Exclusive: Lebanon's President Aoun says dialogue with Hezbollah is only way to secure state monopoly on weapons

Before his official visit to Qatar on Tuesday, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun sat down for an interview with the New Arab's Arabic language edition, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, in Beirut to discuss the political, economic, and security challenges facing Lebanon - and the delicate balancing act his presidency has had to navigate just 100 days into office.

Against a backdrop of persistent Israeli aggression in the south, stalled economic reforms, and the unresolved question of Hezbollah's weapons, Aoun offered candid insights into his administration's priorities, regional diplomacy, and the difficult choices ahead.

In a wide-ranging conversation, Aoun addressed Lebanon's shifting relationships with Gulf countries, the status of negotiations with neighbouring Syria, ongoing dialogue with Hezbollah over the state's monopoly of weapons, and the continued Israeli violations and aggression against Lebanese territory.

Aoun also responded to criticism from political rivals and international actors alike, reaffirming his commitment to reform, dialogue, and the reassertion of state sovereignty.

The following is the full transcript of the interview with the Lebanese president. A condensed version of the main points addressed is available here.

What kind of support are you expecting from Qatar during your visit [on Tuesday]? Are your priorities focused on securing continued Qatari support for the Lebanese army, political backing for your term, or financial assistance, such as a Qatari deposit in the Central Bank?

I'm not going to dictate to Qatar how it should support us. Of course, the goal of the visit is to thank Qatar and to ask for continued support for the Lebanese army. We are also seeking Qatari investment in various sectors in Lebanon, most importantly electricity and oil. Qatar is a member of the consortium exploring oil in Lebanon and has stood by Lebanon during many critical moments and crises. Beyond that, Lebanon and Qatar share deep, longstanding ties. So, we will present several projects, and we hope Qatar will invest in any of Lebanon's sectors.

Have you received any indication that Qatar will continue - or even increase - its support for the Lebanese army, especially in light of the challenges and duties required of the army under Resolution 1701?

When I met Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in Cairo on the sidelines of the Arab summit (the extraordinary session held in March), I asked him to continue supporting Lebanon in the petroleum sector and in military salaries. His response was: "Consider it done". There are military equipment shipments expected soon to the Lebanese army, with Qatar covering the costs - around $10 million. And of course, we remember the slogan "Thank you, Qatar", and we remain hopeful for continued goodwill from them.

In your inaugural address, you emphasised that Lebanon will from now on only export goods and the expertise of its people to the Gulf countries [in reference to the illegal drug trade]. Now, nearly 100 days into your term, which has received both Gulf and international backing, are you starting to see signs of support materialising?

In the early days following my election, delegations from all the Gulf countries visited Lebanon to congratulate us on the successful completion of the elections and to extend invitations for official visits. For example, we expressed to UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan our hope that the Emirati embassy in Beirut would reopen. His quick response to reopen the embassy was a positive sign.

However, it's also up to us to take steps toward fulfilling these pledges, starting with the economic reforms we have already begun. Qatar, for its part, played a key role in ending the presidential vacuum through the Quintet Committee. The communications I've received and the visiting delegations all affirm their support for Lebanon - to help it stand on its feet again, rebuild, and get back on the right track through meaningful economic reforms.

Is a visit to Saudi Arabia planned in the near future?

There are 22 agreements between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia currently under review. Once we are ready, we will notify the Saudi side and await confirmation of a date for a second official visit.

How do you assess the first 100 days of your presidency, especially given that your inaugural address was filled with ambitious pledges? What has been the biggest obstacle so far - Hezbollah's weapons, continued Israeli aggression on Lebanese territory, or other challenges?

First, we have to take into account the time it took to form a government within those 100 days. The cabinet formation decrees were signed on 8 February. Since then, we've achieved several milestones in a relatively short period: the appointments of heads of security agencies, the military council, the Internal Security Forces command, a new Central Bank governor, and most members of the Higher Judicial Council. We also passed the banking secrecy law, proposed legislation for restructuring the banking sector, and in the coming days, a Lebanese delegation headed by Finance Minister Yassine Jaber and Central Bank Governor Karim Saeed will visit Washington to meet with IMF officials - for the first time in nearly 16 years. These are accomplishments achieved within just a few weeks.

