Syrian ex-vice president Farouk al-Sharaa testifies: Rafic Hariri was a friend until he was killed

The New Arab publishes a multi-part testimony based on excerpts given by Farouk al-Sharaa, Bashar al-Assad's foreign minister and then vice president, reflecting on various pivotal events that took place in Syria and the region during his tenure.

The book Memoirs of Farouk al-Sharaa ... : 2000–2015 is being published by the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies. It covers a period of Bashar al-Assad's presidency (2005–2015) during which Farouk al-Sharaa continued to serve first as minister of foreign affairs, and later as vice president of the Republic, before being compelled to withdraw from public life in 2013, following a directive from Assad forbidding communication with him.

While the first volume of his memoirs is considered a significant historical testimony on a series of Syria's regional and international engagements—particularly regarding the Syrian-Israeli negotiations during Hafez al-Assad's presidency—this second volume offers Sharaa's account of equally pivotal events during Bashar al-Assad's tenure.

Among these are Rafic Hariri's assassination and the accusations made against Syrian officials over involvement in the killing, which played a role in Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, as well as the upheaval that engulfed the country with the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011.

The New Arab's Arabic-language sister edition Al-Araby Al-Jadeed is publishing excerpts from the book. Here is the first instalment.

Becoming acquainted with Hariri

Assassinations are nothing new; the world has witnessed the bloody downfall of major political leaders, murdered in efforts to silence their voices or extinguish their popular influence. Prominent examples are Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, Count Bernadotte in 1948, John F. Kennedy in 1963, and Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968.

It is only natural that the assassinations of such towering figures in the post–World War II era would dominate the headlines of newspapers and magazines, and that stories would proliferate about their words and legacies.

From here, the question that arises for many—both in Lebanon and perhaps beyond—is this: Was the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, the billionaire businessman and politician, the price he paid for a cause to which he had dedicated his life?

The targeted killing of Hariri — a man whom Lebanon had come to know intimately since the 1980s, after he rose to prominence and earned the special favour of King Fahd bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia — captured the attention of the entire country and drew unprecedented Arab and international media coverage, coinciding as it did with the digital revolution.

The shockwaves of Hariri's death reached every household, and generated a popular outpouring of grief unparalleled in Lebanon's modern history.

Despite this, the haste with which some Lebanese factions rushed to accuse Syria — even as Hariri's body still lay in the American University Hospital in Beirut — fractured Lebanon from within, shattered Syrian-Lebanese relations, and cast doubt over Syria's standing in the Arab world, particularly in the Gulf.

All this unfolded before the truth could be properly distinguished from falsehood.

Within Syria, confusion reigned: those in official institutions who had profited from Hariri’s presence could hardly be suspected of slaying the golden goose; while those who admired Hariri for who he was were angered by the emergence of slogans during some marches that mocked the Syrian dialect and indiscriminately placed all Syrians in Lebanon under suspicion. No distinction was made between those who'd sought bribes from Hariri, and those whose loyalties were neither bought nor sold.

I'd known Rafic Hariri to be a pleasant man, as I came to observe during various meetings and banquets, most of which were held at the residence of Abdel Halim Khaddam, and occasionally at chief of general staff Hikmat al-Shihabi's farm. Hariri did not really distinguish between politics more broadly and its complex inner workings, except insofar as they affected the economy, the stock market, the future of Solidere [the Lebanese joint-stock company], and his personal relationships with Syria, Saudi Arabia—especially King Fahd bin Abdulaziz—and France, in particular its then president Jacques Chirac.

He was liberal in his thinking, so wealthy it was difficult to estimate the extent of his fortune, and not particularly humble. One time, in my presence, he recounted how his wife, in her youth, had attempted to travel alone from Jeddah to Beirut, but was stopped at the airport because her husband was not with her. In response, she told the passport officials: "Is there a woman in the world whose husband is Rafic Hariri, who would ever try to run away from him?"

All Lebanon's political figures, whether admirers or rivals, with whom I interacted, often spoke of Hariri's remarkable ability to capitalise on opportune moments to increase his wealth and expand his business empire both within Lebanon and abroad, while concurrently maintaining his position as prime minister.

Under his leadership, political money emerged as a significant element in the ascent to power in Lebanon, a shift that began with the outbreak of the civil war, and which replaced the system of ascent via family ties, which had once been the cornerstone to such a rise.

Hariri first visited me in the summer of 1986 at my apartment, which was rented from the state. His first comment, after inspecting the living room and the simple, Western-style furniture, was: "This isn’t suitable for the foreign minister of Syria," as if hinting that he was ready to assist me in changing accommodation or refurnishing the house.

I later heard that he made similar offers to several senior Syrian officials, suggesting changes to the furniture in their homes, or even offering to build houses for them. While he was not entirely convinced I was comfortable in my apartment, I of course ignored his hints of offering assistance. Thus, the question of self-sufficiency between him and me ended there.

However, apparently it did not end with some other Syrian officials, whom I heard had maintained financial connections to him over the years, that he sent their children to universities, who were supported by the Hariri Foundation.

As for my personal relationship with him, it remained cordial, as he was either the sitting or former prime minister, and I was the foreign minister of a neighbouring, brotherly country to Lebanon, where many Syrians live and work — as labourers and businessmen, alongside retired politicians, both civilian and military.

I remember Hariri telling me once that Saudi Arabia owed him a substantial sum — contracts worth hundreds of millions of Saudi riyals for successful projects he had completed, but for which he had not been paid in full. King Fahd, he said, had promised to settle his dues after the budget was approved. Then he added: "The first million I ever made in Saudi Arabia, when I was young and just starting out, caused me to lose consciousness for several minutes." Noticing my surprise, he continued, "Believe me, the walls of my home in Jeddah shook for minutes. But today, millions of dollars wouldn't make a hair on my head stand on end."

