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Beirut and Tripoli join IMEC Ports Club: Can they compete in regional trade?
The ports of Beirut and Tripoli have joined a network linked to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), giving Lebanon a potential foothold in regional trade while raising questions over whether the crisis-hit country has the infrastructure and connectivity to compete with hubs such as Israel’s Haifa port.
The administrations of the Port of Beirut and Port of Tripoli signed a joint declaration in New Delhi on 6 October to join the IMEC Ports Club, launched the same day.
"The participation of Beirut and Tripoli in the IMEC Ports Club places Lebanon inside the conversation, as a new trade architecture linking India, the Middle East and Europe is being shaped," Lebanon’s Public Works and Transport Minister Fayez Rasamny told The New Arab.
He said the aim was to turn the two ports into gateways for transit, logistics and regional trade by connecting them to inland transport networks, border crossings and markets beyond Lebanon.
"That is where the real economic value is created: in cargo movement, storage, logistics services, investment and jobs," Rasamny said, pointing to plans for a logistics corridor linking Beirut with the Bekaa Valley and the Syrian border to the east, as well as a proposed railway connecting Tripoli with Abboudieh in northern Lebanon.
"Geography gives us an advantage; connectivity is what will turn that advantage into economic power."
However, joining the Ports Club does not mean Lebanon has formally become a signatory to the original IMEC framework announced in 2023, nor does it guarantee that the corridor’s main route will pass through the country.
Rasamny said the club nevertheless offered Lebanese ports a platform to build partnerships, improve supply-chain and digital connectivity, and position themselves to attract future trade flows.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun welcomed the inclusion of Beirut and Tripoli, describing it as a major achievement that had not received the media attention it deserved, had even been met with scepticism.
Israel, with which Lebanon has no formal diplomatic relations and remains at war, is part of IMEC’s original framework. Haifa port – its largest – is expected to play a role in the proposed corridor, placing the two Lebanese ports' potential involvement in a wider network that also includes Israel.
'It depends on connectivity'
The prospect of Lebanon playing a role in the network raises questions about whether its ports could compete with Haifa for shipping and logistics business, or instead serve complementary routes and markets.
Recent figures point to significant activity at Lebanon’s ports, although the picture is mixed. Beirut handled around 6.4 million tonnes of freight in 2025, an increase of 18.4 percent on the previous year, while container throughput reached approximately 944,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs).
In September 2026, Beirut received three large container ships in a single day, including a 366-metre vessel. Yet total freight volumes fell by 10.1 percent year on year in the first seven months of 2026, even as container throughput continued to rise.
Tripoli has also demonstrated its ability to accommodate larger vessels. In June, it received the CMA CGM Eugénie, a container ship more than 360 metres long with capacity for around 15,000 TEUs, reported to be the largest container ship ever to dock at the port.
But the milestone has not translated into an overall increase in freight activity. Tripoli handled 674,000 tonnes of freight in the first five months of 2026, down 32.1 percent year on year, according to Credit Libanais.
The figures highlight the distinction between being able to accommodate large ships and attracting sustained cargo traffic.
Yeghia Tashjian, regional and international affairs cluster coordinator at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, told The New Arab that Lebanon’s inclusion was meaningful, but "more modest than some headlines suggest."
The Ports Club, he said, is "an open platform for port-to-port dialogue and cooperation" rather than a new institutional structure, making Lebanon’s participation "a foothold rather than state-level membership" of IMEC.
Tashjian said Lebanon could realistically seek to become a "secondary Mediterranean transshipment and logistics node," rather than a central land bridge within the corridor.
Beirut and Tripoli could compete with Haifa for some cargo and logistics activity, but joining the club does not mean they will automatically handle the same routes or markets. Their ability to attract business will depend on whether they can offer shippers commercially viable services and reliable connections to destinations beyond Lebanon.
Tripoli could have a particular role because of its proximity to Syria, Tashjian said. If cross-border routes reopen and Syria becomes stable enough to support trade towards Iraq and the Gulf, the northern port could become a link between maritime shipping and regional markets.
But this would require substantial improvements to Lebanon’s transport infrastructure. Tashjian highlighted the lack of adequate connections between ports and inland markets, including the need for north-south rail links to move goods through Syria and onwards to Iraq, Jordan and beyond.
The proposed Tripoli–Abboudieh railway and Beirut’s planned logistics corridor could help address those gaps, but their potential depends on implementation and the development of reliable cross-border routes.
Geopolitical obstacles
Lebanon also faces broader obstacles to attracting investment and cargo. The Port of Beirut continues to bear the legacy of the devastating 2020 explosion, while the country’s fiscal and institutional difficulties and recurring regional conflict risk making shipping companies and investors cautious.
Security and political developments in Syria will also be critical. Without reliable overland connections to regional markets, Lebanon’s ports may struggle to attract the cargo volumes needed to establish themselves as logistics hubs, regardless of their ability to receive larger vessels.
There are also geopolitical complications. Lebanon’s participation in a network that includes Israel does not itself amount to normalisation or formal cooperation between the two countries. But with Haifa part of IMEC’s original plans, Beirut and Tripoli will need to establish what distinct commercial role they can play within the wider network.
The eastern Mediterranean is already the focus of competing efforts to strengthen trade and transport links, with countries including Cyprus, Greece and Egypt seeking to consolidate their positions. Lebanon’s participation in the Ports Club could also feed into wider domestic debate over its engagement with other infrastructure initiatives, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative, IMEC’s main rival.
Ultimately, joining the IMEC Ports Club gives Beirut and Tripoli a platform to develop partnerships and seek a greater role in regional trade. Whether that translates into new investment, jobs and cargo flows will depend less on the declaration itself than on Lebanon’s ability to deliver infrastructure projects, strengthen cross-border connections and provide the stability and governance needed to attract long-term commercial interest.