Syria needs a national unity government, not a technocratic one

Since coming to power, in an attempt to fill the political vacuum left in the country following the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria's new administration has delivered the unexpected.

The latest surprise was the formation of a diverse and youthful technocratic cabinet with female and minority representation, which appears eager to start working and taking on the burdens of the difficult task that has been thrown on their shoulders.

Although this step has received much acclaim on the ground in Syria, as well as getting Arab and international support, none of this hides the fact that the forming of a cabinet in this manner was more aimed at satisfying external demands, rather than being a response to Syria's actual needs.

What Syria actually needs, now more than ever, is a national unity government in which all influential social and political forces and individuals with real pull among ordinary Syrians are represented and come together to work in partnership.

This is what is required to meet the major challenges awaiting us in the coming period.

The idea of a "technocratic government" aims to avoid this sort of partnership, which would entail a relationship of equals between all the forces that participated in the revolution and toppling of the regime. Instead, what has been formed is a "government of competencies", whose task is carrying out orders and instructions.

A country which has been torn apart by war and conflict doesn't need a technocratic government at this stage, including a token minister from a particular sect here, or a token female minister from a particular region there.

We shouldn't forget that the new administration rejected the quota system of government, possibly to cover up its real aim of excluding other influential or potentially influential political and societal forces.

What Syria needs now—just as much as it needs to rebuild roads and hospitals—is to preserve civil peace and address the deep social rifts which aren't confined to relations between the country's diverse sectarian and ethnic components, but that are eroding cohesion within these communities.

This cannot be achieved without the inclusion of real representatives of these components, especially in light of the difficulties of holding fair elections in the near future (if these will ever be held).

The current exclusionary and marginalising approach began with the "Victory Conference" on 29 January 2025. It then continued with the "National Dialogue Conference" which followed superficial "consultations" lasting a week, carried out by a committee assigned to the task, and saw 4,000 people from different governorates attend (how they were selected to represent millions of Syrians remains unclear).

Then came the constitutional declaration, drafted by a narrow committee which tailored it to the new leadership's requirements, and finally, this technocratic government which was formed without the bare minimum of consultation with the political and social forces in Syria.

It is logical to expect this approach to continue when it comes to the selection of those who will sit on the legislative body, and the appointment of the constitutional court, with all authority ultimately concentrated in the hands of one person.

In the beginning, the assessment (or justification) given by many was that the new administration (Hayat Tahrir Sham (HTS)) had suddenly found itself in the seat of power without a plan or programme because of the unexpected collapse of the Assad regime.

After four months however, this interpretation is no longer valid. A clear approach is being taken which signals the attempt to concentrate power in the hands of one individual, and in one political faction.

This approach will not succeed in reuniting the country, nor in securing the removal of sanctions.

Syria needs a broad national consensus and genuine efforts to involve all its political and social components in rebuilding the country, and this won't happen if Syrians continue to be viewed as individuals who are incapable of political organising and collective action (ironically the only group now represented as a political force capable of such actions being HTS).

It is not too late to change course. We can go back and review the steps taken, including the constitutional declaration, and call for an inclusive and comprehensive Syrian national conference. Then, the task would be to agree on the form the state and its political system should take, to elect a national assembly to act as the legislature, to form a committee to write a permanent constitution, and to establish a national unity government supported by qualified and professional individuals to manage a transitional phase whose duration would be agreed upon.

This alone is what will grant Ahmed al-Sharaa the institutional legitimacy he seeks, and strengthen his rule in a constitutional manner and with national consensus. Moreover, this is what we sincerely want—because we want him to succeed, not for any reason other than that his failure will drag the country into a disaster we are determined to prevent with all our strength.

Marwan Kabalan is a Syrian academic and writer. He holds a PhD degree in International Relations. He is the Director of Policy Analysis at the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies.

Translated by Rose Chacko

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