How the Lebanon framework agreement reshapes the US-Iran standoff

Most commentary on the 26 June US-Israel-Lebanon Trilateral Framework agreement has focused on the text of the document, and specifically the extent to which Lebanon's leadership, under the pretext of restoring sovereign hegemony to the Lebanese state, in practice forfeits it to Israel.

Missing from much of this analysis is how this agreement fits into the larger regional picture and seeks to achieve objectives that are not primarily about Lebanon.

As has been widely noted, the mid-June Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed between the United States and Iran represented a significant strategic victory for Iran.

Pursuant to this MoU, Iran was not required to relinquish anything it had not already ceded in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear agreement.

Specifically, the US-Iran MoU makes no mention of any of the issues set out by the US as its objectives when it launched its war on 28 February. In other words, their war objectives are not even up for discussion.

Two of these issues, Iran’s ballistic missile program and its regional alliances, had also been raised previously by the Biden administration. At the time, their resolution to Washington’s satisfaction had been presented to Iran as conditions for the US to resume compliance with the JCPOA, which the first Trump administration had unilaterally renounced in 2018.

Yet the June MoU makes no mention of either issue. In other words, Washington acquiesced to negotiate a comprehensive agreement with Iran that would not require Tehran to concede anything with respect to either its missile program or its regional relationships.

When the MoU was agreed in mid-June, military confrontations between the US and Iran were not only escalating but rapidly approaching the point where Washington’s only alternative to a diplomatic agreement was a resumption of full-scale war with Iran, almost certainly on an even greater scale than during the "40-day War".

Despite its incomparably more powerful military, this was not a course the US was prepared to take at that time. The damage to the US position in the Middle East and globally, the disruption to the US and global economy, as well as the potential impact on the upcoming US elections, were deemed excessive. There was also no guarantee a new campaign would succeed.

It is highly unlikely that Washington accepted the MoU merely to create a pause to allow it to replenish its resources and reload, as it were, its military option. Doing so would require months, if not years.

The more likely scenario is that Washington signed off on the MoU because, at that particular time, it was convinced it had no better option. Given the extraordinary incompetence of this administration, it is also entirely plausible that Washington didn’t fully understand what it had actually agreed to.

That said, the US has also never felt constrained by formal commitments, whether to Iran or any other party.

Washington's determination to change the terms of the MoU reflects, first and foremost, its desire to reverse the strategic defeat administered by Iran in the Persian Gulf. Yet several additional factors, which should be considered secondary rather than primary, contributed to this determination and to Washington's willingness to assume greater risks.

These include the sustained campaign for a resumption of war by key Republican donors and constituencies, most prominently but not exclusively the Israel First and Only contingent; Trump’s exceptionally thin-skinned nature and extreme sensitivity to accusations he’s been outmanoeuvred; and the approaching US elections, including the anticipated competition between JD Vance and Marco Rubio for the Republican presidential nomination.

The US can't just rip up the MoU and replace it with a different text. Instead, it has sought to outflank its existing commitments by entering into new ones with regional states, in an effort to undercut them and impose new ones on Iran.

In this context, the MoU's explicit reference to a ceasefire in Lebanon and to the "territorial integrity and sovereignty" of Lebanon represented not only a strategic cataclysm for Israel, but restored Iran’s role as a significant regional actor. It also strengthened Hezbollah at the expense of the pro-Western presidency of Joseph Aoun, whose ongoing negotiations with Israel had failed to achieve results for the country.

Additionally, the inclusion of Iran and exclusion of Israel from the Lebanon “deconfliction cell” established pursuant to the MoU restored Iranian influence in Beirut.

The Trilateral Framework not only fully removes Iran from the Lebanese equation and replaces it with Israel, but also eliminates all the achievements of the MoU and legitimises Israel’s occupation of Lebanese territory and continued aggression against the country. The Trilateral Framework is not only inherently incompatible with the MoU but also designed for this purpose.

Similarly, the 25 June Joint Statement by the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), issued after a meeting between Rubio and GCC officials, "emphasised that lasting regional peace and security requires addressing the full spectrum of Iran’s threats, including its ballistic missiles, drones, and support of proxies in the region". Washington will now claim that these items are back on the agenda because they are required by its regional allies.

A test of wills

Elsewhere, the US is putting massive pressure on Oman to dissuade it from reaching any agreement with Iran regarding the management of the Strait of Hormuz.

The escalating hostilities in the Persian Gulf this past week should be seen in the same context – a test of wills between Washington and Tehran to set the terms of negotiations rather than as an alternative to such talks.

But just because neither party appears prepared to once again go to war doesn’t mean there won't be one. Either Washington will be forced to respect the MoU it signed, or Iran will be compelled to accept the US-induced revisions. Neither of these scenarios appears likely at present.

Pending the outcome of this struggle, Israel, using the liberties afforded by the Trilateral Framework as cover, will do everything it can to provoke Iran with escalating violations of the MoU's terms concerning Lebanon. If and when Tehran responds, the ball will be in Washington’s court.

Further complicating matters is that the outcome will have a significant impact on the domestic politics of Israel, Lebanon, the United States, and perhaps Iran as well.

In Israel, Netanyahu's political survival hangs in the balance. An enforced end to Israel's Lebanon campaign without a decisive result, should this materialise before the elections due by October, will not sit well with Israeli voters. In the US, the Middle East is already emerging as a key arena for the anticipated contest between Vance and Rubio for the Republican nomination.

Less is known about Iran's new leadership and the extent to which differences over the country’s national security strategy are contributing to its formation.

No such ambiguity exists in Lebanon. In order to strengthen his position vis-à-vis Hezbollah, President Aoun rejected an agreement that required Israel to stop bombing his country and restore its sovereignty. He has instead embraced an agreement that, in the most charitable interpretation, constitutes Oslo on steroids. Under such circumstances, success is not an option.

Mouin Rabbani is Managing Editor of Jadaliyya (www.jadaliyya.com) and author of Gaza Apocalypse (forthcoming, OR Books).

Follow Mouin on X: @MouinRabbani

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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.