Baghdad, Iraq - In the hours before dawn on Sunday, residents of northern Babil - roughly 105 kilometres south of Baghdad - lay awake listening to the sound of American fighter jets circling overhead.
The area sits near Jurf al-Sakhr, a fortified town that has become the operational heartland of Kataib Hezbollah, one of the Iraqi factions that has declared it will join Iran as it responds to US-Israeli attacks.
For those living in the nearby districts of Mahaweel and Musayyib, it was a reminder of how close they are to a front line they did not choose.
The war came to Jurf al-Sakhr on its first day. American missile strikes hit the city, killing two people and wounding a number of faction fighters, according to security sources.
Similar strikes followed in al-Qaim in Anbar province and in the Muqdadiya and Shahreban areas of Diyala. The geography of the strikes sketched the outline of what Washington appears to consider Iran's Iraqi infrastructure, and what it intends to dismantle.
A city without its people
Jurf al-Sakhr is not a typical target. After falling to the Islamic State (IS) in 2014, it was retaken through costly military operations by Iraqi security forces and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF).
In the aftermath, its predominantly Sunni population was displaced - and has never been allowed to return. Kataib Hezbollah and affiliated factions have controlled it ever since.
A brigadier general in the Interior Ministry, speaking on condition of anonymity, described the city as “one of the important targets for the United States,” noting that security assessments indicate it houses drone manufacturing facilities and that it “is expected to become an operations centre if the armed factions participate in the confrontation”.
He added that “some military strikes have already been launched from Jurf al-Sakhr,” including operations targeting what are believed to be American interests in Erbil and Anbar.
The source also described a video that circulated approximately a month ago, appearing to show tunnels containing missiles, believed to have been filmed in Jurf al-Sakhr.
“The city also receives fighters from Iran, Yemen, and Lebanon," he told The New Arab, which, in his view, explains why the factions have consistently refused to allow the area's original residents to return.
An ideology that overrides borders
Iraq's armed factions sat out the 12-day Israel-Iran war last June. This time, the calculation has changed.
Essam al-Faili, professor of political science at al-Mustansiriya University, sees the shift as ideologically inevitable.
“It is natural for the Iraqi armed factions to participate in any war that may break out between Iran and any other state - whether Israel, the United States, or even Turkey,” Al Faili told TNA.
“These factions believe in the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), which makes the ideological dimension a primary guide for their movements and positions.”
The assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, he argued, has made that imperative more urgent.
“From their perspective, there is no longer any justification for not participating in any confrontation Iran is engaged in.”
He noted that some sources speak of drones and rockets being launched from within Iraq toward Israel, though he stressed that “this information still requires more precise confirmation”.
Al-Faili framed the factions' worldview in terms that go beyond national loyalty.
“Many Islamic organisations generally do not believe in political borders as much as they believe in cross-border leadership authority. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, follows the guidance of its General Guide; these factions follow the guidance of the Supreme Leader. This makes the spiritual dimension an essential part of their movements.”
He compared their relationship with Iran not to a state alliance, but to something more organic: the product of decades of ideological formation and Revolutionary Guard training dating back to the 1990s.
He noted, pointedly, that these factions were present in Syria for years “not by decision of successive Iraqi governments, but from their own doctrinal convictions and their particular vision of their regional role”.
Two decision-makers inside one state
The Iraqi government's position has been clear, if not necessarily enforceable. In an extraordinary session of the National Security Council on Monday, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al-Sudani directed security agencies to “confront any action that threatens security and stability,” and stated that “no party or side" would be permitted to drag Iraq into regional conflicts”.
He reaffirmed that decisions on national security, peace, and military movements are exclusively the responsibility of the state through its constitutional institutions.
While the statement was firm, whether it can be translated into action is another matter. Political analyst Nizar Haider identified what he called the “chronic problem” in Iraq.
“The existence of two decisions within the state, an official decision represented by state institutions, and a parallel decision represented by the armed factions. This duality in decision-making centres places the country before serious challenges in times of regional crisis.”
The consequences are not abstract. “If the factions act recklessly and take actual steps to enter the war, Iraq will become a direct target for Israel and the United States,” Haider warned, noting that “part of the Israeli-American target bank already includes faction headquarters and sites inside Iraqi territory and some of these have already been struck.”
He was candid about the state’s limits, as the current government does not have many tools to shape or influence events. It is operating in a caretaker capacity with limited authority, in the face of a parliament unable to make decisive decisions about what is happening, which constrains the state's ability to impose its will.
A political future closing off
Kurdish-Iraqi strategic researcher Kazem Yawer offered a longer-term view, arguing that the squeeze on the factions had begun before this war even started.
“The United States, in the lead-up to the escalation, had sent clear messages inside Iraq - warning against including any armed faction with a political front or political organisation in the composition of the next Iraqi government,” he said.
“Red lines were drawn against the participation of factions or parties affiliated with them in political or administrative work, effectively closing off the political horizon before them.”
The war, in his assessment, has now pushed these factions back toward what they know. “The closure of doors to political and administrative participation drove them, in his estimation, to reconsider the option of returning to armed activity under any name, after they felt that the path of political action was no longer available to them.”
He noted that an American envoy visited Iraq and met with Nouri Al-Maliki just hours before the war broke out, underscoring that Washington's messaging extended beyond warnings.
It included “the removal of political figures on the grounds of having Iranian-influenced orientations or ties”. The implication is that the United States has been systematically narrowing the space available to pro-Iranian political actors, pushing them toward a binary: full alignment with the Iranian camp, or a different path altogether.
“If American policy tends toward isolating those merely suspected of political closeness to Iran,” Yawer observed, "it will be even stricter toward those who carry weapons or adopt a hostile discourse toward American forces or interests in Iraq.”
The factions' organic connection to Iran, he argued, makes them targets by definition as the conflict intensifies.
Official authority, armed autonomy
The hours that followed Kataib Hezbollah's warning that it would “soon begin attacking American bases in retaliation" produced their own answer of sorts. International Coalition forces intercepted a number of missiles and armed drones over Erbil, with no casualties reported.
The exchange was contained. Whether it stays that way depends on decisions being made far from Baghdad.
For Yawer, the fundamental question remains open. “Whether these factions will actually engage in the Iranian campaign against the United States or not, the answer will only become clear through field developments in the coming days.”
What is already clear is that Iraq enters this crisis as it has entered others: with a government that speaks with one voice, and an armed landscape that answers to another.
Montadhar Naser is an investigative journalist and political writer from Iraq. Follow him on X: @montadhar_naser
This article is published in collaboration with Egab
Edited by Charlie Hoyle