A shattered future: How political rifts, restrictions and aid fatigue are stalling Gaza's recovery

Following two years of unprecedented devastation from Israel's brutal genocide, an international reconstruction effort is taking shape to transform Gaza from a war-ravaged territory into a functioning region. Yet competing visions, fragile ceasefires, and deep political divisions threaten to derail one of the largest post-conflict reconstruction undertakings of the decade.

A US-mediated ceasefire signed in October 2025 through negotiations involving Qatar and Egypt represents the latest attempt to establish conditions for recovery. However, the broader 20-point peace plan underpinning reconstruction faces severe obstacles.

"Reconstruction demands massive quantities of steel and iron, requiring integrated international cooperation and productive capacities from multiple nations," said Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Kamel El-Wazir, underscoring the coordination challenges ahead.

Yet experts caution that such coordination remains impossible without first addressing fundamental political obstacles.

Three competing reconstruction frameworks now vie for international adoption and funding, each reflecting divergent political assumptions about Gaza's future governance and the territory's path forward.

The October 2025 US-led ceasefire establishes an interim period governed by an independent Palestinian technocratic committee unaffiliated with any political faction.

This governance model, accepted in principle by Hamas, would manage public services and oversee reconstruction until the Palestinian Authority completes mandated reforms and restores full authority.

The framework encompasses demilitarisation provisions, humanitarian aid, and phased reconstruction, though implementation faces significant roadblocks with neither Hamas nor Israel fully committed to disarmament or PA governance, respectively.

A competing vision emerged in mid-October 2025 when the Palestinian government announced a $67 billion, five-year reconstruction plan explicitly designed to restore PA governance over Gaza as part of a future Palestinian state.

This comprehensive proposal directly challenges Israeli positions, rejecting any PA role in post-war Gaza, creating a fundamental political impasse blocking implementation.

A third framework emerged when the Arab League endorsed an Egyptian-led three-phase reconstruction plan costing $53 billion in March 2025, featuring a six-month interim phase followed by four to five years of longer-term reconstruction.

The Egyptian plan similarly proposes an interim technocratic committee, overseen by the Palestinian Authority, representing a middle position between the US framework and complete restoration of PA governance.

The magnitude of the challenge

International assessments confirm catastrophic destruction on an unprecedented scale.

The UN estimates Gaza is covered in 61 to 70 million tonnes of rubble, substantially higher than initial evaluations.

A joint February 2025 Interim Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment by the UN, World Bank, and EU estimated damages at $53.2 billion over a decade, with $20 billion required within the first three years alone.

"Between 70 and 80 percent of Gaza's core infrastructure and essential facilities have been destroyed. Approximately 92 percent of housing, roughly 436,000 homes, requires repair or reconstruction,” said Dr Nasser Darwish, a member of Gaza's reconstruction committee at the Egyptian Engineers Syndicate, describing the scale of need starkly.

"The first and most urgent phase is humanitarian relief and temporary shelter, then debris removal," he told The New Arab.

"Subsequent phases follow progressively.”

Yet even debris removal confronts unprecedented obstacles.

Israel currently restricts the entry of vital heavy machinery and construction materials, creating a fundamental bottleneck preventing initial clearing operations. This access restriction represents a critical early test of whether political agreements translate into operational capacity.

The financing crisis

Securing funding presents the reconstruction effort's defining challenge.

Estimated costs ranging from $53 billion to over $70 billion vastly exceed available commitments, creating what experts term "donor fatigue" amid repeated cycles of destruction and reconstruction in Gaza.

International assessments initially suggested a “complex multilateral mix”: bilateral donors from Arab and Western governments, multilateral institutions including the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Islamic Development Bank, alongside private-sector mobilisation.

However, major donors, particularly Gulf states, remain reluctant to commit capital without assurance of a long-term political resolution that prevents renewed conflict.

US President Donald Trump's October 2025 statements indicating that "very rich Arab states" will fund reconstruction intensified focus on Gulf financing. Yet formal pledges remain minimal.

A February 2025 Gaza Peace Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh, co-chaired by the US and Egypt, aimed to address governance and reconstruction but notably excluded Israel and Hamas, further limiting its convening power for financing commitments.

The financing impasse reflects more profound scepticism among donors.

“International funding will translate into reconstruction success only if political uncertainties are resolved, access restrictions are lifted, and governance questions are clarified,” Mohammed Fouad, an economic analyst, said.

“Without such assurances, donor confidence remains elusive,” Fouad added. 

Egypt's complex position

Egypt has positioned itself as the leading coordinator and logistics hub for the reconstruction effort.

The country's geographic proximity, port infrastructure at eastern Qantara, Arish, and Ismailia, and developed transport networks create natural advantages for materials procurement and equipment deployment.

The March 2025 Arab League endorsement of Egypt's reconstruction framework further elevated Cairo's role in regional efforts.

However, Egypt's effectiveness remains constrained by larger political dynamics beyond its control. Israeli material restrictions prevent the deployment of the heavy machinery that Egypt could efficiently transport.

Political divisions among competing reconstruction frameworks — the US plan, the PA proposal, and the Egyptian initiative — fragment international coordination. And Egypt cannot unilaterally resolve governance questions or provide security guarantees that international contractors require before committing resources and personnel.

Major contracting firms from Egypt, Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, and other nations have signalled readiness to compete for reconstruction contracts.

A source from one of Egypt's largest firms confirmed the firm's willingness to participate in international coalitions, noting that debris removal alone, estimated at a minimum of nine months, constitutes the foundational phase upon which all subsequent work depends.

Yet private sector mobilisation hinges on conditions currently absent: political stability, clear governance, access guarantees, and security assurance.

International companies will not deploy equipment or personnel to conflict zones or regions with legal uncertainty regarding contracts, permits, or payment mechanisms.

Preconditions for progress

Multiple experts emphasise that genuine reconstruction remains contingent on meeting several interconnected preconditions that currently remain unmet.

A stable political settlement must establish legitimate governance, as current positions remain fundamentally incompatible on all fronts.

An International Stabilization Force requires a clear mandate, sufficient troop commitments, and deployment authorisation, none of which currently exist.

Without security guarantees, neither international contractors nor Palestinian civil society can function effectively in reconstruction environments.

Israel must permit the entry of heavy machinery, construction materials, and humanitarian supplies at a scale sufficient to commence reconstruction, yet current restrictions remain in place.

Simultaneously, Palestinian technocratic committees must build administrative capacity to execute programmes potentially worth $53 to $70 billion — an unprecedented undertaking that requires rapid institutional development in conflict-affected contexts.

The fragile ceasefire

The current ceasefire, achieved in October 2025, remains fragile: the broader 20-point peace plan faces severe implementation obstacles.

The demilitarisation and governance phases encounter significant roadblocks, with neither side willing to implement controversial provisions.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi signalled an intensive diplomatic effort, stating: “The coming weeks will witness concentrated coordination with regional and international partners to establish concrete reconstruction foundations.”

Yet such diplomatic choreography cannot resolve underlying political conflicts where both Israeli and Palestinian positions remain non-negotiable.

Mahmoud Abdelrahman is a writer from Cairo

This piece is published in collaboration with Egab