In recent weeks, the Trump administration has renewed pressure on Lebanon, primarily through diplomatic visits by figures such as Morgan Ortagus, Deputy Special Envoy for the Middle East, pressing Beirut to achieve the impossible: the voluntary disarmament of Hezbollah.
This approach — simplistic, detached from Lebanon’s complex realities, and largely beholden to Israel’s security concerns — is more likely to ignite fresh internal conflict than deliver regional peace.
Since the November 2024 ceasefire ended major hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel — on terms favourable to the latter — the US, EU, Gulf states, and most of Lebanon’s body politic see an opportunity to end the country's problematic military dualism, where state forces coexist alongside a parallel armed group.
They are right. With Syria now under new management and, at least in theory, cutting off Hezbollah’s resupply lines from Iran, geopolitical and military conditions have rarely been more favourable.
Yet American insistence that Hezbollah should surrender its arms without a process or a replacement for the armed groups' deterrence effect is dangerously misguided. Hezbollah’s weapons were never merely logistical appendages from Syria or Iran. They represent something deeper: an entrenched Lebanese political and security reality, born from decades of systemic neglect and foreign occupation.
To understand Hezbollah’s enduring presence, the West must revisit the historical neglect of Lebanon’s Shia communities. The Shia are not the only marginalised community long neglected by Beirut’s Sunni- and Christian-dominated central authority.
Yet Hezbollah has become much more than just a military shield, evolving into a critical provider of essential services — including education, healthcare, microfinance, and social welfare. This reality complicates any attempt at rapid, unilateral disarmament, particularly without comprehensive security guarantees. Yet Washington persists, overlooking the nuanced historical grievances that underpin Hezbollah’s support, at Lebanon’s peril.
After more than two years of political paralysis and a devastating war with Israel late last year, the unprecedented election of a reform-oriented Maronite Catholic president and a Sunni prime minister raised hopes for stability and economic recovery, including critical IMF-backed reforms. Both leaders have clearly signalled their commitment to exclusive state control over arms. Yet this stance, necessary for international credibility, simultaneously sets the stage for potentially catastrophic intercommunal tensions, particularly with the Shia community that sees Hezbollah as its principal protector.
Finding the right place for Hezbollah in Lebanon
The reality is stark: Hezbollah and the community they represent will not surrender their military leverage without credible guarantees. The Lebanese army, chronically underfunded and poorly equipped, currently poses no deterrent to Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty — a situation Israel appears keen to exploit.
Recent incidents of Israeli settlers crossing into southern Lebanon under the guise of religious pilgrimages highlight a troubling trend. Encouraged by extremist factions within Israel’s political landscape, these incursions and the recent expansion of occupied territories in Syria have fuelled fears among the predominantly Shia communities in the South that Israel's true objective is territorial occupation and eventual annexation.
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Thus, genuine security sector reform in Lebanon must be prioritised, starting with its army, the Lebanese Armed Forces. This reform must empower the LAF, not merely as an internal policing force and public employment service supported by the US, EU and Gulf States.
Instead, the LAF will need to be built to become and act as a genuine deterrent capable of integrating advanced military capabilities, currently unique to Hezbollah. Western countries, particularly the US, must recognise that a neutered Lebanese army simply invites further Israeli aggression, perpetuating Hezbollah’s justification for militarisation.
No doubt, Hezbollah itself must make deep sacrifices, owing to its weakened geopolitical position, but also to account for dragging Lebanon into its latest conflagration with Israel.
The group’s use or threat of force internally has not only enabled its substantial political power but also underpinned Lebanon’s chronic political dysfunction: shielding corrupt economic elites, stifling essential reforms, and exacerbating humanitarian and financial crises. Hezbollah’s involvement in suppressing Lebanon’s 2019 popular uprising further eroded its legitimacy among many Lebanese, as did its propping up of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s recently ousted regime.
But calls for the outright elimination of Hezbollah overlook reality. Such a scenario would devastate the Shia community, risking widespread social collapse given Hezbollah’s extensive provision of vital services. Instead, Lebanon requires a nuanced process of reconciliation and confidence-building— one addressing grievances from all sides, including Hezbollah’s victims and its own constituency.
True peace in Lebanon demands patience and strategic pragmatism from domestic leaders and international partners alike. Hezbollah’s current leader, Naim Qaseem, himself acknowledges the necessity of reform within Lebanon’s national army and has made some overtures to the state monopoly on arms. But as US pressure for swift disarmament has increased, his position has hardened, setting up Lebanon for a renewed and reinvigorated conflict over the group’s arsenal.
Hezbollah’s current hardening stance likely signals posture rather than policy — a reminder to supporters that the group cannot be easily sidelined from Lebanon’s political landscape. Nor should it be: Hezbollah holds legitimate political representation. The challenge lies in right-sizing its role, neither inflating nor destroying it.
What this means for peace is that today there is still a narrowing window for gradual integration of Hezbollah’s military capacity into a unified national security apparatus. International stakeholders — chiefly the US, the EU, Iran, and Saudi Arabia — must support this incremental process, abandoning quick-fix demands and recognising Lebanon’s realities.
Ultimately, Hezbollah’s disarmament is less about immediate surrender and more about building a credible Lebanese state capable of protecting all its citizens equally. Until the international community embraces this complexity and commits to a sustained, realistic strategy, Lebanon risks either prolonged misery or, worse, a descent into renewed civil conflict. The choice is clear: genuine peace requires realistic processes, not wishful demands.
Sami Halabi is the Director of Policy at the Beirut-based Alternative Policy Institute and recent co-author of a policy paper on Hezbollah’s disarmament.
Follow him on X: @sami_halabi
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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.