Israeli author claims Mossad recruited an advisor of Hafez Al-Assad

A newly released book titled Mossad: The War of Minds, by Michael Bar-Zohar and Nissim Mishal, published by Yedioth Ahronoth, details previously undisclosed Mossad operations, including the pager bomb attacks in Lebanon and the assassinations of former Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.

The book also describes Israel's June campaign against Iran, including what it calls the "Mossad army" in Tehran, alongside a series of other operations.

While the Hebrew-language book is now available in Israeli bookshops, the Walla news site published a chapter on Saturday detailing an alleged Mossad recruitment of a senior Syrian general during the presidency of Hafez al-Assad.

The general is identified only as "al-Hassan", without a first name. The chapter claims the recruitment was a success, helping avert a miscalculation that could have triggered a military confrontation between Tel Aviv and Damascus.

The account remains difficult to verify by The New Arab and may fall within Israeli propaganda about its regional recruitment operations.

The beginning

According to the chapter published by Yedioth, the alleged recruitment of al-Hassan began when an intelligence officer asked a man identified as "Bashir", described as a Syrian travel agent and Mossad asset in Damascus, if he knew General al-Hassan. Bashir replied, "Affirmatively".

At the time, the officer and Bashir were reportedly sitting in a café in Brussels' Grand Place. Bashir knew many senior Syrian officers and organised their trips to conferences and meetings in Europe.

Every few months, he would be summoned by Mossad's Tsumot branch for briefings before section officers.

The briefing focused on General al-Hassan, who, according to the book, held key positions in the Syrian army, including Coastal Region Commander, Armoured Corps Commander, head of Operations, and was advisor to then-President Hafez Assad.

The book claims that Assad treated al-Hassan like a son, pointing to an example of when al-Hassan's daughter was born with a cleft lip, Assad financed a trip to Germany for successful surgery.

The book adds that al-Hassan had ostensibly retired but continued appearing in uniform at conferences and military events. Hafez al-Assad reportedly relied on him as an advisor, including on Golan affairs and Syria-Israel talks in the US under President Bill Clinton.

Officially, al-Hassan was a businessman, but in reality, he remained a key figure in Assad's regime, enjoying a military car and a personal driver at all times.

Contacting the General

At that time, an Israeli military intelligence unit monitored Syrian officers, especially those advancing to high ranks. Al-Hassan had long been on their target list, prompting the unit to request Mossad establish contact.

The task was assigned to Mossad's Tsumot branch, which discussed access strategies and ultimately based the plan on al-Hassan's prior experience as an armoured corps officer and an expert on tanks used by the Syrian army, manufactured in the Soviet Union. 

The branch concluded the cover story should focus on scrap metal. Mossad allegedly approached an associate in Belgium, active in the scrap business, to assist. According to the book, he provided a room, address, phone number, and company documents for Mossad officers' use.

Bashir was instructed to inform al-Hassan that a European businessman was interested in buying scrap from Syria.

The operation quickly moved from planning to execution. Mossad assigned a Lebanese-origin operative, "Fayed", to liaise with al-Hassan and attend to all his needs in Europe, including lodging, meals, transport, and expenses.

Al-Hassan received an invitation from the scrap company to a business meeting in Brussels in October 1995. The letter stated, "Please confirm your attendance, and we will send you the travel tickets." On the specified day, al-Hassan landed in Brussels. Fayed met him at the airport, took him to a luxury hotel, and oversaw all arrangements.

In accordance with Mossad officers' instructions, Fayed asked al-Hassan, "Do you know English?" The latter replied, "Good," and Fayed then filed a report stating that "al-Hassan speaks English fluently."

That evening, al-Hassan met the "businessman", actually a Mossad intelligence officer named Monty. He encountered a strong-built man who indeed looked like a general, in his mid-50s or 60s.

At dinner, Monty realised al-Hassan "did not know a single word of English", and at that point Mossad officers decided Fayed would also assume translation duties.

The mistake

The next day, al-Hassan toured the scrap facility and discussed metal samples with the friendly businessman, Monty, who treated him with great respect.

Monty asked, "Can you bring samples of metals from Syria that can be purchased from you?”

Al-Hassan replied, "Of course."

Al-Hassan returned to Syria but came back to Brussels months later with a meticulously labelled box of samples. He apparently affixed samples of different metals to the sides of the box and, beneath each sample, placed a photograph and an explanation outlining its nature, source, and additional details.

Mossad officer Monty asked about decommissioned Syrian tanks, and al-Hassan replied, "Yes, I know," while taking care not to reveal his rank or military affiliation. Monty then asked, "Can you help us purchase the scrap from those tanks?" and, according to the book, al-Hassan appeared enthusiastic about helping acquire the scrap.

