enforceable understandings on the long-term elements of any agreement, particularly regarding security guarantees, the irreversible withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, and a timeline for transition to a Palestinian-led entity with broad-based legitimacy.
This will prove challenging as the proposal itself was revised at the last minute after Trump’s meeting with Netanyahu—a move that angered the Arab states that were in Washington to coordinate on the formulation of the plan. It inevitably raises the fear that the long-term elements of any deal could be reneged on by Israel and the US through regular Israeli military operations within Gaza, a delayed transition to Palestinian leadership, or even a permanent trusteeship over the Strip.
Despite these shortcomings and potential pitfalls, the Trump administration has created real momentum toward a deal that could bring an end to the war in Gaza. This has been achieved through securing the buy-in of regional states and opting to utilise US leverage on all parties. It is vital that this window of opportunity is capitalised upon.
Nevertheless, the crude ultimatum focused diplomacy on offer cannot substitute for the patient work required to develop credible, enforceable guarantees and the establishments of an effective, legitimate architecture to ensure implementation of any deal. Trump’s gamble may succeed in forcing Hamas’s hand, but without enforceable guarantees and legitimate governance structures, it will only reset the clock on the next cycle of violence.
Ghassan Elkahlout is the Director of the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies. He is an Associate Professor in Conflict Management and Humanitarian Action at the Doha Insitute for Graduate Studies.
Dr Sansom Milton is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies (CHS) in Doha, Qatar, and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.
They have co-authored Gulf to Global: The Rise of Qatar in Conflict Mediation which will be launched in November 2025.
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