I also recall when he visited me at the American University Hospital in October 1999, after I'd undergone surgery performed by Dr Mounir Obeid, with Dr Samir Alam overseeing the procedure. Hariri suggested I spend some time in Paris to recover and even offered his private jet to take me to the airport in Khalda. I thanked him for such a kind and unforgettable gesture, but I told him I would feel more comfortable recovering at home in Damascus, surrounded by my children and family.

I maintained an amicable relationship with Hariri, distant from the ostentation of private jets, until his life was tragically cut short in a devastating explosion that shook Beirut and whose reverberations were felt as far as Damascus.

The day of the assassination

It was the afternoon of February 14, 2005, and I was hosting a lunch at the Al-Nubalaa Restaurant in Damascus in honour of Miguel Moratinos, marking the end of his mission as the European Union's Special Envoy for the Middle East Peace Process. I was handed a note saying a massive explosion had occurred in Beirut. Explosions were not uncommon in Lebanon, even after the civil war had ended. However, another note quickly arrived from my press office, telling me that the explosion was horrific, and that the target may have been Rafic Hariri's convoy, which had been rushed to the American University Hospital in a critical condition.

The atmosphere at the table changed, and the food lost its taste.

At that moment Moratinos was on his feet delivering his farewell speech, expressing his sadness about leaving the region, and thanking Syria for the hospitality he had received from its officials during his many visits. However, we were suddenly preoccupied with the unsettling news coming in from Beirut. While Moratinos expected me to respond naturally to his speech, as was customary at such farewell events, a commotion suddenly spread through the restaurant as the news of Hariri's death was broadcast.

I called president Bashar from my mobile phone as we were leaving the restaurant, to inquire whether he intended to send someone to Beirut or issue a condolence telegram. He asked, "Will it be a protocol telegram or a political one?" I confirmed it should be political, as the target of this assassination was Syria in Lebanon. I also suggested, with the encouragement of Walid Muallem, who was seated next to me, that the telegram include a message about the need for Lebanese unity during these difficult times.

Khaddam's tears

As we left the restaurant, a few journalists asked me about the tragic bombing. I condemned it outright, calling it a senseless criminal act. However, the first news bulletin I heard on the car radio pointed fingers at Syria. I initially dismissed it as mere radio chatter and gossip. But the statement a few hours later from Hariri's own residence carried a vengeful, political tone. This was a position anyone familiar with the recent history of relations between the two countries could easily understand.

When I tuned into the first Lebanese evening news broadcasts, I couldn't find my statement among the others, even though some news agencies, including the Kuwait News Agency, had distributed it directly with the headline: "Al-Sharaa condemns what happened to Hariri, calling his assassination a heinous criminal act." I was taken aback by how a statement, both in audio and video, from the foreign minister of a country so involved in Lebanon—where Syria's presence overshadowed everything else—and with such an interest in this event, could be excluded.

A few moments later, I saw vice president Khaddam on television, among the mourners at Hariri's residence, tears streaming down his face. I called president Bashar again, assuming Khaddam had been sent on his behalf to offer condolences instead of sending a telegram. He said he knew nothing of Khaddam's trip. I suggested that he ask Khaddam, in his capacity as vice president, to offer condolences on the president's behalf as well, even though Hariri was a former prime minister (in Lebanon, officials retain their titles even after leaving office or passing away).

UN reaction to Hariri's assassination

The day after the explosion, on February 15, 2005, the UN Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning Hariri's assassination and classifying it as a terrorist crime. The Council tasked UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan with appointing Peter Fitzgerald, the Irish investigator, to head a UN mission to investigate the circumstances, causes, and motives behind the event.

Fitzgerald returned to New York and presented his report to the Security Council on March 24, 2005, after conducting numerous meetings in Beirut over the course of a week, during which he examined the explosion site and met with several officials.

In his written report, submitted to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Fitzgerald noted the complexity of the situation in Lebanon and emphasised the need for a high level of professionalism and expertise in addressing it. He stated that this crime required a deeper and more comprehensive investigation. However, he also observed, during his mission in Beirut, the sharp polarization in Lebanon: while some Lebanese believed that Syria was responsible for maintaining security in the country, others saw the assassination as an attack on Syria's presence in Lebanon.

However, most Arab media seemed to latch onto one thing and one thing only: pinning the blame on Syria. They didn't focus on the sharp polarization within Lebanon or the rapidly developing alliances that Fitzgerald highlighted in his report. Instead, the media fixated on Syria's alleged role in Hariri's assassination.

From that moment on, this accusation repeated itself like a familiar refrain in a melody—constantly echoed in newspapers and statements on satellite channels, especially those from the Gulf, long before any official investigation had even begun into the explosion, its victims and who was behind it.

The Security Council, which disregarded the existence of a functioning state and judiciary in Lebanon, was undoubtedly influenced by the unprecedented media uproar and the particular impact this was having on Lebanon.

After reviewing Fitzgerald's report, the Council instructed Kofi Annan to establish an international investigative committee to find the perpetrators of this terrorist act, identify those who planned it, and name the individuals who had been ordered to carry it out. The task was entrusted to Detlev Mehlis, a German judge, who would head the team of investigators.

Mehlis' arrival in Lebanon marked the start of his media stardom. He became something of a celebrity, constantly surrounded by Lebanese television reporters, many of whom were fluent in multiple languages. He gave countless press conferences and became a familiar face on the airwaves.

