After the SDF, the Syrian government turns its eyes on tackling Suweida

Following what may be described as a success by the Syrian government in north-eastern parts of the country vis-à-vis the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), via a mix of political and military tools in coordination with the United States, attention has shifted to another highly sensitive issue: the Suweida province in southern Syria. 

More than seven months after the Suweida events that began on 13 July 2025, following tensions between armed Bedouin residents and Druze armed groups, the core issues remain unresolved, including the return of displaced residents to their villages, the fate of the missing, and the absence of clear findings in the anticipated investigations into violations against civilians during the clashes—in which hundreds of civilians and military personnel were killed, amid reports of field executions and the displacement of thousands.

According to the "Higher Legal Committee" formed by the spiritual leadership of the Druze community in the province, there are at least 230 persons still missing, including 17 women and eight children. Some of the listed names have been released, others have been verified as detained by the Syrian government, and some have been confirmed dead.

The Syrian government acknowledged that 111 civilians were being held in Adra prison in rural Damascus. On 22 September 2025, it released 24 detainees, followed by 36 others in parallel with the handover of two tribal families by local forces in Suweida. 51 detainees remain in Adra prison in connection with the Suweida file.

Regarding the displaced, the Syrian government estimates that around 150,000 civilians from 33 villages in Suweida province and 70,000 Bedouin fled the area during the events. Most Druze residents remained in Suweida, either in shelters, rented homes, or with relatives. In contrast, most Bedouin relocated to other parts of Syria, particularly Daraa province, where they stayed in shelters, schools, or with relatives.

As for the government-appointed investigation committee, it said on 16 November 2025 that what occurred in Suweida constituted a "serious violation requiring precise legal follow-up".

"Everyone who committed a violation will be held accountable," Committee head Judge Hatem al-Naasan said at a press conference, further noting that members of the defence and interior ministries who appeared in social media videos had been detained pending legal measures.

For his part, Committee spokesperson Ammar Ezzeddine said information gathering included direct interviews with civilians, victims' families and government forces.

He acknowledged that most of the information was collected through social media because the committee could not enter certain areas of Suweida controlled by local factions, and noted that the committee had requested a two-month extension to complete its work.

The deadline expired on 16 January 2025, and there has been no update so far.

Can the success with SDF repeat itself?

Questions have been raised about whether the strategy applied to the SDF could also be used in Suweida, with gradual political and security containment rather than open confrontation.

In eastern Syria, the government adopted a composite strategy against the SDF that included limited military pressure to deter without sliding into comprehensive conflict, alongside political engagement that benefited from shifting US priorities, including a desire to reduce its regional presence and to be less sensitive to Iranian expansion.

This approach reduced the SDF's margin of manoeuvre and pushed it toward more pragmatic options.

As in the SDF file, securing the US position appears essential for any Syrian government move in Suweida. The US stance may be indispensable due to the Israeli factor, which could be neutralised only through US pressure or a direct understanding with Israel. The latter option would impose costs beyond the government's capacity and directly affect Syrian sovereignty and core interests.

Control by factions linked to Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, operating under the "National Guard", over security decision-making in Suweida city, and their rejection of the "roadmap" approved in Amman in September 2025 under US sponsorship and reaffirmed in recent Paris talks between Syrian and Israeli sides, has led to political deadlock.

This rejection cannot be separated from the political, military and financial support these forces have received directly or indirectly from Israel and the SDF.

The Washington Post reported on 23 December, citing Israeli, Western and Kurdish officials, that Israel has provided continuous military and financial support to al-Hijri forces since December 2024, including weapons transfers, monthly salaries and intelligence sharing. The report also noted that the SDF transferred $500,000 to al-Hijri forces and continued training their fighters in areas under its control or in Suweida.

Political activist Mohammed Suleiman told Al Araby al Jadeed, the Arabic-language sister publication of The New Arab, that Israel is the main obstacle to resolving the crisis.

He said Israel views Suweida as leverage against the Syrian government, benefiting from a local party seeking its intervention under the pretext of protection from genocide.