The meeting ended on an optimistic note, and al-Hassan returned to his hotel. At that point, Fayed, nicknamed "Speedy Gonzales" in Mossad, a Mexican cartoon character representing a fast-moving mouse, decided to introduce him to Brussels nightlife. He took al-Hassan to restaurants and nightclubs, and ultimately to a brothel in Brussels. According to the book, "that was a big mistake."

The next morning, when the operative Fayed arrived at al-Hassan's hotel, he found him kneeling in prayer in his room. Al-Hassan was not as he had been the previous day; his face was downcast, and his voice was trembling. He told Fayed, "I am praying, yes. I want to atone for the sins I have committed."

He recounted that he had never betrayed his wife and had never acted in such a manner. He then left the hotel hastily, flew back to Damascus, and cut all contact with both the operative Fayed and Monty.

The academic cover

Mossad later recruited a new Arabic-speaking officer, "Peter", and moved operations to the Netherlands. The plan involved turning al-Hassan into a long-term intelligence source under the guise of an academic.

Peter posed as a professor with a Lebanese father and Swedish mother at Leiden University, working on a German project on Russian tank failures in Afghanistan because they were too wide to overcome narrow valleys and difficult terrain.

The cover story created a plausible professional context, enabling Peter to request technical information without raising suspicion. The plan began by enticing al-Hassan to the Netherlands through a new intermediary, "Amir", who presented himself as a legitimate replacement for the previous contact, Fayed, who had mishandled interactions with al-Hassan. Monty's identity was again used as a key lure.

As soon as al-Hassan arrived in Amsterdam, psychological pressure began: repeated delays in Monty’s arrival, accumulating hotel bills, and a growing sense of humiliation.

Mossad's objective was to undermine al-Hassan's confidence, preparing for a staged casual encounter with Peter in a Leiden café. Peter used language, identity, and family cues to quickly establish trust, particularly when speaking Arabic and suggesting similarities with his father. Amir's role facilitated the pre-arranged meeting.

The first meeting evolved into a relationship based on mutual respect. Peter presented himself as a researcher let down by Russian experts, who had failed to assist him on a project concerning the failures of Russian tanks in Afghanistan. This marked the beginning of a gradual "mental planting" process.  Al-Hassan was gradually led to conclude on his own that he was a suitable replacement for the Russian experts. When he offered help, Peter feigned professional and ethical hesitation, reinforcing al-Hassan's sense of perceiving initiative and control.

At a decisive moment, al-Hassan requested a private meeting, disclosing his military rank and his expertise in armoured corps. This achieved the central goal: al-Hassan voluntarily transitioned from a "businessman" to a covert military advisor for the academic project.

Mossad officers carefully negotiated compensation, offering $1,000 monthly plus bonuses, exceeding al-Hassan's official salary. The offer was presented in Amsterdam, regaining a sense of respect after earlier humiliation. Al-Hassan accepted, visibly moved, and received an advance payment. This successfully completed recruitment and initiated regular operations. 

Subsequent meetings shifted focus from technical matters to operational intelligence. Meetings took place in hotels, with Mossad remotely tracking questions. Afghanistan maps were a starting point before moving to the Golan and Syrian troop movements.

The 'golden piece of information'

Peter emphasised technical aspects, while al-Hassan gradually revealed sensitive Syrian military doctrine and movements. This included operational structure, troop deployments, and combat experiences.

The meetings produced what the book describes as a "golden piece of information", including that Syria had changed its combat strategy and that any future war against Israel would not start directly from the Golan but through a Jordanian penetration and flanking approach.

The chapter claims this intelligence influenced Israeli troop redeployments and that al-Hassan was critical during the 1997 crisis, when former Mossad officer Yehuda Gil warned of an imminent Syrian attack based on Syrian army movements. The warning triggered widespread mobilisation within Israeli Military Intelligence (Aman), prompting Minister of Defence Yitzhak Mordechai to tour the Golan to assess the situation.

Peter later met al-Hassan in Berlin to verify intentions. Al-Hassan denied any war plans, explaining troop movements as compliance with the Taif Agreement ending the Lebanese civil war and regulating the presence of Syrian forces. His information diffused escalation fears. Subsequent investigations revealed that Mossad officer Yehuda Gil had fabricated information and was punished, thereby enhancing al-Hassan's credibility as a strategic source.

The operational relationship lasted about four years, marked by personal friendship, gifts, and family courtesies, reinforcing emotional and operational trust.

Al-Hassan continued providing high-value intelligence until his death, unaware of the deception.

The book's chapter concludes that recruiting a senior source helped prevent a miscalculation that could have triggered a military confrontation between Damascus and Tel Aviv.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.