With Venezuela, Gaza and Iran mediation, Qatar has shifted from soft power to skin in the game

From Gaza to Kabul, Qatar works quietly to broker peace. How did it become so pivotal, and why now mediate between the US and Venezuela, asks Tanner Manley.
4 min read
23 Oct, 2025
Last Update
27 October, 2025 10:06 AM
By continuing its involvement in South America, Doha is not only building on its legacy of long-term mediation but testing the limitations of small-state security in a changing international order, says Tanner Manley [photo credit: Getty Images]

Qatar made headlines recently for its mediation between Hamas and Israel that led to the Gaza ceasefire agreement. What is perhaps less widely known is the Gulf state’s mediation of at least a dozen conflicts in other regions, including in South America.

Earlier this month, in response to recent US strikes on civilian vessels off the Venezuelan coast, Colombian President Gustavo Petro called on Qatar to mediate between Washington and Caracas. Petro, who restored his country’s ties with Caracas in 2022, recognises that the Gulf state is well-positioned to help defuse regional tensions.

Qatari officials have reportedly already been mediating behind the scenes. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has been receptive to Qatar’s diplomatic involvement, while US President Donald Trump appears to be rejecting diplomacy in favour of a military approach, escalating tensions.

The Gulf state’s mediation between these parties is not without precedent. In 2023, Doha quietly hosted secret talks that led to the Barbados agreement and limited sanctions relief later that year.

As I previously argued with Leily Rossi, mediating this dispute represented more than a gesture of goodwill on Qatar’s part. Over the past decade, mediation has been the cornerstone of the state’s foreign policy. From Gaza to Afghanistan, Doha has specialised in brokering talks between parties to some of the world’s most intractable conflicts. This strategy has enabled it to balance relations with its key security partner, the United States, alongside Iran and non-state actors, while projecting influence well beyond its size.

Yet the environment that once rewarded Qatar’s neutrality has grown far less predictable. On September 9, Israel struck Hamas’ politburo in Doha, killing and wounding several people, including a Qatari security officer.

Only months earlier, Iran fired missiles toward the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar during a flare-up in regional hostilities. Together, these attacks punctured Qatar’s core security assumptions: that mediation engenders protection, that neutrality deters attack, and that US security arrangements still hold value.

As Dr. Majed Al-Ansari, an advisor to the Prime Minister of Qatar and the spokesperson for its Foreign Ministry, observed in Foreign Policy, the Israeli strike represented “a paradigm shift for the whole region” toward a perception of Israel as “a national security threat” to Gulf states.

It constituted an “attack on the concept of mediation [and] solving conflicts through peaceful means.” After such attacks, it is even more imperative for a small state like Qatar to continue to adapt and diversify its diplomatic, defence, and economic partnerships.

Still, Qatar’s diplomatic corps is small, and its mediation bandwidth is finite. Overextension could dilute the credibility that underpins its influence, while any perceived “win” for Maduro could again become a flashpoint in US domestic politics and spark criticism of Doha’s involvement.

Nevertheless, the same fragmentation of global power that has heightened certain risks also creates new opportunities. By mediating between the United States and Venezuela, Qatar is extending its diplomatic playbook to a region where direct threats to its national security are lower but where the political returns remain significant.

Moreover, Qatar’s energy and agribusiness investments, along with aid projects, also help to reinforce its regional outreach, backing its diplomacy with economic clout.

Facilitating dialogue between Washington and Caracas allows Doha to demonstrate continued utility to an important ally, while expanding ties with other partners — ones that may constitute increasingly important parts of its diversified diplomatic portfolio.

Ultimately, mediation and diplomatic diversification remain an effective part of Qatar’s approach to navigating an increasingly multipolar international system.

By continuing its involvement in South America, Doha is not only building on its legacy of sustained, long-term mediation but also testing the limitations of small-state security in a changing international order.

Perspectives

The stakes are high and growing. Venezuela’s long-running border dispute with Guyana has escalated, prompting the International Court of Justice in May to warn of a significant and increasing risk that Caracas might attempt to “acquire and exercise control and administration over the territory in dispute.”

Trump’s ad hoc South America policy, recklessly combining the carrot and stick, has exacerbated tensions. Recent US posturing has been increasingly militaristic, as the Trump administration abandons diplomatic channels and conducts military strikes on vessels off Venezuela’s coast.

In this context, mediation and international pressure urging de-escalation are desperately needed, and, as in the past, Qatar’s sustained diplomatic involvement can play a pivotal role.

By mediating between the US and Venezuela, and in myriad other contexts, Qatar is testing whether small states can effectively cultivate security through diplomacy in an era when great powers, and their small allies, operate beyond all red lines.

Tanner J. Manley is a Policy Fellow at the Crisis Response Council. He previously worked as a Research Assistant at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs in Doha, Qatar. His work focuses on international law, cross-border disputes, and the foreign policy and security of Gulf states.

Follow him on X: @Tanner_J_Manley

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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.