What happens if Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is killed or dies?

Just two days into Israel's war with Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could bring down the Iranian regime and open a new chapter for the country.

Netanyahu's remarks about killing Khamenei sparked strong reactions among Iranians. Many ordinary citizens and anti-regime media figures even celebrated the idea of an Iran without him.

However, the broader question raised by Netanyahu's comment concerns the credibility of his claim: would Khamenei's death truly make Iran a better place to live for its people?

Two experts inside Iran who spoke to The New Arab believe that while Khamenei's death would deal a heavy blow to the Islamic Republic, it would not lead to its collapse.

According to them, the Shia governing system of Velayat-e Faqih, which has held power in Iran for more than 46 years, does not rely on one individual alone.

'Face of a system'

A political science professor who fled Tehran to a town in central Iran after the Israeli attacks spoke to TNA about the difference between Khamenei's real power and how it is perceived in the country.

Although Khamenei is seen as having the final say on all matters in Iran, he is not the ultimate decision-maker, the expert said.

"Khamenei does not make the final decisions in a military and political structure that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps tightly controls," the expert told TNA. "Khamenei is the face of a system that runs through the entire structure of governance."

"The idea that Khamenei, at 86 years old, is fully aware of everything happening in the country and makes decisions based solely on that knowledge does not match reality. It is the IRGC and Khamenei's advisors who shape those decisions by passing on filtered information to his office in the way they choose," the expert added. 

According to the expert, the Iranian political system, established after the 1979 revolution on the principle of clerical supervision, greatly benefits those connected to its corrupt and authoritarian system. For them, maintaining Khamenei as the face of the system helps them continue their operations discreetly.

He noted, "Even six or seven years ago, Khamenei may have had significant influence over decision-making, but that's no longer true. Comparing this frail old man, who in his latest speech could barely speak strongly, to figures like Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi is completely unrealistic."

Drinking a poisoned cup

A retired IRGC colonel in Tehran agrees that killing Khamenei would not significantly change the regime's dictatorial structure. As an example, he points to Israel's killing of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the former leader of Hezbollah. 

According to the former officer, Nasrallah's death had a significant psychological impact on Hezbollah members, but the group is now trying to rebuild itself. He believes the same would happen if Khamenei were killed.

He also emphasised that the IRGC and the regime's international military strategy is not based on how much damage they receive, but on how much damage they can inflict.

"For them, what matters is how much harm they cause the enemy, not how much harm they suffer themselves," he told TNA. "In recent years, the entire ruling power in Iran has focused on how much damage they dealt to Israel, not on the blows they have taken, even if that's the killing of Khamenei."

He added that the idea of killing Khamenei is also closely tied to the goals of the US and Israel.

"If the attacking force wants to strike Iran and slowly weaken it, they actually need Khamenei to make compromises," he stressed. 

He referred to former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who ended the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, by saying he was willing to "drink the cup of poison."

"If there's going to be a deal with Iran, there has to be someone with enough authority to drink the cup of poison, and that person is Khamenei."

Meanwhile, during the 12-day war, events in Iran suggested that Khamenei played a limited role in key decisions. His three video messages, aside from the usual rhetoric against Israel and the US, offered no strategic or military details, nor any clear direction.

In his final message, Khamenei spoke in a slower, less forceful tone, lacking his usual style. He made no mention of the ceasefire with Israel, raising questions about whether he approved it himself or left control to bodies like the Supreme National Security Council or the Revolutionary Guard's top council.