In my view, it was impossible to overlook the fact that, as a German judge and head of the investigation committee, Mehlis should have remained out of the media spotlight until he had reached a well-evidenced and conclusive result.

One detail I recall is how Mehlis repeatedly showed a picture of the Mitsubishi car that was purchased from Japan and used in the explosion, considering its discovery one of his greatest achievements, even though Syrian security had assisted him in the process.

We must also not forget his predilection for accepting numerous invitations from Lebanese people to crowded restaurants, where he appeared delighted to dine, greet the patrons, and spend long evenings with them, leaving the task of writing the reports to his multinational team.

However, there is another, more troubling, side to this investigator's track record. This occurred when the Americans tasked him with investigating the famous nightclub bombing in West Berlin in 1986, of which he accused Libya. At the time, president Ronald Reagan did not hesitate to bomb Muammar Gaddafi's residence in Tripoli, on the basis of a mysterious cable that could not be considered a conclusive piece of evidence with which to condemn Gaddafi, regardless of one's opinion of him.

What drew my attention regarding Hariri's assassination is that the Security Council had never acted with such speed or urgency over any massacre in any part of the world since the establishment of the United Nations sixty years ago. If one were to conduct a review of such events in the Council's records, one would find very little evidence of interest in the assassination of individuals, regardless of their prominence or the number of victims involved.

The whole of Lebanon was in uproar for days, weeks, and months. Flags and banners of various kinds were raised in town squares, at crossroads, and on balconies. This contributed to further splitting the Lebanese people, with hundreds of thousands gathering for the "March 8 Alliance" and similarly large crowds for its opponent coalition the "March 14 Alliance".

It was as if the spectre of civil war was reappearing after it had ended with the Taif Agreement more than fifteen years before.

Resolution 1595

The Security Council met again, remarkably swiftly, to discuss the Mehlis report. Just a few days later, on April 7, 2005, it issued Resolution 1595, which in name resembled the famous Resolution 1559. In a deliberate or perhaps spontaneous association, the two resolutions were linked in the preamble.

The accusation against Syria was renewed, claiming that it was responsible for extending president Lahoud's term and linking this to Hariri's assassination. This included that president Bashar al-Assad had personally threatened Hariri's life if he did not vote in favour of extending Lahoud's presidency, referencing an unpublicised meeting on August 26, 2004, during which Hariri quoted Assad as saying he would "break his head and Lebanon's head over him" if he did not agree to the extension.

Perhaps Terje Rød-Larsen, the UN envoy to Lebanon, played a special behind-the-scenes role in issuing Resolution 1595. The resolution did not directly accuse Syria by name, like Resolution 1559, which had spoken of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon without naming Syria or Hezbollah explicitly. However, the interpretations of the two resolutions were left to the discretion of the UN Secretary-General.

Larsen was one of those rare European figures who knew how to navigate the "political arena" without ever revealing his hand. He had visited Damascus several times, meeting with president Bashar al-Assad in both the capital and Aleppo, and had also met with me at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was a talented operator - shrewd, intelligent, and skilfully evasive in a way that made it nearly impossible to pin him down on anything he didn't want to say.

I remember vividly how, in his report, Mehlis—who knew Larsen well—suggested the total restructuring of the Lebanese state. But what Mehlis didn't quite grasp was that Lebanon had already undergone a years-long restructuring process which had culminated in the Taif Agreement. When Mehlis started to realise the complexities of the situation, he turned to the Lebanese authorities with a request: that they arrest the senior security officials in Lebanon as a first step, due to their links with Syria.

These men, whom the media had already begun calling "the four generals," included: general Jamil Al Sayyed, director-general of general security; general Ali Al Hajj, head of Internal Security; brigadier general Mustafa Hamdan, commander of the Republican guard; and general Raymond Azar, head of military intelligence.

Mehlis didn't stop there. He insisted that the Syrian government send several high-ranking officers to his office at Monteverde in Beirut for questioning, including major general Ghazi Kanaan, former head of the Syrian military's security and intelligence branch in Lebanon, and his successor, general Rustum Ghazaleh.

False witnesses and Mehlis

In the wake of these earth-shattering developments, Lebanon's opposition took charge of the country's affairs, with support from the UN Security Council, especially after the hasty resignation of PM Omar Karami, whose pride couldn't withstand the provocations he received from certain Lebanese MPs.

Karami's resignation came as a shock to us in Syria, given that the Karami family had always maintained a stance far from flattering toward the Syrian presence—this was something clear to anyone.

Following this event, the tension in our relations with Lebanon's new authorities reached its peak.

Our modest forces in Lebanon, around 14,000 soldiers, found themselves in an increasingly precarious position - they were in no condition to defend themselves if attacked by any Lebanese faction. Our greatest fear at the time was that someone might decide to set fire to a Syrian tank parked in one of the narrow alleys of Lebanon, and then claim a "revolution" had erupted.

Syria was left with two choices, neither of them easy. Either we would need to massively reinforce our forces and deploy them in Beirut, which would risk turning us into active participants in a new civil war spiralling out of control, or we would have to reposition our forces away from Beirut and retreat toward Dahr Al-Baidar.

Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon

Naturally, I was one of those who favoured the second option, in line with my cautious stance on keeping our forces in Lebanon for too long and the necessity of respecting the terms of the Taif Agreement, even though it had not been fully implemented by the Lebanese (for instance the abolition of political sectarianism)—because that was their issue.

I informed the president of my position and suggested that the withdrawal date should be set before the upcoming Lebanese parliamentary elections in May 2005. I had told the president on several occasions that Syria's strength in Lebanon did not stem from its military presence, but rather from the strategic, geopolitical, economic, and historical relationship between the two countries.

