The Iran file and the US threat to bomb the country dominated half of Al-Araby Television’s interview on Thursday evening with Azmi Bishara, Director General of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, speaking from Lusail in Qatar.
Bishara argued that US President Donald Trump does not seek to change the Iranian regime, but rather to subdue it and force it into making radical concessions. In the interview, Bishara said Trump is determined to complete the mission he began in last summer’s 12 day war on Iran, warning that Arabs have no interest in an Iranian war, nor in partition or chaos there.
On the newly formed Gaza administration committee, Bishara noted that its chances of success depend on Israeli conduct, ruling out any change in the occupation state’s policy and describing what is happening in Gaza as the continuation of war at a lower intensity, alongside creeping annexation in the West Bank.
As for any forthcoming Israeli elections, which may be called early, Bishara asserted that raising Arab voter turnout in Israel is a key condition for defeating Benjamin Netanyahu and the far right.
Internationally, the new global order, in the Arab thinker’s words, is now based on a division between strong and weak powers, between conservative and liberal forces, and on Trump and his team’s conviction that NATO has become a burden on America. He observed that all of Trump’s moves regarding Greenland are linked to dismantling the partnership with Europe.
Striking Iran… technical delay or window for dialogue?
Bishara appeared uncertain about the reasons behind Washington’s postponement of a strike on Iran, which he revealed had been expected on Wednesday night. He said that if the delay reflects a desire to open the door to dialogue, that would be positive; but if it is purely a military-technical matter to complete preparations, then it is merely a postponement.
Asked about Trump’s objectives in any potential strike, Bishara noted that the current US president's “approach is persistent and not fickle; everything moves along a clear line: power politics wrapped in reality television,” as he put it. Trump does not seek regime change in Iran at present, Bishara explained, “and believes he will force the Iranian leadership to submit to his policies and interests, hoping that morale within the system will collapse quickly under the blows, that it will come to the negotiating table and accept Washington's terms."
Foremost among these terms, according to Bishara, is that the Iranian regime ends its adversarial position vis-à-vis America and its allies, in particular Israel. He also placed economic interests high on the list of US objectives, asserting that “the Trump administration is not an administration of regime change and state-building, but one of power relations and interests.”
In this context, Bishara recalled that Israel had been the main driver of escalation between the United States and Iran during periods of reformist rule, even though, in imperial American thinking—even before Trump’s first term—Iranian reformists were seen as suitable interlocutors for dialogue, something that does not apply in Israeli thinking. On this point, the Director General of the Arab Center expressed astonishment that “America escalates against reformists it is supposed to negotiate with,” explaining that Trump, buoyed by what he sees as success in Venezuela, wants to “complete the mission he began in last summer’s war on Iran,” since the strike at the time was not decisive.
Bishara stressed that Trump believes Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s standing within the system must be weakened, pointing to the possibility that circles within the regime may emerge willing to negotiate with the United States on interim issues until Trump leaves office or the regime regains its strength.
He argued e that it will be difficult to repair Iran’s economic situation and respond to popular demands without lifting the U.S.-led embargo. Improving economic conditions, he said, is important for all Iranian factions, but especially for reformists, who believe conservatives block their success because the sanctions will persist as a result of their policies. Bishara argued that the internal struggle in Iran over lifting sanctions coincides with a domestic battle over who will succeed Khamenei, with reformists seeking to ensure the successor comes from their ranks.
According to Bishara, Iran has lived in a continuous “revolutionary” protest state since 2009, as a segment of society no longer accepts the system’s authoritarian character. He noted that the margin for freedom of expression in Iran is “far greater than in many authoritarian states” such as China and numerous Arab countries, “but this is no longer sufficient, because the nature of society has changed and it can no longer tolerate what it did 30 years ago.”
In Bishara’s view, regional and geo-strategic issues and foreign interventions are a core part of the protest landscape, “with Israel playing the largest role, just as the scale of Israeli penetration was very large during the 12-day war” in June. He recalled that the nuclear issue is currently off the table, and that the Americans will seek the greatest possible concessions from Iran on long-range missiles and its regional influence.
While he said that, despite all their divisions, Arabs have no interest in an Iranian war, partition or chaos—having seen the results in Iraq—he revealed that Gulf states fear the repercussions of any change brought about by external intervention. “There is therefore caution about what might follow in the event of collapse,” he said.
Although he acknowledged that Iran is an ancient, multi-ethnic state and that there is no real danger of its disintegration, he added that “even a country like Russia entered a decade of chaos after the fall of the Soviet Union.”
“United States of Yemen”?
Asked whether developments in Iran might affect Yemen, Bishara replied in the affirmative—"but only if the other parties (opposed to the Houthis) are alert to the need not to exploit the situation to settle scores, and not to inflame sectarianism or call for foreign intervention, because that introduces existential fears.” A realistic outlook, he said, dictates that in a context of Iranian weakness, understanding must be reached in the interests of the countries concerned, such as Lebanon and Yemen.
He reiterated what he had said on the same channel the previous Thursday: “The Houthis are part of Yemen, but they cannot rule the country alone.” In this context, Bishara floated the idea of a kind of “United States of Yemen,” with a degree of decentralisation, and the same for for Sudan or Libya, where a return to a centralised political formula has become impossible after their civil wars.
