Genocide goes Squid Game as Israel outsources 'aid' to Gaza gangs
Israel's day after plan in Gaza has been revealed by its so-called 'aid' regime: disaster capitalism and Shin Bet-organised crime, says Richard Silverstein.
6 min read
Israel’s divide-and-conquer strategy is nothing new, writes Richard Silverstein [photo credit: Getty Images]
Another of Israel's worst-kept secrets is out: Shin Bet is arming and funding 600 to 1,000 Palestinian mercenaries from the al-Shabab clan in Gaza to sow chaos and counter Hamas by proxy.
These gunmen fire directly at starving Palestinians seeking the aid provided by Israeli-US disaster humanitarianism, with over 100 killed since the program began in what's been described as human "hunger games."
Israel claims that it doesn't supply either light weapons or salaries to these thugs and that the weapons are captured from Hamas. But given the Israeli army's history of lying, there's reason to be sceptical.
Writing in Haaretz, Yossi Melman exposed another covert layer of Israel's aid effort, designed in part to sideline independent NGOs. This is, of course, the shadowy group called the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), which has funded and managed the operation, aided by former US Special Forces operatives. Melman reveals for the first time that Mossad created the dummy foundation in Switzerland.
Its opaque funding, it turns out, came directly from Israel's Defense Ministry, to the tune of $140 million per month.
Reuters reports that McNally Capital, a Chicago-based private equity firm and financial arm of Ward McNally, a sixth-generation heir of the Rand McNally publishing family, has ownership in GHF.
The investment is obscured through a second entity, Safe Research Solutions (SRS), which appears to be a "cut-out" designed to conceal McNally Capital's involvement.
SRS was incorporated in Wyoming in November. The SRS website lists no staff under "Our Team". During the same period, an Israeli group developed the original concept for GHF.
Despite denials from US ambassador Mike Huckabee, The New York Times reports otherwise: "The project is an Israeli brainchild, first proposed by Israeli officials in the earliest weeks of the war, according to Israeli officials, people involved in the initiative, and others familiar with its conception, who spoke on condition of anonymity to speak more freely of the initiative...The broad contours of the plan were first discussed in late 2023, at private meetings of like-minded officials, military officers and business people with close ties to the Israeli government."
The project was devised around November 2024, when SRS was first registered, clearly a move to enlist US funders and further obscure Israel's role.
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A parallel proxy scheme involving the Al-Shabab clan was devised by Israel’s intelligence apparatus and approved by Prime Minister Netanyahu and the defense minister. Yet, true to form, Netanyahu deflected blame, claiming the “security apparatus” was behind it:
“On the advice of security officials, we activated clans in Gaza that oppose Hamas. What’s wrong with this?”
If nothing was wrong, why shift responsibility to Shin Bet, who executed the plan under his direction? In a further display of hubris, and despite international condemnation for partnering with gang-linked groups, Netanyahu doubled down in an Instagram post, repeating, “What’s wrong with this?”
Neither the Knesset, security cabinet, nor senior army command was informed, an unusual and telling lack of oversight.
The mercenary group is loosely affiliated with a Gaza-based Bedouin clan. Some members have ties to Fatah security circles, but the group’s leader, Yasser Abu Shabab, has been disavowed by his own tribe as an Israeli collaborator.
The Israeli army enables this by standing by during the attacks and allowing Abu Shabab's men to operate freely in zones under its control.
While the Israeli army has long tolerated gangs in Gaza, reports that Shin Bet is now arming and funding them mark a serious escalation. Shin Bet believes Hamas's command structure has been weakened enough to allow proxies like Abu Shabab to gain real influence over the population. As with many Israeli strategems, the plan seems far-fetched.
Israel tried something years ago, but it failed. Hamas reportedly killed the leader of a clan accused of collaborating with Israel. But conditions are different now.
With the Israeli army occupying most of Gaza, it can offer protection to Abu Shabab, whose fate may not be as swift, or as grim.
Israel's sordid history with proxies
Israel's divide-and-conquer strategy is nothing new. It has repeated this approach many times: creating the South Lebanon Army to counter the PLO, funding and arming al-Nusra and the Syrian Druze as buffers against Hezbollah in the Golan.
Yossi Melman explains in Haaretz:
"These are mercenaries similar to those established by colonial regimes. France did so in Algeria and Syria. The British in their colonies in Africa and Asia, and the United States through the CIA in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Israel operated similarly in the 1970s as it created the Village Leagues, the Phalange and South Lebanese Army and rural [Druze] militias in Syria’s Golan Heights. In most cases, these militias of collaborators and mercenaries have failed."
The US supplied massive weapons to the Taliban to fight the Russian invasion. After driving the Russians out, the Taliban turned on the US, sheltering Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, and killing thousands of American troops, just as they had done to the Russians.
Be careful what you wish for: today’s proxy can become tomorrow’s mortal enemy.
Proxies bought with weapons and logistics rarely stay loyal. They develop their own interests and often turn lethal, like Hezbollah and Hamas. Some Israeli experts warn that the policy could backfire spectacularly if multiple militias emerge after Hamas’s fall.
Though catastrophic to many, this outcome may be exactly what Netanyahu wants. Israel favours failed states and regularly sows chaos among rivals like Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.
The weaker these states are, the less they can resist Israel’s security goals. Disruption and dysfunction aren’t flaws in the system; they’re features.
A security source warned The New Arab that yesterday’s 20-year failure in southern Lebanon could repeat in Gaza:
"This ‘South Gaza Army’ reminds me of the South Lebanon Army. I hope it doesn’t mean the IDF will stay in Gaza for 18 years, as it did in Lebanon.
This concern is serious, especially since Netanyahu and his extremist ministers have declared the Israeli occupation of Gaza indefinite, mirroring Israel’s open-ended presence in southern Lebanon and the Golan.
If so, Israel likely sees these clans as long-term proxies to govern Gaza, much like the Palestinian Authority has become a security errand boy. The only scenario that might end this collaboration is if Israel opts to remove all Palestinians from Gaza, a grim but real possibility.
Richard Silverstein writes the Tikun Olam blog and is a freelance journalist specialising in exposing secrets of the Israeli national security state. He campaigns against opacity and the negative impact of Israeli military censorship.
Follow him on Twitter: @richards1052
Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com
Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.
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