How disinformation is undermining Syria’s future

Disinformation was a defining feature of the Syrian conflict since 2011, it shaped narratives and manipulated public opinion since its onset. Bashar al-Assad’s regime violently suppressed dissent, and propaganda was a key tool for consolidating his power. Whilst the fall of the regime has brought great relief for many of those who were targeted by his disinformation apparatus, the hangover of this risks being a challenge to the new administration during the process of rebuilding the country.

For many years the Assad regime developed a sophisticated media apparatus to discredit opponents, present itself as a defender against terrorism, and justify its actions to domestic and international audiences. The network of disinformation that was created had focused on shaping the national narrative surrounding the revolution in particular.

As the war escalated, disinformation became more elaborate. With its mass online surveillance powers, the Assad regime established an iron dome to block information from reaching areas under its control. This prevented many Syrians from receiving trustworthy news, and they were instead spoon-fed propaganda and disinformation.

Allies of disinformation

One central campaign by the regime related to the use of chemical weapons. Whilst both the United Nations and a fact-finding team from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) considered Assad’s regime responsible for the use of such weapons, an alternative narrative that accused the opposition was dispersed by the former leadership.

Furthermore, Syrian state media and Russian media networks accused the White Helmets, a volunteer rescue group, of staging rescues and fabricating chemical attacks. They were branded agents of Western intelligence, falsehoods that were amplified by fake accounts, state-sponsored outlets, and conspiracy theorists.

Similar tactics were used to obscure accountability for particular chemical weapons attacks like during the 2018 Douma assault.

Throughout the conflict, disinformation was clearly not been limited to the Assad regime.

Russia, Iran, and China depended on propaganda to advance their political interests in Syria. For example, Russia played a major role in discrediting opposition groups and denying war crimes, while Iran promoted narratives portraying their militias as protectors of minorities and forces of stability as they attempted to mask their involvement in sectarian violence and demographic engineering.

This coordinated use of information warfare long-shaped global perception, and both delayed international response as well as shielded the Assad regime from accountability.

The risks to a new Syria

In post-Assad Syria a troubling new trend has emerged: the rise of coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks, tactics reminiscent of China’s "Spamouflage" campaigns. These networks leverage bot farms, hashtag manipulation, fake accounts, and astroturfing to simulate grassroots movements and distort public opinion.

CIB operations rely on fake personas and coordinated activities to amplify narratives that align with geopolitical goals inside Syria and abroad. Exploiting Syria’s sectarian divisions and fragile social fabric to sow discord is one such goal that CIB networks pursue, driven by multiple actors with competing interests.

Foreign governments like Russia, Iran, use disinformation to manipulate narratives, weaken the transitional government, and justify their influence. Pro-Assad loyalists and intelligence networks stoke fear and sectarian tensions to discredit the new leadership, while extremist groups such as HTS and Iran-backed militias exploit misinformation to maintain their foothold.

Meanwhile, private CIB firms networks, or disinformation for hire, amplify false narratives to erode public trust, discourage reconciliation, and manufacture the illusion of grassroots opposition. These tactics ultimately serve to destabilise Syria, prevent unity, and secure continued external control over the country’s future.    

Recent investigations by Eekad Facts, an Open Source Arab Intelligence Platform, reveal the emergence of such networks targeting Syria, mimicking global disinformation tactics that were used to destabilise other nations including Gaza and Sudan.

In Sudan, disinformation campaigns were used to undermine pro-democracy movements during the transitional period following the toppling of President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. These campaigns were orchestrated by a combination of local actors, including military and security forces, and foreign entities with a stake in the country’s political future.

The aim was to discredit civic leaders, undermine transition and deepen divisions within the opposition. The pro-democracy uprisings, which began in December 2018, had led to Bashir's ousting but were followed by a fragile transition, marked by continued military influence and political instability. This ended with a military coup in October 2021, followed by a nationwide conflict between the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Forces.

