How Hadramout is central to the Saudi-Emirati power struggle over Yemen's south

Hadramout, Yemen's largest and most geographically expansive province, has transformed into an arena of confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two ostensible coalition partners whose strategic visions for the resource-rich eastern province have collided irreversibly.

For Riyadh, Hadramout offers something far more consequential than its oil and gas reserves: a potential strategic gateway to the Arabian Sea that could reshape Saudi Arabia's energy independence and geopolitical autonomy in the region.

The notion of a Saudi oil pipeline traversing eastern Yemen toward the Arabian Sea is not new.

According to Abdul-Ghani Al-Iryani, senior researcher at the Sana'a Centre for Strategic Studies, "the idea of extending a Saudi oil pipeline through eastern Yemen is not new; it was proposed decades ago, but the political context is what previously prevented its implementation".

Earlier obstacles stemmed from sovereignty disputes.

The late Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh refused to grant Saudi Arabia a special sovereign privilege and also refused to allow joint protection of the pipeline, which later pushed the Saudis to escalate their demands toward complete sovereignty over the pipeline route, something that would have practically meant dividing Yemen, al-Iryani explained to The New Arab.

But today's context differs fundamentally.

"This formula is no longer on the table today, and the project could now be implementable without any harm to Yemen's unity," al-Iryani argued. "The previous problem was Saleh's refusal of joint protection, whereas the current authority may not object to this arrangement."

The strategic calculus is clear: a pipeline to the Arabian Sea would allow Saudi Arabia to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, a choke point that has served as a regional lever for decades.

According to Dr Adel Al-Shujaa, a political analyst, this project would serve multiple objectives.

"It would give Riyadh a strategic pressure tool during times of regional crises, particularly in its indirect confrontations with Iran, in addition to reducing transportation costs and time, especially toward Asian markets and the Far East," al Shujaa told TNA.

UAE's counter-strategy

Before the latest escalation, the UAE had positioned itself as a dominant force along Yemen's southern and eastern coasts, building a network of allied local military formations across Hadramout.

According to al-Iryani, "the UAE participated in the military coalition in Yemen, partly, in order to obstruct any Saudi strategic projects that might reduce Riyadh's dependence on American protection".

"If Saudi Arabia succeeds in extending a pipeline to the Arabian Sea, it will make the kingdom less tied to the Strait of Hormuz, and therefore less dependent on the American security umbrella. This concerns the UAE, which, as a small state neighbouring a large state like Saudi Arabia, depends primarily on American protection as a guarantee for its national security," al-Irayani added.

Political analyst Misaa Shujaa Al-Din notes that tensions between the countries "escalated after the UAE adopted the separatist project through establishing the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in 2017, which revealed a fundamental difference in the agendas and priorities between the two sides".

Late December marked a critical escalation. Saudi Arabia deployed military assets toward Hadramout and Al-Mahrah with visible intent, signalling essential responses to perceived threats to its national security.

According to Shujaa al-Din, "the STC became weaker after the decline of Emirati support, and the announcement by the Presidential Council Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi about the control of Shield of the Nation forces over Hadramout, Al-Mahrah, and Aden provinces completely".

Within weeks, Saudi-backed forces consolidated control over key areas, and the STC, long the political instrument of Emirati ambitions, began losing ground.

Saudi goals

Saudi Arabia's broader ambitions in Yemen remain somewhat opaque.

According to Shujaa al-Din, "Riyadh currently moves within the framework of reactions, and does not appear to possess an integrated long-term strategic vision".

"The clearest Saudi goal is represented in a stable Yemen, and at the same time loyal to it, such that the powers controlling the borders north and south are friendly powers, which is the essence of the Saudi strategic vision in Hadramout and Yemen in general," she added.

This contrasts sharply with Emirati ambitions, according to the experts. The UAE aspired to control Yemeni islands and coasts and achieve economic, military, and security gains that enhance its presence before the West, Shujaa Al-Din noted.

"But after its influence reached Hadramout, it exceeded the lines permitted from Saudi Arabia's perspective," she remarked.

"Abu Dhabi considered that its control of Yemeni ports, coasts, and islands for a long time allowed it to expand toward Hadramout, which was interpreted by Saudi Arabia as a direct threat. The UAE miscalculated the Saudi response, and as a result lost a lot on the economic and military levels, although it may try to restore its presence later in different forms," she noted.

Despite strategic attractions, implementation obstacles remain formidable. Dr Al-Shujaa noted that implementing these projects faces significant obstacles, foremost among them the absence of security and stability in eastern Yemen, weak state institutions, and competition among local forces over oil and power.

"The absence of ready infrastructure, weak serious international financing amid the continuation of war, and the absence of a solid Yemeni political agreement on energy and export policies, all make the project theoretically possible, but not fully applicable on the ground before achieving real stability in Hadramout and Al-Mahrah," he said.

Regarding the latest Saudi naval movements in the Arabian Sea, Al-Shujaa explained that they are part of proactive efforts to protect vital maritime navigation lines from potential threats, whether from the Houthis or other regional parties, as well as to secure the coasts of Hadramout and Al-Mahrah.

A conflict transformed

According to al-Shujaa, the Saudi-Emirati competition has not ended; it has merely changed form. After it was a direct struggle, it turned into uncoordinated coordination in some areas, which weakened the UAE's ability to impose complete control over Hadramout.

Political analyst Farea Al-Muslimi offered an alternative perspective, arguing that conventional wisdom linking Saudi interest in Hadramout to oil pipelines may overstate the case.

"Yemen, in terms of oil volume, does not represent real weight compared to Saudi Arabia, and traditional thinking about land and maritime passages and pipelines no longer reflects the reality of global oil trade today," he contended.

On the disagreement's roots, al-Muslimi emphasised, "This disagreement is not new but stems from deep structural differences between the two countries. Saudi Arabia, as a state sharing direct borders with Yemen, views the Yemeni file from a different security angle than the UAE, which is not linked by geographical borders with Yemen".

As this rivalry has played out in Hadramout and along Yemen's eastern coast, its consequences have accumulated elsewhere.

Al-Muslimi warned that Yemen will be the biggest loser from this division, being a poor and weak country that needs the support of its neighbours, not their conflicts.

"The existence of two wealthy and powerful states, each with a different vision of Yemen, moves the country to a new level of proxy conflict, which is a pattern of conflicts whose cost to societies and nations is higher and more destructive than direct wars," he added.