All of these efforts are tied to the economic reforms that this presidency has launched and is determined to implement as swiftly as possible. Now, the ball is in Parliament’s court. Of course, lawmakers have the legislative right to amend these proposals, but we hope there won’t be delays - especially with opportunities arising from Arab states that have expressed readiness to support us, provided we implement reforms, which is entirely their right.

On the other hand, there are challenges that this presidency has faced - and continues to face - that can't be resolved within a 100-day period, unlike the previously mentioned issues. These include ongoing Israeli shelling of Lebanon, the continued occupation of five positions in the south, Lebanese detainees held by Israel, and the situation on the eastern border, including clashes with Syrian forces.

As for Hezbollah's weapons, we don't see them as a challenge but rather a longstanding issue that must be addressed. A decision has been made that all arms must be under the sole authority of the state - and that includes Palestinian weapons as well. It's important to highlight here that this principle was mentioned in the ministerial statement, and Hezbollah granted its vote of confidence to the government on that basis.

Ultimately, the Lebanese people have been waiting for relief for over forty years. But in politics, there's no such thing as "Let there be, and there was." I don’t have a magic wand, but I am doing everything in my power to move quickly, especially on issues that can be resolved within a short timeframe.

You mentioned earlier the possibility of parliament delaying the passage of reform laws - something that has happened before. Do you feel there is active obstruction from Parliament when it comes to passing certain reforms or legislation?

Politics is shaped by circumstances, and the circumstances have changed. I've always been an optimist - I try to see the glass as half full. I hope there won't be any surprises and that we can move quickly to pass the necessary reform laws. In this regard, we’ve seen a clear sign of commitment from Speaker Nabih Berri, who called for a joint committee session on Wednesday, to study the draft law on banking secrecy.

Of course, Berri doesn’t represent parliament on his own. There are multiple parliamentary blocs, and all of them must act with a sense of national responsibility, and legislative duty, to advance these reforms.

US statements suggest that you're under pressure to disarm Hezbollah, especially as several issues - including aid, economic recovery, and reconstruction - are being directly linked to this by US officials.

The primary demand from the international community is economic reform. The issue of disarmament - and I say disarmament carefully, not dismantling - comes after that. When I met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, he told me: "I want the IMF’s stamp."

As I've said before, the question of weapons - whether Hezbollah's or Palestinian factions' - is a Lebanese issue and a Lebanese demand. We've made it clear that weapons must be exclusively in the hands of the state. This commitment was made in both my inauguration speech and the ministerial statement. The decision, therefore, has been taken; what remains is figuring out how to implement it.

Naturally, the Americans are urging us to move quickly on this front. But my response to them is: if that’s truly your goal, then pressure Israel to withdraw from the five occupied points in southern Lebanon, to return Lebanese detainees, to stop its repeated violations of Lebanese sovereignty, and to move forward with demarcating the land borders in accordance with the 1949 Armistice Agreement.

Has the US set a timeline for Hezbollah's disarmament, or presented any specific plan for how it should be carried out?

They haven’t presented any plan — they’ve left that up to us. As for a timeline, there's no such thing in politics. As I’ve said before, politics is shaped by circumstances, and right now, the circumstances are favourable. Hezbollah has shown a degree of flexibility, particularly regarding the implementation of [UN Security Council] Resolution 1701 south of the Litani River. The Lebanese army is carrying out its duties there without any objections or incidents involving Hezbollah.

In recent days, the army has sealed off Hezbollah tunnels, confiscated and destroyed weapons caches and an underground hospital, and shut down damaged tunnels belonging to the group in the town of Yahmour - which is actually north of the Litani. There have also been operations in Hermel, Nabi Sheet, and other areas along the same lines. But the top priority remains de-escalation in the south.

The army is doing an extraordinary job considering its limited logistical and human resources. Let’s not forget that the terrain in the south - mountains and valleys — makes full-scale inspections and deployment time-consuming. Nevertheless, there is a fully documented file, complete with photos, coordinates, dates, and figures, detailing all the army’s achievements in line with Resolution 1701, since the ceasefire came into effect on November 27.

