Syria's province of Suweida appears to have entered a new phase of political and diplomatic activity after months of deadlock as control lines in the southern province became consolidated.
The renewed activity comes amid increasing US, Jordanian and Turkish engagement, alongside mounting pressure on Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and a strong revival of discussion around the Syrian-Jordanian-US roadmap as the framework that could lead to a settlement ending the province's exceptional situation.
The activity indicates that Suweida is no longer an isolated domestic issue but has become part of broader regional arrangements concerning the future of the Syrian state and the balance between Damascus, Washington, Ankara and Tel Aviv.
Suweida in the spotlight
The Suweida file returned to the spotlight after al-Hijri's statements on 25 August, in which he said that the Druze "are an integral part of the State of Israel".
The remarks prompted objections from Druze figures and religious authorities in Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian occupied territories, while also opening the door to internal conflicts, including pressure on voices opposing al-Hijri.
The most prominent development was the case of Atef Hanidi, one of Suweida's prominent figures, who issued a statement rejecting the linking of the Druze to Israel and criticised al-Hijri for monopolising representation of the province's residents.
After that, the Hijri-backed National Guard forces moved into the town of al-Majdal when Hanidi resides, forcing him to leave for Damascus. The Guard's leadership claim he had left at his own request.
Speaking to The New Arab, Wael Alwan, a researcher at Jusoor Centre, said the revival of the Suweida issue was primarily linked to al-Hijri's statements connecting the province's fate to Israel.
In his assessment, al-Hijri tried to capitalise on the Israeli political situation ahead of the Knesset elections scheduled for 27 October, hoping that Israel's spiritual leader of the Druze community, Mowafaq Tarif, would push Benjamin Netanyahu's government to offer gains to al-Hijri.
Alwan said the Syrian government, in return, had shown sufficient flexibility in dealing with the matter while maintaining national principles it considers necessary for stability.
He argues that Israeli pressure and al-Hijri's actions are inconsistent with consolidating internal stability in Syria, which is a shared Syrian, US and regional objective.
He pointed to the existence of an international roadmap based on Syrian sovereignty, alongside guarantees to prevent disruption of the settlement.
According to Alwan, Israeli involvement in Suweida may not continue in the same way after the Israeli elections, with time working in the Syrian state's favour, particularly given the need for a national solution within the province itself.
Journalist Fouad Azzam, who is from Suweida, echoes this view. He considers that the latest skirmish has forced the parties concerned to reaffirm the Syrian-US-Jordanian roadmap and push towards its implementation.
This was reflected in statements by US envoy Tom Barrack, as well as positions taken by the Syrian and Jordanian foreign ministers.
Azzam told The New Arab that the recent escalation began with students being prevented from sitting exams, the ceasefire lines on the western side being heated up, and al-Hijri's statements concerning Israel, culminating in the case of Atef Hanidi.
He pointed to growing discontent among residents over the security chaos and deteriorating conditions, leading to displacement towards Damascus or outside the country.
According to Azzam, the roadmap has taken steps towards implementation, and al-Hijri's rejection of it will not necessarily be enough to obstruct it, given the existence of national alternatives and declining confidence in him among part of the local community.
He also argued that Israel has begun to retreat on some of the issues, noting that Netanyahu has not repeated the "protection of the Druze" rhetoric in his latest statements. Instead, Azzam noted, Israeli discussion through Druze figures has shifted towards aid, which could indicate that the political use of the Suweida issue is being exhausted.
These developments have gained particular importance with intensified regional contacts.
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani discussed the implementation of the tripartite roadmap for Suweida with his Jordanian counterpart, Ayman Safadi, two days ago.
This came a day after Shaibani held meetings in Ankara with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and US envoy to Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack on Tuesday.
Barrack had reaffirmed Washington's commitment to the roadmap, considering it the only way to resolve the Suweida crisis.
He called for dialogue, understanding and cooperation between the Druze, tribes and neighbouring countries, warning that the alternative to dialogue is not victory but another round of mourning.
The roadmap stipulates that Suweida is part of Syria and calls for transitional arrangements that would ultimately reintegrate the province into state institutions.
It also includes investigating violations, holding those responsible to account, delivering aid, restoring services, compensating those affected and rebuilding damaged areas, returning displaced people, releasing detainees and revealing the fate of missing people.
On security, the plan proposes deploying Interior Ministry forces along the Damascus-Suweida road and withdrawing civilian fighters from the border, replacing them with regular police forces.
It also proposes forming a local police force that includes the province's different communities and is led by someone from Suweida.
The plan further proposes establishing a provincial council and reactivating civilian institutions, launching a reconciliation process between the Druze and tribes, and ending foreign intervention, alongside a Syrian-Jordanian-US mechanism to monitor implementation.
However, the main sticking point remains the issue of weapons and security decision-making.
The presence of a local armed force outside the official structure makes the dispute more than a question of administrative powers and raises the question of which side has the final decision-making authority in the province.
In this context, the US approach appears closer to a formula that combines maintaining Syrian sovereignty with granting the province broad local arrangements, rather than a return to a centralised model.
This explains the emphasis on local police, a local council, guarantees and accountability, alongside opposition to separation or the continuation of external spheres of influence.
Regionally, the calculations of Israel, Turkey and the United States are colliding in Suweida.
Israel views southern Syria from a security perspective linked to preventing the emergence of a strong Syrian state, while Turkey supports Syria's territorial unity and the capabilities of state institutions.
Washington, according to the information available, is pushing for a settlement that prevents a new explosion in the south, particularly as Syria's stability has become linked to broader regional calculations involving trade, energy and transport routes.
Between separation and accountability
Domestically, there are signs that opposition to any attempt to link Suweida to Israel is growing.
Academics and activists from the province have confirmed the existence of opposition to this approach, although fear of weapons and violence limits the ability of opponents to express themselves publicly.
Calls have also emerged to embrace the camp opposing separation and for Damascus to take practical measures to reassure the province's residents, foremost among them rebuilding damaged villages and continuing to hold those responsible for violations to account.
The question, therefore, appears to be how to reconstruct the internal balance in Suweida in a way that allows for a viable settlement.
If Damascus and Washington succeed in supporting local forces capable of representing the province's interests within the Syrian state, al-Hijri's monopoly over decision-making could weaken.
But if Damascus fails to provide convincing political, security and community guarantees, or returns to a heavy-handed security approach, tensions could flare and be exploited by forces opposed to any settlement.
The current activity therefore appears closer to an attempt to put the Suweida issue back on the path towards a solution, based on a US-Jordanian-Turkish convergence around the need to consolidate stability and make use of growing internal opposition to the status quo.
Yet the process's success remains linked to the parties' ability to address the root of the Suweida's crisis: combining Syrian sovereignty, justice and accountability, local guarantees and control of weapons, while preventing foreign intervention in a way that keeps the province from returning to a cycle of violence or becoming a permanent sphere of influence for any foreign party.
Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.