We agreed the withdrawal should be completed by April 26, 2005, before the elections, so that it could not be claimed they were held under a Syrian military presence.

The Security Council's appointment of Mehlis to lead the investigation committee came alongside an insistence on enforcing resolutions 1595 and 1559, as well as the demand for the Syrian security officials to appear for questioning at the Monteverde offices in Beirut.

I tasked Dr Riad Daoudi and Ahmad Arnous with contacting the UN Secretariat and the international investigation committee at Monteverde to meet with Mehlis and convince him that sending Syrian officers to Beirut was not feasible due to the severe deterioration in Syrian-Lebanese relations following Hariri's assassination, and therefore the potential risk to their lives.

Mehlis insisted that, under the mandate granted to him by the Security Council, Syria was obliged to fully and unconditionally cooperate with the investigation committee. He emphasised this point repeatedly in his reports, statements, and press conferences. He also declared that his door was open to anyone willing to testify before him and the committee—an announcement widely interpreted to mean he would warmly welcome any witness willing to accuse Syria.

During this period, Mehlis heard from several individuals who later turned out to have given false witness, including Hussam Hussam and Mohammed Zuhair al-Siddiq, among others. Alongside them came a number of prominent Lebanese and Syrian political figures: Abdul Halim Khaddam, Syria's former vice president; Walid Jumblatt, leader of Lebanon's Progressive Socialist Party; and Walid Muallem, Syria's deputy foreign minister, who had personally volunteered to appear before the committee.

Hussam Hussam, we later learned, had been arrested by Lebanese authorities and pressured—some say tortured—into making a statement implicating senior Syrian officials in the assassination. His "testimony" would soon unravel under scrutiny.

Mohammed Zuhair al-Siddiq was an even more slippery character, manipulating Mehlis, his aides, and certain Lebanese journalists with a series of fabricated stories. He made the rounds on Lebanese television, offering ever-changing and contradictory accounts, none of which provided credible evidence proving the accusation against Syria.

A Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII

I learned via the media that a Security Council meeting had been scheduled for October 31, 2005, at 10 am, at the level of foreign ministers, specifically to discuss Mehlis's report on the assassination. Although I was not officially invited—Syria's term on the Security Council ended in 2003—I could still attend as an observer if I wished. I travelled to New York in haste; meetings of the Council at this level were extremely rare. The last one had taken place just before the invasion of Iraq, and I was personally keen to hear firsthand what would be said on the details of Hariri's assassination and who was being blamed.

As soon as I arrived in New York, I met with the foreign ministers of Russia and China, Sergey Lavrov and Li Zhaoxing, both of whom I had long-standing friendships with. They informed me that the draft resolution had already been agreed upon the night before—probably while I was still on the plane from Damascus to New York. They explained that they had managed to introduce some amendments to soften its language; otherwise, it would have been far harsher and far more condemning of Syria. They further explained that the resolution was issued under Chapter VII because Syria's cooperation with the international investigation committee was not deemed "full" (Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorises the Security Council to address threats to international security through military or nonmilitary measures).

I never witnessed a more dry and formal meeting in my life—neither among friends nor foes.

I made my way into the famous Security Council Chamber to observe the vote and listen to the ministers' statements afterwards. The president of the Council asked me to take my designated seat as an observer among the fifteen member states. He pointed out that while I had the right to speak, I had no right to vote—something I was of course well aware of. After that, he gave the floor first to the permanent members, then to the non-permanent ones.

The vote on Resolution 1636 passed unanimously, following which the ministers began explaining the reasons behind their votes and their countries' positions on the Hariri assassination. There was a notable uniformity in tone and sharpness in content across their statements. Some remarks were low-key, such as those by Lavrov, Zhaoxing, and Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim, who refrained from attacking Syria directly.

The harshest and most aggressive speeches came from US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and British foreign secretary Jack Straw.

Fortunately, I was the last to speak. This, of course, had nothing to do with luck—it was simply the order prescribed by the Council's internal rules. Speaking last gave me an advantage in that I could address everything I had just heard with clarity, confidence, and a full awareness of the strengths and weaknesses in the ministers' arguments. My response was thorough and addressed each point raised by the speakers.

The exchanges became quite heated with Jack Straw, who sat beside Condoleezza Rice, whispering to her throughout as if she were dictating his replies to my speech. However, his aggressive tone struck me as a sign of the weakness of his arguments. Months later, when I ran into him at an international conference in Manama, he approached me to apologise, admitting that some friends had told him he had overreacted and that he should have been more measured in responding to the Syrian minister.

Resolution 1636, adopted by the Security Council on October 31, 2005, under Chapter VII, marked a troubling precedent in international law. It introduced a new and distorted concept of what constituted a threat to international peace and security. In my view, the resolution damaged the credibility of the Security Council more than it damaged Syria. Over time, people forgot about it—even though it had authorised the use of force against Syria.

In my opinion, it was a reactive, vengeance-based decision—one that no responsible council should take pride in having issued.

Although I don't think it necessary to recount every discussion and intervention that took place before me at the Security Council—since any interested reader can easily refer to them in the UN records—I do feel it is important to summarise the key points made by the US and British foreign ministers. By doing so, I can shed further light on the wording of the resolution, the circumstances surrounding its adoption, and the positions of their two countries, which had overseen and championed its passage.

A summary of Condoleezza Rice's speech

By adopting Resolution 1636 (2005) this morning, we at the UN affirm our support for the Commission's search for the truth—an effort being capably led by Mr Detlev Mehlis. We also reaffirm our legitimate demands directed at the Syrian government and make it clear that failure to comply will bring about serious consequences from the international community.