We should also keep in mind the army’s other responsibilities: along the northern and eastern borders, at sea, internally, and in counterterrorism, drug control, and maintaining daily security.

How much funding and manpower does the Lebanese army need to fully deploy in the south and carry out its duties properly?

If we're speaking strictly about the south, the truth is we'd need the entire army. But we've already approved the recruitment of around 4,500 soldiers, and that number will increase to 10,000. Still, it’s not just about manpower; we also need to create the right conditions for deployment.

We’re working to scale up. We’ve received military vehicles from the US, we’re expecting more from Qatar, and Jordan has sent armoured personnel carriers. Had we not also been facing challenges on the eastern and northeastern borders, we would have already reinforced our southern deployment. But at this moment, we’re unable to do so.

It’s important to note that the army isn’t just deployed in the south - it’s spread across the entire country. It’s carrying out missions that don’t even fall under its core mandate as outlined by the Defence Law, which is leading to operational strain. That’s why it’s critical to also strengthen the Internal Security Forces and increase their numbers, so they can relieve the army from some internal duties.

That said, given the current reality - the economic crisis which affects soldiers as well as civilians, the pressures of Palestinian and Syrian refugees, and the complex border situation - the Lebanese army is doing a remarkable job, one that few other armies would be able to perform under such conditions.

Does the US understand this reality, or is it unaware that rushing to disarm Hezbollah could trigger a civil war in Lebanon?

Of course, this is something we’ve communicated to the Americans. We also told Morgan Ortagus, the US Deputy Envoy to the Middle East, that while we want to see Hezbollah disarmed, we do not want to ignite a civil war in Lebanon. The US administration is listening, and they are aware of the realities on the ground here. As for me, I certainly do not want to see Lebanon fall into chaos. Any internal issue must be resolved through dialogue, and Hezbollah is not disconnected from this reality.

But you’ve been criticised by some Lebanese political forces opposed to Hezbollah for your insistence on dialogue as the path to disarmament.

To those who criticise me, I ask: what would you do if you were in my place?

They argue based on Lebanon's previous experiences with dialogue around weapons - in 2006, 2007, and 2008 - which led nowhere.

Again, I say: politics is shaped by circumstance. And the circumstances in 2025 are very different from those years. Let’s not forget the significant changes that have occurred in Syria, or developments on the Iranian front, such as Tehran’s evolving stance on the Houthis in Yemen and the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq. These shifts create a more favourable environment to engage with Hezbollah, to encourage them to place all their concerns on the table, and to allow the state to address them.

Is there ongoing communication with Hezbollah?

Yes, there is direct and ongoing communication with Hezbollah, and this is already reflected on the ground - as we saw recently on the airport road in Beirut, where partisan banners were removed. These are positive signs. We are moving step by step, and we aim to resolve this issue as swiftly as possible, because there are pressing national matters that must be addressed in Lebanon’s interest. As I’ve said before, the decision has been made - what remains is dialogue on how to implement it, through bilateral discussions between the presidency and Hezbollah.

Can we say that 2025 will be the year Hezbollah’s weapons are withdrawn?

We hope that 2025 will be the year Hezbollah’s weapons are either withdrawn or brought under full state control. That is what I am working toward.

Do you have a vision for how disarmament should take place? And what is your position on proposals suggesting that Hezbollah’s weapons be handed over to the state, or that its fighters be integrated into the Lebanese Armed Forces given their battlefield experience? What happens to the weapons currently being confiscated by the army?

First, regarding confiscated weapons, these are examined by experts. If they are usable and meet our standards (in terms of ammunition type, origin, etc.), we keep them in army stockpiles. Unusable weapons are destroyed.

As for Hezbollah members, they are Lebanese citizens. If they wish to join the Lebanese army, they can undergo what we call integration training programs. This has happened before - after the civil war, members of the Progressive Socialist Party and the Lebanese Forces were integrated in this way. If Hezbollah members apply, and they meet the eligibility requirements - including education, medical fitness, age, and so on - then the same standards that apply to all Lebanese will apply to them as well.

We haven’t discussed this scenario with Hezbollah yet, but this is our vision: the Defense Law should be applied equally to everyone.

