Why is Kosovo joining Gaza's International Stabilisation Force?

On 30 March, Kosovo’s government approved the deployment of Kosovo Security Forces personnel to Gaza as part of the proposed International Stabilisation Force (ISF) backed by the United States and envisioned under President Donald J. Trump’s peace plan.

Then on 7 September, Pristina formally signed an agreement to join the United Nations-mandated force, according to a statement posted on social media by the Board of Peace.

The decision places Kosovo at the centre of a wider international effort to establish security and support reconstruction in Gaza, while also raising questions about the mission’s role, its legal and political implications, and Kosovo’s ties with the United States and Israel.

Kosovo's strategic calculation

Kosovo’s decision to join the Board of Peace and the ISF underscores Pristina’s commitment to the United States. The small Muslim-majority Balkan state has long regarded Washington as its most important international partner.

This is particularly because of the US role in supporting Kosovo during and after the Kosovo War (1998–99) and in backing its independence, which the US under the George W. Bush administration formally recognised in February 2008 as one of the first countries in the world to do so.

But Dr Ramadan Ilazi, head of research at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS), said Kosovo’s decision should not be understood solely as an attempt to please Washington.

He described the motivation as a combination of principle, pragmatism, and strategic interest, arguing that Kosovo also wants to demonstrate that it can contribute to international security after more than two decades as a recipient of international assistance.

“There is now a strong desire to demonstrate that it can also be a contributor. Kosovo remains grateful for the international engagement that helped end the war in 1999, supported post-war reconstruction, and continues to provide security through KFOR. Participating in the ISF is therefore also a way of expressing solidarity and giving something back,” Dr Ilazi told The New Arab.

Lily Lynch, editor-in-chief of the Balkanist Magazine, holds that participating in Trump’s initiative sends a message that Kosovo’s relationship with the United States is intended to remain strong regardless of which political party controls the White House.

This is quite significant given concerns in Kosovo that a Trump administration could potentially be more accommodating toward Serbia.

“Kosovo decided to join the Board of Peace and [ISF] as a demonstration of its fidelity to the United States. The decision indicates that regardless of who is in the White House, Kosovo's commitment to its relationship with the United States is ironclad,” she told The New Arab.

“Some foreign policy commentators see Kosovo's existence as an independent state as a product of Clintonite foreign policy and liberal internationalism; there was concern among some in Kosovo that a Trump presidency would give Serbia an advantage,” added Lynch.

“But participation in the Board of Peace and ISF suggests that Kosovo wants to make clear that its commitment to a strong relationship with America transcends party politics.”

The Kosovo-Gaza comparison and its limits

Prime Minister Albin Kurti has framed the decision through Kosovo’s own experience with international peacekeeping. In announcing the government’s support for the deployment, Kurti pointed to the fact that Kosovo itself has benefited from international forces since 1999.

The analogy is also linked to the continued presence of NATO’s KFOR mission, which has provided security in Kosovo for more than two-and-a-half decades.

Lynch sees this as a deliberate attempt by Kurti to explain why Kosovo should now contribute to an international mission elsewhere, based on the argument that international forces helped provide security in Kosovo, and therefore Kosovo can now use its own experience and capabilities to assist another population.

Kosovo’s Security Forces have developed expertise in areas including search-and-rescue operations and demining, which policymakers in Pristina say could be relevant to the Gaza mission.

But the comparison between Kosovo and Gaza is also one of the most contested aspects of the decision because the circumstances surrounding NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and the proposed Gaza mission differ in fundamental ways.

In Kosovo, international intervention followed a war between Serbian forces and the Kosovo Albanian population and ultimately preceded Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. Questions remain over whether Kosovo’s experience can straightforwardly serve as a model for the Gaza initiative. This distinction is important because Kurti’s comparison is not simply historical. It is also political.

Jelena Novakov, a Belgrade-based geopolitical analyst who writes for Kosovo Online, said the comparison is understandable given Kosovo’s own experience of conflict and international protection, but argued that it also contains a significant contradiction.

