Why the Iran-Israel war was a delicate tightrope walk for Russia

On 22 June, President Donald Trump authorised strikes against Iran’s Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan nuclear facilities.

While many of the US’s European allies offered conditional support for Trump’s actions and some Middle East regional powers released cautious statements of concern, Russia stridently opposed them.

The Russian Foreign Ministry condemned the US strikes as “irresponsible” and contended that they flagrantly violated international law. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev expressed confidence that the US attacks would not curtail Iran’s nuclear program and claimed that external powers were prepared to arm Iran with nuclear warheads. 

The Kremlin’s solidarity with Tehran reflects the strength of the Russia-Iran strategic partnership and Moscow’s efforts to capitalise on eroding US soft power in the Middle East.

Despite this solidarity, during hostilities, Russia did not provide military support to help Iran resist Israeli and US strikes. Russia’s primary theatre of intervention was diplomatic as it tried to present itself as an arbiter that could de-escalate hostilities with Iran.

Since the ceasefire was announced by Trump on Tuesday, Moscow has said it is in favour of "peace", but Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov cautioned against making any “hasty conclusions” given reports of exchanges of fire after it came into effect.

Russia's solidarity with Iran

Since the inception of Israel’s 'Operation Rising Lion' strikes on Iranian military facilities on 13 June, Russian officials have presented two arguments in support of Iran. The first argument rebutted Trump’s contentions about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

During his 21 June interview with Sky News Arabia, Russian President Vladimir Putin defended Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy development and denied that Iran was seeking to build nuclear weapons.

Putin substantiated these claims by highlighting International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) statements rebutting Iran’s nuclear ambitions and hailing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s fatwa against Iranian nuclear weapons production.

The Russian Foreign Ministry went further by specifically endorsing Iran’s right to operate the nuclear facilities that were under Israeli bombardment.

The second argument was that military strikes on nuclear infrastructure posed grave security risks. Rosatom CEO Alexey Likachev recently warned that an attack on Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant would be “beyond evil” and create an environmental catastrophe comparable to the Chernobyl disaster of 1986.

The Russian Foreign Ministry warned that Israel was directly threatening Russian technicians in Bushehr and argued that its actions would lead to a “nuclear catastrophe” that would also be detrimental to Israel’s security.

The third argument was that the US strikes on Iran would increase nuclear proliferation risks. Vice-Speaker of the Federation Council Konstantin Kosachev argued that Libya, Iraq, and Iran were attacked as they lacked nuclear weapons, while India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel are immune from military assaults.

Putin has framed the US strikes on Iran as a product of an unstable international system, and nuclear proliferation risks compound that belief.

As Russia has allegedly militarised the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, violated Ukraine’s sovereignty, and rhetorically supported North Korea’s nuclear program, many international observers see double standards in these narratives.

Nonetheless, they resonate strongly within the Russian expert community and are being paired with additional practical and ideational arguments.

Dmitry Suslov, the Deputy Director of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, told The New Arab that this solidarity stems from the contrast between Israel’s critical stance and Iran’s supportive attitude towards Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Iran has offered military support for Russia’s “special military operation”, while Moscow also wants to align with the “world majority” in the Global South that is against Israel’s conduct.

Russian military assistance to Iran

Despite these expressions of solidarity, Russia did not provide military assistance to Iran and would have been unlikely to do so if the conflict continued.

Russia’s restraint can be explained by its threat assessments, limited material capabilities, and foreign policy balancing strategies.

The collapse of the Iranian regime would have been a major blow to Russia’s geopolitical standing in the Middle East and would have had ripple effects for Russia’s internal stability.

During the St. Petersburg Economic Forum last week, former Austrian Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl’s parallels between Europe’s alleged regime change ambitions in Russia and Israel’s actions against Iran received widespread Russian media coverage. 

Nevertheless, there was little expectation in Moscow that the US or Israel were ready for a 2003 Iraq war-style regime change mission. Instead, Russian state media outlets pushed comparisons between the US strikes on Iran and Trump’s largely symbolic 2017 and 2018 attacks on Syria’s chemical weapons program.