Is there any proposal to replicate the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) model from Iraq in Hezbollah's case?

Absolutely not. There will be no PMF-style force and no independent units within the army.

Returning to the issue of arming the Lebanese army, don’t you believe that foreign, especially American, military support has fallen short, particularly in terms of providing advanced and high-quality weaponry?

What matters more than simply acquiring advanced or high-quality weapons is the ability to maintain them, ensure their servicing, and cover their operating costs, which are often higher than the cost of the weapons themselves. These expenses include maintenance, equipment, and spare parts, and they must align with our economic reality and financial capacity in Lebanon.

The issue isn't that the US is unwilling to provide us with advanced weapons - even if they did, those weapons would be of little use if we are unable to sustain or service them. It's a question of practicality, not politics.

After her second visit to Beirut (about two weeks ago), US Deputy Envoy to the Middle East Morgan Ortagus stated that she hadn’t heard any objection from you regarding the formation of three diplomatic committees to discuss sensitive issues with Israel. How accurate is that?

We did not discuss that topic. What we did discuss was our position on the southern land border, and we emphasized that any negotiations with Israel should follow the model of the maritime border demarcation. Speaker Berri also suggested returning to the 1949 Armistice Agreement, meaning negotiations should take place via technical and security committees.

If negotiations do take place over the land borders and the 13 disputed points, would they be direct or indirect?

They would follow the same model as the maritime border talks, meaning a mixed military and civilian delegation would participate, and the process would lead to the signing of a specific agreement, whether under US, international, or UN auspices.

This issue is negotiable. But as for talk of other issues - what would we even be negotiating over? There are no Israeli prisoners in Lebanon. On the contrary, there are Lebanese detainees in Israel - currently 15, after 5 were recently released. And there are Lebanese territories still under Israeli occupation. So aside from the land borders and the 13 disputed points, there’s nothing else on the table to negotiate.

Lebanon rejects normalisation, but could Israel’s withdrawal from occupied points and the cessation of its attacks open the door to normalisation talks? Or is the official Lebanese position firm that Lebanon will be the last to sign a peace deal with Israel?

This issue was not raised with the American side. What was discussed was the security situation along the border and how to maintain control. I was clear in affirming our commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative that emerged from the Beirut Summit in 2002 and the Riyadh Summit in November 2024.

To be clear, in politics, anything is possible, circumstances dictate reality. The Americans currently understand that normalisation or peace negotiations with Israel are not possible. Our priority today is ensuring long-term stability along the borders.

Hezbollah refuses to disarm as long as there is an ongoing Israeli threat and aggression, and it seems that this threat isn’t going away anytime soon. How can Hezbollah realistically be convinced to hand over its weapons under such conditions, especially when both the Americans and the French have told you they cannot provide guarantees?

I said this to Morgan Ortagus - Israel's continued presence in the five occupied points gives Hezbollah an excuse. They need to withdraw from Lebanese territory so that we can take responsibility and deploy the army.

At the same time, we need to understand Hezbollah’s concerns and perceived threats in order to send a clear message: that we, as the state, will address them on its behalf, and that it should give the state room to act. What other option do we have besides diplomacy? Do we want a civil war? I don’t think anyone wants that or can afford it. That’s why dialogue is essential. Yes, there are differences of opinion, but we have to talk - there’s no other way forward.

What’s the status of the investigation into the rockets launched from Lebanon toward Israel?

We have fingerprints, and we are currently checking them against the Lebanese state’s database. If they belong to Lebanese citizens, we’ll be able to identify them. If they’re foreign, it will be more difficult. Some individuals have already been detained in the case, and we’re also hoping to receive international assistance with the investigation, in case other parties have information that could help.

Are you concerned that the natural outcome of continued Israeli violations could lead to a full-scale confrontation if Hezbollah or its support base responds? Or can we say another Israeli war on Lebanon is unlikely?

These scenarios are always possible. But Hezbollah has shown restraint and a high level of awareness during this period. Despite the heavy human losses it has suffered, it has acted responsibly.

We, in turn, have sent messages to the Israelis through the Americans, saying that if they have suspicions about a weapons cache, a room, a building, or anything similar, we are monitoring the situation and will take care of destroying it ourselves.