For the past thirty years, Syria's occupation of Lebanon has permeated every aspect of Lebanese society. However, beginning last year, Syria’s intervention grew so corrupt and intolerable that it spurred a wave of opposition—both within Lebanon and among the international community. In late August, the Syrian government imposed an extension of president Émile Lahoud's term. In response, the international community took action, even though some members of the Security Council were reluctant to name Syria directly. Thus, Resolution 1559 (2004) called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and urged all states to respect Lebanon's sovereignty.

When the Syrian government failed to comply with these demands, Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri resigned in protest. Less than four months later, Prime Minister Hariri was assassinated in a terrorist bombing that also killed 22 others. One million Lebanese citizens stood united in downtown Beirut, openly demanding truth, justice, and liberation from Syrian control.

We have now received the Commission's interim report (662/2005), which tells us that converging evidence points at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this terrorist act. We have been told that it is hard to imagine such a complex assassination plot being carried out without the knowledge of senior Syrian officials.

With today's unanimous adoption of this resolution, the UN is taking a step toward holding Syria accountable for any further non-cooperation with the Commission's investigation, and we signal our willingness to consider additional measures if necessary. This resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, is the only means available to compel the Syrian government to meet the UN's legitimate demands and to fully cooperate with the Mehlis Commission.

A summary of Jack Straw's speech

I am grateful to all my colleagues here for their unanimous vote in the Security Council in favour of Resolution 1636 (2005). With the strong wording of this resolution, I believe we are sending a very powerful message to the Syrian government and to elements within Lebanon about the urgent need for their full cooperation with the investigation being led by Prosecutor Mehlis.

Lebanon has experienced much violence and bloodshed throughout its history. Nevertheless, the assassination of former prime minister Rafic Hariri on February 14 was a profound shock both to the people of Lebanon and to the international community, a brutal reminder of medieval practices—resolving political disputes through political assassination.

The accumulated evidence presented in the Mehlis report (662/2005) is both serious and alarming. After careful study of the report, it is difficult not to support its conclusions: that there is evidence pointing to the involvement of both Lebanese and Syrian officials in this terrorist act. But for the Commission to complete its mission, it requires Syria's full and unconditional cooperation, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter.

We also rightly warn the Syrian government that our patience is not unlimited. Continued failure to cooperate fully will compel us to consider taking additional measures to ensure that the Security Council, through the Commission, can fulfil its role in assisting the Lebanese government to achieve justice. If we turn our backs on this crime because of the apparent political complexities, we will not only lose the trust of the Lebanese people in this institution, but we will also undermine the credibility and authority of the Council itself and damage our broader efforts to uphold the rule of international law.

Farouk al-Sharaa's response

My fundamental objection to the report of the International Investigation Commission is that it proceeded from the assumption that Syria was guilty of committing this crime, rather than starting from the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

What is strange is that your Council endorsed the Commission's conclusions without any scrutiny or critical examination. If the mere presence of military forces and security agencies in a country meant that any criminal or terrorist act occurring there could not happen without the knowledge or approval of these forces and agencies, then it would have been necessary to accuse the US military and security agencies of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; to accuse Spanish security agencies of the Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004; and to accuse British security services of the London underground bombings of July 7, 2005.

Furthermore, one cannot help but express astonishment at the Council's decision to act under Chapter VII of the Charter in this case, while it refrained from doing so in far graver and more catastrophic situations. For example, in the Qana massacre of April 1996, which claimed the lives of more than one hundred civilians, the Security Council did not even decide to form an international investigation committee—because Israel was the accused party, caught on camera and by eyewitness accounts.

In Iraq, following the horrific bombing that killed UN envoy Sérgio Vieira de Mello and more than twenty of his colleagues in August 2003, the Council contented itself with issuing a mere presidential statement. And when Israel attacked the Jenin refugee camp in the occupied West Bank in April 2002—destroying it in broad daylight and killing more than 400 Palestinians, including dozens of women and children—it not only refused to cooperate with the committee appointed by the Council, led by Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, but succeeded in closing the case entirely.

Nevertheless, Syria—out of its commitment to discovering the truth—decided, and continues to maintain, its full cooperation with the International Investigation Commission until irrefutable evidence can establish the true perpetrators of this heinous crime.

Finally, allow me a brief and simple comment regarding what Mr Jack Straw said. He was right in noting that the assassination of the late Rafic Hariri resembled practices from the Middle Ages. I would add to Mr Straw's comment by saying that the investigation into this crime has also been conducted in a manner reminiscent of the Middle Ages—where the accused was condemned before even being interrogated.

Jack Straw—who was whispering with Condoleezza Rice throughout the session, apparently taking notes on what she wished him to say on her behalf—requested to speak a second time, perhaps sensing his failure to convince the others.

Jack Straw's second intervention

Mr President, I wouldn't have asked to respond had I not heard the Syrian foreign minister, Mr Farouk al-Sharaa, express what I can only describe as an extremely crude comparison between the situation in which the Syrian government now finds itself and the circumstances faced by the government of the United States on September 11, the government of Spain on March 11, 2004, and the government of the United Kingdom on July 7 of this year.

I believe that if any of my colleagues around this table still had doubts about the need to adopt Resolution 1636 (2005) under Chapter VII, Mr Mehlis makes it clear—and I have quoted him—that the presumption of innocence remains in place.

However, the investigation currently underway is not some medieval inquiry, as Mr al-Sharaa suggests. Rather, it follows the recognised procedures of all sound investigations: first, gathering preliminary evidence to determine whether further investigation is warranted.

Had the Syrian government provided full and substantive cooperation, Mr Mehlis's report would have been different, and I am fully convinced that there would have been no need for a ministerial-level meeting today, and probably not even for a resolution at all.

