How the Houthis have control over Yemen's essential digital infrastructure

Last week, on 1 February, Yemen saw a new escalation in civil aviation when Houthi forces blocked the landing of the first commercial flight scheduled to arrive at Al-Mokha International Airport in Taiz province, southwestern Yemen, from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The air navigation centre in Sanaa ordered Yemenia Airlines flight to remain outside Yemeni airspace after takeoff, despite the flight being officially included in operational schedules. The move highlights the Houthis' control over Yemen's key digital infrastructure from Sanaa amid the country's institutional divisions, and the strategic advantage this provides for the group.

The flight ban occurred due to the Houthis' control over Sanaa's air traffic control centre, disrupting travel for 152 passengers, including patients and elderly individuals, who were waiting on the tarmac for departure to Saudi Arabia. Airport authorities had to provide accommodation and assistance to travellers from multiple Yemeni provinces using this newly opened route, which welcomed its first flight since its inauguration on 1 February 2021.

According to aviation sources, the group did not stop at administrative obstruction but issued direct threats to bomb the plane if it attempted to land at Al-Mokha, triggering public outrage and renewed calls to relocate the air traffic control centre to the temporary capital, Aden, to assert full sovereignty over Yemeni airspace.

The incident underscores that control of Yemen's airspace, despite shifting front lines, still passes through centralised servers in Sanaa, not Aden. The Houthis continue to operate the Area Control Centre (ACC), which manages all air traffic in Yemen. This control provides them not only with radar visibility but also with "technical legitimacy" before international organisations such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), which recognises the Sanaa centre as a regional navigation hub both geographically and historically.

More than a decade after the Houthis' September 2014 coup, Sanaa's air traffic control retains route-determining codes, and software updates, typically distributed through an international network, are routed automatically through servers in the capital. Therefore, all airports remain at the mercy of the authorities in Sanaa.

'Server Sovereignty' conflict

The struggle over the civil aviation control centre is part of a broader contest dubbed "server sovereignty", distinct from the decade-long military conflict on the ground.

The Houthis leverage Sanaa's control to strangle Yemeni institutions that remain unable to operate independently. Their control over digital infrastructure gives them greater authority than the internationally recognised government in Aden, since they still control networks for telecommunications, internet services, air navigation, and airspace management. Despite political and administrative divisions between Sanaa and Aden, the "digital keys" for these sectors remain in Sanaa.

Telecommunications and internet services are among the most significant sectors under Houthi control since the 2014 coup. They dominate the telecommunications authority and its central servers, which operate Yemen Net, Yemen Mobile, Youtelecome, and Sabafon.

The authority's unified data centre in Sanaa gives the Houthis control over local and international communications, internet gateways, URL allocation, cross-border monitoring of calls and data, and the ability to cut service to any province. This sector is also a major revenue source for the group, funding military and other activities.

With oil and gas wells largely inactive or outside Houthi-controlled areas, telecommunications towers have become "new wells", pumping much-needed funds into the group's coffers in Sanaa.

Estimates for 2025–2026 suggest the sector generates over $1 billion annually for the Houthis through profits from state-owned companies, forced taxes, and licensing fees.

Yemen Mobile is a key revenue source, with annual revenues exceeding 300 billion Yemeni rials (at 535 rials per US dollar in Houthi-controlled areas), reflecting market monopoly and the use of subscriber data to develop interlinked investments. Revenue extraction also includes a "war effort tax" levied on telecom and internet bills, affecting citizens in government-controlled areas who effectively fund Houthi opponents with every activated internet package via Yemen Net.

Financial experts note that control of the Yemen international telecommunications gateway, TeleYemen, gives the group exclusive access to international call revenues and network interconnects, generating foreign currency that is used to fund military operations and influence networks, thereby bypassing the Aden-based central bank. This "cross-border cash flow" makes the telecom sector Sanaa's most powerful tool, both for surveillance and as a financial lifeline, sustaining its economy despite international isolation.

The war has produced geographic, administrative, and institutional splits, including in Yemen's digital infrastructure. Official identities differ: residents in Sanaa and Houthi-controlled areas hold ID cards with distinct numbers and codes from those in Aden and government-controlled zones.

Both sides use a central database and servers located in Sanaa, creating challenges for international recognition of Houthi-issued documents, travel for students and patients, document renewal in liberated areas, duplicate record-keeping, and the absence of unified registries.

Technical separation remains a key challenge for the internationally recognised government, undermining its authority and leaving it dependent on the Houthis' digital controls.

Attempts to create independent technical authorities, such as the "Aden Net" project, have failed.

Institutional divisions

Political analyst Waleed Shamsan told The New Arab that the internationally recognised government "has failed in recent years to achieve any real technical or administrative separation from Sanaa", despite relocating to Aden and controlling areas vacated by the Houthis.

He explained that communications networks, financial systems, central databases, passport and civil registry systems, and frequency management for radio, television, internet, and telephony "remain organically linked to infrastructure designed and managed from Sanaa, restricting the government’s operations and leaving key digital levers in Houthi hands."

Shamsan said this failure "undermines the government's ability to exercise sovereign functions," affecting economic and service performance and institutional control.

He added that the inability to establish independent infrastructure or alternative data centres "exposed institutional fragility and reinforced reliance by citizens and the private sector on systems controlled by the Houthis, including remittances, communications, and official documents."

Shamsan stressed that this situation gives the Houthis "political and economic advantages not gained through military force", granting direct influence over funds, licences, and transactions in areas controlled by the government itself.

"Restoring state authority begins with rebuilding digital and administrative infrastructure, calling on the government to treat the issue as a sovereignty priority equal to military efforts," he argued.

Technical researcher Fahmi Al-Baheth told TNA that international recognition of Sanaa's control centres by bodies such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and internet address management organisations is based on technical and operational logic, "not political recognition."

These organisations regard the state as "a single legal entity" and prioritise "operational safety and service continuity" over internal disputes.

 "As long as Sanaa's equipment operates and centres function technically, the organisations abide by the existing reality, awaiting a viable alternative implemented by the recognised government," he said.

Al-Baheth criticised the Aden Net project, intended as an independent international gateway to break Yemen Net's monopoly and attract users through competitive services. He said it remains a "stalled project", unable to expand or evolve into a full-fledged telecom company, despite years of war.

He noted the obstacle is not merely technical but also an absence of "administrative and political decisions", adding that independent infrastructure could be established within a year if concrete measures were taken.

Regarding Yemen's digital infrastructure and potential solutions, he suggested opening investment to international companies, which could cover high costs, potentially millions of dollars, while bringing management expertise to operate the sector effectively.

Al-Baheth warned, however, that the current situation is dangerous: the Houthis still control fibre-optic networks and central office interconnections, "retaining full control over communications and internet even in government-controlled areas".

Financial resources for these services continue to flow to the General Telecommunications Corporation in Sanaa, he stressed.