Why Sudan is launching an ICJ genocide case against the UAE

It has now been two years since Sudan’s brutal war erupted. Despite plunging the country into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, tangible international efforts to push for peace remain minimal.

Yet Sudan is hoping to shift the tide. In a significant move on 6 March, Khartoum initiated a legal case against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing the Gulf state of violating the Genocide Convention due to its alleged involvement in fuelling the conflict.

The case, heard at the ICJ in The Hague on 10 April, centres on accusations that Abu Dhabi backed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group that splintered from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in April 2023 - an event that ignited the devastating war.

The RSF and allied militias have since been accused of committing genocide, murder, rape, and widespread human rights abuses, particularly targeting the non-Arab Masalit tribe in West Darfur.

While concrete international action has yet to follow, the war has already killed tens of thousands of civilians and displaced around seven million. A staggering 26 million people now face acute food insecurity, while over 30 million require humanitarian assistance.

Sudan's legal arguments are grounded in the Genocide Convention, asserting that the UAE's actions constitute violations of Article I (obligation to prevent and punish genocide) and Article III (punishable acts such as complicity in genocide).

Sudan’s case argues that the UAE's support for the RSF, including supplying weapons and financial assistance, amounts to complicity in genocide.​

Additionally, the case aims to determine the extent of the UAE’s complicity in the RSF’s abuses. At the hearing, Khartoum requested provisional measures from the ICJ to compel the UAE to halt support for the RSF and prevent further harm to the Masalit people.

Increasing scrutiny on the UAE

Since the conflict began, reports have indicated that gold has been smuggled out of Darfur to Dubai, bypassing Sudan’s central authorities. The mines, controlled by the RSF and in which UAE-linked companies have reportedly invested, have enriched the RSF and its leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as ‘Hemedti’.

In the ICJ case, Sudan cited reports suggesting the UAE supplied weapons to the RSF via covert cargo flights through neighbouring Chad, many of which coincided with RSF escalations.

It has also pointed to reports of wounded RSF fighters receiving treatment at Zayed Military Hospital in Abu Dhabi, as well as ammunition and armoured vehicles manufactured in the UAE allegedly found in RSF hands.

For its part, the UAE described Sudan’s accusations as a "cynical publicity stunt,” while claiming it is committed to peace in Sudan.

The case marks a notable shift towards pursuing accountability through international law. Many observers have drawn parallels to South Africa’s case against Israel last year on the plausibility of genocide in Gaza.

Though Sudan’s case differs - centred on a state’s support for a third-party perpetrator - it reflects a growing trend of using international courts to apply pressure beyond direct belligerents.

Sudan’s complaint is certainly ambitious, and legal experts say it faces an uphill battle. Nonetheless, it has already unsettled the UAE. For its part, the Emirates have denounced the lawsuit, calling it politically motivated.

“The case puts pressure on the UAE, and there is the hope, at least in Europe, that governments would use the evidence in the case to reconsider how they engage with the UAE,” Andreas Krieg, Associate Professor at King’s College London, told The New Arab.

“However, the UAE has mobilised their networks in Washington and Europe, to ensure that its partners do not side with the Sudanese government,” Krieg added.

He warned that many policymakers, particularly in Europe, remain hesitant to publicly criticise the UAE, long considered a key Western economic and security partner in the region.

Legal challenges ahead

Despite growing evidence and the harrowing scale of atrocities in Sudan, significant legal obstacles lie ahead. For one, due to the nature of proceedings at the ICJ, any outcome is likely to take several years.

In previous ICJ cases such as Ukraine v. Russia and South Africa v. Israel, the Court has confirmed that Article IX of the Genocide Convention gives it broad powers to resolve disputes about how the treaty is interpreted or applied.

There is, however, a crucial hurdle in Sudan’s case. When the UAE joined the Genocide Convention in 2005, it submitted a reservation to Article IX.

Essentially, that means the UAE does not accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction to settle disputes under the Genocide Convention.

“A reservation means a state does not agree to be bound by that Article of the treaty. The UAE’s reservation says that it does not agree to have the ICJ judge a dispute under the Genocide Convention,” Melanie O’Brien, Associate Professor of International Law at the University of Western Australia and President of the International Association of Genocide Studies, told The New Arab.