If minister al-Sharaa is indeed implying that what happened on September 11, 2001, March 11, 2004, and July 7, 2005, occurred with the knowledge or approval of the governments of the United States, Spain, and the United Kingdom, then I believe he ought to state that explicitly.

Farouk al-Sharaa's second response

I apologise for taking the floor a second time. In truth, I have no desire to engage in any quarrels, but I do wish to clarify a few points raised by Mr Jack Straw.

The first point concerns what Mr Mehlis said. Mr Straw actually agrees with me that Mehlis's statements were based on assumptions, not facts. After the interrogation of the Syrian officials in Damascus, Mehlis was asked by a journalist whether he would be returning, and he replied, "I might return, or I might not," which means there are doubts regarding the conclusions he has drawn.

The second point: we have condemned the attacks of September 11, 2001, on numerous occasions because, quite simply, we Arabs have paid—and continue to pay—the price for these terrorist acts. We are among their victims. Syria also officially condemned the train bombings in Spain through a formal statement, and similarly, we condemned the London underground bombings both through official declarations and a direct telephone call.

The third and final point: we sincerely seek to uncover the truth behind the assassination of the late Rafic Hariri with definitive, irrefutable evidence—not to pursue other objectives driven by hidden agendas.

The president of the Security Council then announced that there were no further speakers on his list.
Rice continued whispering with Straw, but neither requested the floor again.

After this session, I happened to encounter Jack Straw in one of the restrooms at the Security Council. He approached me privately and apologised, telling me that he would "behave next time".

Escaping Syria's predicament

These were difficult days for the Syrian foreign minister, who refused to succumb to blackmail or compromise the dignity of his country which obliged him to stand up to major powers, even though personally, he had been unenthusiastic about the continued presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon after Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000.

One clause in the Taif Agreement clearly allowed for Syrian troops to be stationed, after their withdrawal from Lebanon, at locations such as Dahr Al-Baidar, Ain Dara, and the Bekaa Valley, in a legal manner, with the approval of the Lebanese government and the Arab League. From these elevated positions in Lebanon, our forces could easily observe Beirut with the naked eye and monitor the Lebanese-Syrian-Israeli front using simple surveillance equipment.

The main individuals required for investigation in Syria were president Assad and other members of his family. In June 2005, Mehlis wrote to me, with the knowledge of the UN Secretary-General, providing a list of names and the requests related to them. I gave the letter to the president in his office at the Al-Rawda Palace, where discussions of highly sensitive matters are not to be held over the phone. He read the letter and did not respond, as if it were addressed to me personally and not to the Assad family.

At that time, Mehlis considered my failure to respond promptly to the letter as an obstruction of the investigation. The publication of this accusation against me in his report, without justification, led to a media campaign against me personally, accusing me of obstructing the investigation—a campaign that lasted for weeks, as though the assassination had taken place with my knowledge.

In Mehlis's final report, which he presented to the Security Council on December 6, 2005, just a few days before he stepped down as head of the International Investigation Committee, glaring legal flaws appeared in his report, especially regarding the credibility of the witnesses.

In Syria, we had two conditions regarding the investigation: first, that it would be professional and legal, not political. It was illogical for the Security Council to issue a resolution in which the Lebanese government is considered a credible authority, while simultaneously not acknowledging its judicial authority and so forming an international judicial committee. The second condition was that no Syrian civil or military official should appear in Monteverde, Lebanon, because the relationship with Lebanon was going through an abnormal stage.

I explained to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his assistant, Terje Rød-Larsen, over the phone at that time, the importance of addressing these two points, and the need to exclude any names that were falsely accused by lying witnesses. If there were any names that were not fabricated by such witnesses, meetings with them should take place inside Syria, not in Monteverde. Annan replied, "Let me think about it, because not everything is within my control."

Two days later, Annan called me and explained that he had been unable to convince the Security Council to allow the investigation to take place inside Syria. The investigation committee had been very clear in its findings, both in its report and in the closed sessions of the Security Council. He told me that the investigations would now need to be conducted outside Syria, notwithstanding our concerns.

As for the other officers who had been questioned within Syria, they would, under Chapter VII, be required to appear again before the committee outside the country. This was due to the fact that the Security Council, particularly the US Permanent Representative John Bolton, had suggested finding another country where freedom of expression could be ensured without any restrictions.

The phone call, or rather the two final phone calls with Kofi Annan, lasted more than half an hour. Despite my efforts, I couldn't convince him that we had facilitated the investigations inside Syria and were fully prepared to continue supporting them. I suggested a location for the investigations and said that the Golan Heights was Syrian land under illegal occupation.

There is a demilitarised zone in the Golan where only the UN flag is flown—neither the Israeli nor the Syrian flags are allowed. The international investigation committee could meet with the Syrian officers involved at the UN's headquarters there, where the investigators would have complete freedom. He said he would call me back, as the decision had already been made by the Security Council, and the mandate granted to the investigation committee by the Council.

It seemed clear to me that Kofi Annan was convinced by my suggestion, as we discussed how the Syrian officers and the investigation committee could reach the UN headquarters in the Golan via a UN helicopter, marked with the UN emblem and flag. This could set off from where the committee was based in Beirut, passing through UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon and from there to the UNDOF forces in the adjacent Golan region, without needing approval from any state. A simple notification from the UN to the three countries concerned (Syria, Lebanon, and Israel) would suffice, ensuring the flight path for the UN-marked aircraft was secured—matters of this nature are guaranteed by international law which ensures the required overflight clearances from the concerned nations.

