Netanyahu is stroking Trump's ego: But will flattery buy a ceasefire in Gaza?

On July 7, 2025, President Donald J. Trump welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House for the third time in less than six months. That certainly exceeds the diplomatic courtesy extended to any other ally of the United States.

Their two face-to-face meetings during the 4-day visit were depicted as frank discussions focusing, among other things, on a 60-day ceasefire proposal to temporarily pause the brutal fighting raging for the past 20 months in Gaza; in addition to various bilateral issues, including the aftermath of the recent 12-day war with Iran, as well as the security situation in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

The formal dinner at the White House, deemed by both parties as the highlight of the Netanyahu visit, was essentially a diplomatic “dud” with no serious announcements about any agreements on the agenda items revealed to the media by the administration.

The only surprising element was Netanyahu’s handing President Trump a letter nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Political pundits were perplexed whether to depict the fraudulent gesture as a compliment or an insult to the US president, considering it comes from the first prime minister of Israel, indicted while in office for multiple charges of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust.

At any rate, the central tenets of the Gaza ceasefire proposal discussed during Netanyahu’s visit were recently accepted in principle by both Israel and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). However, contrary to overly optimistic assessments by Trump and Steve Witkoff, insisting that only one issue remains outstanding, in fact, according to sources familiar with the Doha talks, several key points of contention remain to be ironed out by negotiators representing both parties.

The draft agreement widely leaked to Arab and Israeli media outlets is quite like documents proposed intermittently by the US and Arab mediators and stakeholders since October 7, 2023.

It is déjà vu again. The deal currently under consideration includes the same basic steps that both sides in Gaza have been asked to take before.

That means: a cessation of military operations by both Israel and Hamas; the release of Israeli hostages, living and dead, held in Gaza since October 7, paired with the release of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel; the gradual withdrawal of Israeli troops from densely populated areas of the Strip; and the urgent delivery of humanitarian aid, relief supplies, and fuel to all parts of Gaza.

The amounts and methods of distribution are, as always, still up for negotiation.

Although many analysts in the US and the region agree that a genuine, enforceable ceasefire that puts an end to the daily genocidal bloodletting witnessed since October 2023 is generally welcome, others are quite apprehensive about the remaining loose ends throughout the deal that threaten its effectiveness, sustainability, and verifiability.

Four fundamental concerns come to mind in this regard. First and foremost, the document conspicuously avoids addressing the day after and its political implications for the people of Gaza. There are no convincing direct answers, nor even implicit hints, in the draft agreement regarding such fundamental questions as who will control or govern the Strip once a deal is accepted. Mr. Netanyahu left Washington with the ironclad US assurances that “There will be no more Hamas.” Israel, in other words, will be allowed to “eliminate Hamas down to its very foundation,” as Netanyahu insisted.

Second, as widely admitted by American and Israeli analysts, both Hamas and Israel are asking the Trump administration for political guarantees. Hamas understandably wants solid assurances from the guarantors that the ceasefire deal will lead to a permanent end to the Gaza war and not simply a temporary respite.

Contrary to that, Israel demands guarantees and clear understandings from the US to ensure a temporary arrangement while retaining its ability to resume fighting without any restrictions to eliminate Hamas, should that become necessary from its perspective. While Hamas was left empty-handed in this regard, Netanyahu went home with a better chance of getting his request met by Trump based on the existing bias and imbalance in Washington's current policy position.

Third, since the inception of the Gaza war, neither Israel nor the US has amended its original objective of eliminating Hamas’s military and governing capabilities. That goal remains intact today, which prompts objective analysts to ask what then motivates Hamas to sign this deal, which is tantamount to a suicide pact on its part, endorsed by the Trump administration?

Finally, PM Netanyahu was elated during the July 8 dinner by President Trump’s tacit approval of Israel’s so-called “Humanitarian City” proposal, indicating the adherence of both parties to their earlier ill-conceived and illegal plans to transfer hundreds of thousands of Palestinians out of the Gaza Strip, whether forcibly or voluntarily. Trump’s silence on the matter spoke volumes without uttering a word.

The stuttering indirect proximity talks currently taking place in Doha might offer an opportunity to address these questions partially or entirely by plugging the above-stated gaps in the existing draft.

President Trump remains upbeat about the talks despite the lack of any tangible progress or breakthrough. Washington remains optimistic about the ongoing efforts by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff to facilitate negotiations over the persisting snags.

Should these talks fail, the parties, including the United States, have no one to blame but themselves for pushing a short-term deal that lacks a hopeful vision for genuine and lasting peace, which requires abundant diplomatic flexibility from all parties without exception.

Khalil E. Jahshan is the Executive Director of Arab Centre Washington DC.

Follow him on X: @khalilejahshan

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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.