Could 1948 Palestinian political parties shape Israel's upcoming elections?

As the Israeli election approaches, the importance of political parties and voters from the 1948 Palestinian community is increasing ahead of the election scheduled for 27 October, particularly amid a close race between the current far-right governing coalition and the opposition, as neither side has secured a majority to form a government.

Historically, Palestinian political parties have remained outside the circle of Israeli coalition and government formation.

This is partly because Zionist parties have excluded them from the political legitimacy framework for participating in government.

It is also because these Palestinian parties have not viewed themselves as partners in governments responsible for policies of occupation and killing against Palestinians, discriminatory policies towards 1948 Palestinian citizens, and operating within the self-declared definition of Israel as a "Jewish and democratic" state.

Another factor has been the ability of Israeli parties, over decades, to form governing coalitions without needing the support of Palestinian parties.

The emergence of Palestinian parties

One of the most prominent cases in which parliamentary support from Palestinian parties became decisive to a government's survival came in 1993.

After Shas withdrew from the government of Yitzhak Rabin, it lost its parliamentary majority; the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality and the Arab Democratic Party provided what became known as a "safety net" for the government from outside the coalition.

This came in exchange for understandings that included increased budgets allocated to the 1948 Palestinian community, reducing some aspects of discrimination in government policies, and addressing several civic demands from Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship.

However, this began to change over the last decade and became apparent during the 2019 election, amid shifts in the Israeli party landscape and patterns of Palestinian party representation that increased the weight of Palestinian voters and the role of Palestinian parties.

First, this shift followed the formation of a joint list by Palestinian parties in 2015 to contest the Knesset election, after the electoral threshold for entering the Knesset was raised from 2% to 3.25%.

This raised concerns at the time that these lists, if they contested the election separately, would be unable to cross the threshold.

The Joint List won 13 seats in that election, the highest representation achieved by Arab parties in the Knesset up to that point.

Second, the shift resulted from the sharp division that emerged in the Israeli political map from the 2019 election between the camp led by Benjamin Netanyahu, which included right-wing, religious and far-right parties, and the camp opposing him.

Both camps failed in more than one election to secure a parliamentary majority by relying solely on parties from their own camp, increasing the political weight of seats.

Parties in successive elections

This political crisis led to five elections between 2019 and 2022, most of which failed to produce a political resolution.

During this period, the Joint List underwent repeated changes.

It broke apart shortly before the April 2019 election, with Palestinian parties contesting the election in two separate lists.

It was then reconstituted ahead of the September election that year, winning 13 seats.

In the March 2020 election, the list achieved an unprecedented result by winning 15 seats, the highest parliamentary representation achieved by a list in the history of Knesset elections.

However, this achievement did not prevent renewed internal disputes.

The United Arab List (the Southern Islamic Movement), led by Mansour Abbas, withdrew from the Joint List shortly before the March 2021 election.

The split came against the backdrop of a political and strategic dispute over the role of these parties in the Israeli political system.

Abbas adopted an approach based on a willingness to negotiate and cooperate with either of the two Israeli camps, including the Benjamin Netanyahu camp, in exchange for, what he describes, as achieving civic and economic demands for the community.

The United Arab List believes that the most important aspect of parliamentary work is exercising influence and achieving gains and everyday livelihood demands for the community.

The other components of the Joint List, however, rejected this approach at the time, viewing it as crossing the political boundaries that should govern relations with the Israeli right, particularly the far right.

Indeed, the 2021 election resulted in the formation of a government led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, which included the United Arab List, in a first-of-its-kind precedent for an independent party to formally participate in an Israeli governing coalition.

The government became known as the "change government" but lasted only about a year before collapsing, the Knesset was dissolved, and a new election was held.

In the 2022 election, competing Arab parties contested the election in three lists: the United Arab List (the Southern Islamic Movement), an alliance between the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality and the Arab Movement for Renewal; and the National Democratic Assembly, which contested the election separately.

This came after the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality and the Arab Movement for Renewal withdrew, on the night the lists were submitted, from a partnership agreement signed with the National Democratic Assembly to contest the election on a joint list.

The Assembly was consequently forced to contest the election alone but failed to cross the electoral threshold.

The election, meanwhile, resulted in Netanyahu returning to power after his camp secured a clear majority and formed a right-wing religious coalition with 64 Knesset members.

The 2022 election therefore once again showed that the way 1948 Palestinian parties contest elections, particularly the risk of votes being lost because of failure to cross the electoral threshold, can directly affect the balance of power between Israeli camps.

These parties failed to overcome their differences and reconstitute a joint list including all their components for the 2026 election. Instead, they are contesting the current election on two main lists.

Three parties, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, the National Democratic Assembly, and the Arab Movement for Renewal, have united under the "Joint List", while the United Arab List is contesting the election independently.

