Why are Gulf states not striking back at Iran?

Gulf states have been hit by waves of Iranian missiles and drones for three days as Tehran lashes out at its neighbours following Saturday's unprovoked assault on Iran by the US and Israel.

Despite hotels, ports, energy facilities, and bases being hit by Tehran's projectiles, none of the affected GCC states has retaliated with direct strikes on Iranian territory.

The restraint is striking. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain have activated air defences, condemned the attacks, and reserved the right to respond, while some host US military facilities that have been used in Washington’s ongoing campaign against Iran.

Yet even as Iranian strikes have expanded beyond US bases to include civilian infrastructure, Gulf states have stopped short of direct retaliation.

The New Arab looks into why the Gulf has decided not to strike back, yet.

Entangled - but not leading the war

At the heart of the crisis is an unprovoked war by the US and Israel against Iran, and although Gulf states are not directly involved, they are deeply entangled.

Several Gulf countries host US military installations that have played roles in US operations across the region, and from Tehran’s perspective, these states are enabling strikes on Iranian territory by having these facilities on their soil.

Iranian officials have framed their missile and drone campaign as retaliatory and aimed at American assets - even as some projectiles have hit or targeted economic and civilian infrastructure in Gulf cities completely unrelated to Washington's military.

That creates a paradox for Gulf rulers: they are operationally exposed to retaliation, yet escalating directly against Iran would formally transform them from host states into full combatants.

Escalation the 'least-preferred scenario'

For many Gulf leaders, being drawn into a direct war with Iran is the worst possible outcome.

"The Gulf states have a lot to lose, in terms of their security and economies, by being dragged into a war, not to mention the smaller states that do not have the capacity for it. They will try to establish some form of de-escalation with Iran," Dania Thafer, director of the Gulf International Forum in Washington, told Le Monde.

"The greatest asset the Gulf countries currently have is working in unison, to present a united front in their messages to Iran, to pursue containment through dialogue and strengthen their collective defence capacities and intelligence sharing," she added.

The Gulf economies are heavily exposed: oil export terminals, aviation hubs, ports, tourism sectors and financial centres are all vulnerable to prolonged conflict.

Even limited exchanges have disrupted airspace and rattled markets; a full-scale war would threaten the economic foundations on which Gulf stability rests.

Fear of regime collapse and regional chaos

Beyond immediate economic risks lies a deeper strategic fear: what happens if Iran itself destabilises?

Among Gulf policymakers, the idea of regime change in Tehran, which is openly discussed in the US and Israel, is viewed with caution.

"The regime change strategy was tried and failed in Afghanistan, in Iraq. Do you think a country of 90 million people will fall easily? The core of the Gulf countries' hesitation is a fear of chaos, rather than a preference for the continuation of the regime," said associate professor at Kuwait University Bader Al-Saif to Le Monde.

For Gulf states, an implosion in Iran could unleash prolonged instability across the region, from refugee flows to militia spillovers and proxy conflicts. An embattled but functioning Iranian state may be hostile; a fragmented one could be far less predictable.

That calculation helps explain why even governments that distrust Tehran are wary of escalating a conflict that could spiral beyond control.

US signalling and alliance management

Another factor shaping Gulf restraint is Washington’s own posture.

President Donald Trump recently indicated in an interview with The New York Times that he does not believe it is necessary for Gulf Arab states to directly join the US and Israel in striking Iran. That message reduces pressure on Gulf capitals to demonstrate loyalty through offensive action.

Instead, Gulf governments have emphasised defensive measures and collective coordination, issuing joint statements condemning Iranian strikes while stopping short of announcing retaliatory operations of their own.

Civilian infrastructure and the cost of retaliation

Iran’s strikes have increasingly affected not only military-linked facilities but also energy infrastructure and civilian sites. Airports, industrial zones and urban areas have been disrupted or damaged, whether as direct targets or as a result of interceptions.

For Gulf states, that shift raises the stakes. Direct retaliation could invite heavier missile salvos against economic lifelines that underpin their domestic stability and global standing. 

Many observers note that Iran’s capacity to launch repeated missile and drone salvos exceeds the defensive depth available to most Gulf states.

In that context, restraint is not passivity but necessary strategic calculation.

Gulf capitals remain aligned with Washington, host US forces and condemn Iranian attacks, but they appear to be betting that containment, collective defence and de-escalation are safer than crossing the threshold into direct war with a powerful neighbour.

For now, they are absorbing retaliation while trying to avoid becoming the next front line.