Dutch Blockade of the Scheldt: Lessons for Hormuz and US empire

As we mark 100 days since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran and two months of a dubious 'ceasefire', direct hostilities between Iran and Israel have resumed. Iran's missile strikes came after its leadership warned that Israeli bombing of Beirut would be met with a "painful response."

The Israeli strategy is undoubtedly to gradually escalate until the United States is persuaded to join a renewed attack on Iran. However, President Trump has declared that he is ‘in no hurry’ to reach a deal with the Iranians, and his repeated threats to relaunch the war if Iran doesn't moderate its peace terms have amounted to nothing.

This dynamic will likely continue in the short-term. The simple rundown is that as things stand, Iran has won the war, and the US knows this, but is trying to negotiate peace terms that will make its defeat not so severe that it risks sparking the collapse of the world order. Iran, however, has little reason to facilitate this.

The United States has done little but cause misery for the country since the 1979 revolution, and even when it appeared to be offering reconciliation, such as the JCPOA agreement under Obama, it only proved itself to be agreement-incapable when it reneged on the agreement and reimposed sanctions despite Iran keeping to its side of the bargain.

This has resulted in an Iranian leadership that is convinced that their country has only one way out of its predicament, while keeping its sovereignty, the US must be expelled from the Middle East.

Hence, Iran’s demands for a permanent end to the war would entail ruin for the US position in the region. According to the New York Times, Iran is demanding that the US accept Iranian control over the Straits of Hormuz and its right to impose tolls on any ships passing through, immediately grant Iran access to billions of dollars of frozen assets, including $24bn held in overseas banks, gradually lift the sanctions imposed on Iran due to its nuclear programme, and pay reparations of $300bn to Iran to repair damage caused during the war, often described as an ‘investment fund’.

If the United States were to agree to even a watered-down version of this, it would be to admit that it has been defeated in carrying out a basic task of its status as the global hegemon: guaranteeing free access to international waterways to facilitate free trade.

The US now sees itself in a similar quandary to that faced by Spain after the Fall of Antwerp during the Dutch Revolt in 1585. At the time, Spain was the most powerful state in Europe with a global maritime empire. It also ruled most of the Low Countries as the ‘Spanish Netherlands’, with the major port of Antwerp, its location on the river Scheldt granting it immense wealth, as much international trade passed through it.

 The Spanish were successful in recapturing the city from Dutch rebels and expelling its Protestant population, but this tactical success would not result in a strategic victory, as the Dutch proceeded to blockade the river Scheldt, leading to Antwerp, rendering its function as a major port useless. Despite many Spanish attempts to reopen the Scheldt, the Dutch were able to maintain the blockade until 1795, with Antwerp reduced to a shadow of its former self long before then, and Amsterdam having replaced it as the region’s major port.

That Spain was incapable of forcing the Dutch to reopen the Scheldt, especially agreeing to peace in 1648 with the Scheldt still blockaded, was a major factor in its ceasing to be the world’s predominant colonial power. Its victory in recapturing Antwerp notwithstanding.

Likewise, the US may have caused significant damage to Iran in this war. For instance, it and Israel’s mass-killing of Iranian leadership figures may appear impressive to observers at the operational level. But what are the strategic goals of such operations? Logically, the objective of killing leadership is to bring about a breakdown in command and control of the military, and/or to replace the country’s leadership with one more amenable to agreeing to surrender to the US’ terms. It’s plain to see that neither of these has happened.

Iran is now taking an even harder line with the US than almost anyone thought possible a few months ago, and there was no sign of Iran losing control of its military during the fighting. Soon after the ceasefire, US intelligence believed that  “half of Iran's stockpile of ballistic missiles and its associated launch systems… 60% of the naval arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps… [and] about two-thirds of Iran's air force” were still operational.

This is all after the US expended huge amounts of critical munitions, which will take ‘years’ to replenish its stocks. Without adequate stockpiles of these munitions, the US cannot effectively wage war against a state with a modern military such as Iran.

Publicly, President Trump is talking up the naval blockade on Iranian ports as a means to gain leverage. This is unlikely to work. Iran is well accustomed to surviving under international sanctions; a blockade of its ports will cause more economic hardship, but it is not likely to be significant enough to cause state collapse anytime soon. Certainly not before the calamitous effects of the Straits of Hormuz being closed to international shipping become too much for the US and its allies to tolerate.

President Trump now has two options. Either he goes for broke and launches an even more destructive attack on Iran, which would probably require a ground invasion and risk of heavy casualties, and attempt to overthrow the Islamic Republic by direct military force. Or, he accepts that the attack on Iran has not only failed, but it has also left Iran far stronger than it was before the war.

Now that Iran has proven the theory that it can take control of Hormuz anytime it wants to, and nobody can stop it, there’s no reason for it to return to the status quo. Iran is now establishing a toll system that controls who can access the Straits. This will give it tremendous leverage over almost every significant state in the world, all of which will be incentivised to keep the Iranians happy, lest they cut off their access to the world’s biggest fossil fuel exporters.

This reintegration in the world economy as a major power, alongside sanction relief bolstering its coffers, would put the Islamic Republic in a strong position to alleviate domestic discontent and strengthen its alliances across the region.

The longer this ‘ceasefire’ is dragged out, the more that the new world order becomes a de facto reality.

Daniel Lindley is a writer and trade union activist in the UK.

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