Armed resistance, democracy, diplomacy: Palestinians Gen Z hold the key to Palestine’s future

For over a century, Palestinians have alternated between revolution and diplomacy in their struggle for independence and the end of colonial settler occupation. Both approaches, armed resistance and political negotiation, have shaped the modern Palestinian experience.

Yet neither has delivered the ultimate goal: freedom and statehood. Revolution is not known to be built on the democratic people-based concept, but is it possible that Palestinian elections could be a pathway to independence?

In the early 20th century, Arabs who theoretically supported Palestine relied on diplomacy. That strategy brought only dispossession: the partition plan, the Nakba, and occupation.

Armed struggle, beginning with the Palestinian revolution of the 1960s, restored national identity and won the PLO global recognition, but not liberation. Later, the first intifada’s largely nonviolent uprising led to the Oslo Accords, which promised peace but collapsed under the weight of Hamas bombings, Israeli intransigence, and the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. The second, more violent intifada entrenched division and deepened despair.

Today, after the devastating Gaza war, Palestinians again face a strategic reckoning: return to armed struggle, double down on diplomacy, or find a hybrid path.

President Mahmoud Abbas has long rejected armed resistance, convinced that diplomacy is the only viable route under overwhelming Israeli and American pressure.

But his commitment to negotiations, once seen as pragmatic, but without any buy-in from the people, has left him increasingly isolated. Yet despite his diplomatic approach, Israel has worked relentlessly to delegitimise him, while Washington continues to enable Israel’s occupation policies and settlement expansion.

Despite Abbas’s rejection of Hamas tactics, Israel and the US now conflate the PLO-led Palestinian Authority with Hamas. The result is political paralysis: a leadership discredited internationally (especially in Washington) and distrusted domestically.

Yet amid the rubble of war, an unexpected opportunity has emerged. Growing international recognition of the State of Palestine, most recently by several Western countries, has revived hope that diplomatic momentum might yield political renewal.

To harness this moment, Abbas has pledged a series of reforms, foremost among them national elections to be held within a year of the ceasefire. If the ceasefire continues and Abbas’s commitment holds, Palestinians could head to the polls in October 2026 to elect both a president and a new Palestinian Legislative Council. Some seats in the Palestine National Council, the PLO’s highest body representing 14 million Palestinians worldwide, may also be filled.

If realised, these elections would mark the first major test of Palestinian democracy in nearly two decades and provide a solid answer to what Palestinians want in terms of war and peace. But they also expose deep uncertainties about the movement’s cohesion and capacity for renewal.

The first question is whether Hamas will participate. Abbas has insisted that any party entering the race must accept the PLO’s international commitments, including recognition of Israel, adherence to human rights conventions (especially the rights of women).

Given Hamas’s ideological stance, full compliance seems improbable. At most, some affiliated figures might run independently or on local lists. Yet Hamas’s potential absence does not guarantee a victory for Fatah or other PLO factions. Their own legitimacy crisis runs deep.

After decades of dominance, Fatah and its allies suffer from chronic dysfunction: centralised decision-making, corruption, and nepotism have alienated large segments of the public. For younger Palestinians—many of whom have never voted in national elections—these parties symbolise stagnation, not liberation. Restoring trust will require genuine reform, not rhetoric.

There are faint signs of introspection. Fatah’s Central Committee reinstated veteran leader Nasser al-Kidwa, previously expelled for trying to form an independent list in 2021. The move suggested a willingness to heal internal rifts. Similarly, limited anti-corruption measures, such as the arrest of a cabinet minister and the attempted detention of a fugitive border official, hint at awareness of systemic decay. But these symbolic gestures are unlikely to satisfy a sceptical public.

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Another major unknown is Marwan Barghouti, the imprisoned Fatah leader who remains the most popular Palestinian figure across political divides. Unless he is released or allowed to run from prison, no other candidate can easily unite the electorate.

Without a galvanising figure like Barghouti, Fatah risks fragmentation, while the broader national movement may struggle to secure a mandate strong enough to pursue reform or resist Israeli pressure.

Palestine’s demographic reality adds urgency. The population is overwhelmingly young and digitally connected. Generation Z, shaped by war, occupation, and global activism, is less patient with ageing leaders who have ruled for decades without renewal. Across the region, from Morocco to Iraq, young voters are challenging established elites, and Palestinians are no exception.

For Fatah and the PLO, adapting to this shift is existential. They must open space for new leaders, embrace transparency, and meaningfully engage grassroots constituencies. Otherwise, they risk ceding political relevance to emerging local, independent, or Islamist movements better attuned to the language and aspirations of youth.

The coming year will test not only Abbas’s reform pledges but the very survival of the Palestinian national movement as a credible vehicle for self-determination. These elections, if they occur, will determine whether the Palestinian leadership can evolve into a democratic, accountable system reflecting the people’s will, or whether it remains trapped in the old logic of factional dominance and revolutionary nostalgia.

The choice between revolution and democracy is not merely theoretical. It is the defining challenge for a nation still struggling to translate its sacrifices into sovereignty. Palestinians have tried both paths and found neither sufficient on its own. What remains is the harder task: to reform the institutions of liberation into instruments of democracy, before history renders them obsolete.

Daoud Kuttab is an award-winning Palestinian journalist and the author of the new book State of Palestine NOW.

Follow Daoud on X: @daoudkuttab

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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.