Can Egypt help Lebanon dismantle Hezbollah's tunnel network?

Lebanon's newly elected President Joseph Aoun arrived in Cairo on 19 May for his second official visit in less than three months, as part of a broader pivot by Beirut toward the moderate Arab states of the region. The visit, which follows his participation in the Arab League's emergency summit on Gaza in March, reflects a recalibrated Lebanese foreign policy that includes deepening security and diplomatic ties not only with Egypt, but also with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, and Qatar—a strategic shift enabled by new regional dynamics.

This evolving approach comes in the wake of major political transformations: the defeat of Hezbollah as a military force within Lebanon, and the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. With these long-standing obstacles removed, Beirut is seizing the opportunity to reassert state sovereignty and revive key infrastructure and development projects that were long stalled due to regional instability and internal fragmentation.

President Aoun's delegation, which included top advisers and economic officials, underscores Lebanon's interest in securing Arab support across critical files—from energy and reconstruction to military assistance.

Aoun, who served as army chief, was also seeking closer military assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces charged with disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani River all the way to the border with occupied Palestine as part of the ceasefire agreement with Israel signed in November 2024. This includes technical help with dismantling tunnels used by armed groups and clearing explosives in Lebanese territory. 

In an interview with Egypt's ON TV before his arrival, Aoun confirmed that he would be requesting Egyptian support in dealing with underground tunnel networks and the detection of explosives.

The Egyptian presidency confirmed that the two leaders discussed "mechanisms for enhancing Lebanon's stability and restoring regional peace and security," as well as cooperation in infrastructure, energy, and reconstruction.

Egypt is uniquely positioned to assist Lebanon in dismantling tunnel networks.

Veteran Egyptian security expert Gen. Fouad Alam told The New Arab, "Egypt has a vast reserve of experience that qualifies it to help other countries."

"The success of the army and police in destroying smuggling tunnels in Sinai helped them tighten their control over Sinai and eradicate terrorist activities in it," he added.

Over the past decade, Egypt has dealt with an extensive underground network between Gaza and Sinai used by Hamas and, later, by ISIS operatives. Egyptian forces launched a massive crackdown that included constructing a fortified border fence equipped with sensors, demolishing thousands of buildings in the border city of Rafah, and sealing tunnel entrances allegedly hidden inside homes.

Former National Defence College chief Gen. Mohamed al-Ghabari explained that some tunnels were several kilometres long and wide enough for trucks. "They had their openings in fake toilets inside homes," Gen. Ghabari said, adding that the demolition campaign, though controversial, was decisive in severing the Gaza–Sinai connection.

Human Rights Watch at the time reported that over 12,000 buildings were demolished during these operations, describing the campaign as a potential breach of international humanitarian law. 

Critics also argue that such actions align closely with Israeli interests and risk undermining legitimate resistance movements. In both Gaza and Lebanon, tunnels have served not only as military infrastructure but also as vital lifelines for besieged communities—providing access to food, medicine, fuel, and weapons in the face of blockades and occupation.

In Gaza, these tunnels were a crucial means of bypassing the Israeli blockade, while in Lebanon, similar underground networks have been used by Hezbollah as part of its deterrence strategy against Israel. For many in the region, efforts to destroy these networks—particularly with support from regional powers—raise concerns about regional complicity in containing armed resistance rather than addressing the root causes of insecurity, such as occupation and foreign intervention.

As such, Egypt's expertise, while operationally effective, is seen by some as serving a regional counter-resistance agenda under the guise of anti-terrorism.

Arab states like Egypt, which signed a peace treaty with Israel and has taken part in the blockade of Hamas-ruled Gaza, pursue a geopolitical doctrine that has long abandoned armed resistance against Israel while empowering state institutions and resisting the influence of non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

This is evident in its policies in Libya, Sudan, and now Lebanon, where it supports the national army over militia groups.

"Egypt loathes non-state actors," Lebanese analyst Assaad Bechara told TNA. "Its support for the Lebanese army reflects its regional doctrine of state sovereignty."

This aligns with President Sisi's post-meeting statement, calling for full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701—which demands Hezbollah's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, the disarmament of all militias, and Israeli withdrawal. He urged that the Lebanese army take full control south of the Litani River.

"Implementing the resolution would shield Lebanon from future conflict with Israel. Lebanon's security and stability are contingent on the enforcement of national and international legitimacy," Bechara added.

Eyeing the Arab World for Lebanese renewal

Beyond security and diplomacy, energy cooperation is a central pillar of Egypt–Lebanon relations. In 2022, the two countries signed an agreement—with Syria as a transit partner—to transport 650 million cubic metres of Egyptian natural gas annually via the Arab Gas Pipeline to power Lebanon's Deir Ammar plant. This deal could provide up to four additional hours of electricity per day to Lebanese households.

However, its implementation has stalled due to complications around US sanctions on Syria and conditions tied to World Bank financing, including reforms to Lebanon's electricity sector. The recent removal of these sanctions could revive these agreements, as Beirut hopes.

Agricultural trade is another cornerstone of bilateral ties. Egypt is among Lebanon's top destinations for agricultural raw material exports, but the relationship has been hindered by tariff increases and regulatory challenges.

In 2016, Egypt raised import tariffs on hundreds of items, including key food products, impacting Lebanese exporters despite existing regional trade agreements like the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). Lebanese agricultural producers also face issues with rules of origin enforcement, adding complexity to trade with Egypt.

President Aoun's visit to Cairo is just one chapter in a wider regional engagement strategy currently pursued by Beirut.

Since taking office, Aoun has prioritised outreach to influential Arab capitals — including Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Amman—in a bid to reposition Lebanon as a functional, sovereign state within the moderate Arab fold.

This outreach is not just diplomatic posturing.

With Hezbollah neutralised and Assad gone, Lebanon finds itself with a rare window to resume long-frozen economic and governance projects. From electricity sector reform and port redevelopment to anti-corruption measures and decentralisation, the roadmap now has fewer obstacles.

Beirut sees Egypt—alongside other moderate Arab partners—as essential at this moment of transition, both for their experience and for their ability to channel broader Gulf and international support.

"As a central state in the region, Egypt has always lent support to the Lebanese state," Bechara said.

"It does this because it has vested interests in Lebanon's stability, something that contributes to the stability of the region as a whole," he added.