Amid rising regional tensions, the confrontation between the United States and Iran appears more complex than a direct military clash. The stakes are not measured solely by airstrikes or the scale of destruction but by each side’s strategic objectives and the political consequences likely to unfold in the medium and long term.
But while both parties seek to present themselves as victorious to the public, one of Tehran’s most significant strategic errors has been antagonising the Gulf states through direct or indirect attacks, reinforcing the perception that Iran is an unreliable partner.
Iran could have pursued a more pragmatic approach, building bridges of trust with its Gulf neighbours and presenting itself as a regional power committed to stability and balance. Instead, it chose to strike Gulf countries or target their security directly or through proxies, a move that constitutes a major strategic mistake.
This approach has not only expanded the circle of adversaries but has also pushed Gulf states closer to international alliances, particularly the United States, in search of security guarantees against mounting threats.
Washington’s objectives in any military confrontation with Iran differ significantly from Tehran’s. The United States primarily seeks to achieve strategic goals, including controlling Iran’s enriched uranium programme and ensuring the uninterrupted flow of international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz under all circumstances, including wartime.
It also aims to protect its military and economic interests in the region and to prevent Iran from threatening global trade or from closing the Strait of Hormuz, a vital energy artery.
These objectives could be pursued through large-scale air operations targeting Iran’s military infrastructure, particularly long-range missile systems that could endanger navigation or regional bases.
In a more escalatory scenario, the United States might deploy limited ground forces on nearby islands or sites to push Iranian forces away from the strait, reducing their ability to threaten transiting vessels.
If limited operations fail to achieve full objectives, Washington could adopt a harsher approach, destroying military and economic infrastructure near the strait and potentially in other areas inside Iran.
This could be accompanied by a crippling economic blockade aimed at weakening the Iranian state internally, with an implicit expectation that domestic protests could eventually pressure political change.
By contrast, Iran’s priorities differ significantly. Its top concern is not avoiding destruction or economic loss but maintaining regime survival.
From this perspective, the regime's continued existence despite overwhelming military and economic pressure constitutes a victory in itself. For this reason, any ceasefire announcement would likely be followed by extensive media campaigns from both sides, each seeking to portray itself as the winner.
Beyond narratives of victory and defeat, the clearest reality is that Arab countries bear the heaviest burden in such conflicts second only to Iran. Military tensions, reciprocal escalation, and the Gulf's transformation into a theatre for major and regional powers all increase regional instability.
This underscores the urgent need to develop a genuine Arab security project grounded in a shared strategic vision for regional security. The Arab world cannot remain a stage for settling scores among international and regional powers, nor can it continue to rely entirely on external forces for security and stability.
Building a more independent Arab security system, strengthening defence cooperation among Arab states, and developing self-reliant deterrence capabilities are all essential to prevent the region from again becoming a proxy war zone.
True stability will be achieved only when Arab states can protect their own interests and define the balance of power in their region independently of others’ conflicts and untrustworthy neighbours.
Mahmoud Khalaf Al-Deiri is a Syrian researcher and writer with a doctorate in political science.
Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.
Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.