In an unprecedented move in its history, the United Arab List has included a Jewish candidate in a prominent position on its list: Yoav Segalovich, who served as deputy minister of internal security in the "change government" and was a Knesset member for the Yesh Atid party.

The move has been interpreted as an attempt by the United Arab List to broaden its acceptance within the opposition camp and strengthen prospects for cooperation with it in the post-election period, particularly if the opposition manages to form the next government and needs the list's support or participation in the coalition.

The existence of two lists does not simply reflect an organisational disagreement or competition over the ordering of seats.

It reflects two significantly different views of the role of Palestinian and Arab representation in Israeli politics.

The United Arab List adheres to an approach based on seeking to exercise influence from within the Israeli political camp system, using its parliamentary strength to negotiate over government formation or participate in government in exchange for budgets, decisions and civic gains for the community.

In the current election, following the experience of participating in the governing coalition in 2021, Mansour Abbas, head of the United Arab List, has announced his alignment with the opposition camp, setting two stated goals: bringing down the Netanyahu government and contributing to the formation of an alternative government.

The Joint List, meanwhile, does not rule out influencing the identity of the next government.

It has explicitly stated that one of its goals is to bring down the right-wing government and contribute, as far as possible, to preventing its return and forming an alternative government.

Some components of the Joint List also do not rule out, in principle, providing a "safety net" for a government led by opposition parties from outside the coalition if specific political conditions are met and understandings are reached that include political and civic demands related to the community and the Palestinian cause.

In this respect, the Joint List position differs from that of the United Arab List in that the former does not make participation in the governing coalition a goal in itself.

Instead, it raises the possibility of conditional influence from outside while maintaining greater political independence from the Zionist camps.

Increasing turnout by the community

The two lists also place increasing turnout in the community at the top of their objectives, after turnout remained at around 60% in the last election, compared with a higher rate across Israeli society.

They argue that increased participation would directly increase the size of Arab representation in the Knesset and could automatically reduce the chances of the Netanyahu camp and the right reaching the majority needed to form a new government.

Given the current balance of power, the close projected share between the current governing coalition led by Netanyahu and the opposition camp, and the absence of a clear majority for either side, the scenario of Palestinian parties becoming a decisive factor in determining the identity of the next government is no longer merely hypothetical.

The United Arab List's support for the opposition camp alone may not be enough to form an alternative government.

Some components of the "Joint List" abstaining from voting against the new government could become necessary to enable it to win the Knesset confidence vote.

The question therefore shifts from the position of these parties alone to that of the opposition parties themselves.

If they do not have an independent parliamentary majority, would they be prepared to form a government relying on support from Palestinian parties, even if that support were limited to abstaining from voting against it in the confidence vote?

Or could they move towards reaching an understanding or political agreement with the United Arab List that guarantees its support for the new government?

This scenario is particularly important because winning confidence for a government does not necessarily require an absolute majority of 61 Knesset members.

It can instead be achieved by a majority in the parliamentary vote, giving abstention political importance that could become decisive if the camps are closely balanced.

The opposition parties could therefore face a practical test over the extent to which they are prepared to accept an actual Arab role in forming the government.

Eisenkot's options

The issue of the position and role of these parties is therefore no longer linked only to their own decision over whether to support or oppose a government.

It also extends to the candidate tasked with forming the government and the extent to which his camp is prepared to recognise the legitimacy of the Arab political role in the equation of power formation.

Gadi Eisenkot, the most prominent opposition candidate to form the next government, had announced that he would not approach Palestinian parties after the election to seek their support for forming a governing coalition.

Instead, the decision would be in the hands of these parties themselves: either abstaining from voting against a government he leads in the confidence vote, supporting it from outside without joining the coalition, or opposing it, which could prevent the formation of an alternative government and allow Benjamin Netanyahu to remain in power.

At this stage, the position reflects Eisenkot's desire to avoid giving the Netanyahu camp additional campaign material to accuse him of seeking to form a government dependent on Palestinian parties.

However, Netanyahu has already begun attacking him on this issue, claiming that Eisenkot is seeking to establish a government based on Palestinian parties that he describes as "supporters of terrorism".

Through this rhetoric, Netanyahu is seeking two parallel goals: to pre-emptively delegitimise any alternative government Eisenkot might form with direct or indirect Arab support and raise concerns among some Jewish voters about Palestinian parties becoming a decisive factor in determining the identity of the next government.

Therefore, relying on Arab parties has become a central tool in the election campaign, not merely as a debate over the nature of political partnership, but also as a means of mobilising right-wing voters against the opposition camp. The upcoming Knesset election will not only be decisive over the identity of the governing camp but also over the question of the legitimacy and possibility of 1948 Palestinian parties exercising influence.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.