How long can the US sustain airstrikes against Iran?

As US pressure on Iran increases to reach an agreement, and threats of regime change grow louder, how long can Washington sustain airstrikes in the region?

Analysts are debating whether attacks would be limited, capable of causing major internal changes, or extend for several weeks, and what their ultimate impact would be.

Jason Campbell, a Middle East military and security expert, told The New Arab that, based on a retired vice admiral’s assessment, the US could launch intensive air campaigns using two aircraft carrier groups and other fighters in the region for several weeks, but not for months.

"You are looking at several weeks, but I do not think more than four to six weeks," he said, noting that operations beyond that would require a massive resupply of ships and aircraft and would raise questions about the strategic objectives.

Campbell, currently a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and a former adviser in the US Department of Defence from 2016 to 2018, said the United States could inflict significant damage on Iranian military targets within days, as seen during the 12-day war in June 2025.

However, he noted, "This damage will not come without a high cost."

"What are the objectives after weeks? How do these align with declared goals? How sustainable is this, and for how long can airstrikes continue? What will be the impact on resources and resupply for carriers and other ships, assuming one thing: we have not seen full preparation for this yet?" he added.

"Flawed" strategy

Campbell warned that a sustained bombing strategy aimed at regime change is deeply flawed. He compared it to the Rolling Thunder campaign in Vietnam, which lasted three years without achieving political objectives.

He noted there is no direct link between continuous airstrikes and regime change in Iran, pointing out that Tehran still possesses roughly 1,000 ballistic missiles despite losing about half of its launch platforms in the previous war. The exact pace of stockpile reconstruction remains unclear seven months after the US-Israeli attacks.

"Trump, as we have seen, prefers rapid strikes using mainly air and naval assets. But if the goal is ongoing bombardment in hopes that the regime collapses, I think that is a very flawed strategy. We hear talk of possible limited strikes to pressure Iran into a deal more aligned with US objectives. Still, there is extensive literature on the limits of airpower in achieving political goals," he said. 

"Looking at Vietnam, the Rolling Thunder campaign was intended to pressure North Vietnam politically. It lasted three years, failed, and escalated ground troop involvement. I do not claim that just because it failed in Vietnam, it will fail here. But people tend to forget Iran is a large country with 90 million people," he added.

Regarding whether a future conflict would be US-led or Israeli-led, Campbell noted that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Washington in late December 2025 to oppose resuming nuclear talks.

"We also heard he favours limited strikes on Iranian missiles or rebuilding its air defences, which is Israel's top priority. While I do not know if Israel is necessarily eager for a full-scale war with high uncertainty and unpredictable political outcomes, they would certainly back limited strikes on Iranian military targets and accept uncertainties about Iran's response. They would prefer this over any diplomatic deal covering only the nuclear programme, which, according to reports, is what the US is discussing with Iranian officials."

One key point Campbell raised, in response to TNA, is the depletion of Israeli and US air defence stocks during last year's conflict with Iran.

"This factor is significant in assessing sustainability for any new campaign, especially given Iran's capacity to launch large numbers of ballistic missiles. Defensive stockpiles are crucial. Reports indicate the US has reinforced Patriot and THAAD systems in the region and deployed some Aegis destroyers in the eastern Mediterranean to protect Israel," he said. 

"But a major factor is Israel's ability to replenish anti-drone and anti-missile stocks. When I visited Israel in November, discussions suggested Israel might strike Iran again if it rebuilds its missile defences, but part of the calculation was waiting until reconstruction was sufficient, potentially late summer or early fall 2026. This timing is somewhat early," he added.

"The US reportedly used around 100 THAAD missiles during the 12-day war, with only 12 or 13 additional missiles delivered in 2025. I believe 2026 will be similar, far from the reconstruction pace seen during the 12-day conflict. This is a key factor in both US and Israeli military options and sustainability," he continued. 

Regarding Iran, he said, "Estimates indicate roughly 2,500 ballistic missiles of varying ranges. Around 50 per cent of launch platforms were destroyed, reducing stocks to about 1,000 missiles. The question is how much they have replenished in the past seven months. This will be crucial for determining options and sustainability. Public sources do not provide enough information for a precise assessment."

On the officially stated US rationale for targeting Iran, Campbell said, "This is a very good point. Honestly, I cannot say for certain. George Bush explained the reasons during the Iraq War, even if they were flawed, at least he explained them. Now, the US administration says it is focusing diplomatically on a nuclear deal, but there are discussions of limited strikes to force a better deal. That option is considered, though limited and strategic. Still, it is harder to evaluate than the 12-day war, which focused primarily on Iranian military and leadership targets."

"Tactically, it succeeded, but current strategic objectives are harder to assess. Whether it concerns a nuclear deal or regime change ambitions, it is difficult to claim with certainty that airstrikes alone would achieve political objectives," Campbell concluded. 

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.