As Russia has deep networks within the Iranian foreign policy establishment and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), only a currently implausible popular revolution could undermine its influence in Iran.

As Russia remains overwhelmingly focused on its offensive operations in Ukraine, it cannot afford to provide missiles or air defence cover to Iran. Putin’s recent statements emphasised that the January 2025 Russia-Iran strategic partnership agreement lacks a mutual defence clause and noted that Iran had not requested Russian air defence assistance.

As IRGC Aerospace Forces deputy for Operations Davood Sheikhian argued in November 2024 that Iran’s domestic air defences were superior to the S-400s, Putin’s latter statement has some empirical validity.

Nevertheless, Ukraine’s successful Operation Spiderweb attack on Russia’s strategic bombers underscores the Russian military’s need to strengthen air defence capabilities at home and a lack of capacity to export them to foreign theatres.

Even though the US-Russia negotiations on ending the Ukraine War have stalled, the Kremlin did not want to be too aggressive in countering US military actions against Iran.

Dmitry Suslov told The New Arab that Russia still wants to maintain constructive relations with the Trump administration and does not want to antagonise Israel to the point that it is seen as a US adversary in the Middle East.

If Iran had blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, Russia would have wanted to avoid antagonising its OPEC+ partners Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which provide a critical outlet for the Russian economy to the global financial system.

Russia's diplomatic arbitration

Since 13 June, Russia has framed itself as an impartial broker that can de-escalate tensions in the Middle East. Within hours of the first Israeli strikes, Putin called Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On 23 June, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi travelled to Moscow to discuss regional developments with Putin.

Despite the lack of concrete interest in Russian mediation from the warring parties and Trump’s “Vladimir, let’s mediate Russia first, you can worry about this later” put-down, Russia continued to position itself as a voice of calm in the storm. During Araghchi’s visit to Moscow, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov again emphasised Russia’s interest in mediation.

But Russia’s mediation ambitions faced massive hurdles. The marked deterioration of Russia-Israel relations since the Gaza war’s inception in October 2023 has reduced Putin’s ability to influence Netanyahu’s calculus.

Even though Russia-Iran relations have significantly strengthened during the same time horizon, Putin’s mediation offer was greeted with mixed reactions.

Some Iranian experts were optimistic that Russia’s arbitration offers had substantive foundations. Shuaib Bahman, a Tehran-based expert on Russian foreign policy, told The New Arab, “In my opinion, Russia can play the role of a mediator” and cited Russia’s experience regulating Israel-Iran tensions in Syria as a positive precedent.

Other experts were more sceptical of Putin’s intentions towards the Israel-Iran conflict. A prominent Tehran-based academic who focuses on Russia and Eurasia told The New Arab that he didn’t consider a big role for Russia.

“Firstly, we don’t need them and secondly, they usually do not give us what we want. Because they want to please Israel and the Russian Jewish community in Russia and Israel”.

This conspiratorial rhetoric builds on Iran’s long-standing discontent with the limitations of Russian solidarity. Russia’s long-standing refusal to encourage Syria to use its maximum air defence capabilities against Israel, and solidarity with the UAE on the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa Islands, which are claimed by Iran, are potent past grievances.

Before the ceasefire announcement, Russia had been trying to thread a delicate needle between showing solidarity with Tehran and framing itself as an effective mediator.

While the worst-case scenario of the Iranian regime’s implosion is still a distant prospect, Russia faces an uphill struggle to rebuild its great power status in the Middle East.

Dr Samuel Ramani is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank and the CEO of Pangea Geopolitical Risk. Samuel is the author of two recent books on Russian foreign policy: Russia in Africa and Putin's War on Ukraine, and is a regular commentator on Middle East affairs for the BBC, Sky News, Al Jazeera, and CNN International

Follow him on Twitter: @SamRamani2