“The Court has previously said that if a country has one of these reservations, the case cannot proceed, and I would assume they will make the same finding here.”

According to Michael Becker, Assistant Professor of International Human Rights Law at Trinity College Dublin, “international law has long reflected the view that permitting states to opt out of compulsory dispute settlement is a necessary cost to persuading states to join some treaties in the first place”.

“It strikes me as highly unlikely that Sudan will be able to persuade the ICJ to reverse itself on this issue,” he told The New Arab.

Additionally, Sudan’s case is unique in that it does not accuse the UAE of direct participation, but rather of aiding a third-party actor - the RSF. This creates fresh obstacles before the ICJ and raises issues that are relatively new within international legal discourse.

“Among other things, Sudan would likely need to prove that the UAE was providing support to the RSF with full knowledge of the group’s genocidal intent and that the UAE’s support actually enabled or facilitated genocidal acts,” Becker added.

Although Sudan may have strong political arguments, the legal pathway is likely blocked unless Sudan can establish jurisdiction through other legal mechanisms.

“The UN Security Council could exercise its responsibility to uphold international peace and security by taking action on the situation in Darfur, but this would require finding a means to bring the P-5 veto-wielding states together, which may be impossible,” said Becker.

Indeed, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council - the US, UK, France, China, and Russia - maintain a strong partnership with the UAE, and even degrees of dependency as a crucial geopolitical partner in the Middle East. This makes any attempt to pressure Abu Dhabi through the Council highly implausible.

As for Sudan’s warring parties, there is also the possibility of the International Criminal Court (ICC) stepping in.

“The International Criminal Court has been investigating violence in Sudan for years, and there are existing arrest warrants out for perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in the early 2000s,” said O’Brien.

“The Court could bring fresh arrest warrants against current perpetrators from the RSF, and then it would be up to Sudan to ensure those wanted by the ICC would be surrendered so they could be prosecuted.”

She added that a peacekeeping mission might be a useful option to stop the violence, depending on Sudan accepting this option.

Future pressure over the war

Many see Sudan’s move as a way to increase diplomatic and political pressure. Officials in Khartoum are almost certainly aware of the legal challenges, given the UAE’s reservation to Article IX, but are pressing ahead nonetheless.

At the very least, Sudan’s case has further put a spotlight on the UAE. Given the UAE’s sensitivity towards the case, it could increase caution over Abu Dhabi’s engagement with Sudan.

“In principle, this should place continuing pressure on the UAE to ensure that its conduct going forward is consistent with the representations it has made to the Court,” said Becker.

Nevertheless, there are signs of mounting scrutiny. A recent UN report, cited by The Guardian on 14 April, revealed that Emirati aircraft appeared to evade detection while flying into military bases in Chad - sites allegedly linked to arms transfers into Sudan.

That revelation, and the ICJ case, came just as the UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy hosted peace talks in London on 15 April, involving the UAE, as well as 19 other states.

Still, global responses remain constrained. European powers are reluctant to jeopardise ties with the UAE, and under the Trump administration, Washington has not addressed the ICJ case, indicating there would be ‘business as usual’ regardless of the case’s outcome.

Despite political obstacles, the UAE is still worried about being seen as a rogue state in the public sphere, especially given the media coverage over the ICJ case, said Andreas Krieg.

“The case is enough to be a stain on the UAE’s reputation,” Krieg added.

Looking ahead, limiting the UAE’s influence in Sudan might be challenging. Along with its economic and military ties with Western powers, Abu Dhabi has deeply embedded itself as a geopolitical actor in East Africa, largely via diplomatic, logistical, and military networks.

“The UAE can use many methods of statecraft in Sudan, and even if the case went against them or political pressure increased, they would still find ways to retain influence in Sudan,” Krieg added, noting that the UAE has done so in Yemen and Libya’s conflict as well.

For now, the Sudan case at the ICJ demonstrates how international legal institutions can be used not only to pursue justice but also to create political pressure.

Whether it will shift the balance in Sudan’s war - or alter how states like the UAE operate in foreign conflicts - remains to be seen.

Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a journalist and researcher who focuses on conflict, geopolitics, and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and North Africa.

Follow him on Twitter: @jfentonharvey