Damascus, Syria - The world watched with a mixture of disbelief and caution as US President Donald Trump stood beside Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, in Riyadh on 13 May and announced the lifting of all US sanctions on Syria.
It was the kind of geopolitical move that could only happen in a transactional world order, where former enemies are rebranded as partners and pariah states are brought back into the fold, not for democratic reform, but for calculated strategic returns.
Frances Tammer, a former UK Ministry of Defence official and professor of security studies, called the moment “of historic political, economic, and international significance”.
She told The New Arab that Trump had provided Sharaa, once the leader of a group with ties to al-Qaeda, with “legitimacy of the highest order,” while boosting Saudi Arabia’s role in shaping US defence and foreign policy.
But Tammer also cautioned that the timeline for lifting sanctions remains unclear, adding that while the move may have a domino effect on other international actors, its success hinges on what Trump gets in return.
“What is Trump looking for in his transactional approach? Maybe something along the lines of the Ukraine critical minerals deal - but this time in the development of Syria’s oil and gas sector,” she remarked.
More broadly, she suggested that normalising Syria’s relations with Israel appeared to be part of the bargain, describing it as “likely to be straightforward,” though fraught with longer-term regional implications.
While the diplomatic fanfare dominated headlines, Syria’s real test lies elsewhere: in the shattered desert landscapes and overcrowded detention camps where the Islamic State (IS), though weakened, still lurks in the shadows.
The question haunting both Damascus and Washington is whether this new political gamble will help finish off IS - or embolden it to rise again.
A fragile decline, but not defeat
Since the fall of Bashar Al-Assad in December 2024, Syria has entered a fragile transition. Assad’s removal fractured the network of Syrian, Iranian, and Russian forces that had for years propped up the regime. But the vacuum they left behind did not immediately translate into IS gains.
By the end of 2024, IS had been conducting an average of 59 attacks per month. Yet since the regime’s collapse, those attacks have dropped by 80%, Tammer confirmed. The reasons remain unclear. “It is possible that the ISIS leadership is reassessing the changing political and military landscape,” she said, though she warned this is likely temporary.
Samy Akil, a MENA political analyst, agrees. “The Assad regime manipulated the ISIS threat for its own survival,” he argues. “It allowed ISIS to expand in certain areas to discredit the opposition and justify its own brutality. With Assad gone, that strategy collapsed - but ISIS hasn’t disappeared. It’s waiting for instability to return.”
The respite didn’t last long. In late April 2025, five Kurdish fighters were killed in Deir ez-Zour, in what SDF spokesperson Farhad Shami described as “one of the deadliest” attacks against the group in recent months.
Tammer noted that Iran’s precipitous withdrawal from military bases near IS-controlled areas may have provided the group with new weapons stockpiles, further enhancing its capacity to regroup. Then, on 18 May, IS targeted a security post in the eastern town of Mayadin with a car bomb, killing five.
Akil warns that any drop in attacks should not be misread as a victory. “ISIS has adapted before,” he said. “It thrives in political vacuums like the one Syria faces now.”
The Kurdish dilemma
One of the most significant political developments came in March 2025, when the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) signed an agreement to integrate into Syria’s national army. While hailed by some as a breakthrough for unity, Tammer described the deal as far from secure.
“The SDF is not just a military organisation, but the embodiment of the aspirations of the Kurdish people,” she explained. The agreement promised the transfer of control of all civilian and military institutions in the northeast to the Syrian administration, but implementation is not guaranteed by the end of 2025.
Meghan Bodette, a specialist in Kurdish politics and counterterrorism, underscores the risks.
“The SDF spent years building autonomous governance structures rooted in secularism and women’s rights,” she says. “Integrating into a central army dominated by former Islamist factions threatens those achievements.”
Reports from Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh districts suggest integration is already fraying. Arab units have reportedly refused to take orders from Kurdish commanders, while pro-Turkish factions have been redeployed to sensitive border areas.
“What happens there will signal whether this agreement is genuine or just another power grab,” Bodette warns.
Israel, Turkey, and regional fault lines
Tammer also pointed to Israel’s mixed response. The fall of Assad, combined with the withdrawal of Hezbollah and Iranian forces, had initially presented Israel with a strategic opportunity to reset relations with Syria. However, this optimism quickly gave way to caution.
Israeli airstrikes have continued, targeting Iranian and Hezbollah weapons stockpiles to prevent them from falling into the hands of former HTS affiliates who could turn their sights on Israel. Israel’s incursion into the Golan Heights and southern Syria - purportedly in support of the Druze minority - further complicated matters.
“Given Israeli assumptions about Hamas were so disastrously wrong, the Netanyahu government is showing it is risk-averse and wants to prevent extremist forces from threatening Israeli sovereign territory,” Tammer noted. She added that while deconfliction talks have occurred between Turkey and Israel, the potential for escalation remains.
Meanwhile, Iraq has taken a pragmatic stance toward the Sharaa administration, seeking to avoid the sectarian mistakes that fuelled past conflicts. For Baghdad, securing its border and preventing IS cross-border sanctuaries remains the top priority, even as Damascus focuses more on internal stability
US commitment: Will it last?
Despite Trump’s high-profile engagement, the long-term US role in Syria remains uncertain. With 2,000 US troops still stationed in northeastern Syria, Tammer flagged unconfirmed reports that the Pentagon may halve the deployment as part of a broader review of overseas operations.
“Ensuring there are no cross-border safe havens for ISIS can only be assured if there is a simultaneous containment effort spanning both Syria and Iraq,” Tammer stressed.
Yet the future of US military and intelligence cooperation with the Sharaa administration is unclear. While Washington encouraged the SDF to integrate with Damascus, it is not guaranteed that US aerial and intelligence support will continue at the same levels.
Bodette adds that justice for IS’s victims remains absent. “ISIS won’t be defeated unless its crimes are prosecuted and its ideology discredited,” she says. “So far, that’s not happening.”
Tammer noted that sanctions relief - particularly the rescinding of the Caesar Act, which targeted Assad-era economic partners - could trigger other countries to follow suit, providing much-needed investment.
But experts warn that this must come with accountability mechanisms, or risk empowering the same structures that fuelled Syria’s collapse.
The clock is ticking
For now, Syria’s future hangs in the balance. The lifting of sanctions may open doors to foreign investment and political recognition, but without genuine reform and inclusive governance, the roots of extremism - sectarianism, injustice, and disenfranchisement - will remain fertile ground for IS.
Tammer argues that the Sharaa administration’s window of opportunity is narrow. “The strategic key to undermining ISIS retention and future recruitment lies in the ability and rapidity of the Sharaa administration to appeal to those feeling disenfranchised politically, economically, and in religious terms,” she said.
“Countering ISIS’ ideology in the areas where it operates is essential.”
As the dust settles from the Riyadh summit, the world is left asking whether Trump’s gamble will stabilise Syria or backfire. If the political process stalls, if militias splinter, or if US forces pull out prematurely, IS will seize the opportunity to return.
Robert Bociaga is a journalist and photographer focusing on international relations and human rights
Follow him on X: @BociagaRobert