While the war on the ground continues to rage, a parallel online battle persists, with ongoing efforts to influence public opinion in Sudan.

Indeed the networks of disinformation in Syria have suspiciously inflated their online presence, with some accounts boasting millions of followers—often through bought or repurposed accounts. While initially driven by bots, these campaigns have started engaging real users. For example, the National Centre for Documenting Violations in Syria has spread false stories to stoke up fear and tension, including that there have been attacks on religious shrines.

The individuals or groups buying and repurposing accounts for disinformation campaigns in Syria are likely to be state actors or affiliated entities with a vested interest in manipulating public opinion or controlling the narrative. These accounts, often purchased or recycled, are used to amplify disinformation by increasing their reach and influence.

The National Centre for Documenting Violations in Syria, established by the Syrian opposition to document human rights violations, has faced credibility concerns due to its political affiliations and role in spreading false information. The fact that the centre is based in the UAE, as shown on the page transparency section, adds another layer of context, suggesting potential political motivations behind its activities.

The UAE has been a significant supporter of Assad and played a key role in rehabilitating his image after Dubai reopened its embassy in Syria in 2018. Its hostility towards post-revolution Arab Spring governments suggests a strategic alignment with specific factions or political interests, potentially influencing the narratives promoted by the centre.

Weaponising misogyny

The weaponisation of women in disinformation campaigns has been particularly effective in a conservative society like Syria. Women, often seen as symbols of honour and morality, have been used to manipulate public opinion and control narratives. False accusations and fabricated stories about women have been wielded to delegitimise opposition groups, suppress activism, and erode trust in leadership.

Under Assad, women activists were painted as morally corrupt or aligned with foreign agendas, undermining their credibility and discouraging others from participating in public life. Such accusations have had devastating consequences.

In order to present the government as a stabilising force, pro-Assad networks depicted women in opposition-held areas as victims needing rescuing by the state, while women allied with the regime were presented as virtuous and heroic.

These tactics have, however, persisted under the new Syrian administration.

Disinformation actors allege that the government enforces conservative policies, such as mandating the hijab, abducting Alawite girls, segregating genders in public spaces, and condoning attacks on women who refuse to wear the hijab. These claims, whether true or fabricated, fuel societal tensions and weaken trust in governance.

Without direct confirmation from the transitional government or credible sources, the public should approach such narratives with caution and avoid falling into misinformation-driven hysteria. Disinformation thrives on uncertainty, making it essential for people to seek verified information rather than react to unverified claims.

In Sudan, disinformation also targeted women’s clothing and behaviour to polarise society, spread propaganda and delegitimise opponents during the period of transition.

Additionally, competing factions accused each other of enforcing restrictive dress codes, marginalising women, or promoting Western agendas to erode traditional values. These narratives exploited cultural and religious sensitivities, fostering divisions and distracting from critical political and economic issues.

In both cases, women have been portrayed as either victims needing rescue or as agents of moral decay, reducing complex realities to simplistic, emotionally charged propaganda.

Beyond borders

Syria’s disinformation campaigns illustrate the global nature of modern propaganda. Many actors such as Russia and Iran are adopting both overt and covert strategies in Syria as a testing ground for information warfare to reshape narratives and rewrite the history of the country.

Disinformation campaigns undermine justice, accountability, and the integrity of global discourse. By exploiting societal divisions and cultural sensitivities trust in institutions is also severely undermined.

Defending the truth following Assad’s fall is both a moral and strategic necessity.

The international community must take robust action to counter disinformation, including promoting media literacy, exposing false narratives, and supporting independent journalism and fact-checkers. Only by addressing these challenges head-on can we ensure transparency, accountability, and stability in Syria for generations to come.

Zouhir Al-Shimale is a Syrian journalist and researcher specialising in disinformation, digital influence operations, and their impact on political and social realities. His work aims to bridge the gap between digital ecosystems and real-world consequences, with a particular focus on Syria the MENA region.

Follow him on X: @ZouhirAlShimale

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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.