“For a young country that is still struggling with international recognition and, in a way, remains a recipient of international assistance through KFOR, this represents a significant demonstration of improved stability, even if largely symbolic,” she told The New Arab.

“What is debatable is the decision to participate in an initiative launched by the country that is largely responsible for the devastation in Gaza, after Kosovo itself experienced aggression,” Novakov added.

Dr Ilazi noted that Kosovo’s experience could provide a point of reference but cautioned against treating it as a model for Gaza.

“Kosovo and Gaza have different histories and political circumstances. Our experience cannot tell Palestinians what their future should look like. It can, however, remind us that people need both physical security and a say over how they are governed,” he said.

He also pointed to Kosovo’s own experience with international administration, arguing that this provided another lesson that could be relevant to the Gaza mission.

“We also know the frustrations of international administration, as we had our own share of that with [the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)], and these include decisions made far from the people affected, unclear accountability, and arrangements described as temporary that become very difficult to change. That experience is worth sharing too,” Dr Ilazi said.

Kurti appears to be carefully framing his message to reassure Kosovar Albanians who may be uneasy about Kosovo’s involvement in Trump’s Gaza initiative. With 4,600 KFOR troops stationed in Kosovo, at least as of earlier this year, the southeastern European country continues to depend on international peacekeeping troops.

 “Kurti is trying to say, ‘international peacekeeping troops have helped keep us safe, so now we can use our own unique expertise to help others.’ Kurti is also undoubtedly trying to communicate Kosovo’s unique value to Trump’s putative peace effort. Of course, all of this would be far more meaningful if Trump’s plan for Gaza actually benefited the people of Gaza the way NATO helped Kosovar Albanians,” Lynch explained to The New Arab.

"I would say this is the main problem with Kurti's framing: He’s right that international forces helped the [Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)] force Serbian troops out of Kosovo in 1999. This was a prerequisite for Kosovo’s eventual declaration of independence in 2008. That’s the difference here,” she noted.

“By Kurti’s own analogy, what’s happening with Trump's Gaza peace plan is much more akin to what would have happened in 1999 if NATO troops had helped Serbia retain control of Kosovo and had helped Serbian forces keep Albanians in submission.”

By invoking Kosovo’s experience with international protection, the country’s prime minister is presenting participation in the ISF as an extension of a principle that Kosovars know personally, which is the idea that international forces can provide security to a population emerging from conflict.

Whether that principle applies to Gaza, however, remains a matter of significant disagreement.

Between Palestinian sympathy and strategic necessity

The decision is also likely to be viewed through the lens of Kosovo’s domestic politics. With many citizens of Kosovo sympathetic to Palestinians, there is tension between public sentiment and Pristina’s strategic interests.

Kosovars who oppose Trump’s Gaza plan or support the Palestinian cause may nevertheless view participation as a necessary cost of maintaining the United States as Kosovo’s closest ally, which can be understood as a limitation faced by a small state.

Novakov said, however, that the issue has so far generated little sustained public debate in Kosovo. She attributed this partly to the country’s wider political and economic problems, including prolonged political instability, inflation, stalled negotiations with Belgrade and the EU, deteriorating relations with Washington, and the legal proceedings involving former KLA leaders.

“There is currently no large-scale public conversation about this issue in Kosovo,” Novakov told The New Arab. “There is support for Palestine among Kosovars, but the government’s alignment with the US is rarely raised as one of the main issues during demonstrations.”

Dr Ilazi cautioned against assuming that political support for the deployment necessarily translates into broad public support for every aspect of the mission. Although he stated that the parliament’s 89-0 vote on 17 April to approve the government’s earlier decision to deploy Kosovo’s forces to the ISF “shows broad political support for participation,” Dr Ilazi stressed that it does “not tell us how the public will respond to every task the mission might undertake, and I would avoid claiming a public majority without reliable polling.”