Suleiman added that Israeli involvement includes support for local factions, promotion of minority persecution narratives, attempts to impose a safe corridor from the Golan to Suweida, and the provision of aid and facilities to some Druze civilians, including food, medical assistance, scholarships, and religious and security communication channels.

Suleiman also noted that Israel is seeking to place Suweida among its national security priorities to pressure Washington, which in turn is working to reach a security agreement between Syria and Israel.

In Washington, an informal congressional briefing titled "Defending Freedom", organised by Druze groups, focused on the situation of minorities in Syria, particularly the Druze in Suweida. Despite attempts to amplify the event, it remained media-focused and unofficial.

In parallel, Sheikh Suleiman Abdul Baqi, who supports the Syrian government, conveyed a counter-message backing Syrian unity and engagement with the central state.

Suweida province is facing successive economic crises amid political paralysis and diverging positions between groups led by al-Hijri, calling for separation from Damascus and accountability for violations, and broader public sentiment that seems to reject separation but demand redress, accountability, compensation for displaced residents, and clarification of the fate of the missing.

Relief activist and lawyer Majed Wahbi, speaking from Suweida to Al Araby al Jadeed, argued that the situation east of the Euphrates differs from that in southern Syria, as Turkish interests differ from Israeli interests.

Turkey, he stressed, seeks a unified Syria to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish state, while Israel favours partition or the establishment of sectarian entities.

Wahbi argued calls for a sectarian state in the south are receding following developments east of the Euphrates and the US withdrawal from the al-Tanf base.

"The people of Suweida have historically demonstrated national commitment, and that any solution must recognise this," he added.

Wahbi said resolving the crisis requires acknowledgement of crimes committed in Suweida, serious and public accountability, and an apology from the presidency.

He also called for protecting university students, recognising this year's secondary school certificates, compensating victims, returning displaced villagers, and granting local self-administration within the Syrian state, alongside proportional representation in senior posts and security institutions based on competence.

Initiatives and deadlock

Activist Osama al-Tawil, based in Suweida, said the first step must come from Damascus through tangible measures rather than promises.

He told Al Araby al Jadeed that separation is unrealistic and does not serve Suweida residents or the Druze community, which is historically linked to Syria, and called for moving beyond emotional reactions and focusing on accountability and the safe return of displaced residents with compensation.

Policies by the "National Guard", particularly the closure of the Damascus–Suweida road, have worsened living conditions. The road was reopened after public pressure following its closure after the killing of four young men in al-Matouna village by a Syrian security member. The closure led to flour shortages, bakery closures and rising public anger.

Political researcher Fouad Azzam, from Suweida, told Al Araby al Jadeed that al-Hijri supporters sought to minimise the impact of developments in northeastern Syria by arguing that Suweida differs structurally and geographically and is subject to Israeli considerations.

He said they staged a demonstration in al-Sir Square, raising Israeli flags and images of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after feeling threatened, aiming to solicit Israeli support and "to energise a fatigued population in the mountain, exhausted by the ongoing road blockade and deadlock caused by the Suweida leadership’s rejection of the road map."

Azzam added that the Syrian government, through the Suweida governor, renewed calls for national dialogue after intellectuals proposed a "Third Initiative" that challenged al-Hijri dominance.

He noted that the initiative could have gained broader momentum, particularly with support from intellectuals and certain circles. Still, al-Hijri supporters used the al-Matouna incident to reiterate their rejection of reconciliation, negotiation, or recognition, insisting on self-determination and leveraging the US congressional session to support their position.

Azzam added that the SDF model resurfaced after the international coalition withdrew from al-Tanf base. He said al-Hijri supporters had promoted the base as part of a "Dawood [David] corridor" linking Suweida and the SDF in northeastern Syria.

"With the withdrawal, such claims were exposed, and the US abandonment of the SDF raised questions about whether Israel would give up its separatist ambitions, particularly as it has not formally declared support for separation," he said.

He considered that resolving the Suweida file requires more substantive steps from the government and civil society, including addressing pending cases, particularly those involving detainees, and returning displaced residents to their villages.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.