As for whether Hezbollah could be dragged into war — it is not currently inclined in that direction. Still, the possibility remains as long as the attacks continue. That’s why we keep repeating: let us handle the negotiations with Hezbollah, and give us the space to work.

Land border demarcation with Syria is a complex matter. Has the issue of the Shebaa Farms specifically been raised during meetings between Lebanese and Syrian officials? Do you believe you can secure formal recognition from Damascus that Shebaa is Lebanese?

I wouldn’t use the words "secure" or "extract", but during my visit to France, where I met President Emmanuel Macron, Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides, and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa also joined the conversation by phone before the formation of the Syrian government.

We discussed the formation of a committee to officially demarcate the border. President Macron expressed interest and readiness to help by providing access to French archives that support Lebanon’s claim over the Shebaa Farms. So, we need to move toward the final demarcation of the borders. Al-Sharaa also stressed the importance of resolving this dispute.

It’s worth noting here that the disputed points with Israel (excluding Shebaa) total around 400,000 square meters — that’s less than half a square kilometre. In contrast, the disputed areas with Syria cover significantly larger territories. For example, the disputed area in Arsal alone is around 40 million square meters. So we’re talking about millions of square meters in dispute with Syria.

Do you expect border demarcation negotiations with Syria to be difficult?

Of course, each side will naturally try to pull in its own favour based on the maps it holds. We hope that France will assist us, given the reports and archives it possesses. And I'll repeat — by nature, I’m very optimistic and always try to see the glass half full.

Are there fixed principles when it comes to Lebanon’s land borders with Israel, especially given the criticism that followed the maritime demarcation experience, which some viewed as a concession of Lebanese rights? Will your term be marked by full adherence to Lebanon's land border claims?

Maritime demarcation is different from land demarcation, according to both technical and legal experts. There is no such thing as maritime borders between two states unless they are mutually recognised, officially demarcated, and registered with the United Nations.

The land borders are different. Our southern land borders have already been demarcated and documented internationally. However, field developments since the late 1960s and especially following the recent aggression require efforts to reassert and reinforce those demarcations.

That’s why we consistently call for a return to the 1949 Armistice Agreement, which is based on the 1923 Paulet–Newcombe Agreement. Through negotiations, this issue can be addressed and resolved in a way that preserves Lebanon’s interests and full sovereignty over every inch of its land, and ensures the stability and security of our international borders. We are also exploring several ideas — including the issue of the village of Ghajar and the course we need to follow regarding it.

Do you intend to invite Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa to visit Beirut, or are you considering a visit to Syria to meet him?

Everything is open to discussion, but to be honest, there are priorities. Right now, Qatar is first, followed by the UAE, then Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, and Egypt.

What about Washington?

Of course, we want to visit the United States, but we must first visit these Arab countries - they are the ones closest to offering meaningful help to Lebanon.

Do you believe that your visit to Damascus, when it happens, should result in agreements on major files and key national issues?

Even if it doesn’t result in agreements, it should at least correct the course of the relationship, one that must be based on mutual respect and the sovereignty of both nations. I may find myself compelled to visit Syria if some of the issues become difficult to resolve otherwise.

Has the appointment of the new Central Bank governor had any repercussions on your relationship with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam?

There is absolutely no issue between me and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. He didn’t have a nominee, but I did. [New central bank governor] Karim Saeed attended the cabinet session, answered questions, and everyone voiced their opinions.

In the end, both the prime minister and I abided by the constitution, which states that decisions should be made by consensus, and if that’s not possible, by vote — which is what happened. Together, we presented a model for how constitutional institutions can function properly and with respect to the national pact. It’s a healthy process — a difference of opinion, not a conflict — and all of this falls within the framework of democratic discourse and healthy debate.

Could the positive tone in your relationship with Speaker Nabih Berri shift, particularly around the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, given that Berri represents Hezbollah’s political stance?

Speaker Berri and I are in agreement on all major issues, especially the principle of exclusive state control over weapons. The decision has been made but the approach and method of implementation are what matter now.

I don’t want to clash with anyone. I want to talk with everyone and put Hezbollah's concerns on the table so we can address them through the state.