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Balfour anniversary: Britain knew of 'Jewish terror' before the Nakba, archives reveal
On the 109th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, newly examined British intelligence documents reveal how officials warned that Zionist militants were using terrorism to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, despite Britain's own intelligence service insisting that the 1917 declaration had never promised them an independent state.
The newly unearthed documents, examined by The New Arab at Britain's National Archives, expose how British authorities documented Zionist terror attacks on Palestinian civilians, the destruction of villages, the killing of women and children, and plans to expand Jewish territorial control beyond Palestine in the years leading up to the 1948 Nakba.
Some of the documents, including a British intelligence lecture dated 8 January 1948, explicitly carry the heading "Jewish Terrorism", revealing how British security officials themselves classified the activities of Zionist armed groups in Palestine.
Few understood the violence of Zionist militias better than the British, apart from the Palestinians themselves. Yet the archives reveal an extraordinary contradiction - the imperial power whose declaration helped lay the foundations for Israel was receiving detailed warnings about the terrorism being carried out in pursuit of its establishment.
The documents also expose British concerns that sections of the Jewish community publicly condemned terrorism while sympathising with its perpetrators, raise new questions about the deadly 1948 bombing of the Jewish Agency headquarters in Jerusalem, and record the contrasting treatment of civilians by Zionist militias and Arab forces.
Britain's own intelligence challenged Zionist claims over Balfour
The Balfour Declaration, issued on 2 November 1917 by British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour, expressed support for establishing a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine, then under Ottoman rule.
It also stipulated that "nothing should prejudice the civil and religious rights of the country's existing non-Jewish communities", who constituted the overwhelming majority of its population.
But nearly three decades later, British intelligence officials were explicitly challenging the Zionist movement's interpretation of that promise.
In a secret report dated 2 September 1946, James Robertson, head of MI5's Middle East section, argued that the declaration had never committed Britain to establishing a Jewish state in Palestine.
Robertson maintained that Zionists had attached meanings to the declaration that went far beyond its original intention, transforming a commitment to a Jewish "national home" into a demand for statehood.
His assessment identified three methods used by the Zionist movement to pressure Britain and international opinion: intensive propaganda, irregular immigration into Palestine and terrorism.
The report offers a revealing insight into Britain's own understanding of the declaration, showing that senior intelligence officials rejected the interpretation used by Zionist leaders to justify their demands for a Jewish state.
The contradiction would become increasingly stark as British officials documented the violence of the Haganah, Irgun and Stern Gang Zionist militias, whose attacks against Palestinians and British authorities intensified in the final years of the Mandate.
Jewish community condemned terrorism publicly while sympathising with militants
British records also reveal concerns that public condemnations of Zionist terrorism were not matched by efforts to stop the perpetrators.
In February 1944, British High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael reported that Jewish newspapers and organisations regularly denounced attacks, but showed little willingness to assist police investigations.
By October, his assessment had become more alarming. MacMichael warned London that sympathy for armed militants had grown, particularly in Tel Aviv and other Jewish urban communities.
He believed that much of the urban Jewish population had become sympathetic to the saboteurs, despite earlier public opposition to violence.
The findings reveal how British officials increasingly questioned the sincerity of public condemnations, although their assessments did not establish that all Jewish residents supported the attacks.
Jewish Agency bombing raises new questions
The archives also contain previously undisclosed details surrounding the deadly bombing of the Jewish Agency headquarters in Jerusalem on 11 March 1948.
The explosion killed 13 people - all Jews - seriously wounded 33 and left another 51 with minor injuries.
According to a confidential report by Sir Alan Cunningham, the last High Commissioner of the British Mandate of Palestine, a vehicle belonging to the American consulate entered the agency's compound shortly before the explosion.
Its driver, Anton Camillo Daoud, a Palestinian Christian employed by the consulate, parked the vehicle before leaving in a taxi.
A Jewish security guard confirmed that he recognised both the vehicle and its driver. The taxi driver subsequently told investigators that Daoud claimed he had received orders to leave the vehicle at the agency at a specified time.
British investigators also reported that the Jewish Agency obstructed their inquiries.
A subsequent British report stated that Haganah members prevented a senior police officer from entering the compound, making it difficult to establish a reliable account of the explosion.
British intelligence warned of Zionist statehood
In March 1948, MI5 director Percy Sillitoe attended a secret meeting in Taunton, southwest England, to discuss intelligence operations against Zionist militias.
British intelligence warned that the Jewish Agency had established extensive international networks, with representatives maintaining contact with senior diplomatic and government figures.
Sillitoe also raised concerns about the security implications of a future Jewish state, which British officials feared could threaten their strategic interests in the Mediterranean.
British documents expose massacres and forced displacement
By April 1948, British authorities were receiving detailed reports of Zionist attacks on Palestinian villages.
In a telegram dated 9 April, Cunningham described the assault on Al-Qastal, overlooking Jerusalem, where Zionist fighters used mortar bombardments and explosives to force Palestinian residents from their homes.
A subsequent British communication recorded a Zionist spokesman claiming that 200 Palestinians had been killed, approximately half of them women and children, and another 200 wounded. These figures have not been independently verified.
The spokesman also acknowledged Haganah's knowledge of the attack and its declared ambitions to seize territory extending beyond Palestine into Jordan (which was known as Transjordan at the time).
Other reports documented an attack by approximately 200 Zionist fighters on Nasr al-Din, near Lake Tiberias, killing nine Palestinians and wounding five.
On 14 April, Zionist gunmen attacked a Palestinian market in Tiberias using mortars and automatic weapons, while three houses were blown up.
British archives document Arab protection of Jewish civilians
Another British document, dated 28 May 1948, recorded the surrender of Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter to Jordan's Arab Legion shortly after the 1948 war, commanded by Abdullah al-Tal.
Pablo de Azcarate, a Spanish diplomat and United Nations representative who witnessed the surrender, reported that Jewish prisoners and civilians had not been harassed.
He described Arab soldiers helping elderly people, women and children, while the Arab Legion responded immediately to isolated incidents of looting.
Azcarate praised al-Tal's conduct, saying it had established an atmosphere of trust throughout the operation.
British officials considered his testimony sufficiently significant to seek wider coverage among British and American journalists.
A telegram from the British mission in Jerusalem recorded efforts to inform the American consulate about the Arab Legion's treatment of Jewish civilians, hoping the account would reach American reporters.