PKK disarmament: A roadmap to Kurdish justice or another mirage?

In a historic announcement on May 12, 2015, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) declared its decision to disband and lay down arms. The decision, taken at the group’s congress on May 5 and 7, 2025, follows a call from its imprisoned founder, Abdullah Öcalan, and marks what could be the most significant development in Kurdish politics in over half a century.

After decades of conflict that have shaped the security architecture of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and beyond, the prospect of Kurdish disarmament raises both hope and unease: is this the beginning of peace, or another illusion in a cycle of unfulfilled promises?

The armed insurgency of the PKK began in 1984, rooted in the Turkish state’s longstanding repression of Kurdish identity, language, and political expression. Over the past 40 years, the conflict has claimed more than 40,000 lives and displaced millions. The PKK has been designated a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the US, and the EU — but for many Kurds, it has symbolised resistance in the face of repression.

Few armed movements in modern history have lasted this long while maintaining regional relevance and expanding its power across nation-state borders. The armed struggle of PKK outpaced similar organisations such as the IRA in Northern Ireland, the FARC in Colombia, or the LTTE in Sri Lanka.

Unlike those movements, the PKK’s struggle became transnational, spawning ideological and military offshoots like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), now a central player in Syria’s northeast. This makes the decision to disband not just a local or national issue, but one with significant regional consequences.

Why PKK disarmament matters

In Turkey, the implications of a peace process are enormous. A successful transition away from insurgency could lead to long-sought recognition of Kurdish constitutional rights, renewed protections for cultural and linguistic freedoms, and potentially a new model of decentralised governance.

Amnesty for thousands of political exiles and prisoners — including Selahattin Demirtaş, the former leader of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP)—could be a vital signal of sincerity from the state.

Yet Kurds remain cautious. Past negotiations, such as those in 2013–2015, collapsed when the Turkish state refused to follow through on promised reforms. In the absence of third-party mediation or clear guarantees, there are fears that disarmament could leave Kurds politically vulnerable and unprotected once again.

Subscribe Now and Listen to our Podcasts On

Meanwhile, in Syria, the ripple effects are already being felt. Just weeks after Öcalan’s call, on March 10, 2025, the SDF signed an agreement with the new interim Syrian government led by Ahmad al-Sharaa. The deal envisions integrating the SDF into national security structures and recognising Kurdish rights within a new constitutional framework.

If implemented, this could transform the Kurds from marginal actors into stakeholders in post-Assad Syria — a shift that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago.

The Arab role: Balancing diplomacy and strategic interest

While much of the focus has rightly been on Ankara and Damascus, Arab states, particularly in the Gulf, are increasingly influential in shaping the contours of this emerging peace.

Countries like Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia have moved from being passive observers to active participants in regional diplomacy, including support for reconstruction efforts in Syria and ongoing efforts to broker a peace deal in Gaza.

The recent visit by US President Donald Trump to the Middle East, where he met leaders of Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, and negotiated commercial deals, adds another layer to the puzzle. Of particular note was his meeting with interim Syrian President al-Sharaa, a gesture that is seen as a green light for the Gulf states to deepen engagement with Syria’s reconstruction.

Arab governments have long viewed Kurdish empowerment with a mix of suspicion and opportunity. On one hand, they fear potential ripple effects for their own minority groups; on the other, the Kurds in Syria and Iraq offer a secular, organised, and militarily capable force that can serve as a buffer against both Iranian expansion and jihadist resurgence.

A stable and politically integrated Kurdish partner may be exactly what Gulf capitals hope for as they recalibrate their strategies in a post-conflict Middle East.

Justice for the Kurds?

Still, for all the high-level agreements and symbolic gestures, uncertainties for a roadmap persist.

Will Turkey follow through on promised reforms, or will it once again use peace talks to neutralise Kurdish demands while preserving a centralised, nationalist state? Will Syria’s interim government provide real protections for Kurdish rights, or co-opt the SDF into a fragile regime that risks falling back into conservative authoritarianism under HTS? And perhaps most importantly: will Kurdish society itself accept this transition after decades of armed struggle if there are no tangible reforms on the horizon?

Many Kurds follow the current developments with cautious optimism. They remember the failed peace negotiations of the past: the collapse of the 2013-2015 peace process after the HDP’s electoral success; the brutal military operations in southeastern Turkey following failed peace negotiations in 2015 and 2016.

The timing of this announcement is also noteworthy. It comes at a moment of broader transformation in the region: Assad has fallen, the SDF is negotiating integration, Arab states are re-engaging with Syria, and American-Iranian nuclear negotiations via Oman have seen renewed momentum, raising hopes for a potential agreement that could ease tensions in the Middle East.

In Gaza, there are ongoing discussions about a possible ceasefire, reflecting a fragile but hopeful attempt to halt the recent cycle of violence.

Meanwhile, in Istanbul, Ukrainian and Russian delegations met for the first time since the war began, with the talks facilitated by Turkish officials and observed by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. As expected, neither Trump nor Putin attended, but the meeting still marked a significant step forward for achieving a broader peace in the Middle East and beyond.

Nevertheless, for Ankara, a Kurdish peace may be less about reconciliation and more about securing its influence in a changing Middle East. Speaking the language of peace has often been a way for Turkish leaders to maintain control at moments of regional change and uncertainty. Are we witnessing the same strategy in a new form?

Ultimately, disarmament alone will not bring peace. For the Kurds, peace means justice — freedom from persecution, recognition of their identity, and participation in the states they inhabit as equals. If the PKK’s disbandment is to mark the start of something genuinely new, it must be matched by concrete, irreversible steps from both Turkey and Syria.

The international community, including Arab states with growing stakes in the region, must ensure that this moment of possibility is not squandered. Without meaningful change, the disbandment of the PKK may be remembered not as the dawn of a new era, but as the quiet end of one more Kurdish resistance—outmanoeuvred by state power and abandoned at the brink of transformation.

Dr Mashuq Kurt is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Royal Holloway, University of London. He specialises in political sociology and the anthropology of religion with a focus on Turkey, Kurdish studies and Muslim diasporas. He is the author of Kurdish Hizbullah in Turkey: Islamism, Violence and the State (Pluto, 2017) and has published widely in leading academic journals. Beyond academia, he contributes to public discourse through media commentary and documentary filmmaking. His writings appeared in Le Monde, Foreign Policy, Open Democracy, Jadaliyya, among others.

Follow him on X: @mimkurd

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff, or the author's employer.