Is Israel a regional power or is its military prowess overhyped?

Since October 7, 2023, Israel has increasingly portrayed its military operations as a war unfolding across multiple arenas. Israeli officials and commentators frequently describe the conflict as spanning seven fronts: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Within Israeli political, security, and public discourse, the ability to confront threats simultaneously across these fronts is presented as evidence of Israel’s growing strategic capacity.

The narrative emphasises not only Israel’s military superiority but also its ability to project power across widely dispersed theatres, reflecting what officials often term a “long operational reach.” Israel’s capacity to contain or weaken adversaries on multiple fronts is portrayed domestically as a strategic turning point, reinforcing its image as an emerging regional power.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu articulated this vision in his address to US Congress on 24 July 2024, calling for a strategic alliance between Israel and the United States to confront what he described as the existential threat posed by Iran. He proposed that this partnership should expand to include regional states that had normalised relations with Israel, as well as others potentially moving in that direction.

Netanyahu referred to this framework as the “Abraham Alliance,” inspired by the Abraham Accords, arguing that such a coalition could fundamentally reshape the strategic architecture of the Middle East.

This theme was reinforced in Netanyahu’s address at a conference of Israeli ambassadors held in Jerusalem in early December 2025. He emphasised that Israel is no longer merely a resilient state defending itself but an increasingly influential actor shaping regional dynamics.

Israel’s ability to navigate complex threats – from Gaza and Lebanon to Syria and Iran - combined with expanding alliances and deterrence strategies, signals a shift from a historically “defensive” posture toward a more assertive regional presence. In his view, these developments suggest Israel is steadily consolidating a role as a regional power with growing global relevance.

From Netanyahu’s perspective, the ongoing US–Israel war on Iran fits into a broader strategic vision in which Israel moves beyond narrow “territorial defence” to assert influence across the Middle East.

A few months later, on March 7, 2026, he declared: “We have turned Israel into a regional power; all of this requires boldness, initiative, and the willingness to take risks.”

By linking Israel’s operations against Iranian and military infrastructure to the notion of regional power projection, Netanyahu frames the current war not only as a matter of neutralising threats but also as a demonstration of Israel’s strategic reach. This rhetoric reflects a broader doctrinal shift -from reactive “defence” to proactive engagement - underpinned by advanced military capabilities, deepening security cooperation with Washington, and deterrence strategies that extend well beyond Israel’s neighbouring countries.

Yet the debate over Israel’s regional status is not limited to political rhetoric. Within Israel’s own strategic community, scholars and security experts offer differing interpretations.

Dr. Gadi Yeshayahu, a former security official and research fellow at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman University in Herzliya, argues that Israel represents a rare case in international relations: a small state that functions as a regional power. Applying the “triple test” of capabilities, willingness to use power, and status recognition, he demonstrates that Israel’s military strength, technological leadership, economic development, and readiness to project force give it influence far beyond its geographic and demographic size.

Yeshayahu’s study also highlights the growing political discourse among Israeli leaders framing Israel as a regional power, alongside increasing regional recognition of its role in shaping security arrangements, particularly in response to shared threats like Iran. These factors collectively indicate that Israel challenges traditional assumptions that regional power depends solely on territory or population, showing how technological, military, and strategic advantages enable a small state to exert significant influence.

A contrasting view is offered by Professor Efraim Inbar, a right-wing scholar at Shalem College in Jerusalem. He argues that despite Israel’s military successes since 7 October, these achievements do not constitute genuine regional power. He warns that claims of dominance echo the euphoria that preceded the strategic surprise of the October 1973 War.

While Israel has strengthened deterrence, especially against Iran and Hezbollah, these operations have not fundamentally altered the regional balance of power. Structural limitations – including small size, limited manpower, economic dependence on global markets, and reliance on the US – remain. Unresolved conflicts in Gaza, alongside shifting dynamics in Syria and Lebanon, further constrain Israel’s ability to consolidate regional dominance.

Beyond scholarly debate, the perception of Israel as a regional power is promoted by parts of its military, technological, and business elite. This view emphasises military and technological superiority, strategic alliances with the United States, and growing engagement with Arab states following the Abraham Accords.

Israel’s technology sector exemplifies this image: the country hosts over 7,000 startups, ranks among the world’s leading venture capital destinations per capita, and accounts for a significant share of global cybersecurity exports. High-tech contributes roughly 15% of GDP, strengthening Israel’s reputation as a “startup nation” whose technological strength supports both economic resilience and strategic influence.

Even Israel’s technological leadership is increasingly scrutinised. A report by the National Committee for Accelerating Artificial Intelligence identified several structural challenges that could threaten the country’s future competitiveness in AI and related high-tech sectors. Chief among these is a significant shortage of advanced AI researchers in Israeli universities, which limits the talent pipeline needed to maintain innovation globally.

This shortage is further compounded by limited national computing infrastructure, forcing companies and research institutions to rely heavily on foreign cloud services, raising concerns over data sovereignty, costs, and strategic independence. Taken together, these obstacles suggest that while Israel’s technological sector remains highly innovative and influential, its global leadership is not guaranteed.

Ultimately, whether Israel has truly become a fully consolidated regional power remains an open question. Its growing military reach, expanding diplomatic networks, and technological capabilities certainly strengthen its influence, yet structural constraints persist, regional alliances continue to shift, and Israel remains strategically dependent on Washington.

More critically, Israel’s domestic political discourse – including the positions of a majority of its political parties – largely denies or minimises the strategic consequences of its occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.

On the ground, approximately two million Palestinians in Gaza live without secure shelter, while military control, annexation, displacement, and other oppressive practices increasingly shape and restrict the lives of some three million Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The Palestinian question remains central, and all attempts to eliminate or marginalize it have failed, emphasising that Israel’s regional ambitions cannot be fully understood or sustained without addressing the persistent humanitarian, political, and strategic consequences of the occupation.

Dr. Rami Nasrallah is Associate Professor (Hon.), The Bartlett Development Planning Unit (DPU), University College London (UCL).

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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.