As Hezbollah join forces with Iran, Lebanon’s back to square one

The US-Israel war on Iran has already destabilised the region, causing much death and destruction. The impacts are also being strongly felt in Lebanon.

In response to the assassination of Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by Israel and the US, Hezbollah’s military branch fired missiles and drones at an Israeli missile defence site, south of the city of Haifa. Following these events, the Israeli occupation army is now expanding its war and occupation in Lebanon.

Despite the so-called ceasefire that has been in place since November 2024, the Israel army has been launching near-daily attacks in Lebanon, killing hundreds, kidnapping dozens, and injuring thousands more. In addition, Tel Aviv has continued to occupy five areas in Lebanon following its attacks in 2024, and it has blocked any reconstruction since then, especially of several bordering villages that it levelled to the ground. This has also prevented tens of thousands of displaced people from returning to their homes.

Following Hezbollah’s most recent attacks, Israel bombed Beirut’s southern suburbs once again, as well as towns and villages in the south and Beqaa Valley.

Israel also started a new ground military invasion in Southern Lebanon to expand its so-called “security buffer zone” at the border. There has also been direct military confrontations between Hezbollah and Israeli armed forces in the south.

Additionally, the Israeli army issued large-scale evacuation orders, which has resulted in massive forced displacement of populations in Beirut’s southern suburbs, the Bekaa region and the area south of the Litani river.

Over half a million people have already been displaced and have been seeking protection in ⁠shelters across Lebanon, and over 500 have been killed.

Certainly, Hezbollah’s military operation has given Israel a pretext for the current military offensive that provides a renewed opportunity for its ongoing objective of weakening the party. Israel can now achieve this by targeting Hezbollah’s members and institutions and could even obtain new concessions from the Lebanese state, including deepening the attempts for a normalisation process between the two countries.

Israel’s campaign of attacking other opposition actors is also clearly already underway, as seen with the assassination of a Palestinian Islamic Jihad commander and a Hamas official, as well as its targeting a member of Jamaa Islamiya and the bombing of its offices in the city of Saida.

But Hezbollah’s threats aren’t just external, since the attacks they are now facing disarmament by the Lebanese government.

Hezbollah’s organisational unity fractured?

Behind this façade of unity that Hezbollah is presenting in the face of Israel’s attacks, it is likely that internally there are differences of opinions and orientations. This has already been brewing since the 2024 war.

The assassinations of former Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and many of the party’s political and military figures have detrimentally impacted Hezbollah’s leadership and organisational structure. And new Secretary General, Naim Qassem, does not seem to enjoy the same political influence and popularity as his predecessor.

Such a position, coupled with geopolitical threats (impacted also by the fall of Syria’s Assad’s regime in December 2024), have all inevitably led to increasing differences within the party. In this context, Hezbollah’s dependency on the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) only strengthened, especially in its military branch.

In fact, the opening of a new front in Lebanon benefits IRGC as it is trying to increase the cost of the conflict for the USA and Israel, not only militarily but also economically. This is also why Iran closed the straits of Hormuz, a strategic passage for nearly 20% of global maritime oil traffic, forcing many companies to use alternative, more expensive routes that take much longer.

However, there are some within Hezbollah’s military branch who had other ideas and thought that the outbreak of the war would eventually lead to a resolution between Iran and the US, and that part of the negotiations would involve getting the Lebanese government to suspend its plan of disarming the party.

So while key party figures like Qassem have publicly supported Hezbollah’s engagement in the current war, there are signs that others aren’t.

Hezbollah’s former minister Mustafa Bayram posted for instance a tweet (that was later deleted) accusing Tel Aviv of orchestrating the rocket attack – that Hezbollah had actually fired – in order to justify its planned attacks on Lebanon.

It’s also alleged that Hezbollah officials Mohammad Fneish and Mohammad Raad guaranteed leader of Amal and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, that the party would not engaged in the current regional war.

Sections of Hezbollah’s popular base have also expressed criticism over its attack on Israel, as they are tired of the destruction and displacement the latest war is bringing. Especially considering how weakened Hezbollah’s military capacities have been since 2024, people have little faith in its ability to have any real impact on the dynamics of the war on Iran.

The issues don’t stop there. Whilst calls to ban the party by Hezbollah’s traditional enemies like the Lebanese Forces are unsurprising, seeing their close ally Amal, endorse the government’s decision to ban the party’s security and military operations, is a major blow. It demonstrates additional growing tensions that Hezbollah has with the other Shia political party.

Nevertheless, despite Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam calling on the Lebanese army to immediately disarm Hezbollah, this will likely not happen because over one third of the soldiers are Shia and the move therefore risks unity. Moreover, such a decision would need the green light from Amal -  in order to provide a Shia political cover. However, Berri is still not ready to grant such an approval, especially given it could weaken the Shia community as a whole, and with the future of the Iranian regime – and by extension Hezbollah – is still unclear,

More broadly, the anger and frustration against Hezbollah among large sections of the Lebanese population, has only grown deeper with recent events. Indeed, the party is seen as a central force responsible for the current unstable national and regional context.

What now?

Whilst Hezbollah is facing a real existential threat, the Lebanese government is failing to reassure the population who faces displacement and further violence due to Israel’s ongoing attacks. Its quest to disarm Hezbollah – a desire echoed by Israel, regional and Western powers – rests on the misguided logic that state’s sovereignty can only be restored by consolidating its monopoly over violence.

Hezbollah’s disarmament – an agreement for the continued external funding of the Lebanese army – is also linked to a normalisation process with Israel, that the government expects will lead to an influx of financial aid for reconstruction. This implicitly makes Lebanon’s sovereignty contingent on the acceptance of external terms, with heavy pressure from Washington. This makes any ‘agreement’ with Israel, less an affirmation of sovereignty than a surrender of agency.

Attempts to continue the process of disarmament of Hezbollah – particularly amidst Israel’s war in the region – without a political or economic transformation of the country, could further increase sectarian tensions and weaken the state.

Clearly, Hezbollah’s autonomous military capacities and political relationship with Iran are incompatible with a sovereign national defence policy, but the government cannot ignore its base when making decisions. After all, the party’s support was greatly shaped by the state’s failures, insecurity, socio-economic marginalization and repeated external attacks and wars, particularly by Israel.

And, while Hezbollah’s armament is considered less and less as a security guarantee against Israel, it remains an asset within the national political system as well as neighbouring Syria whose new ruling elite is seen as hostile to Shias.

Ultimately, the government lacks any genuine response regarding the needs of the targeted and displaced populations, not to mention it has failed to promote any reconstruction plans for destroyed areas.

Whilst Israel’s war must certainly be opposed, there is currently little show of force in Lebanon. Resistance cannot be sustained if it is restricted to a single sect or group, and if lacking a political project that supports democracy, social justice and equality.

As for the government’s rhetoric regarding sovereignty, as long as it is based on top-down imposition by force, external pressures by nations with interests that contradict those of the people, these words are empty. Indeed, in the absence of plans to develop state capacities, whether in providing social services or defending Lebanon’s borders, the current situation will certainly not deliver anything the serves the needs and demands of the country’s popular classes.

Joseph Daher is an academic and author of Syria after the Uprisings, The Political Economy of State Resilience; Hezbollah: the Political Economy of Lebanon’s Party of God; Marxism and Palestine.

Follow him on Twitter: @JosephDaher19

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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.