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Can the Libya model work for Iran’s nuclear programme?
In recent weeks, Israeli and American officials have revived talk of applying the so-called "Libya model" to Iran's nuclear programme - a strategy that would aim to dismantle Tehran's nuclear capabilities through diplomatic pressure rather than military force.
The idea was publicly floated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his visit to Washington this week. After meeting with US President Donald Trump, Netanyahu told reporters he would favour an agreement with Iran similar to the one reached with Libya in 2003, which saw Tripoli fully and permanently dismantle its nuclear programme.
Before departing the US, Netanyahu reinforced his stance, claiming there were only two ways to deal with Iran's nuclear file: through a comprehensive agreement or military action. The former, he said, should resemble the Libya precedent, where "we go in, blow up the facilities, dismantle all the equipment under US supervision and implementation. That’s the ideal scenario."
This framing echoes comments made earlier by US Republican Senator Tom Cotton, who also said Trump would prefer an Iran deal modelled on Libya’s 2003 agreement with the United States.
Iranian officials have swiftly and categorically rejected the notion. Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi dismissed the idea, saying the US must be "dreaming" if it believes it can apply the Libya model to Iran.
Iranian nuclear expert Rahman Ghahremanpour told The New Arab's Arabic language edition that international nuclear oversight norms do not support applying one country's nuclear file to another.
"Each nuclear file is unique to the country it concerns and cannot be directly compared with another," he said, stressing that nuclear diplomacy must be tailored to each nation's distinct political, geographic, and strategic circumstances.
He highlighted that Libya's nuclear programme was far less advanced than Iran's and lacked a strong domestic base. In contrast, Iran's programme is largely indigenous, built up over two decades, and embedded in the expertise of its scientists and engineers.
Ghahremanpour also noted that Libya's decision in 2003 came in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq, during a period when then-President George W. Bush was promoting a doctrine of preemptive war. Libya's regime under Muammar Gaddafi was internally fragile and facing international isolation.
In contrast, he said, Barack Obama's administration later recognised the limits of coercive policy. Obama ultimately acknowledged Iran's right to enrich uranium - a key shift that underpinned the 2015 nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
According to Ghahremanpour, Washington is unlikely to seriously pursue the Libya model with Iran, knowing Tehran would never accept it. Instead, the US appears to be engaging in what he described as "coercive diplomacy", marked by visible military deployments to the region, including to Diego Garcia.
"They are not offering traditional diplomacy, but rather diplomacy by dictate," he said.
Why Iran can't be 'de-nuclearised' like Libya
Another Iranian analyst, Alireza Majidi, emphasised that the depth and resilience of Iran's nuclear infrastructure make it fundamentally different from Libya's.
"Iran's nuclear know-how exists in the minds of its scientists," he said. "It is entirely homegrown and has progressed independently for over 20 years."
Majidi argued that even dismantling Iran's physical infrastructure would not erase its knowledge base, especially given the development of nuclear physics as a major academic field in Iranian universities.
He also pointed out that Libya had already been weakened by a US military strike in the 1980s and had lost much of its regional influence by the 1990s, whereas Iran remains a powerful player with a network of regional alliances.
Majidi believes Netanyahu's promotion of the Libya model is more about sabotage than diplomacy. "He's trying to undermine both the Iranian and American sides in the negotiation," he said, suggesting that Netanyahu's real aim is to provoke Iran into walking away from talks and to push the US toward a harder line.
According to Majidi, Netanyahu understands Trump and his inner circle well. By invoking the Libya model - which ultimately ended with Gaddafi’s overthrow and killing - Netanyahu seeks to both appeal to Trump's aggressive instincts and play on Iranian fears of regime change.