Annan expressed surprise at my detailed explanation, and I told him that I'd worked with Syrian Air in the 1970s.

Annan called me back less than an hour later and said that the proposed approval from the Security Council had not been granted and asked me not to enquire about the reasons. The second call was brief, as he did not want to explain the refusal. I suspected John Bolton was behind the rejection.

After consultation with the special judicial committee in Syria, which included several legal experts in Damascus - especially after the adoption of Resolution 1636 under Chapter VII – I saw two dilemmas facing Syria when it came to uncovering the complex plan before it could achieve its objectives through the numerous tools available both domestically and abroad. The media would play a crucial role in this regard, in both its political and legal dimensions, particularly in the era of the digital revolution.

The first challenge revolved around the large crater created by the explosion that led to the assassination of Hariri. This explosion, which should have garnered much more attention, was not examined in sufficient depth—particularly concerning its size, scope, and the extent of the destruction. Had the explosion occurred above ground or beneath it? And was it caused by 1,000 kilograms of TNT or even more?

The second challenge was finding a neutral location where the investigation could take place in total secrecy, without any interference from the Syrian authorities, and which was different to the proposal I'd already made which had been rejected. The investigation committee was threatening Syria with Chapter VII, meaning the use of force in case of non-cooperation, which heightened the importance of the attempt, regardless of whether it was successful.

The goal of addressing these two challenges was not to "pull the rabbit out of the hat"; we weren't expecting a miracle - especially considering that the three countries we were challenging—America, Britain, and France—had controlled the region's policies for nearly a century, both through the UN Security Council and previously, through the League of Nations.

Dr Sami Khiyami, our ambassador to London, played a key role in the judicial committee, supervising the foreign experts.

This was—and remained—the reality, with Syria and its friends and allies within Lebanon at best holding only the "blocking third" and not the third capable of confrontation, initiative, or determining the region's fate.

The attainable goal we sought to achieve was merely to cast doubt on the accusation narrative, which had been marketed to the world to such an extent that even our Russian and Chinese friends, along with some Arab brothers, believed it. This was the real danger behind the accusation, as well as the the fact that public opinion in Syria was deeply affected by the assassination of Hariri.

Proving the regime's innocence of Hariri's blood was a goal that had to be achieved, and this responsibility fell squarely on the shoulders of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its minister before anyone else.

Doubts about the narrative regarding the crater—at least among the Russians—emerged when, at my request, we secretly conducted real filmed experiments in the desert of Syria over several days, testing various types of explosions, both above and below ground, using different vehicles and trucks, and with up to 1,000 kilograms of TNT or more.

We did not obtain a crater of the depth or width that occurred in the Beirut explosion on that fateful day. We shared these images with Moscow, compiling them into a special album overseen by general Ali Mamlouk, the head of the General Intelligence Directorate, who was tasked with travelling secretly to Moscow at my insistence and with president Assad's approval.

Mamlouk succeeded in casting doubt among the Russian security officials and their military advisers about the size of the massive crater, as he informed me upon his return from Moscow. The Russians produced some satellite images taken on the day of the explosion, which showed aerial activity—two planes flying over Beirut and the eastern Mediterranean coast between 10:00 am and 2:00 pm Beirut time on February 14, 2005. They provided us with the satellite data, but could not confirm the reason for these air sorties or whether one of the planes was American and the other Israeli, as both were of American manufacture.

The solution to the second dilemma was proposed through conducting the investigation in a neutral country.

I sent a trusted envoy to Kofi Annan to secretly inform him that what we deemed appropriate to meet the requirements of the Security Council resolution, was to conduct the investigation at the UN headquarters in Vienna, the capital of Austria, which is on neutral ground. The Syrian officers required to testify would enter through the back entrance, to ensure that no media outlets were alerted to their presence, as confidentiality was a condition for the integrity of the investigation. This was the content of my letter to the Secretary-General.

To create an environment where international investigators could ask questions with "absolute freedom," Kofi Annan accepted these commitments, and I have no doubt that his high professionalism is to be commended, as this aspect of his character earned him the respect of others, despite his occasionally compliance with American directives.

To implement the plan, I called upon our ambassador in Vienna, Safwan Ghanem, a seasoned diplomat with extensive experience. I explained to him the details of what he needed to do in Vienna before and after the arrival of the seven Syrian officers required to testify. The officers concerned left Syria on a private Syrian plane to Turkey. They then travelled to Vienna, ensuring that no journalists knew they had come from Syria.

Ambassador Ghanem accompanied them upon their arrival at Vienna Airport, presenting them as friends and family, and lodged them at his own home, after relocating himself and his family to a hotel nearby, as per the agreement, to remain in contact with them. He then took them through the back door of the UN headquarters in Vienna, ensuring that no media outlets were aware of their presence.

The officers returned to Damascus after the required investigations in the same manner they left for Vienna, passing through Turkey. Syria's relations with Turkey were excellent after president Bashar's visit to the country in 2004, as were our relations with Austria, with which I share friendships with officials such as the foreign minister and the Austrian chancellor.

One of the Syrian officials, general Rustum Ghazaleh, was kept in the investigator's room for a few extra minutes and was asked – as Ghazaleh later told ambassador Safwan Ghanem on the way to the airport – to say that Bashar al-Assad was the one who ordered the assassination of Rafic Hariri in exchange for his exoneration. However, Ghazaleh flatly rejected the offer, according to his statement.

Unlike Mehlis, Serge Brammertz, the international investigator who succeeded him, did not level any accusations against the president, his brother Maher al-Assad, or his brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate. When Brammertz issued his follow-up report after meeting with president Bashar in Damascus in April 2006, and after meeting with me as well, there were no charges. However, he did suggest in his report that there was a need for better cooperation.

