Here's how Lebanon can escape the US-Israeli peace process trap

The controversial negotiations between Lebanon and Israel that took place on 14 and 23 April expose the contradictions sustaining conflicts in Lebanon and across the region.  

Direct talks were requested before the current war by Lebanon as part of the government’s strategy of asserting sovereignty through state monopoly over arms and pursuing negotiations that reflect the national interest independently from Iran.

The request was made again through a renewed initiative by Beirut after the war. But in the six weeks prior to Lebanon’s negotiation request, Israel had indiscriminately killed and wounded thousands of civilians, created a no-go zone up to the Litani River, displaced about a fifth of the population, destroyed entire villages, towns and neighbourhoods and devastated civilian infrastructure so that the forcibly displaced cannot return, and struck over 100 targets in one day as part of “operation eternal darkness”, including residential blocks in central Beirut.

Israel refused a ceasefire in the first round of negotiations with Lebanon. One emerged only after President Trump imposed a ten-day truce, ironically after Iran made this a condition to its parallel talks. The truce did not hold even for a day. Israel sought to treat this truce in the same way it did the November 2024 ceasefire, which Israel breached more than 1,500 times over fifteen months while Hezbollah largely observed it -- a premise that Hezbollah refused to accept this time.

Since then, Israel continued its systematic destruction of the south, including the notorious desecration of a statue of Jesus by an Israeli soldier. On the eve of the second round of negotiations, Israel targeted two female journalists and their rescuers, killing Amal Khalil and severely injuring Zeinab Faraj. Only then did the Lebanese government threaten recourse to international courts.

Lebanon improved its demands in the second talks, seeking full Israeli withdrawal, the return of displaced residents, and the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south. Yet the negotiations held little prospect in achieving this given Israel had moved in the opposite direction in between the two rounds of talks, establishing a “buffer zone” and a 'yellow line' on Lebanese territory. The only agreement reached was for a three-week extension to a non-existent ceasefire. 

An Israeli trap

Lebanon has trapped itself in negotiations in which it faces alone the weight of the US acting, not as an honest broker, but as Israel’s closest ally. Despite this, they have jointly cast themselves as friends of Lebanon, framing the war as directed only at Hezbollah while presenting the talks as advancing shared aims of disarming Hezbollah and ultimately pursuing normalisation.

This narrative has made the Lebanese government appear complicit in Israel’s crimes against its own people. In the circumstances, the talks are proving counterproductive, raising the prospect that Lebanon could be drawn into US-pressured concessions without securing its core objectives. Rather than advancing sovereignty, the government risks resembling the Palestinian Authority, administering security on Israel’s behalf while it expands its settlements and dominance.

Another means for Israel to exert its influence on Lebanon is through dividing the country. It is clearly leveraging Lebanon’s notoriously corrupt elites and sectarian tensions for that purpose. In addition to the divisive narrative around the talks, sectarian tensions were stoked by Israel’s forced displacement of over a million people into communities unable to absorb them, its selective “protection” of certain Christian and Druze communities while targeting the Shia population, and the sudden emergence of “Lebanese Christian Zionism” in Washington on the first day of talks, when a former US envoy praised in those terms a Lebanese banker that is being investigated in France for alleged money laundering.

If Israel and its allies’ genuine concerns are security and the disarming of Hezbollah, a big if, then they should reconsider existing strategies. Israeli breaches of the ceasefire and its devastation of south Lebanon have negated the Lebanese government’s ability to disarm Hezbollah and to convince communities under attack that the state can protect them through negotiations. Moreover, the “buffer zone” that Israel created south of the Litani provides it with extensive territorial and water gains without protecting it from the longer reach of Hezbollah missiles and drones. Occupation of the south only reinforces the legitimacy and resolve of armed resistance.

Lebanon’s true leverage lies in the logic of its position. Israel and its allies cannot have it both ways. They cannot demand the disarmament of Hezbollah while sustaining the very conditions that justify armed resistance. They are also aware that Hezbollah cannot be disarmed by force by either the Lebanese army nor by Israel, by its own admission. If disarmament is to happen at all, it will require the elimination of the rationale for armed resistance.

That requires establishing a specific framework: a ceasefire and full Israeli withdrawal under international guarantees, alongside recognition of the right to resist until withdrawal is complete. The Lebanese state must prioritise relief and reconstruction across all communities, especially in the south, while strengthening the army to assume national defence.

Normalisation should remain off the table until Israel adheres to international norms and reaches a just settlement with the Palestinians. With domestic consensus on the terms of Hezbollah’s disarmament, the Lebanese government would be able to galvanise more effective international support.

Israel’s influential allies in North America and Europe should be receptive: they are suffering economic and social blow back from aiding Israel during a genocide in Gaza that they are legally obliged to stop. They have emboldened Israel to expand settlements in the West Bank and launch illegal wars against Lebanon and Iran, deepening crises across the region. The war on Iran has exposed growing divergences between Israel’s strategic objectives and those of both Europe and the US, even where Washington is directly engaged.

At the same time, Gaza and the wider regional wars have become significant electoral issues, testing the political credibility and coherence of candidates and swaying results.

Given Lebanon has been set up to fail in its negotiations and that Israel will not self-restrain, the onus is on Europe to urgently lead in closing the gap between its stated commitments, its policies and its legal obligations. Shifts in US domestic politics may, in time, push Washington in the same direction. In the meantime, Lebanon’s government must adopt better strategies that reduces domestic vulnerabilities and builds effective international support.

Mona Deeley is a lawyer, producer and CEO of Reform Initiative for Transparent Economies (RITE), authoring their latest report “The War on Palestine and the Decline of Democracy and the Rule of Law."

Follow her on Instagram 

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com

Opinions expressed here are the author's own, and do not necessarily reflect those of their employer, or of The New Arab and its editorial board or staff.