After Netanyahu's rejection of Trump's Gaza plan, Palestinian factions mull next steps

The factions' inability to impose their positions could either deepen their rivalry or prompt them to develop a common political framework.
13 August, 2026
"The Palestinian factions face a new reality after the war. Hamas cannot return to governing Gaza as it did before, while Fatah cannot return without Palestinian agreement," Attallah told The New Arab. [Getty]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's rejection of US President Donald Trump's Board of Peace 15-point plan has shifted Palestinian factions' focus to disputes over disarmament, Israeli withdrawal, and political control, linking Gaza's future to these issues.

After nearly three years of the Israeli genocidal war, Hamas and Fatah remain divided and face political and organisational limits. Smaller factions like Islamic Jihad have even less capacity to influence Gaza's future.

The issue isn't just how Palestinians should respond to Israel, but also each faction's role post-war. Can Hamas hold a political role if its weapons dominate negotiations? Can Fatah return to Gaza without Hamas's consent? And can factions unify before outside powers decide Gaza's future?

Akram Attallah, a Gaza-based political analyst, believes that the Palestinian factions are entering a phase in which none can impose its vision alone, making unity essential to shaping Gaza's future.

"The Palestinian factions face a new reality after the war. Hamas cannot return to governing Gaza as it did before, while Fatah cannot return without Palestinian agreement," Attallah told The New Arab. "Their weakness could either deepen the division or push them toward a new political understanding."

He said Netanyahu was seeking to alter the second phase by making Hamas' disarmament and the dismantling of its military infrastructure a condition for Israeli withdrawal.

"Israel does not reject the second phase, but wants a second phase that is radically different from the one that was negotiated," he added.

Attallah warned that continued division could leave outside powers determining Gaza's political future.

The weapons question

Hamas is at the centre of the next phase because its weapons is a very contentious issue in negotiations.

Accepting disarmament under Israeli terms risks stripping Hamas of its main military capabilities and protections without Israeli withdrawal guarantees. Rejecting disarmament might enable Israel to retain forces in Gaza or renew hostilities.

According to Palestinian analysts, a middle ground could involve gradual disarmament, phased Israeli withdrawal, international guarantees, reconstruction, and Hamas' inclusion in the Palestinian political system.

Ramallah-based analyst Tamara Haddad believes that the debate isn't just about disarmament but also about "who implements it, how, when, and what defines weapons as disarmed."

"Making disarmament a condition for Israeli withdrawal could reintroduce deadlock, with Israel demanding disarmament before pulling out and Hamas insisting it won't surrender weapons until Israel fulfils commitments," she told TNA.

"Any new deal needs clear timelines and verification to prevent indefinite Israeli presence in Gaza. Beyond weapons, Gaza's governance faces challenges after war damage and regional pressure, making a return to previous rule difficult," she said.

Haddad suggests Hamas could shift from sole governance to participation in broader Palestinian politics, ensuring its presence and avoiding disarmament exclusion.

Fatah faces a different challenge. Officially, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority might be ready to handle Gaza's administration, but its return needs Palestinian consensus. A return based on Israeli or U.S. plans excluding Hamas could just recreate division.

"Neither Hamas nor Fatah had the ability to impose its vision unilaterally," Esmat Mansour, a Ramallah-based analyst, told TNA.

Hamas, he said, was under pressure over its weapons and its future rule in Gaza, while Fatah could not govern the Strip without Palestinian consensus and political and regional support.

Mansour described the weakness of both sides as a possible opening for a new understanding.

The continued division, he said, "is no longer just an internal Palestinian problem, but has become a strategic weakness," allowing external actors to deal separately with Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

Palestinian or outside control?

The inability of the factions to impose their positions could either deepen their rivalry or encourage them to develop a common political framework.

So, Mansour called for a "comprehensive Palestinian formula" to unify factions, addressing Gaza's administration, weapons, and representation.

He proposed a transitional government of independent figures linked to unified institutions, involving political forces within a broader national framework.

Reconstruction and security efforts could support this, offering Hamas an exit from the control versus disarmament dilemma and Fatah a route back to Gaza based on Palestinian consensus, avoiding external deals.

Islamic Jihad and other factions may need to redefine their roles, shifting from mainly military actions to political participation within a broader Palestinian framework.

Mansour emphasised the immediate need to consolidate the ceasefire and prevent the second phase dispute from collapsing the agreement.

He also highlighted the importance of maintaining simultaneous disarmament and withdrawal.

He argued that this setup would need real US pressure on Israel, as Netanyahu probably wouldn't change just due to mediators.

"Time could be working against the Palestinian factions as Israeli elections approach," Taysir Abdullah, a Gaza-based analyst, told TNA.

He said US pressure on Netanyahu had declined as the Trump administration focused on other issues, while Netanyahu had effectively entered an "election campaign" and could use the rejection of the 15-point proposal to regain room for military operations and targeted killings.

Abdullah warned that continued Palestinian division could allow outside actors to shape Gaza's future. "If Hamas negotiates alone over weapons and Fatah over Gaza's administration, the Palestinians could find themselves implementing arrangements rather than shaping them," he said.

He stressed that consolidating the ceasefire and reaching a Palestinian understanding was essential to preventing US, Israeli and regional actors from determining Gaza's political and security future.

Paradoxically, the factions' shared weakness may offer their best chance for agreement. Hamas cannot restore its previous rule alone, Fatah cannot return without Palestinian consensus, and smaller factions lack a viable alternative.

Attallah, Mansour, al-Hadad and Abullah believe that the most realistic path is to consolidate the ceasefire, establish phased disarmament alongside Israeli withdrawal, form a transitional Gaza administration and rebuild unified Palestinian institutions.

Otherwise, continued division could leave Israel, the United States and regional actors shaping Gaza's future, rather than the Palestinians themselves.