Tony Blair’s senior foreign policy adviser warned Washington that an invasion of Iraq without UN backing could cost the British prime minister his job, newly released documents reveal.
David Manning, Blair’s foreign policy adviser at the time, told US national security adviser Condoleezza Rice that America’s drive for regime change in Baghdad risked triggering “regime change in London”.
The warning came during a meeting in late January 2003, days before Blair travelled to Camp David to meet President George W. Bush.
Two months before the invasion, Blair was seeking a second UN Security Council resolution to legitimise military action - something his adviser said was "politically essential" to secure support from the cabinet, parliament and public opinion.
In a confidential memo dated 29 January 2003, Manning told Blair he had made it clear to Rice: "A second resolution is a political necessity for you domestically. Without it, you would not secure cabinet and parliamentary support for military action. You could be forced from office if you tried. The US must not promote regime change in Baghdad at the price of regime change in London."
The memo, now declassified by the UK National Archives, reveals the pressure Blair faced in trying to align Britain with Washington while navigating deep domestic opposition to the war.
Bush’s 'messianic' stance
The US had already signalled impatience with France and Russia, both of whom had veto power at the Security Council and opposed further military escalation while UN weapons inspectors had found no evidence of Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction.
Christopher Meyer, then UK ambassador in Washington, warned London that Bush’s stance on Iraq had become “messianic” and politically irreversible. In a cable sent after Bush’s State of the Union address, Meyer wrote that the president had framed the overthrow of Saddam as a "crusade against evil to be undertaken by God’s chosen people", leaving little room for diplomatic retreat.
Bush, Meyer said, saw the conflict in stark terms, describing his mission as ridding the world of “evil-doers”. While Blair sought to delay an invasion until at least late March, the US was prepared to move as early as February.
Ignored warnings
Manning privately told Rice that Bush could afford to “gamble” on the timing of the war because he already had congressional approval for unilateral action, but Blair could not. “There comes a point in any poker game when you have to show your cards,” Rice reportedly said. Manning warned that while Bush could stay “at the table” if he delayed, Blair would not survive politically.
In the end, the US and UK abandoned efforts to secure a second UN resolution, blaming French President Jacques Chirac for making clear he would veto any move to authorise force.
Other briefing notes to Blair before the Camp David meeting warned that toppling Saddam risked unleashing “significant levels of internecine violence” in Iraq. Those concerns were echoed years later in the Chilcot Inquiry, which concluded that Blair ignored clear warnings about the likely post-war chaos in Iraq.
The invasion went ahead on 20 March 2003. Blair survived politically but faced widespread backlash at home, staying in power until 2007. The UK’s participation in the war remains the most controversial decision of his premiership.