Concluding the Yemen segment, he criticised the Riyadh statement calling for a South–South dialogue for including a clause on “restoring the state of South Yemen”, stressing that while a segment of Yemenis have not abandoned the idea, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to be a partner in such a project. As for Yemen’s future path, Bishara said the solution lies exclusively with Yemenis themselves, and that “there is no alternative to the outcomes of the National Dialogue” (2013–2014).
Greenland and a global divide between conservatives and liberals
Turning to Greenland and the US administration's desire to seize the world's largest island, Bishara rejected Trump's justification that annexation is necessary to ward off a Chinese–Russian threat, describing the supposed threat as very remote from the Arctic island. He recalled that the United States already has a military base in Greenland, and asserted that the real objectives are domination, annexation, resources, and Trump’s obsession with entering history as the man who expanded America's territory.
On the geopolitical dimension, Bishara said Trump is moving towards dismantling the partnership with Europe and treating NATO as a burden on America—“a strategically odd approach, because America needs allies.”
Asked about the contours of the new world order in Trump’s second term, Bishara said the trend entrenches a division of the world among the powerful—“and Europe is not among them.” He warned that if Republicans win successive election cycles, a radical transformation of the global order will become entrenched, based on a division between strong and weak, and between conservative and liberal forces. In that case, “Europe becomes an adversary of America except when it is governed by conservative forces,” which is why Trump supports all far-right conservative movements in Europe.
US midterm elections
On the US midterm elections scheduled for later this year, Bishara stressed that domestic conditions are decisive in voting, and that “foreign adventures are used internally.” He noted the existence of an economic narrative claiming that this foreign policy brings money into the American interior, but said Trump’s problem is that this has not materialised in reality, because the beneficiaries are the wealthy alone.
Working classes and the middle class, he said, are harmed even by policies on immigration and healthcare. Moreover, foreign “successes” in the conservative sense have not boosted Trump’s popularity at home, in addition to the existence of conflicts within the right-wing camp itself over foreign policy and overseas entanglements.
While acknowledging the difficulty of predicting how these divisions within the “Make America Great Again” camp will translate electorally, Bishara said the coming congressional elections will offer an opportunity to understand them, as the voting systems there are individual-based.
He added that divisions also extend to the role of foreign lobbies in pressuring the current administration, including among those who reject the image of Israel controlling America—“the dog wagging the tail, not the tail wagging the dog.” This led to an extended discussion of Israel’s influence over the United States on the Palestinian file, with the Zionist lobby’s clear aim being to make Israel the architect of US Middle East policy—a project not yet complete, as evidenced by Israel’s desire to partition Syria, contrary to Trump’s wishes.
Israeli elections
Were general elections held in Israel today, they would revolve around the country’s longest-serving prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who wants to remain in power not only because he is, in Bishara’s words, opportunistic, criminal and a liar, but also because he holds an ideological creed centred on Greater Israel and preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state—translated into creeping annexation in the West Bank and a continuing low-intensity war in Gaza.
Netanyahu, Bishara said, “is devoting all his efforts to sabotaging the second phase of the Gaza agreement,” and has succeeded in everything since 2023, in Palestine and across his other war fronts, in the absence of any genuine Arab and international pressure.
Bishara explained that Netanyahu’s popularity has improved in recent months, but that at most he reaches around 40 per cent in polls. Under Israel’s electoral system, this would not yield more than 52 or 53 seats out of 120 were elections held today.
Drawing on his long political experience in the Knesset and within Israel’s Arab Palestinian community, Bishara spoke at length about Arab parties and their role in the next electoral contest. He stressed that Israeli society has shifted in its attitude towards Arab participation in political life: opposition to a Palestinian state has risen sharply, even among those who once supported it under certain conditions, to around 75 per cent, while the proportion favouring stripping Arab citizens of voting rights has also increased. He concluded that Arabs will not be allowed to participate in forming any future Israeli government.
According to Bishara’s estimates, Arabs should run on a single electoral list that could secure 15 seats if turnout is raised. Two lists might yield 12 seats, while three lists could also reach 15 if all pass the threshold. He summed up the equation succinctly: “If it is important to prevent Netanyahu from forming a government, Arabs must raise turnout and participate in one strong list, even if they disagree politically.”
The condition for the success of the Gaza administration committee
Asked whether the Gaza administration committee headed by Ali Shath possesses the tools for success, Bishara replied that nothing will work unless Israel withdraws from Gaza, opens the Rafah crossing, and allows the committee to operate. He expressed surprise that the US embassy in Cairo was chosen as the venue for the committee's first meeting on Thursday, suggesting this was likely an American decision.
He said he was confident that, assuming good intentions on the part of its members, the committee’s prospects depend on Israeli behaviour. He recalled that its role is temporary and transitional, to address people’s needs and horrific conditions and to bridge a phase until life in Gaza becomes possible. He suggested that the committee could ease its task by relying on existing administrative structures—civil services responsible for health, education, planning, policing and other essential sectors.
Bishara nevertheless ruled out any change in Israeli policy in Gaza. On Lebanon, he explained the expansion of Israeli strikes by the fact that the occupation state sees no reaction to its violations. He recalled that even before 7 October 2023, Israel’s demand was limited to disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani River, but in light of its military successes and the absence of any real response to its aggression, it now covets more distant objectives. Israel, he said, may even want the Lebanese state to clash with Hezbollah.