Breadcrumb
The claims that the recent Dutch elections led to a return of the political centre and a repudiation of the far-right, are off the mark. We should be under no illusion, the far-right remains a decisive force and the country’s rightward drift continues.
At first look, Dutch politics seem extraordinarily chaotic, especially given that since the turn of the century only one government coalition lasted its full term. The last outgoing coalition, which was the first to include a far-right party (Geert Wilder’s Party for Freedom (PVV)), predictably collapsed after just eleven months. In reality, it was marked by instability from the beginning.
Nevertheless, amidst the ‘chaos’ lies a clear pattern that Dutch politics has followed: the left declines, the far-right grows, and the mainstream/centre right adapts by leaning ever more rightward. The October elections demonstrated this all too well.
Wilder received 30,000 less votes than the largest party, the centrist D66, but holds the same number of seats (26 out of 150). It was a ‘dream’ defeat, because the parliamentary far-right as a whole remained in the same position as before.
The losses of the PVV were off-set by the gains of the Forum voor Democractie (FvD), a party that is arguably even more to the right of Wilders with its openly neo-fascist references. They gained four more seats, having previously had three.
JA21, a party that shares PVV’s far-right politics, but under a far more technocratic guise, jumped from having one seat, to nine.
One very surprising result was that the conservative-liberal VVD, part of the outgoing coalition, went from having 22 seats to 24, after the polls predicted more substantial losses the ‘traditional’ party of the Dutch right.
Nevertheless, this doesn’t necessarily scream stability for the VVD. Under its current leader, Dilan Yeşilgöz, the party moved further to the right, attacking Palestine solidarity with accusations of antisemitism, and denouncing the centre-left parties as dangerous radicals. Whilst the political party lost votes from moderate liberals, they were compensated with former PVV voters.
Indeed, the VVD is becoming less and less centre-right, and increasingly a natural ally of the far-right. For example, its current refusal to enter into a coalition with Wilders (again), is not based on a rejection of his ideas, but rather because they are angry about his ‘irresponsible’ and ‘unreliable’ behaviour as a coalition partner.
That far-right ideas are no obstacle for the party is further demonstrated by its desire to join a coalition with JA21.
Contrary to what media pundits and analysts are saying about the victory of D66 against the far-right, it certainly shouldn’t be read as a progressive political earthquake. The party won 26 seats (only two more than in 2019), but whilst its leader Rob Jetten adopted a political approach reminiscent of Obama and Tony Blair. He combined a vaguely progressive image and hope-filled rhetoric with a further shift towards the right on issues such as refugee rights, austerity measures in health care, and increasing military spending.
The embrace of the Dutch flag was also a notable (problematic) symbolic move.
It is almost depressing to think that in the Dutch political landscape, D66 – once founded to introduce democratic reforms in political institutions – still counts as ‘progressive’. Its recovery following a historic low some decades ago is in no small part because it is seen as the ‘anti-Wilders’ party. D66 is cosmopolitan, pro-EU, optimistic and appeals to highly educated voters, a contrast to Wilders who rails against ‘Europe’, and warns against supposed existential threats to the ‘Dutch nation’ from migrants and Muslims.
Whilst D66’s triangulation allowed it to pick up votes from centre-right parties, its largest share of new votes still came from the centre-left.
This election also saw the left take a real beating. The main parliamentary left parties, the Labour Party (PvdA) and GreenLeft (GroenLinks), have been engaged in a merge since the last elections, and had hoped that this unity would generate enthusiasm amongst voters. However, these aspirations were sorely crushed as they ended up losing five seats.
This is largely because the parties are caught in a double bind. The Labour Party, which suffered a historic defeat in the 2017 polls after forming a coalition with the right and implementing harsh austerity measures, had hoped to undo the negative image that has surrounded them since. But with the intention to enter a coalition with the centre-right remaining, they unsurprisingly didn’t get very far with the campaign.
The party is too ‘left’ for centrist anti-Wilders liberals, while also unable to attract new, non-voters.
Ultimately, it speaks volumes that no left-wing party was really able to capture the energy of the historically large protest movement in solidarity with Palestine over the last couple of years. Not even the radical-left party BIJ1. Clearly, many lowered their political horizons by voting (most likely with a heavy heart) for the GroenLinksPvda slate.
Jetten declared people in the Netherlands vote based on good ‘vibes’, but how long will this sustain the newly formed government?
Now controlling a third of parliamentary seats, the far-right remains a key force. Obviously, its rise over a quarter of a century is not going to be undone through clever marketing strategies, or even a single election campaign. After all, outside of parliament, it has established its own online media eco-system while also exerting increasingly strong influence on right-wing legacy media. It has deep roots in the country’s colonial past and feeds on ongoing social issues such as anger over cuts in healthcare and a deepening housing crisis.
There are clearly many who are drawn to the far-right because it offers an “explanation” for their day-to-day issues – blaming minorities, and especially Muslims. The centre on the other hand, offers essentially more of the same, hoping that not being far-right will be enough. It isn’t.
The case of the Netherlands should serve as a warning about the growing normalisation of the far-right, and the dangerous political trajectory that follows when real opposition is neither organised, nor able to put forward a long-term strategy that looks beyond the ballot box.
Alex de Jong is co-director of the International Institute for Research and Education (IIRE) in Amsterdam, Netherlands and editor of the Dutch socialist website Grenzeloos.org.
Follow him on Twitter (X): @AlexdeJongIIRE
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