The mission was successful, regardless of what the investigators concluded. The success I mean does not imply that Hariri's assassination was solved, but rather that the Syrian Arab Republic's cooperation with the international investigation committee was complete, unconditional, and without the Syrian government having had to sign any agreement with the UN Secretariat similar to its agreement with Lebanon, which had invalidated the role of the Lebanese judiciary.

It was no mean feat preventing the media, in the age of the digital revolution, from publishing any news about the senior Syrian officers visit to Austria via Turkey. As well as this, it undermined the claims being upheld by major countries - by nullifying the sweeping accusation against the president and his family members for the assassination of Hariri, which I considered a prerequisite for exonerating Syria.

However, the consequence of that effort was a false accusation against me in Mehlis's report, accusing me of misleading the investigation.

President Bashar didn't share the same assessments and conclusions when I met him in his office at the end of 2005, after the officers returned from Vienna, for reasons I still do not understand. As soon as we finished talking about Hariri, the president surprised me by saying: "There is a lot of pressure on me, and it's not new, it's been going on since my father's time, and I didn't try to listen to it back then, as you know!".

Instead of asking him where this pressure was coming from – because I had actually heard about it directly from his father, where Saudi Arabia was the country being referred to – I responded, half-jokingly, as we often did to lighten the tense atmosphere, saying, "maybe you would like to change the foreign minister." He immediately replied: "And who do you suggest in your place?"

I didn't take offence at his quick reaction, as I wasn't attached to the position. If Bashar had kept me on when he became president, it was doubtless because he felt he needed my help for a while. But I sensed that he wanted to exclude me, so that any successes under his rule could not be attributed to anyone else…

I told him that Walid Muallem, the deputy foreign minister, might suit him personally for two reasons—he had longstanding ties with Bandar bin Sultan from his time as ambassador in Washington, and subsequently with Saudi Arabia; and he had also built relationships with members of the US negotiating delegation during the peace talks. He'd also been tasked with sensitive missions, including meeting Hariri shortly before his assassination.

As for the second option, it could be Faisal Mekdad, Syria's representative to the UN in New York, who I said was loyal to the president and the country. The third option was Dr. Riad Daoudi who was well-versed in international law, participated in peace negotiations, and had successfully carried out numerous assignments.

After we discussed the names, the president addressed me: "What do you think about becoming vice president? I can rely on you." I said he was young and didn't need anyone, but he insisted, adding that I could define my own responsibilities and present them after the New Year.

I left the People's Palace deep in thought. The truth is, I was never drawn to power, so the list of responsibilities I drafted didn't exceed one page. The first clause stated that I would carry out whatever duties the president assigned to me. Second, the position should have its own administrative staff with defined roles to support operations. Third, all delegation orders should be issued by presidential decree. Fourth, there should be a declared budget within the state budget, approved by the president.

The president read through the page in my presence, clause by clause, following which he said: "You can request whatever expenses and allocations you need—I won't deny you anything. So there's no need for a separate budget. And we don't need any additional staff—just look at the bureaucracy we already have! Even the presidency doesn't have a designated staff!"

He continued holding the paper containing my modest proposal, after attempting to cross out everything except for the first clause—that I would carry out whatever task he assigned to me. I left the meeting feeling uneasy, because in practical terms, he hadn't agreed to anything.

Ghazi Kanaan's suicide

I heard directly from president Bashar and general Assef Shawkat about the suicide of Ghazi Kanaan in his office at the ministry of interior.

I joined the front ranks of the mourners, alongside prime minister Naji al-Otari and a few other Syrian officials, outside Al-Mouwasat Hospital in Damascus on Wednesday, October 11, 2005—despite the fact that I didn't know him well.

The Lebanese knew Ghazi Kanaan as their de facto ruler for two decades. Later, at the start of president Bashar's term, he became head of Syria's political security directorate in the Ministry of Interior, and was eventually appointed minister of interior in prime minister Otari's cabinet. Despite his close friendship with Hariri, Kanaan was among dozens accused in connection with Hariri's assassination.

At one point, I was tasked by the president with speaking to the Syrian officers implicated in the case, including Kanaan. When I reached out to him, he insisted—very politely—that we speak at the Foreign Ministry rather than his own office at the Ministry of Interior, even though I had offered to come to him.

During a meeting with the president at the palace, I asked him directly whether Kanaan's death had in fact been a suicide. Without hesitation, he picked up the phone and called his chief of staff, Abu Salem. "Abu Mudar is sitting with me," he said. He then asked him to read aloud the letter Ghazi Kanaan had sent shortly before his death. As the president pressed the speaker button so I could hear, Abu Salem read the message: Kanaan asked the president to look after his wife and children after he was gone, in a letter filled with gratitude and words of deep appreciation.

As for Assef Shawkat's account, it was vivid and detailed. He told me he had an appointment with Ghazi Kanaan at 9:00 am on the morning of his suicide. But Kanaan arrived at the Ministry of Interior around 8:00 am, then left immediately for his home. From there, he called to say he might be a little late for the meeting. Shawkat speculated that Kanaan may have picked up the pistol he used to end his life [at home], as he had stopped carrying a weapon since becoming minister.

Shawkat also mentioned that general Maher al-Assad claimed to have offered condolences for Kanaan in his hometown of Bhamra, a village in the Qardaha district, before adding pointedly - "even though he actually never bothered to make the journey."

Farouk al-Sharaa is a Syrian politician and diplomat. He served as served as foreign minister from 1984 to 2006, then as vice president until 2014.

This is an edited translation from our Arabic edition. To read the original article click here.

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