As he explained, much will depend on what people see unfolding in Gaza.

“Clearing unexploded ordnance, helping aid reach families and making neighbourhoods safer are contributions the government can explain clearly. Public confidence would be harder to sustain if Kosovo’s soldiers became associated with restricting Palestinian movement or protecting arrangements that leave people displaced,” Dr Ilazi told The New Arab.

Kosovo has relatively little ability to influence major international conflicts and may therefore prioritise maintaining relationships with powerful allies, chiefly Washington. The result is a complicated political position in which criticism of the Gaza policy can coexist with acceptance of Kosovo’s participation, according to Lynch.

“The majority of Albanians are sympathetic to Palestinians, though there are some very vocal Zionist Albanians as well. But even those who support Palestine and deplore Trump’s Gaza plan are likely to accept the Kosovo government's decision to participate as a necessary cost of keeping America as their closest ally. The prevailing thought in Kosovo is ‘we’re a small country, there’s not much we can do to shape major world events and distant conflicts, so we will accept this arrangement because this is what our closest ally wants,’” she told The New Arab.

For Novakov, the calculation is ultimately rooted in Kosovo’s continuing reliance on international support. Around 100 countries have yet to recognise Kosovo’s independence, including five European Union members (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain), while Russia and China remain opposed to its statehood.

With Brussels’ focus increasingly shifting towards Ukraine, she argues, maintaining a close relationship with Washington remains particularly important for Pristina.

Questions over responsibility and accountability

Beyond public opinion, the deployment raises questions about legal and reputational responsibility. There are valid concerns to raise about the possibility that Kosovo’s involvement could expose its personnel or government to scrutiny if the wider operation were associated with forced displacement, the consolidation of Israeli control over Gaza, or other conduct that violates international law.

Lynch argues that these concerns deserve particular attention because of Kosovo’s own experience with international justice and accountability. The recent conviction and 25-year sentence of former Kosovo political and military leader Hashim Thaçi on war crimes charges has already placed questions of wartime responsibility at the centre of public debate.

Against that background, participation in a controversial international operation could create additional scrutiny if Kosovar personnel became associated with actions later determined to be unlawful.

Dr Ilazi distinguished between the legal and reputational risks Kosovo could face.

“I would also separate legal responsibility from reputational damage. Establishing legal responsibility requires evidence about particular actions and circumstances. Public trust can be lost much earlier if a mission is seen as facilitating abuse or denying Palestinians control over their future,” he told The New Arab.

He also argued that Kosovo should establish clear limits on what its personnel can be asked to do.

“Those restrictions need to shape operational planning, with legal review, reporting to the Assembly and a credible option to suspend or withdraw the contingent. We should not leave individual soldiers to resolve political ambiguities that their government failed to address,” commented Dr Ilazi, who also argued that the perspectives of Palestinians themselves should receive greater attention in discussions about the force.

“One issue that deserves more attention is how Palestinians themselves view the force. Most discussions focus on Washington’s intentions and the calculations of contributing countries. Yet the people expected to live alongside this mission need meaningful influence over the arrangements it supports. From Kosovo’s experience, we should understand how much that matters,” he argued.

A new test for Kosovo's foreign policy

Ultimately, Kosovo’s decision to participate in the Gaza stabilisation effort highlights the difficult choices facing a small state whose security and international standing have been closely connected to the United States for many years.

For Kurti’s government, participation offers an opportunity to demonstrate continued commitment to Washington and to portray Kosovo as a country capable of contributing to international security rather than simply receiving international assistance.

At the same time, the decision places Kosovo between competing pressures, including domestic sympathy for Palestinians, its strategic partnership with the United States, questions about the nature of the Gaza mission, and concerns about legal and reputational consequences.

As the deployment moves forward, the central question will be whether Kosovo can maintain its strong relationship with Washington while avoiding becoming entangled in the contentious political and legal disputes surrounding Gaza.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics. 

Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero

Edited by Charlie Hoyle