Why technocrats alone cannot fix Gaza's post-war politics

As the first phase of the ceasefire took effect on Monday, witnessing a prisoner exchange and partial Israeli withdrawals, negotiations for the second phase are inching forward, with questions about who will govern Gaza moving from theoretical to urgent.

US President Donald Trump's proposal for a technocratic government, staffed by Palestinian and international experts, whilst explicitly excluding Hamas and other factions, has gained traction amongst Western and Israeli policymakers.

Ahead of this week’s peace summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said that a 15-member committee of Palestinian technocrats, with no affiliation with any Palestinian factions and vetted by Israel, would govern day-to-day affairs in Gaza.

However, Palestinian analysts warn that these arrangements, divorced from internal political legitimacy, risk repeating past failures whilst potentially liquidating what remains of Palestinian national aspirations.

The debate also exposes deeper fractures in Palestinian political life at a moment when the international community shows unprecedented sympathy for Palestinian statehood. 

Popular mobilisations across Europe, shifting sentiment towards condemning Israeli actions, and growing recognition of Palestinian rights create what could be a pivotal opportunity.

But according to analyst Imad Abu Awad, whether Palestinians can capitalise on this depends on their ability to “forge internal unity,” which is precisely what has eluded them throughout the war.

The Palestinian Authority's limited options

"If the Palestinian Authority governs Gaza, it means the Palestinian cause remains in good shape," Abu Awad tells The New Arab. 

He argues that such governance would signal genuine political unity between the West Bank and Gaza, potentially enabling “state-building”. Yet he immediately qualifies this optimism by stressing that it assumes alignment with a comprehensive national vision. 

"The current situation shows division and fragmentation. If the [Palestinian] Authority decides today, under American and Israeli pressure, to go to Gaza, it won't be able to govern. The matter requires significant internal arrangements."

Analyst Ashraf Okka says the PA is determined to establish a presence in Gaza through a partnership with Egypt and international institutions, potentially under a ‘Board of Peace’, which Trump had initially suggested could be chaired by Tony Blair.

Within this framework, the PA seeks two main directions, he explains. First, continuing political movement at the international level to activate Palestinian statehood through the United Nations and gain international recognition. And secondly, attempting to govern Gaza to affirm the geographic unity of Palestine.

Yet Okka frames this within the stark realities facing Hamas.

"Hamas today in Gaza might be able to partially govern, but it cannot move forward," he argues. “International isolation would persist whilst Israel conducts repeated assassinations and incursions through aerial targeting or quick tank raids, similar to operations in the West Bank.”

Analyst Ismat Mansour reinforces concerns about the PA, describing an entity transformed into one “seeking survival” rather than achieving genuine national projects.

“Its priorities centre on avoiding confrontation with Israel and the United States,” he observes, undermining what remains of the Palestinian cause through measures like denying families their salaries and changing Palestinian curricula to fit more with Israel’s goals.

"There’s no way around it. The [Palestinian] Authority has lost all political vision," he tells The New Arab.

Hamas faces existential questions

Abu Awad insists that while Hamas may not be involved in post-war governance, it will not vanish from the political scene.

"The internal Palestinian situation needs all Palestinian forces," he explains. “Together, Hamas and Fatah constitute 90 per cent of Palestinian popular support, with recent elections demonstrating each movement's strength. Understanding each faction's actual weight requires new measurements, possibly through elections.”

Okka stresses the practical steps that Hamas could take, with the group having indicated it will step away from governance, at least for the years to come. 

"This requires changing its methodology and tools, even the people leading it. Perhaps it requires changing the name or creating a new party expressing Hamas's new policies." Such a transformation would represent seismic shifts in Palestinian politics, though whether Hamas possesses the capacity or willingness for such an evolution remains uncertain.

This critique extends to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which Abu Awad describes as having lost its prestige and strength. The organisation consists primarily of Fatah alongside minor factions reduced to quota arrangements, with its leadership unchanged for decades.

"The PLO needs to reform itself if it wants to restore its role, and must include Hamas and Islamic Jihad," he argues. "Without this, the organisation remains merely a slogan or empty house without real echo or power."

Why external solutions miss the mark

Trump's technocratic proposal draws profound scepticism from many Palestinian analysts. Abu Awad warns that its success would mean the liquidation of the Palestinian cause. 

"Technocrats care only about economic and administrative aspects, without looking at political dimensions like settlements and occupation. This plays into Israel’s vision rather than the prospect of Palestinian self-governance contributing to state-building," he argues.

Okka dismisses the concept more bluntly as "an Israeli, foreign, European innovation" which lacks the capacity for survival, unless backed by a political organisation capable of protecting it.

Palestinians need professional political governments able to advance their interests and make appropriate governance decisions, he insists, “not newcomers learning on the job simply because they hold expertise in particular fields”.

Both emphasise that technocracy from American and Israeli perspectives serves as a model for eliminating the Palestinian state. It might achieve economic stability, but not political stability. 

“Real stability requires national salvation emerging from a Palestinian national authority,” Abu Awad argues. "What's happening today seeks technocrats without national reference."

The challenges facing any Gaza administration are enormous. Restoring life across health, education, and social spheres requires massive external funding and the internal capacity for organisation and security provision.

Gaza will likely see chaos at clan and factional levels, plus social problems around property and inheritance after two years of immense pressure on Palestinian society.

Okka calls for new formulas for national unity, arguing that traditional approaches can no longer respond adequately. 

"We need a framework for managing differences and accepting different parties in each other so we can advance or re-advance, specifically in Gaza," he says. “Both Fatah and Hamas must recognise their new roles and accept existing differences between factions.”

Even if the situation stabilises in Gaza, he argues that widespread confrontation will continue in the occupied West Bank. 

“The [Palestinian] Authority's role should shift towards cohesion with the Palestinian people, choosing resistance whilst protecting citizens in villages and towns exposed to settler violations.”

International efforts, he adds, remain important but are limited to symbolic moves such as recognising Palestinian statehood whilst imposing harsh conditions on Palestinians themselves, Abu Awad acknowledges.

But any approach will remain ineffective as long as internal Palestinian divisions continue along their current trajectory.

“The fundamental question remains whether any governance model can succeed without genuine Palestinian consensus behind it,” Mansour says. “External proposals, however well-intentioned or expertly staffed, cannot substitute for internal political legitimacy.”

This article is published in collaboration with Egab