Has Lebanon won its war on drugs with arrest of narco-clan lord Nouh Zaiter?

Black SUVs sped up to a building on the Knisseh-Baalbeck road in eastern Lebanon, with special forces soldiers from the Lebanese army briskly exiting the vehicles upon arrival. Not long after that, a man in his late 40s walked out with his hands up, peacefully surrendering himself to the Lebanese law enforcement agents that had come to arrest him.

The man was Nouh Zaiter, described by the army in a statement announcing his arrest as “one of the most dangerous wanted men” in Lebanon. For years, Zaiter, a prolific drug smuggler, was considered untouchable by Lebanese authorities. That came to an end on Nov. 20.

“He’s a major player, he’s one of the major smugglers,” Mohanad Hage Ali, the deputy director of research at the Carnegie Middle East Center, told The New Arab. “His targeting comes in a string of targets, including his cousin Abu Saleh (Ali Zaiter) who was killed in a drone strike by the LAF (Lebanese Armed Forces) this year as well.”

Zaiter’s arrest was viewed as a major victory for the Lebanese government after he evaded the authorities for years from the safety of his home in the Bekaa.

However, the successful arrest of Zaiter was more of a symbolic win for the Lebanese authorities rather than being something that will have a significant impact on the drug trade in the region. 

“His arrest won’t really add to much in terms of the general war on drugs,” said Hage Ali.

Despite being one of the most wanted men in Lebanon for his smuggling of hashish and, allegedly, captagon, Zaiter maintained a very public persona. He gave interviews to the media and crafted an image of himself as the “Robin Hood of the Bekaa,” with authorities hesitant to crack down on his smuggling, given the well-armed force that he led.

On the other side of the border in Syria, not only did authorities under the Assad regime refuse to clamp down on his smuggling activities, but they reportedly sought to utilise his network to move captagon produced by government forces around the globe. Zaiter has long denied helping to smuggle captagon, stating that he would not send such “poisons” to “his worst enemy.”

Due to his large public image, it made his arrest appear to be much more significant than it was.

According to Hage Ali, Zaiter was merely an “intermediary” who helped move drugs transnationally. On top of that, Zaiter was not even the head of the Zaiter clan, the largest clan in Lebanon, calling into question how much it would actually stop smuggling efforts.

“The way that they operate in that region is that each clan has different networks,” he stated. “If the head is removed, then he is replaced by another guy from the clan and it continues and there is a balance between the different clans and their illicit activities in that region.”

Narco-clans

Hage Ali was also sceptical that another clan would try to fill any void left by Zaiter, since there are strict rules amongst the clans in which they “respect the turf” to maintain a balance and avoid inter-clan strife that can quickly descend into bloody conflict.

Instead of the arrest of one man being what impacts drug smuggling in Lebanon, it is outside factors that have had the biggest impact.

With the fall of the Assad regime in Syria on December 8, 2024 and subsequent efforts by the new Syrian government, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, to secure the country’s famously porous borders, it has increasingly undermined these smugglers.

Syria, though, is far from having complete control over all of its territory, with Paul Salem, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, calling it the “wild west.” “[Syria] has a very long way to go. The Syrian territories are still very, very porous and the new order in Damascus still has a pretty tenuous hold on things,” Salem told The New Arab.

While Zaiter’s arrest may not have a tangible impact on drug smuggling, Salem argued that this should not take away from the Lebanese state’s efforts, nor the results it could have regionally.

“The drug trade has been a particular concern to the Arab Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia in particular but others as well, and Jordan,” Salem said. “It is a priority that the [Lebanese] government is giving in order to repair and revive its relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.”

Zaiter’s arrest also carries political significance, given his alleged ties to Hezbollah.

The Hezbollah nexus

Drug smugglers were not the only ones who benefited from the Lebanese-Syrian border.

For decades, Hezbollah has used it to bring weapons and money into the country and also used it to send troops into Syria when it fought in support of the Assad regime after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011.

After the recent war with Israel, though, and the election of Joseph Aoun as Lebanese president and reformer Nawaf Salam as prime minister, Hezbollah’s ability to smuggle anything into Lebanon has become a monumental challenge.

The Lebanese government took control of the ports and Beirut airport, even going so far as to ban Iranian flights into Lebanon out of fear that Israel would bomb the airport over the alleged use by Hezbollah and Iran to smuggle things into the country. The army also started tightening its control of the Lebanese-Syrian border and started to deploy troops south of the Litani River, in accordance with the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement with Israel.

“What we’re witnessing is that the state is extending its control in areas that were previously off-limits and were generally dominated by Hezbollah,” Salem said.

Because of this, Zaiter’s arrest might not affect Hezbollah directly, but it is still “Hezbollah-adjacent.”

It is a kind of flexing by the government and the army, Salem explained, to send a warning to Hezbollah that the state is getting serious, even if they are not looking to go after Hezbollah at this time, due to the inherent risks that directly confronting Hezbollah contains.

This is part of a larger strategy by the Lebanese government to exert pressure on Hezbollah to come to the table and negotiate over its arms.

By tightening its grip on Hezbollah’s ability to rearm its vast and deadly arsenal through exerting control over its borders and by targeting Hezbollah’s financial network, such as Al-Qard al-Hassan, the government is hoping that the party will feel suffocated enough to finally agree to a peaceful resolution to efforts by the government to disarm them without risking direct military confrontation that would almost undoubtedly lead to a civil war.

This, so far, has yet to happen, largely due to continued Israeli attacks on Lebanon, which help to undermine the Lebanese government’s authority and allow Hezbollah to argue that it is the only one that can protect the country, as the state is incapable of doing so.

According to Hage Ali, the Lebanese government’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah and tackle drug smuggling are part of a dual strategy: focus on one for as long as you can and then shift to the other.

Initially, the Lebanese government pursued Hezbollah’s disarmament, but, due to the Israeli attacks and refusal by Hezbollah to cooperate, the government decided to shift focus for the time being.

“The army is doing more on counter narcotics and, now, less on disarmament,” Hage Ali said. “It started with more on disarmament and less on counter narcotics, but, at some stage, you could see this flip.”

Nicholas Frakes is a journalist and photojournalist based in Lebanon, reporting on the Middle East.

Follow him on Twitter: @nicfrakesjourno